Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace

352 Pages·1999·1 MB·English

by  Kenneth W Stein

HEROIC
DIPLOMACY

HEROIC
D I P L O M AC Y
SADAT, KISSINGER,
CARTER, BEGIN,
AND THE QUEST FOR
ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE

KENNETH W.STEIN

ROUTLEDGE
NEW YORK LONDON
Published in 1999 by
Routledge
29 West 35th Street
New York, NY 10001

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003.

Published in Great Britain by
Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane
London EC4P 4EE

Copyright © 1999 by Routledge
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA
Stein, Kenneth W., 1946–
Heroic diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the quest
for Arab-Israeli peace/Kenneth W.Stein.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-415-92155-4 (pbk.).—ISBN 0-415-92154-6 (cloth)
1. Arab-Israeli conflict—1973–1993. 2. Diplomatic negotiations
in international disputes. 3. Arab countries—Foreign relations—Israel.
4. Israel—Foreign relations—Arab countries. 5. Israel-Arab war,
1973—Peace. 6. Arab-Israeli conflict—1993—Peace. I. Title.
DS119.7.S6749 1999
956.04–dc21 98–49359
CIP
ISBN 0-203-90522-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-90615-2 (Adobe eReader Format)
ISBN 0-415-92155-4 (Print Edition)
Dedicated to my parents,
Tillie and Max Stein,
and
my students

CONTENTS

Preface
ix
Acknowledgments
xiii
CHAPTER 1
The Key Players in Arab-Israeli Diplomacy
1973–1978
1
CHAPTER 2
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
1947–1973
46
CHAPTER 3
The October 1973 War
74
CHAPTER 4
From War to Diplomacy
The Kilometer 101 Talks
97
vii
Contents
CHAPTER 5
The 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference
and the Buildup to Sinai I
117
CHAPTER 6
The Syrian-Israeli Agreement, Sinai I and II,
and Defining a Comprehensive Peace
1974–1977
146
CHAPTER 7
Unintended Consequences
The 1977 Road to Geneva Ends in Jerusalem
187
CHAPTER 8
From Jerusalem to Oslo and Beyond
1978–1998
229
Appendix
269
Notes
275
Works Cited and Suggested Reading
313
Index
321

viii
PREFACE

AFTER ISRAEL’S establishment in May 1948, the Arab world refused to
make peace with the new Jewish state. Though Arab states signed armistice
agreements with Israel in 1949, a technical state of war remained in effect. Attempts
to sign formal peace agreements between Israel and Jordan, and Israel and Syria
continually failed, and no Palestinian Arab-Israeli accommodation was seriously
considered. The states were locked into a catch-22 situation: Israel would not allow
Palestinian refugees to return to the new Jewish state’s territory until Arab states
recognized it diplomatically; Arab states would not recognize Israel until Israel
allowed Palestinians, displaced by Israel’s creation, to return to their land within the
new state. The Arab world saw Israel as an extension of Western imperial presence
in the Middle East. It was also a blight on the Arab character and required removal.
Egyptian President Nasser cemented an Arab commitment, which endured for two
decades, to seek Israel’s destruction. Under pressure to survive in this hostile
environment, Israel developed a secure economy, integrated millions of new
immigrants, and built an army supported by weapons capable of protecting its
national security. For their part, many Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, and Iraq,
responded by looking to the Soviet Union for equivalent military hardware. In this
manner the cold war further complicated the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In June 1967, mounting tension exploded into war. Without warning, Israel
premptively attacked Syria and Egypt, and then Jordan. Israel’s lightening military
victories solidified an Arab fear: the unlikelihood of Israel’s destruction. The Arab
world responded: “No peace, no recognition, no negotiations with Israel.” But the
international community, working with the United Nations, set forth principles
that could govern eventual negotiations. Security Council Resolution 242 of
November 1967 became a framework for future negotiations. It called for the
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states in the region and a
solution to the growing refugee problem, and stated an admissibility of the
acquisition of territory through war. Along with this general outline, several
negotiating mechanisms were tried, among them third-party mediation, great-
power talks, private diplomacy, and secret meetings. As Egypt’s new president in
1970, Anwar Sadat sought to alter Nasser s priorities and change Egypt’s political
ix