Hannah Arendt's Cryptotheology

24 Pages·2017·0.3 MB·English

by  Rafael Zawisza

religions
Article
Thank God We Are Creatures: Hannah
Arendt’s Cryptotheology
RafaelZawisza
FacultyofArtesLiberales,UniversityofWarsaw,ul.NowyS´wiat69,00-046Warszawa,Poland;
[email protected]
(cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:1)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:1)
(cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)
Received:1October2018;Accepted:13November2018;Published:19November2018
Abstract: Main concern of this article is to grasp the interpretative matrix of Hannah Arendt’s
doctorate, which, I claim, is the central organising net for her other writings. I call this matrix
“cryptotheologicaldefenceofthesecularworld”.Inordertoshowitsfunctionality,Ihavetodetermine
thecharacterofArendt’sdiscourseinrelationtotheologyandphilosophyonthebasisofherdoctoral
thesisfrom1929. Themainattentionwillbefocusedonthefigureoftheneighbourasasingularand
theconceptofnatality. Iwillshowhowthecritiqueoftheology,oftenveryironic,servesArendtto
contesttheparadigmofthepoliticaltheology.
Keywords: Hannah Arendt; Augustine of Hippo; creatureliness; neighbour; post-secularism;
cryptotheology;marrano;transcendence;singularity
DieWeltwarschlechthinunabsolutgeworden. NichtbloßderMensch,neinauchGottkonnteaußer
ihrenGrenzen,wennanderserwollte,Platzfinden. DiesemetalogischeWeltbotaber,geradeweilsie
gottloswar,keinenSchutzgegenGott.
FranzRosenzweig,DerSternderErlösung(Rosenzweig1921,p. 23)
AfterhavingreadnumeroustextsaboutHannahArendt’sdoctoralthesisDerLiebesbegriffbeiAugustin,
Icametoaconclusionthatweneedanewinterpretationofit. Itisarulethatscholarsinsistingon
Arendt’ssecularismdonothaveanideahowtointegratetheconfusingdissertationintoheroeuvre.
Thereisatemptationtoavoidthisinconveniencebystatingthatbetweenthedoctorateandhernext
majorwork,TheOriginsofTotalitarianism—whichmeansbetween1929and1951—therewasadecisive
break. Iamnotgoingtocontestthefactsandclaimthattherewasnochange,thatthehorrifictime
oftotalitarianrulership,exile,andwardidnotputanimprintonHannahArendt. Buttoannounce
thebreakandneglectherfirstworkwouldbenothingbutanexcuse. Anexcusethatmakesherwork
easiertounderstand,eventouseorwidespread,nonethelessitwouldmeanthatagalvanisedimageof
Arendtaspoliticaltheoristwillbecomemoreandmoreaclichéandanobstacletoreviveherthought
forfuturegenerations.
There is no historical evidence of what motivated Hannah Arendt to choose the topic of the
dissertation. Laure Adler claims that it was meeting Rudolf Bultmann at his seminar on the New
Testament, which coloured Arendt decision. It was apparently thanks to him that she discovered
Augustine for herself (Adler 2008, p. 62). However, other scholars insist on the primary role
of Heidegger. Jacques Taminiaux intended to show that Heidegger’s lectures on Aristotle made
animpressionontheyoungArendt(Taminiaux1997). LucaSavarinoattemptedtounderlineanimpact
of Heidegger’s lectures from 1920 to 1921 (introduction to the phenomenology of religion as well
asthelectureaboutAugustineandNeo-Platonism),althoughSavarinoemphasisesthatthereisno
certaintywhetherArendtwasfamiliarwiththecontentofthoselectures,whichshedidnotattend
(Savarino1999, pp. 251–61). Variousinfluencesdonotexcludeeachother, whichiswhyonemay
Religions2018,9,371;doi:10.3390/rel9110371 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions
Religions2018,9,371 2of24
alsomentionHansJonas,whoasaverygoodfriendofArendt’swaselaboratinghisthesisAugustin
unddaspaulinischeFreiheitsproblem: EinphilosophischerBeitragzurGenesisderchristlich-abendländischen
Freiheitsidee,finishedin1930.
