Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and - CiteSeer

12 Pages·2003·0.17 MB·English

TheJournalofRiskandUncertainty,26:1;5–16,2003
(cid:1)c 2003KluwerAcademicPublishers.ManufacturedinTheNetherlands.
Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim:
Altruism and Identifiability
DEBORAHA.SMALL∗ [email protected]
GEORGELOEWENSTEIN
DepartmentofSocialandDecisionSciences,CarnegieMellonUniversity,Pittsburgh,PA,15213,USA
Abstract
Althoughithasbeenclaimedthatpeoplecaremoreaboutidentifiablethanstatisticalvictims,demonstratingthis
“identifiablevictimeffect”hasprovendifficultbecauseidentificationusuallyprovidesinformationaboutavictim,
andpeoplemayrespondtotheinformationratherthantoidentificationperse.Weshowthataveryweakform
ofidentifiability—determiningthevictimwithoutprovidinganypersonalizinginformation—increasescaring.In
thefirst,laboratorystudy,subjectsweremorewillingtocompensateotherswholostmoneywhenthelosershad
alreadybeendeterminedthanwhentheywereabouttobe.Inthesecond,fieldstudy,peoplecontributedmoretoa
charitywhentheircontributionswouldbenefitafamilythathadalreadybeenselectedfromalistthanwhentold
thatthefamilywouldbeselectedfromthesamelist.
Keywords: valueoflife,identifiablevictims,dictatorgame
JELClassification: C9,Z0
Peoplereactdifferentlytowardidentifiablevictimsthantostatisticalvictimswhohavenot
yetbeenidentified.Specificvictimsofmisfortuneoftendrawextraordinaryattentionand
resources. But, it is often difficult to draw attention to, or raise money for, interventions
that would prevent people from becoming victims in the first place. For example, when
JessicaMcClure(“BabyJessica”)wastrappedinawellinTexas,over$700,000wassent
to her family for the rescue effort (Variety, 1989). If those donations had instead been
spentonpreventativehealthcareforchildren,hundredsofchildren’slivescouldpotentially
have been saved. As Schelling (1968) noted in a seminal article on what has come to be
known as the identifiable victim effect, the death of a particular person invokes “anxiety
andsentiment,guiltandawe,responsibilityandreligion,[but]...mostofthisawesomeness
disappearswhenwedealwithstatisticaldeath.”
Schelling’s comment points to an intuitively plausible psychological account of why
identifiablymatters.Itsuggeststhatidentifiablevictimsstimulateamorepowerfulemotional
responsethandostatisticalvictims.However,thelimitedamountofresearchthathassought
tobetterunderstandtheidentifiablevictimeffecthasnotsupportedsuchanaccount.
JenniandLoewenstein(1997)identifiedfourpotentialcausesoftheidentifiablevictimef-
fectandconductedstudiestoteasethemapart.Mostobviously,identifiablevictimsaremore
vivid than statistical victims (see Nisbett and Ross, 1980), especially when details about
∗Towhomcorrespondenceshouldbeaddressed.
6 SMALLANDLOEWENSTEIN
them are communicated—e.g., pictures, family information, and so on. Second, identifi-
ablevictimsarecertainvictims,whereasstatisticalvictimsare,bydefinition,probabilistic.
Researchonriskydecisionmakingsuggeststhatpeopleareloss-averse—theydislikelosses
muchmorethantheylikeequivalentvaluedgains(KahnemanandTversky,1979).Ifsaving
astatisticallifeisseenasagain,butsavinganidentifiedvictimisseenasavoidingaloss,then
thispredictsthatpeoplewillplacegreatervalueonidentifiedvictimsthanonstatisticalones.
Third, evaluation of an identified victim is made ex post—i.e., after the event has
occurred—whereas the evaluation of a statistical life is made ex ante. Ex post evalua-
tionmakesblameandresponsibilitymuchmoresalient,andriskperceptioncandependon
thesaliencyofblame(Douglas,1992).Attributionofblameislessclearintheexantecase
sinceitisimpossibleforpeopletopredictandtakeonresponsibilityforallthetragedies
thatmightoccur.ThisthirdcauseisclosesttotheonethatSchellingimplicitlyattributed
theidentifiablevictimeffectto,andisclosetothecauseweexamineinthispaper.
