Hegel and the History of Philosophy: Proceedings of the 1972 HEGEL SOCIETY OF AMERICA Conference PDF
Preview Hegel and the History of Philosophy: Proceedings of the 1972 HEGEL SOCIETY OF AMERICA Conference
HEGEL AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY HEGEL AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Proceedings of the 1972 HEGEL SOCIETY OF AMERICA Conference edited by JOSEPH J. O'MALLEY K.W. AWOZIN FREDERICK G. WEISS ·· . I I ~ " : ~ :"r. MARTINUS NIJHOFF - THE HAGUE - 1974 © 1974 by Martinus NijhoJ!. The Haglle, Netherlands All rights reserved, ineludi/lg the riglit to tra/lslate or to reprodllce this book or parts thereof ill any form ISBN· 13 :1178·90·247 ·1712-5 e-ISBN-U:1l78-114-010-1657-5 POI: 10.10071978-114-010-1657-5 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. "The Pilgrimage of Truth through Time : The Conception of the History of Philosophy in G.W.F. Hegel" A. Robert Caponigri, University of Notre Dame 1 II. "Hegel as Historian of Philosophy" Quentin Lauer, S.J., Fordham University 21 III. "The History of Philosophy and the Phenomenology of Spirit" Joseph C. Flay, The Pennsylvania State University 47 IV. "Hegelianism and Platonism" John N. Findlay, Boston University 62 V. "On Hegel's Platonism" Lucia M. Palmer, University of Delaware 77 VI. "Cartesian Doubt and Hegelian Negation" Frederick G. Weiss, The Citadel 83 VII. "Liebniz and Hegel on Language" Daniel J. Cook, Brooklyn College, CUNY 95 VIII. "Hegel's Critique of Kant" John E. Smith, Yale University 109 IX. "Kant and Hegel on Practical Reason" Peter Laska, The University of Arizona 129 X. "Moral Autonomy in Kant and Hegel" Heimo E.M. Hofmeister, The American University 141 XI. "Hegel and Solovyov" George L. Kline, Bryn Mawr College 159 VI TABLE OF CONTENTS XII. "Hegel and Peirce" Max H. Fisch, The University of Illinois 171 Bibliography Joseph c. Flay 194 Index 237 FOREWORD The papers published here were given at the second biennial conference of the Hegel Society of America, held at the University of Notre Dame, November 9-11, 1972. They appear in an order which reflects roughly two headings: (1) Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy in general, and (2) his relation to individual thinkers both before and after him. Given the importance of the history of philosophy for Hegel, and the far-reaching impact of his thought upon subsequent philosophy, it becomes immediately apparent that we have here only a beginning. At the conference, cries went up "Why not Hegel and Aristotle, Aquinas, HusserI and Hart mann?" Indeed, why not? The answer, of course, might be given by Hegel himself : if we wish to accomplish anything, we have to limit ourselves. We trust that future conferences and scholarship will bring to light these relationships and the many more which testify to Hegel's profound presence in the mainstream of past and present thought. It is furthermore no accident that the renaissance of Hegelian studies has brought with it a rebirth of the history of philosophy as something relevant to our own problems. For Hegel, the object of philosophy is alone the truth, the history of philosophy is philosophy itself, and this truth which it gives us cannot be what has passed away. The editors wish to thank the Departments of Philosophy at the Univer sity of Notre Dame, Marquette University, and The Citadel for their support in conducting the conference and in the preparation of this manuscript. J.J. O'MALLEY K.W. ALGOZIN F.G.WEISS To the memory of H.B. Acton t June 16th 1974 Professor of Moral Philosophy University of Edinburgh and Paul M. Byrne t May 13th 1974 Chairman of Philosophy Marquette University THE PILGRIMAGE OF TRUTH THROUGH TIME: THE CONCEPTION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN G.W.F. HEGEL A. ROBERT CAPONIGRI University of Notre Dame An intimation that a very special relationship must obtain between philosophy and its own history has long haunted western thought. Equally persistent has been the premonition that the exploration of this relationship must have a profound effect, not on the historiography of philosophy alone, but on the idea of philosophy itself as well. Hegel makes vocal and brings into focus intimation and premonition alike when he writes: " ... the history of philosophy because of the special nature of its subject matter (Le. philosophy itself), is different from other histories", *1 In what way is the history of philosophy different, in what way is this difference determined by the nature of philosophy and in what way does this difference, in turn, affect philosophy? This is the essential theme. Efforts to reach an understanding in principle of this special relation between philosophy and its own history have produced the most divergent views. To bring some order into this diversity a continuum might be construct ed. The poles of this continuum would be, at the one extreme, the complete objectification of the history of philosophy relative to the activity of philo- '" References, unless otherwise noted, are to the following titles : Hegel, G.W.F. : Lectures on the History of Philosophy translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson. New York: The Humanities Press/London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 3 vs., 1955 (referred to as Haldane). Hegel, G.W.F. : Vorlesungen fiber die Geschichte der Philosoph ie, herausgegeben von Hermann Glockner, 3 vs., Fr. Frommans Verlag Gunther Holzboog, Stuttgart 1959 (referred to as Glockner). Lauer, Quentin: Hegel's Idea of Philosophy, with a new translation of Hegel's Introduction to the History of Philosophy. New York: Fordham University Press, 1971 (referred to as Lauer). 1 Haldane: p. 8; Glockner, I, p. 35 : " ... der Geschichte der Philosophie, um der besonderen Natur ihres Gegenstandes willen, eine andere Bewandniss hat als mit den Geschichten anderer Gebiete". 