HannahArendt’sdoctoraldissertationwasdefendedinautumn1928inFreiburgandpublishedby
JuliusSpringerinBerlinin1929underthetitleDerLiebesbegriffbeiAugustin:Versucheinerphilosophischen
Interpretation. It was part of a series which was soon to be closed and where Karl Jaspers helped
his students to publish their thesis. Scarcity of time, which Arendt complained to Jaspers about,
couldexplainthedenseandinconclusivecharacterofthethirdpart: Vitasocialis. However,therewere
graverproblemsthattheyoungauthorencounteredandsomehowleftunresolved,whilestillbeing
abletodrawupamap,whichwoulddelineateherlaterconcerns.
For hermeneutical reasons, there is one decisive issue I have to explain at the start. Hannah
ArendtworkedonthetranslationofherdissertationintoEnglishinthelate1950sandearly1960s.
ItwasatranslationbyErnstBaschAshton,whichshereceivedtoapproveandwhichshecorrected
alot,goingasfarastoamendthewholetext,exceptthelastpart,Vitasocialis,whichsheleftunchanged.
Again,itisnotcertainwhyArendtgaveupatcertainpoint,asaresultofwhichthetranslationneeded
towaitforpublicationuntil1996. Inaletterfrom20October1965toMaryMcCarthy,Arendtgave
animpressionofhowshefeltabouttheencounterwithherprewartext:
I got myself into something absurd—Macmillan had asked me years ago for my dissertation on
Augustine. Ineededthemoney(notreally,butcoulduseit)andsaidyes. Thetranslationarrivedtwo
yearsagoandnowIranoutofexcusesandhavetogooverit. Itiskindofatraumaticexperience.
Iamre-writingthewholedarnedbusiness,tryingnottodoanythingnew,butonlytoexplainin
English(andnotinLatin)whatIthoughtwhenIwastwenty. ItisprobablynotworthitandIshould
simplyreturnthemoney—butbynowIamstrangelyfascinatedinthisrencontre. Ihadnotreadthe
thingfornearlyfortyyears. (ArendtandMcCarthy1995,p. 190)
ThedifferencesbetweentheGermanoriginalfrom1929andArendt’samendmentsfromthe1950s
and1960stotheEnglishtranslationofherdissertationconstituteatopicinitself. HereIanalysethe
finalshapeofherdoctorate,claimingthatitscomplexdevelopmentonlyconfirmedthatwhatArendt
hadwritteninthelate1920sthenbecamethecryptotheologicalmatrix,whereinitialintuitiononly
crystallisedandfromwhichitwaswidespreadthroughouthervariouswritings. Iampersuadedthat
scrupulous, “Talmudic” work on the comparison of the German and English editions, all existing
correctionsincluded,isnecessaryandthatitisaworkwaitingforitsauthor. Yet,asfortheaimand
structureofmythesis,thisisnotofhighimportance.Firstofall,themostessentialpartofArendt’s
dissertation,namelythethirdchapterentitledVitasocialis,waspublishedinEnglisheditionasadirect
translation of the original from 1929, because Arendt did not introduce any changes to this part.
Asforthetwopreviouschapters,Ianalyseoriginalaswellasaddedfragments,treatingthemasone
migratingentity. WhatImeanbythatisthattheideaspresentinthefirsteditionwereonlydeveloped
morefullyinthe1950sand1960s,thusthereisnobreakorshiftthatcouldmakethishistoricalprocess
ofmigrationofideasproblematicformyreconstruction. Whatconstitutesthegenuineshiftalreadyin
the1920sisVitasocialis. Tosummarize,Iwasconsideringdividingthematerialbycommentingonthe
originalandontheamendmentsseparately,butIdecidedthattheadvantagesofthisoptionarefewand
theriskofproducingchaos—quitepredictable(duetonecessityofconstantlyclarifyingwhichversion
ofArendt’sdissertationIreferto—andthentointegratesomecomplexlinesofargumentation). Inmy
opinion,natalismistheundercurrentofArendt’sthought,originatinginherdoctoralthesis,thatis
whyitisnotcontroversialtoseethisinholisticperspective. Whatwouldbeofhighimportanceisto
graspthemomentsinhertextswrittenafterpublicationofTheOrigins(1951),whichwereinfluenced
byherreturntoherdissertationsincethe1950s. Ionlymarkthisfacthereinordertodemonstrate
theprocessesoftranslationsandtransmissions. ThespecifictextsatstakearethelastchapterofThe
Origins—IdeologyandTerror—addedtothesecondedition(1958)butwritteninthemiddleinthe1950s
aswellasTheHumanCondition(1958). OnRevolution(1963)inthisperspectiveappearsastheelaborate
responsetothedilemmasandaporiaswhichhauntedArendtwhenshewaspreparingVitasocialis.