The fourth cause, and the one that has received the greatest empirical support, is the
referencegroupeffect.Peoplefeelgreaterconcerntowardvictimsasthereferencegroup
theyarepartofgrowssmaller(Slovic,Fischhoff,andLichtenstein,1980).Forexample,a
diseasethatkills100peopleoutofagroupof100isseenasacalamity,butonethatkills
100peopleacrossthecountryisexperiencedasmuchlessdisturbing.Identifiablevictims
representthemosthighlyconcentrateddistributionofrisk(ann ofn)becauseidentifiable
victimsbecome,ineffect,theirownreferencegroup.Incontrast,astatisticallifehasamuch
largerdenominator,becausetheriskistypicallyspreadacrossalargepopulation.
JenniandLoewensteinfoundonlyweaksupportforthefirstthreeexplanations,butstrong
support for the fourth explanation involving the proportion of the reference group saved.
SimilarresultswereobtainedbyFeatherstonhaughetal.(1997)andBaron(1997)andall
werereportedinthesameissueoftheJournalofRiskandUncertainty,whichwasdevoted
totheproblemofvaluinghumanlife.
Theideathattheidentifiablevictimeffectis“just”areferencegroupeffectissomewhat
surprisingandseemstoconflictwithSchelling’scompellingintuitionthatthereissomething
specialaboutidentifiedvictimsthatcausesustoreacttotheminamoreemotionalfashion.
Evenifthereferencegroupeffectcanhelptoexplaintheidentifiablevictimeffect,itseems
difficulttoacceptthatthisisthewholestory.
Severalpsychologicaltheoriessuggestthatpeopleusedistinctprocessestomakejudg-
ments of specific as opposed to general targets (Hamilton and Sherman, 1996; Sherman,
Beike, and Ryalls, 1999). Dual-process models in social psychology suggest that peo-
ple become more mentally, and emotionally, engaged when they process information
aboutspecificindividualsthanwhentheyprocessinformationaboutabstracttargets.The
central-peripheralmodel(PettyandCacioppo,1986)andtheHeuristic-Systematicmodel
(Chaiken, 1980) both can be applied to the perception of and reactions to victims. These
dual-process models suggest that specific instances are more involving to the perceiver.
Specificcases,suchasidentifiablevictims,arethusmorelikelytoreceivegreatercognitive
attention, and deeper consideration. Abstract cases, including statistical victims, are less
emotionally involving, and judgments of them are more likely to be made on the basis
of peripheral or heuristic cues. The differential functioning of separate processes helps
explainwhyknowingthatthereisaparticularsomeoneinneedwhomyoucanhelpfeels
HELPING AVICTIMORHELPINGTHEVICTIM 7
qualitativelydifferentfromknowingthatyoucouldhelponeofmanypossibleneedypeople.
Thevictimismoreemotionallygrippingthana victimregardlessofthesizeoftherefer-
encegroup.Basedonourdoubtsabouttheformer“referencegroupeffect”conclusion,we
decidedtoconductamorefocusedtestoftheeffectofidentifiability.
Testingforaneffectofidentifiabilityisdifficultbecauseitishardtomanipulateidenti-
fiabilitywithoutalteringotherfactorsatthesametime.Perhapsthebiggestproblemisto
identifyvictimsinanymeaningfulfashionwithoutrevealinginformationaboutthem—e.g.,
theirgenderorage.Assoonasonerevealsspecificcharacteristicsofthevictim—eveninfor-
mationastrivialasaname—itispossiblethatpeoplefeelespeciallysympathetictopeople
withthosecharacteristics.Onceidentifyinginformationisprovided,itispossiblethatthe
specificcharacteristicratherthantheidentifiabilityofthevictimperseisresponsiblefor
anydifferentialresponseoneobserves.
