Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment PDF
Preview Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
HeuristicsandBiases Is our case strong enough to go to trial? Will interest rates go up? CanItrustthisperson?Suchquestions–andthejudgmentsrequired toanswerthem–arewovenintothefabricofeverydayexperience. This book examines how people make such judgments. The study ofhumanjudgmentwastransformedinthe1970s,whenKahneman and Tversky introduced their “heuristics and biases” approach and challenged the dominance of strictly rational models. Their work highlighted the reflexive mental operations used to make complex problemsmanageable,andilluminatedhowthesameprocessescan lead both to accurate and to dangerously flawed judgments. The heuristics and biases framework generated a torrent of influential research in psychology – research that reverberated widely and affectedscholarshipineconomics,law,medicine,management,and political science. This book compiles the most influential research in the heuristic and biases tradition since the initial collection of 1982(byKahneman,Slovic,andTversky).Thevariouscontributions developandcriticallyanalyzetheinitialworkonheuristicsandbiases, supplementtheseinitialstatementswithemergingtheoryandempi- rical findings, and extend the reach of the framework to new real- worldapplications. Thomas Gilovich is Professor of Psychology at Cornell University and a member of the Cornell Center for Behavioral Economics and DecisionResearch. DaleGriffinisAssociateProfessorattheGraduateSchoolofBusiness, StanfordUniversity. Daniel Kahneman is Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs,PrincetonUniversity. HEURISTICS AND BIASES The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment Editedby THOMAS GILOVICH CornellUniversity DALE GRIFFIN StanfordUniversity DANIEL KAHNEMAN PrincetonUniversity cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City Cambridge University Press Th e Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 8ru, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521792608 © Cambridge University Press 2002 Th is publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2002 Reprinted 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Heuristics and biases : the psychology of intuitive judgment / edited by Th omas Gilovitch, Dale Griffi n, Daniel Kahneman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-521-79260-6 – isbn 0-521-79679-2 (pbk.) 1.Judgment. 2. Reasoning (Psychology). 3. Critical thinking. I. Gilovitch, Th omas. II. Griffi n, Dale. III. Kahneman, Daniel, 1934– BF447.H48 2002 153.4 – dc21 2001037860 isbn 978-0-521-79260-8 Hardback isbn 978-0-521-79679-8 Paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Information regarding prices, travel timetables, and other factual information given in this work is correct at the time of fi rst printing but Cambridge University Press does not guarantee the accuracy of such information thereafter. TothememoryofAmosTversky Contents ListofContributors pagexi Preface xv Introduction–HeuristicsandBiases:ThenandNow 1 ThomasGilovichandDaleGriffin PART ONE.THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS A. RepresentativenessandAvailability 1 ExtensionalversusIntuitiveReasoning:TheConjunction FallacyinProbabilityJudgment 19 AmosTverskyandDanielKahneman 2 RepresentativenessRevisited:AttributeSubstitution inIntuitiveJudgment 49 DanielKahnemanandShaneFrederick 3 HowAlikeIsIt?versusHowLikelyIsIt?:ADisjunction FallacyinProbabilityJudgments 82 MayaBar-HillelandEfratNeter 4 ImaginingCanHeightenorLowerthePerceived LikelihoodofContractingaDisease:TheMediating EffectofEaseofImagery 98 StevenJ.Sherman,RobertB.Cialdini,Donna F. Schwartzman, andKimD.Reynolds 5 TheAvailabilityHeuristicRevisited:EaseofRecall andContentofRecallasDistinctSources ofInformation 103 NorbertSchwarzandLeighAnnVaughn B. Anchoring,Contamination,andCompatibility 6 IncorporatingtheIrrelevant:AnchorsinJudgments ofBeliefandValue 120 GretchenB.ChapmanandEricJ.Johnson vii viii Contents 7 PuttingAdjustmentBackintheAnchoringand AdjustmentHeuristic 139 NicholasEpleyandThomasGilovich 8 Self-AnchoringinConversation:WhyLanguage UsersDoNotDoWhatThey“Should” 150 BoazKeysarandDaleJ.Barr 9 InferentialCorrection 167 DanielT.Gilbert 10 MentalContaminationandtheDebiasingProblem 185 TimothyD.Wilson,DavidB.Centerbar,andNancyBrekke 11 SympatheticMagicalThinking:TheContagion andSimilarity“Heuristics” 201 PaulRozinandCarolNemeroff 12 CompatibilityEffectsinJudgmentandChoice 217 PaulSlovic,DaleGriffin,andAmosTversky C. Forecasting,Confidence,andCalibration 13 TheWeighingofEvidenceandtheDeterminants ofConfidence 230 DaleGriffinandAmosTversky 14 InsidethePlanningFallacy:TheCausesandConsequences ofOptimisticTimePredictions 250 RogerBuehler,DaleGriffin,andMichaelRoss 15 ProbabilityJudgmentacrossCultures 271 J.FrankYates,Ju-WheiLee,WinstonR.Sieck,IncheolChoi, andPaulC.Price 16 DurabilityBiasinAffectiveForecasting 292 DanielT.Gilbert,ElizabethC.Pinel,TimothyD.Wilson, StephenJ.Blumberg,andThaliaP.Wheatley D. Optimism 17 ResistanceofPersonalRiskPerceptions toDebiasingInterventions 313 NeilD.WeinsteinandWilliamM.Klein 18 AmbiguityandSelf-Evaluation:TheRoleof IdiosyncraticTraitDefinitionsinSelf-Serving AssessmentsofAbility 324 DavidDunning,JudithA.Meyerowitz,andAmyD.Holzberg 19 WhenPredictionsFail:TheDilemma ofUnrealisticOptimism 334 DavidA.ArmorandShelleyE.Taylor
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