Religions2018,9,371 3of24
Richard Wolin calls Arendt’s dissertation “a strikingly un-Arendtian document ( ... ) [in
which—RZ] the inflections of her mature philosophical voice are barely audible. It is a work of
adisciple,narrowlytextualinorientationandfocus,devoidoftheoriginalitythatwouldcharacterize
hersubsequentwork”(Wolin2001,pp. 42–43). WolindisregardsthefactthatthewholeArendtian
anthropologywasgerminatinginherfirstbook. Heusesschematicexplanation,whichshowshow
littleheunderstoodfromDerLiebesbegriff;WolinthinksthatbecauseofAugustine’sotherworldliness,
youngArendt—aslostinAugustinianworldview—couldnotbereconciledwithherlaterinsistence
on worldliness. In sum, he overlooks that it was precisely in Augustine that Arendt intended
to find commitment to the world despite having declared rejection of it. His second argument,
that transcendence contradicts plurality, also shows rather Wolin’s own misconception and in
consequence it obnubilates Arendt’s dialectic attitude towards theological tradition. Only on the
basisofhisinterpretativefailurecouldWolinnotonlyseparateDerLiebesbegriff fromherlaterthought,
but he could also claim that in Rahel Varnhagen Arendt rejected her first work as concentrated on
introspection(Wolin2001,p. 44). Iwouldratherinsistthatdespiteherscepticismabouttheforceof
inwardness,shedidnotdismissitsrolealtogether.
KurtSontheimerfoundDerLiebesbegriff morepromising,callingit“thefirstimportant,butnot
particularly original step towards intellectual independence” (Sontheimer 2005, p. 31). It is
characteristicthatthedissertationisunderestimatedeitherbythesecularinterpreters,orbytheological
ones,whohaveatendencytoascribeeverythingvaluabletoAugustineandseeArendtinaminor
positionof,forexample,Heidegger’s“child”orAugustine’s“daughter”. JohnKiess,asoneofthefew
commentatorsrepresentingtheology,feltcompelledtoprotestagainstthoseattemptsatdiminishment:
“aswithHeidegger,ArendtappropriatedandcriticizedelementsofAugustine’sworkwiththesame
spiritofindependencethatwillmarkherengagementwithmanyotherthinkers”(Kiess2016,p. 21).
ItisevenmorethantosaythatArendtwas“aqualifiedAugustinian”(ClarkeandQuill2009,p. 254).
It is not unimportant how we understand Arendt’s stance towards the Augustinian legacy,
andlater,howweestimatewhathappenedafterWorldWarIIatherfirstencounterwithAugustine’s
thought. IagreewithJoannaVecchiarelliScott,whostatesthatArendt’sperseveratingreferencesto
Augustine“arecentraltoherargumentandcannotbeeasilydismissedasscholasticdecorationor
theafterglowofanearlyflirtationwithidealismforthemostpartoutgrown”(VecchiarelliScott1988,
p.398). Aswewillsee,Arendtbuiltonacertainlogicofthoughtalreadyinscribedinherdoctoral
thesis. “This text—Étienne Tassin writes—is seminal: it fecundates [irrigue] all the future works,
includingcapturingthedistancewhichitinduces”(TassinandAlbanel2010,p. 11). Itwas,however,
not only the logic of argumentation, but also the set of problems she found in Augustine which
sheregardedaspressingonherowncontemporaneity. Thequestionswerenotsomuchoriginally
Augustinian,butratherrevivedindifferentthematicconstellations. ThatiswhyIabstainfromcalling
Arendt an Augustinian of any sort. She deeply distorted his reflections and did not read him as
atheologian. ThosewhoregardDerLiebesbegriff asaworkdependentonAugustineandtheologyare
probablyconfusedbyitsform,un-Arendtianindeed. Ifonedoesnotfollowthelinesofargumentation
rigorously and does not pay attention to the details, it seems that the author of the dissertation is
a commentator of the great thinker of the past. By quoting Augustine extensively, Arendt made
theimpressionthatshewastotallyimmersedintotheanalysedmaterial. Butthiswaspreciselyher
strategy: to show, through close reading, inconsequences and aporias. They would not appear as
problematicpointswithoutHannahArendt’suniquepositionofspeaking,whichgaveherfreedomto
composeAugustine’sthoughtinthewayshediditandnototherwise. Arendt’sseemingly“humble”
roleofcommentatorsubmergedherextremelycriticalvoice. Yet,again,thisvoiceissosubtlyironic
andhercriticismsoembeddedinthestructureofthebook,thatitiseasytodisregardit.