Inthestudiespresentedhere,weavoidthisproblembymanipulatingaparticularlyweak
form of identifiability, determination of the recipient of help, that avoids conveying any
information about the victim. Statistical victims are indeterminate in the sense that the
people who will become victims have not yet been determined. Identifiable victims, in
contrast,aredetermined.Thevictims’identitieshavebeendetermined,whetherwelearn
anythingabouttheiridentity.Wehypothesize,therefore,thatevenifwehavenoinformation
aboutthepersons,determinedvictimswillbeperceivedasmoretangibleandhenceevoke
greater sympathy. Indeterminate victims, in contrast, are more difficult to imagine and
empathizewith,andhenceoneislesslikelytobehavetowardtheminanaltruisticfashion.
1. Labexperiment
Ourfirststudyusesaspecializedversionofthe“dictatorgame”toprovideaquantitative
measureofaltruism.Inthestandardversionofthegamean“allocator”ispresentedwith
an endowment and then given the opportunity to split the endowment with an unknown
“recipient.” Although economic models which assume selfishness predict that allocators
will keep the entire endowment for themselves, in fact many allocators give a positive
amount(seeCamererandThaler,1995,forareviewoffindings).Ofspecialrelevanceto
the current study, Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996) varied the design of the dictator
gameinvariousways,includingpermittingcommunicationbetweentheallocatorandthe
recipient.Theyfoundthatindividualswhocommunicatedwithone-anotherbecamemore
other-regarding,andpositedthatithadthiseffectbecauseitreducedtheperceived“social
distance”betweentheplayers.
BohnetandFrey(1999)examinedoneaspectofsocialdistancethatisespeciallyclosely
relatedtoidentifiability.Theyconductedaversionofthedictatorgameinwhichdifferent
subjects played either (a) completely anonymously, (b) with silent identification, and (c)
withface-to-facecommunication.Theyfoundthatrelaxinganonymitywhilestillforbidding
dialoguewassufficienttoincreaseother-regardingbehavior.Notethatrelaxinganonymity
issomewhatdifferentfrompureidentifiabilityaswehavedefinedit.First,inthecontext
of their studies, it introduces the possibility that one will interact with the individual in
the future, and that such interaction will be affected by the recipient’s knowledge of the
dictator’sbehavior.Second,asdiscussedabove,itintroducesthepossibilitythatanyeffect
8 SMALLANDLOEWENSTEIN
is due to the specific identities of the linked pairs as opposed to the mere fact that they
are identified. Nevertheless, the results are certainly consistent with our prediction that
determiningthepersontobehelpedincreasesgenerosity.
In our first experiment, we modified the dictator game to produce a situation in which
fortunatesubjectswhoretainedtheirendowmentcouldcontributeaportionofitto“victims”
whohadlosttheirs.Themainmanipulationinthestudywaswhethertheidentityofvictims
hadalreadybeen,orwasabouttobebuthadnotyetbeen,determined.Wehypothesized
thatdeterminedvictimswouldreceivemoremoney.
1.1. Method
Seventy-sixundergraduatestudentsatCarnegieMellonUniversityparticipatedinthestudy
inexchangeforresearchparticipantcreditandwhateversumofmoneytheyearnedfrom
thegame.Subjectswererecruitedingroupsoften,andwererandomlyassignedasablock
tooneofthetwoconditions(determinedorundetermined).Theywereseatedincubicles
facingawayfromoneanotherandwereinstructednottospeakorturnaroundandlookat
oneanotherduringthecourseoftheexperiment.Theexperimenterinformedthesubjects
thatalldecisionstheymadewouldbeanonymousandthat,atnopointduringorafterthe
experiment,wouldanyonelearntheidentityofanyonetheywerepairedwith.Attheendof
theexperiment,subjectsweretoldthattheywouldreceivetheirpaymentsfromtheoutcome
oftheallocationsinsealedenvelopes,sothattheywouldonlylearntheoutcomeoftheir
ownallocation,andnooneelse’s.
At the beginning of an experimental session, each subject was given an envelope with
$10.00intheformof40papertokensworth$0.25each.Subjectswereinformedthatthe
tokenswereequivalenttorealmoneyandthatthosetheyretainedattheendofthegame
could be exchanged for cash. The experimenter then circulated the room with a bag of
piecesofpaperlabeledwithanumberfrom1–10,andeachsubjectdrewanumber.