2 A. ROBERT CAPONIGRI sophy and, at the other, the total identification of philosophy with its own history. In the first instance, the historiography of philosophy would possess no intrinsic philosophical character. Though its "content" or "matter" would be philosophy, the history of philosophy would obey methodological canons which dictate a strict objectification of the relation between history and its subject matter whatever the character of the latter; canons which dictate, for example, that political history cannot and ought not to be a form of political action, nor religious history apologetic or catechetical. In the second instance, by contrast, philosophy and the history of philosophy would form a seamless unity, in the sense that the history of philosophy would prove to be a philosophical transaction, indeed, the supreme philo sophical act. Other views of this relationship would find their natural places, so to say, along this continuum as each approximated the one or the other of these extremes. Hegel, it would seem, leaves us no doubt as to where, on this continuum, his own view would fall. It would fall at, or very close to, the extreme of the identification of philosophy and its own history. Hegel writes, "The history of philosophy is itself scientific and thus essentially becomes the high point of the science of philosophy."z And, lest any equivocation find entrance, he presses the point: " ... this history represents not merely the external, accidental events contained within it, but it shows how that content, or what appears to belong to mere history, belongs to the science of philoso phy."3 Arresting and unequivocal as these assertions are, the basic reason which leads Hegel to make them and thus to assume the position at the extreme point of identification on that continuum is more arresting still. That reason lies in his fundamental philosophical enterprise, the construc tion of the system. Unless these assertions are valid, the construction of the system of reason is not valid. The Hegelian system is a system of total mediation. That is to say, it is a system in which the world of experience is grounded without residue in the principles of reason, while these in turn are totally concretized or realized in the range of actual or possible expe rience. The identity of philosophy and its own history is the very core and axis of this system of mediation. The problem, therefore, of the relationship of philosophy and its own history is not, for Hegel, an exercise in mere erudition; it is a central issue in his own speculative system. The best evidence 2 Haldane: p. 6; Glockner, I, p. 33 : "die Geschichte der Philosophie selbst Wlssen schaftlich ist und sogar zur Wissenschaft der Philosophie der Hauptsache nach wird." 3 Haldane: p. 6; Glockner, I, p. 33 : " ... dass sie nicht bloss das Aeusser, Geschehene die Begebenheiten des Inhalts darstellt, sondern wie der Inhalt, - diess, was als historisch aufzutreten erscheint, - selbst zur Wissenschaft der Philosophie gehort." THE PILGRIMAGE OF TRUTH THROUGH TIME 3 for this assertion is to be found in his most inclusive formulation of the problem, a formulation which will provide the constant framework for all his reflections on the issue. 1. The Problem: Hegel's Formulation Hegel conceives this problem, in its widest reaches, as embodied in a contradiction which must be resolved before the conditions of the system can be fulfilled. "This subject," he writes, "contains an inner contradiction. Philosophy aims at understanding what is unchangeable, eternal, in and for itself. History tells us what at one time has been, at another has vanished. Truth is eternal, it does not fall within the transient. It has no history. But if it has a history and if this history is only a representation of past forms of knowledge the truth is not to be found in it."4 This contradiction controls his entire address to this problem. At the same time, this contradiction dictates the task which confronts him. He must establish the counter-thesis which will resolve this contradiction; he must demonstrate that truth must have a history, "veritas filia temporis." He must establish that the changing must generate the unchanging, time the eternal, the shifting thought of man abiding truth. Or the task may be stated with equal justice in the converse but symmetrical terms: the unchang ing must generate the changing, the eternal time, the one truth conflicting systems of truth, conflicting philosophies, as the condition of its own self realization. The alchemy by which this transformation will be accomplished will have two names, philosophy and history, but a single reality, the con struction of the system. 2. The Point of Departure Hegel flnds the springboard for the accomplishment of this task in a cultural phenomenon which none can fail to observe: the general scepticism toward philosophy as a viable human enterprise bred precisely by incom- 4 Haldane, pp. 7-8; Glockner, I, p. 35 : "Der Gedanke, der uns bei einer Geschichte der Philosophie zunachst entgegen kommen kann, ist dass sogleich dieser Gegenstand selbst einen inneren Widerstreit enthalte. Denn die Philosophie beabsichtigt das zu erkennen, was unveranderIich, ewig, an und fUr sich ist. Ihr Ziel ist die Wahrheit. Die Geschichte aber erzahlt soIches, was zu einer Zeit gewesen, zu einer anderen aber verschwunden und durch Anderes verdrlingt worden ist. Gehen wir davon aus, dass die Wahrheit ewig ist : so flillt sie nicht in die Sphlire des Voriibergehenden, und hat keine Geschichte. Wenn sie aber eine Geschichte hat, und indem die Geschichtediess ist, uns nur eine Reihe vergangener Gestalten der Erkenntniss darzustellen : so ist in ihr die Wahrheit nicht zu finden; denn die Wahrheit ist nicht ein Vergangenes."
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