ApartfromtheproblemofinventivenessofearlyArendt,therearetwootherissues:herpotentially
politicalstanceandherattitudetotheology. RonaldBeinerwrites: “WhattheAugustinebookmay
indicateisthatArendtwasapoliticalphilosopherbeforesheknewthatshewasone”(Beiner1997,
p. 270). Mytaskistoradicalisethisstatementbyshowinghowdeeplypoliticalherearliestconcerns
Religions2018,9,371 4of24
abouttheloveoftheneighbourandrelationsoftheindividualtornbetweenGodandworldwere.1
IamnotgoingtocontestthethesisthatRahelVarnhagen’sbiographywasArendt’sfirstpoliticalbook,
properlyspeaking(Armenteros1999,p. 86),andindicatedtheperiodwhenshebecamepolitically
consciousandbegantodealseriouslywithhistory, law, andpolitics. Yet, Istronglydisagreewith
CarolinaArmenteros’unjustqualificationsofDerLiebesbegriff asa“highlyabstractexistentialexercise”
(Armenteros1999,p. 87).
Arendt’sdoctoralthesishasmuchtoofferwhenitcomestoananthropologyofpoliticaltheory,i.e.,
more“pre-political”or“meta-political”reflections;however,thisdoesnotmeanthatitislessrelevant
inthatregard. Conversely,whatIcall“pre-political”iswhatwasreflectedbyArendtherselfunderthe
term“pre-theologicalsphere”(dievortheologischeSphäre;Arendt1929,p. 3). Thespherepriortoany
religionanditstheologicalself-understandingconstitutesabattlefieldwiththeparadigmofpolitical
theology,whichmakespoliticsdependentoncertaintheologicalorigin.
It is probably not astonishing that Arendt’s dissertation has not found its full recognition.
AmongbothreligiousandsecularcommentatorsthereisnoagreementwhetheryoungArendtwas
moretheologicalorphilosophical. Ifoundsomeparadoxasindicative,namelythataJesuitclaimsthat
“HannahArendtneverwritestheology”(Boyle1987,p. 96),whileasecularscholardoesnothesitateto
reportabout“Arendt’syouthfulflirtationwiththeology”(Moyn2008,p. 71). Someresolutionwould
betocountArendtamong“nontheologianspracticingtheology”(Biale2011, p. 9), asDavidBiale
shortenedAmosFunkenstein’sdefinitionofthe“seculartheology”. However,whatinterestsmethe
mostis“herconsequentabilitytolivewithcreativeconfusion”(Neiman2001,p. 72). ThatiswhyIam
inclinedtothinkaboutHannahArendtasarepresentativeofthegroupnamedbyAgataBielik-Robson
“thephilosophicalMarranos”(Bielik-Robson2014).
OnlybyreferringtothiscomplexapproachitwouldbepossibletoreintegrateDerLiebesbegriff
withinthecontextofpolitico-theologicaldebatesoftheWeimarperiod.2 Inordertodothat,however,
amovebackwardsisnecessary,whichgraspsthedissertationinitsmicrocosm. Thesubtletynecessary
to decipher Arendtian cryptotheological secularism usually escapes theological interpretations.3
Even though secular interpretations are closer to the point, they remain incomplete without
acknowledgementthat,indefendingsecularity,Arendtsoughthelpbybothsecularandtheological
means. That is why Samuel Moyn in his otherwise excellent article about Arendt and the secular
marvels over the fact that she acceded biblical provenance for the model of political promise and
callsthisidea“rathershocking”(Moyn2008,p. 86). Theconceptofnatalityposesasimilardifficulty
forMoyn,ashethinksthatitistooreligiouslyburdenedandbecauseofthatitincursariskofthe
Schmittiancritique(Moyn2008,p. 96). Iclaimexactlytheopposite: thatArendt’sfamiliaritywith
theologyandherphilosophyofbirthmakestheattackonthepoliticaltheologyallthemorecrushing.