Eachsubjectthenreceivedthefollowingwritteninstructions:
Theactualexperimentrequiresthathalfoftheparticipantsbeginthetaskwith$10.00in
papertokens,butthathalfbeginwithnothing.Tocreatethissituation,eachpersonwill
drawacardfromthebag.Halfofthecardshavetheword“KEEP”onthem,andtheother
halfhavetheword“LOSE”writtenonthem.Ifyoudrawa“KEEP”card,youkeepyour
papertokens.IfyoudrawaLOSEcard,putyournumbercardandyourtokensinthebag
whentheexperimentercomestoyou.
Thenextpartoftheinstructionsdifferedsubtletyforthoseinthedeterminedandunde-
terminedconditions.
Inthedeterminedcondition,theinstructionsread:
Each“KEEP”participantwillnowbelinkedwithone“LOSE”participant.Ifyouarea
KEEPparticipant,youwilldrawoneofthe“LOSE”participant’snumbersfromthebag.
Pleasedosonowandwriteitonthefollowingline.Iamlinkedwithnumber .
Ifyouarea“LOSE”participant,writeanXintheblank.
HELPING AVICTIMORHELPINGTHEVICTIM 9
Intheundeterminedcondition,theinstructionsread:
Inamoment,eachofthe“KEEP”participantswillbelinkedwithone“LOSE”participant
byhavingthe“KEEP”participantdrawoneofthe“LOSE”participant’snumbersfrom
thebag.Beforewedothat,however,wehaveadecisionforyou.
Forparticipantsinbothconditions,theinstructionsthencontinued:
KEEP participants: If you are a “KEEP” participant, you now have the opportunity
toallocateyour$10.00endowmentbetweenyourselfandthe“LOSE”participant.The
decisionthatyoumakeisfinal.Thatis,allofthetokensthatyouallocatetoyourselfare
yourstocashinattheendoftheexperiment.Likewise,theLOSEparticipantyouhave
been linked with will cash in whatever tokens you allocate to him/her. Remember, the
rolesassignedandyourdecisionwillbeanonymous.Noonewilleverlearnthatyouare
aKEEPparticipant,youwillneverlearntheidentityofthepersonyouarelinkedwith,
andnoneofyouwillknowhowmuchmoneyeachparticipanttakeshome.
Pleaseputthetokensyouwouldliketogivetheparticipantyouarelinkedwithinthe
manilaenvelope.Also,writeyourdecisioninthefollowingblanks:
Keepforself
Givetolinkedparticipant
$10.00TOTAL
LOSEparticipants:Puttheseinstructionsbackinthewhiteenvelopeandsealit.
Atthispoint,theinstructionsintheundeterminedconditionsaid:
Now,wewilldrawthenumberoftheLOSEplayeryouwillbelinkedwith.Pleasedraw
anumberfromthebagandwritethenumberhere .
Finally, KEEP participants in both conditions were told to put the tokens they were
keepingforthemselvesinthewhiteenvelopewiththeirinstructionssheetsandtosealthe
envelope.
Astheinstructionsindicate,theonlyaspectvariedbetweenthetwoconditionswasthe
time when an allocator drew the number of the recipient: before making an allocation in
the determined condition and after making an allocation in the undetermined condition.
The experiment was implemented exactly as specified by the instructions. There was no
deception;paymentwasdeterminedasdescribedtothesubjects.
1.2. Results
Ourmajorhypothesis,thatAllocatorswouldgivemoremoneytorecipientsinthedetermined
condition than in the undetermined condition, was supported. The results are reported in
Table1.
Because the contributions were not distributed normally, we analyzed the difference
betweenthetwogroupswithaMann-Whitneynon-parametrictest,whichconfirmedthat
10 SMALLANDLOEWENSTEIN
Table1. Summarystatisticsofallocationstoundeterminedanddeterminedrecipients
inthelabexperiment.