Politicaltheologyisdeconstructedbytheintroductionofthethirdelement,precedingboththeology
andpolitics: anthropology. Whatismore,theappreciationofthehumanbirthinitsanti-naturalist
specificity serves to contest the political implications of the doctrine of the original sin, on which
Christianpoliticaltheologyrelied.
1 ForthepictureofthetensionsinWeimarGermanyduetoreligiousdivisions,seethesociological-historicalsummaryof
ToddH.Weir(Weir2015).Hedepictedintrareligiousbattles,butalsoacampaignagainstsecularism,whichhelpedHitler
cometopower. TheauthoralsodescribedtheCatholicambivalentreactiontoNazismandviceversa,thereasonswhy
ProtestantssupportedHitlermorethanCatholics,orhowCatholicsmimedcommunistorganisationsinordertocombat
them.WhatismissinginWeir’sarticleistheroleoftheJews.
2 Thefirststepinthisdirectionwasalreadytaken,see(Chacón2012).
3 ThediscussionaboutArendtandtheologydidnotreachfull-scaleuntilJesuitsfromBostoneditedthevolumeAmormundi
(Bernauer1987a). Nevertheless,therewasnofurtherresonance,probablybecausethisvolume,containingmanydeep
insightsnotwithstanding,ischargedbyapologeticintentions.
Religions2018,9,371 5of24
1. PretheologicalSphere
Arendt’sdissertationwas“guidedbythequestionofthemeaningandimportanceofneighbourly
loveinparticular”(Arendt1996,p. 3). Knowinghersenseofirony,thiscouldimplicitlyindicatethat
despitethefactthatthiswasoneofAugustine’scentralconcerns,histheologicalvisionofGodand
itsphilosophicalantecedenceshadoverriddenessentialityoftheneighbour. ThefactthatArendt’s
recapitulation of Augustine’s views was intended to be an accompanying critique from the very
beginningisreinforcedbythefollowingstatement:
Augustine’severyperceptionandeveryremarkaboutlovereferatleastinparttothisloveofneighbor.
Thusthequestionabouttheneighbor’srelevancealwaysturnsintoasimultaneouscritiqueofthe
prevailingconceptofloveandofman’sattitudetowardhimselfandtowardGod. (Arendt1996,p. 3)
TakingintoaccountheroveralldeconstructionoftheAugustinianconcepts,Arendtcouldnothave
beenmuchmoreovertaboutherintentionsintheintroduction. Otherwise,itwouldhavebeenseenas
agrosseffrontery—afterall,shewasjustadoctoralstudentatthattime.4
Arendt’sinitialremarksconcealapolemicalapproach,withoutthedetectionofwhichthewhole
interpretationofherworkwouldbogdown. Sheveryoftenpretendedthatshewasjustsummarizing
Augustine’s ideas, while in fact she adopted his views in order to turn them against themselves.
For instance, when she said: “This critique will never be an absolute critique from some fixed
philosophicalortheologicalstandpoint. Itisacritiqueonlybecausetherespectiveconceptoflove
claimstobeaChristianone”(Arendt1996,p. 3). Inotherwords,Arendt’sintentionistochecktowhat
extentAugustine’sargumentationstickstotheteachingsofChristianity.
SheestimatedthatAugustinehadbeen“trulyreligiousratherthandeterminedbyNeoplatonic
Greekinfluences”(Arendt1996,p. 4). BysayingthatArendtonlypayedoffadebttobiographical
truth,toAugustine’sinnerintentions,5 which,however,didnotfinditsroadtofulfilmentthroughout
Greekcategories.6 Heterogeneousinfluencestogetherwith“heterogeneousintentions”broughtabout
theeffectof“disjointedness”,andforthatreasonArendtappliedher“systematicapproachindetail”
so that “a substantially common base” (Arendt 1996, p. 4) could be grasped. In no case did she
intend to synthetize Augustine’s divergent trains of thought—on the contrary, she made crevices
on this common surface perfectly visible, without any attempt to reconcile them in antithetical or
dialecticalform. TheironicimpetusofArendt’sanalysisemployswhatwecouldcall“doublenegative
dialectics”,7 which is able to maintain contradictions in motion, following life’s own rhythm that
defendsitselffromstopping,ending,anddispersing.
Nonetheless, irony does not exclude seriousness, related to this so far quite mysterious
“substantiallycommonbase”locatedwithin“pretheologicalsphere”. Ironicimpulsesservetouncover
it,yetnotallowingtodetermineitastheultimateground. Ontheotherhand,aswewillseelater,
itisjustbecauseofthisultimate, driftinggroundthatthecommonbasecouldappearascommon.
Arendt’sinterpretativestrategyrelieson“makingexplicitwhatAugustinehimselfhasmerelyimplied”,
meaningthatinordertotreathimmoreseriously,oneneedsadetachmentfrom“Augustine’sdogmatic
4 Iwouldnot,however,gosofarasRichardWolindid,whosays:“Incertainrespects,theworkstandoutasanembarrassing
testimonialtothedelusionsofassimilationism.ItwaswrittenatapointinArendt’slifewhenshestillentertainedhopesof
auniversitycareeramidthewoefullyconservativemilieuofGermanacademicmandarins”(Wolin2001,p.43).Asreflected
inherprewarletterswithJaspers,Arendtwasverystraightforwardandfierceinhercritique.ShequarrelledwithJaspers
abouthispoliticalstancetowardsJewsinthe1930s.Moreover,HansJonaspreservedamemoryofheraudaciousbehaviour
attheuniversity:beforejoiningRudolfBultmann’sseminarontheNewTestament,sheasaJewwantedtomakesurethat
shewouldnotlistentoanti-Semiticremarks.JoannaVecchiarelliScottposesarhetoricalquestion,askingwhoamongthe
WeimarerastudentsdaredbehavesoboldlytowardsthemandarinsofGermanacademia(VecchiarelliScott2010,p.16)?
5 “ForAugustinethisrelevance[oftheneighbour—RZ]wassimplyamatterofcourse”(Arendt1996,p.4).
6 Arendtexplainedoneoftheaporiasfoundintheanalysedtextsbysayingthat“thereasonforthisincongruityliesin
Augustine’sterminology,whichhetookfromthetraditionofGreekphilosophyevenwhenhewishedtoexpressexperiences
thatwerequitealientoit”(Arendt1996,p.12).
7 Derivedfromsimultaneousabsorptionandnegationoflife’s“notyet”and“nomore”:“Thisquestioningbeyondtheworld
restsonthedoublenegativeintowhichlifeisplaced”(Arendt1996,p.70).
Religions2018,9,371 6of24
subserviencetoscripturalandecclesiasticalauthority”(Arendt1996, p. 4). Thethingwhichfrom
a dogmatic position seems to be ironic, blasphemous, and heretic, could actually be a polemical
strugglefortrueseriousness(inthiscase: intreatingone’sownneighbour). Nevertheless,Arendt
didnotdefendanypolemicswithorthodoxyassimplyjustifiedinitselfthankstobeantidogmatic.
Thisis crucial, becauseit ishardto attackherstance assimple reversal, revaluation ofvalues, etc.
Instead,sheadmittedthat“suchintentionaldetachmentfromalldogmaticelementsmaydoomthe
interpretationofareligiousauthor,butisrelativelyeasytojustifyinAugustine’scase”(Arendt1996,
p. 4).
The way that Arendt emphasized autonomy of the secular realm against the divine one is so
subversivethatonecanprobablyunderstandthefollowingconclusiononlyasanexcusethatcould
have left a naïve reader mistaken: “Of course, these presentations will not prove whether, in fact,
such a pretheological sphere is to be justified as all, or whether the possible being or not being of
humanexistenceistrulysettledinGod’spresence”(Arendt1996,p. 6). Partially,thisstatementcould
signifythatArendt’s“attemptataninquiryofpurelyphilosophicalinterest”(Arendt1996,p. 6)—as
she called her dissertation—does not encroach upon territory reserved for theology. But it is not
clearhowArendtcouldmaintainthepurityofthisdivision, sincesheacknowledgedthatevenin
hismostreligiouswritingsAugustine“neverwhollylosttheimpulseofphilosophicalquestioning”
(Arendt 1996, p. 6). Moreover, in Der Liebesbegriff the essential theoretical battles were conducted
preciselyinthemidstoftheology, usingtheologicalreasoning, drawingconclusionsfromittothe
pointofabsurdity.