Undeterminedvictim Determinedvictim
Condition (n=37) (n=39)
Mean $2.12 $3.42
Standarddeviation $1.79 $2.51
Median $1.81 $3.81
Mode $2.00 $5.00
Percentof$5.00(orgreater)offers 18.9% 46.1%
Percentof$0.00offers 18.9% 15.4%
subjectsgavesignificantlymoretovictimswhohadbeendeterminedpriortotheallocation
taskthantovictimswhowereyettobedetermined(Z =−2.3,p =0.02).
From the last two rows of the table, it is apparent that the determination manipulation
affectedthemagnitudeofdonationstovictimsbutnotthetendencytomakeanydonation
atall.Therewasastrikingdifferencebetweenthetwogroupsinmean,medianandmodal
contributions,butvirtuallythesamefractionofsubjectsineachconditiongavesomepositive
amount.1
Figure1presentshistogramsofgivinginthetwoconditions,whichreinforcestheobser-
vationthatthemajordifferencebetweenthetwoconditionsisinhowmuchsubjectsgave
ratherthanwhethertheygave.Thefigurealsoshowsthatcontributionswerenotnormally
distributed.
Figure1. Comparisonofallocationstoundeterminedanddeterminedrecipients.Donationsareroundedtothe
nearestdollar.
HELPING AVICTIMORHELPINGTHEVICTIM 11
1.3. Discussion
This study provides evidence for the effect of identifiability on altruism. The results are
especiallystrikingbecausethe“victims”inourstudywere,inthegeneralschemeofthings,
not particularly disadvantaged—they had simply missed out on the opportunity to gain
a $10 windfall—and the determination manipulation was subtle. If such a weak form of
identifiabilitycanproducesuchadramaticdifferenceinaltruisticbehavioritseemslikely
that variations of identifiability will produce even more dramatic effects in naturalistic
situationsinwhich,forexample,oneusuallydoesobtainatleastsomeinformationabout
identifiablevictims.Nevertheless,suchaneffectcannotbeassumed,whichiswhywechose
toconductourfollow-upstudyinthefield.
2. Fieldexperiment
Inoursecondstudy,potentialdonorswerepresentedwithaletterrequestingmoneytobuy
materialsforahousethatwastobebuiltforaneedyfamilythroughtheHabitatforHumanity
organization.Theletterdescribedseveralfamiliesonthewaitinglisttomoveintohomes.
Identifiabilitywasmanipulatedbyinformingrespondentsthatthefamilyeither“hasbeen
selected” or “will be selected” from the list. In neither condition were respondents told
whichfamilyhadbeenorwouldbeselected;theonlydifferencebetweenconditionswas
inwhetherthedecisionhadalreadybeenmade.
2.1. Method
AtpublicplacesaroundPittsburgh,includingtheairportandshoppingcenters,peoplewere
approached and 234 individuals consented to fill out a survey on an unrelated topic for
$5.00 pay. When they finished the survey, each was presented with 5 one dollar bills, a
returnenvelope,andaletterfromHabitatHumanity.2Participantsweretoldthattherequest
wasentirelyseparatefromthesurveyjustcompleted.Theywereaskedtoreadtherequest,
regardless of whether they thought they would be interested in donating the money that
they had earned, and to return the envelope, sealed with their receipt and any amount of
the$5.00theychosetodonate,eveniftheyweregivingnothing.Thesurveyadministrators
wereblindtothehypothesisandunawarethatthecharityrequestlettercameintwoforms
thatwererandomlydistributedamongthesurveys.Thetextoftheletterinthe“determined”
condition,withalternativewordingfortheundeterminedconditionpresentedinbrackets,
wasasfollows:
Severalfamilieshaveappliedtohelpbuildandpurchaseahomeforthemselves.Habitat
protectstheconfidentialityofapplicants,butherearebriefdescriptionsofthefamilies,
namesexcluded:
1) Asingledadwhoworksasapainter.Hehastwokids:his8-year-oldliveswithhim
andhepayschildsupportforanotherchild.
2) Asinglemomwholiveswithher3childrenandherdisabledfather.Herkidsareages
4,2,and5months.