That Arendt manoeuvred between secular and religious reading of theological discourse,
provoking its destabilisation, becomes visible in her introduction of the term the “pretheological
sphere”. It is not only that she assumed that theological edifice rests on philosophy, but—more
profoundly—thatitalwaysrestsonacertainanthropology,asitderivesfromanthropologicalsources,
and finally from the time out of mind. That is why, according to the double negative dialectics,
shesecularisedtheology,andgrantedreligionapositionhigherthanearthlyauthority,atthesame
timedismantlingthetheocraticstalematewiththissingularmove. BythisImeanthatsheextracted
themostpreciouselementfromtheologyinordertocatapultitinto“heavens”ofideals. Thereligious
experienceandtheologicaldiscoursearenotexcluded,butseparated. Theformerconcernsstrictly
innerreality,thelatterwouldinspiretheworldifitonlycouldilluminateexistencewithoutdemanding
acertaincredo. Sincethesecondoptionisbarelypossible,Arendtchoseaphilosophical“contraband”
insteadofareversaloftheology. ThoserestrictionsexplainwhyArendt’simmediatereactiontoany
possibilityoftheabsolutetoappearconsistedofstrengtheningdivisionsandbufferzones. Arendt
quotedAugustine:
Theyhavenotunderstoodthat‘Donotdotoanotherwhatyoudonotwishtohavedonetoyou’,cannot
bevariedinanywaybyanynationaldiversityofcustoms. WhenthisruleisappliedtotheloveofGod,
allvicesdie;whenitisappliedtotheloveofourneighbor,allcrimesvanish.(Arendt1996,pp. 4–5)
However,Arendt’scommentdistortedtheAugustiniantextbeyondrecognition. Shewrote:
Precedingtheexpresscommandmentofneighborlyloveisanotherthatisindependentofanysuch
explicit divine revelation that has become real in Christ. This is the ‘law written in our hearts.’
TheChristiancommandmentsharpensthis‘natural’law,andthusenhancesthehumancommunity
toitshighestrealityinwhichallcrimesareextinguished. Therefore,weshallbeabletolimitthescope
ofinterpretationintwowayswithoutbeingdogmatic. First,weshallaskaboutthispretheological
sphere. Second,weshallseektograspwhatAugustine’sexegesiswouldregardasthespecificnovelty
intheChristianelaboration. (Arendt1996,p. 5)
Here,herreadingofAugustine,theanti-Pelagianauthor,isthoroughlyPelagian. Inthefirstquotation,
thatfromAugustine,divinelawimplantsitselfonthecommonmoralbasis,freefromculturalcontexts;
it is a narrative conducted by the demands of the economy of salvation, which explains how the
Religions2018,9,371 7of24
Christianfaithonlystrengthenswhatwasalreadypreparedwithinpaganethics,waitingforthedivine
message. Arendtdidnotunderminethisnarrative,shejustchangedperspective: ifa“lawwritten
inourhearts”lastedforcenturieswithoutChristianrevelation,thisundoubtedlymeansthatitwas
independentfromanyrevelation. “Throughphilosophicalworkwithideastheauthorwantstojustify
herfreedomfromChristianpossibilities,whichalsoattracther”(ArendtandJaspers1992,p. 690)—as
KarlJasperswroteinareview,beingthesupervisorofArendt’sthesis. Thatiswhysheemphasised
the element as autonomous from excessively demanding Christian ethics, not calling it “pagan”
or “Jewish”, but rather—“the pretheological”, prior to any institutionalized religion, the “natural,
prereligious,andsecularlaw”(Arendt1996,p. 39). HerreservationregardingChristianityisfullof
respectandjustifiedonlyfromthepointofviewofaMarraniccryptotheologythatArendtsecretly
activatedinherdissertation. TheChristianmessageisrenouncednotbecauseitisfalse,butbecauseit
isalltoosoon.8 Doublenegativedialecticsallowstokeepdivinityatdistance9,whichisnotnecessarily
anatheisticgesture,butamorepiousonethanthatwhichisusuallytakenasreligious. TokeepGodat
distanceimpliespreventionofanydivinisationofearthlyreality. ThisisthereasonwhyArendttook
“natural”inquotes,usingtheterm“’natural’law”(Arendt1996,p. 5)10(eventhoughinthisparticular
context this natural law would be in tune with her defence of secularity). However, secularity in
thisversionisdevoidofsanctity: consequently,secularisationcouldnotbeequalledwitharobbery,
usurpation,orinheritanceofanysacral“property”. Thus,a“substitutionaldilemma”(Moyn2008,
p.77)couldbeavoidedandnotneglected.