12 SMALLANDLOEWENSTEIN
3) Asinglemomwhoisondisability.Sheliveswithher2children:a12-year-oldanda
20-year-oldwhoisalsoondisability.
4) A single mom with 4 kids: ages 14, 11, 11, and 9. Her current home is plagued by
infestation,aleakyroof,birdsintheattic,andhighgasbills.
Eighty percent of the money raised will go directly toward building materials for the
constructionofthenexthouse;therestgoestoadministrativecosts.PittsburghHabitat
hasalreadydecided[willdecide],basedonneed,whichofthefamiliesjustdescribedisin
themostneed,andthatfamilywillmoveintothehousebuiltbyCMUstudentsandfaculty.
ThefamilythatHabitatchose[willchoose]willparticipateinthebuildingoftheirnew
home.Ifyouwouldliketodonateanyofthemoneythatyoureceivedforfillingoutyour
questionnairetohelpbuildahomeforthefamilythathabitathaschosen[willchoose],
pleaseputitintheenvelope.Wedonotwantyoutofeelpressuredintogivingsofeeltostep
asidefromtheresearcher,putwhatyouchooseofyour$5.00intheenvelope,andreturn
ittotheresearcher,sealed,regardlessofwhether,orhowmuchyouhavecontributed.
2.2. Results
Asinthepreviousstudy,wepredicted,andfound,thatcontributionswouldbelargerwhen
the recipients had already been determined than when they were yet to be determined.
SummarystatisticsforthestudyarepresentedinTable2.
Whethermeasuredbymean,medianormode,donationswerelargerinthedetermined
conditionthanintheundeterminedcondition,andthedifferencesissignificantbyaMann-
Whitneytest(Z =−1.99,p =0.05).Moreover,unlikethepreviousstudy,morepeoplein
thedeterminedfamilyconditiongaveanythingatall(69.5%)thanwhenthefamilyhadnot
beendetermined(56.9%),againasignificantdifference(χ2(1)=3.99,p =0.05).Figure2
presentsahistogramoftheresults.
Onepossiblealternativeinterpretationoftheresultsisthatrespondentsmighthavecon-
struedeithertheorganizationorthepotentialrecipientsdifferentlybasedonwhetherornot
HabitatforHumanityhadyetselectedtherecipientofthehome.Itispossiblethatrespon-
dentsmightinferthattheorganizationislesstrustworthytocarrythroughwithitsplans,or
thatthefamilythatwillbechosenwillbelessdeserving,ifthemoneyisbeingraisedbefore
Table2. Summarystatisticsofallocationstoundeterminedanddetermined
familiesinthefieldexperiment.
Undeterminedfamily Determinedfamily
Condition (n=116) (n=118)
Mean $2.33 $2.93
Standarddeviation $2.31 $2.25
Median $2.00 $4.00
Mode $0.00 $5.00
Percentof$5.00offers 38.8% 49.2%
Percentof$0.00offers 43.1% 30.5%
HELPING AVICTIMORHELPINGTHEVICTIM 13
Figure2. Comparisonofdonationstoundeterminedanddeterminedhabitatforhumanityfamiliesreceivingaid.
abeneficiaryhasbeenchosen.Totestthesepotentialalternativeaccountsoftheresults,we
conductedabriefsurveytoexplorewhetherpeopleconstruedthesituationdifferentlyinthe
twoconditions.Wepresentedaseparatesampleof42undergraduatestudentsatCarnegie
MellonUniversitywiththecharityrequestletter(halfreceivedthedeterminedfamilycon-
ditionandhalfreceivedtheundeterminedfamilyversion)andaskedthemtorespondtothe
followingquestionson7-pointlikertscales:
1) Howlikelydoyouthinkitisthatmoneydonatedwillactuallygotobuildingahomefor
aneedyfamily;and
2) Assumingsuchahomeis,infact,constructed,whatisyourbestguessoftheneediness
ofthefamilythatreceivesit.
There were no differences across conditions in the responses (p = 0.74; 0.69 respec-
tively).Meanresponsestoquestion1were5.7fortheunidentifiedconditionand5.8forthe
identifiedcondition,andforquestion2were5.6fortheunidentifiedconditionand5.7for
the identified condition. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the effect we observed resulted
fromdifferentinterpretationsofthesituation.3
2.3. Discussion
This field study provides even stronger support that identifiability of the victim affects
altruism. By moving out of the laboratory, we eliminated potential artifacts such as the
concern that students might have felt of being “found out” by their peers or other non-
empatheticmotives.Bycollectingmoneyforarealcharitytohelppeopletrulyinneed,we
illustratetherealworldimplicationsofthiseffect.
3. Generaldiscussionandconclusions
Incombination,thesetwostudiesprovidenewevidencesupportingtheexistenceofaniden-
tifiablevictimeffect.Theweakformofourdeterminationmanipulationshows,furthermore,
14 SMALLANDLOEWENSTEIN
thattheeffectisnotduetospecificinformationthatpeoplereceiveaboutvictims(although
thatcanbeacontributingfactor).Althoughreferencegroupsizemayagainbeacontribut-
ingfactorintherealworld,evenwhenoneholdsthereferencegroupsizeconstant,there
remainsaneffectofidentifiability.
Although we conjecture about the cause of the effect, and specifically speculate that
identifiabilityaffectsthewaythatpeoplethinkabout,andemotionallyreactto,victims,our
studiesprovidenoevidencethatthesearetheactualmechanismsthatproducetheeffect.
Futureresearchcouldtestformediationbymeasuringemotions,orbyexaminingtheimpact
ofinducingorsuppressingspecificemotions.
Another possible contributing factor is that determined victims provide more salient
reasons to act. Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993) maintain that many decisions are
driven by arguments or reasons, rather than value-based calculations of options. Thus, in
onestudy,somesubjectswereaskedtoimaginethattheyhadagreedtotakeawagerthat
gavethema50–50chanceofwinning$150orlosing$100andhadlost,andwereaskedif
theywouldliketoplayagain.Amajoritysaidthattheywould.Othersweretoldthatthey
had taken the wager and had won; again they wanted to play again. However, when they
weretoldthattheyhadacceptedthefirstwagerbuthadnotyetplayed,amajoritysaidthat
theydidnotwanttoplayagain.Apparently,actuallyresolvingtheuncertaintyinitiateda
lineofreasoningthatsubjectsdidnotspontaneouslyengageinwhentheuncertaintywas
not resolved. In future research it would be interesting to test whether statistical victims
similarlyevokedifferentargumentsorreasonsfromvictimsthathavebeenidentified.
In ongoing research, we are attempting to generalize these results beyond the impact
of identifiability on empathy for, and altruism toward, victims. If it is true that simply
determiningavictimincreaseshelpingbyreducingthepsychologicaldistancebetweenthe
selfandavictim,thenitispossiblethatdeterminingatargetotherthanavictimcouldhave
animpactaswell.Victimsarevictimsbecausetheyarenotresponsiblefortheirsituation
andthusevokesympathyandpity(Weiner,1980).If,instead,apersoninneedisconsidered
responsiblefortheiradversesituation,thentheresultingemotionsmightinsteadbeanger
anddisgust.Angerfollowsfromthebeliefthatanotherperson“couldandshouldhavedone
otherwise,”andtheemotiondiminishesourinclinationtohelpthisperson(Weiner,1995).
If we feel greater pity for a victim who has been determined, it might be the case that
wefeelstrongerangertowardadeterminedtargetwhocausedandisresponsiblefortheir
predicament.Thereforethe“determinedvictimeffect”behindidentifiabilitymaysimplybe
onecaseofamoregeneral“determinedothereffect,”inwhichanydeterminedtargetevokes
astrongeremotionalreactionthananundeterminedtarget.Futureresearchshouldexplore
therangeofothersocialjudgmentsandbehaviorsthataremoderatedbydetermination.
Acknowledgments
WethankJenniferLerner,MargaretClark,andLindaBabcockfortheirhelp.Loewenstein’s
participation in this research was supported by the Center for Integrated Study of the
HumanDimensionsofGlobalChange,ajointcreationoftheNationalScienceFoundation
(SBR 9521914)andCarnegieMellonUniversity.