2. Nature
De-divinizationofnaturebymeansofthenotionoftranscendentGodgovernsthethinkingof
FranzRosenzweig,whowasthegreatestunmentionedprecursorofArendtwhenshewaspreparing
DerLiebesbegriff. ForRosenzweig,nonidentityof“world”and“nature”11 (Rosenzweig2005,p. 23)
protectsahumanbeing’sfreedom,ultimatelyguaranteedintheanalogous,paradigmaticseparationof
Godfromtheworld:
Theconditionofcreature,whichwehaveclaimedfortheworldinordertosavetheselfnessofman,
thereforeletGod,too,escapefromtheworld. Metaethicalmanisthefermentationthatbreaksdown
thelogicalandphysicalunityofthecosmosintothemetalogicalworldandthemetaphysicalGod.
(Rosenzweig2005,p. 22)
Formanconfrontedfacetofacewithnaturerenderstobe“notacreature,butapart”(Arendt1996,
p. 69),apartofnaturewhosetotalityobtrudesascrushingifthereisnothingtocounterbalanceit.
It obtrudes itself upon individuality to the extent that it hollows inwardness out, resulting in the
denigrationofthesubject.Onthecontrary,Arendtemptiedindividualityoutofnaturalcontent,leaving
freespaceforethicallife. “Ifhe[man—RZ]couldbesaidtohaveanessentialnatureatall,itwould
belackofself-sufficiency”(Arendt1996,p. 19). Itmeansthatthehumanconditionisundetermined,
8 Iwilldemonstratethevalidityoftheterms“Marranic”and“Judeochristian”later.HereImayaddahypothesis,whichIam
unabletoprovewithinthescopeofthistext,butwhich,nonetheless,inspiredmyinterpretation,namelythatthemodelof
Arendt’shiddentheologicalimaginationcouldbefoundintheideaofawithdrawnGod(tzimtzum)asitisknownfromthe
LurianicKabbalah.ThehypothesisisverifiabletextuallythroughArendt’sintellectualexchangewithGershomScholem,
whichstartedinthelate1930s.AsfortheearlierpossiblesourcesofthisinfluenceonecouldindicateFranzRosenzweig.
ItisalsonotexcludedthatArendtmighthaveinheritedcertainheterodoxideasthroughGermanidealism,especiallyvia
dialecticaltheology,andifso,theterm“Judeochristian”wouldgainadditionallegitimisationininterpretationofArendt’s
oeuvre. Allinall,whatiscrucialforthecurrentpresentationisthataccordingtothe20thcenturyre-appropriationsof
theLurianictheologicalnarrativebytheGerman-Jewishthinkers,thesecularcharacterofsecularityseemstobetheonly
traceofdivinechosenness. AsfortheimportanceoftheArendt–ScholemcorrespondencefortheLurianichypothesis,
seeamarvellousstudyofVivianLiska(Liska2017).
9 Ielaboratedthisideaforthefirsttimeinanarticlefrom2012,see(Zawisza2012).
10 CatholicscholarslamentonArendtandblameherofbeingignorantwhenitcomestothenaturallaw,justlikeiftheywere
unabletounderstandthatsomeintelligentpeoplecanrejectahypothesisofnaturallaw,havinginmindalternativetheories
ofhumanself-constitution.(SeeWinters1987,pp.197,203,217;Kampowski2008,p.265).
11 JustlikeinTruthandPolitics,Arendtmadeadistinctionbetween“politics”and“world”,seeingthelatterasmorevoluminous.
Religions2018,9,371 8of24
unknown,butnotinasensethatweneedmoreknowledgetocaptureitfullyoneday;itisunknown
becauseitisendlessly,irreversiblydeepenedandcomplicatedbylanguageandenigmaticinscriptions
intoinwardness. Humanbeingisbornasastrangerintonature,andforthatreasonshecannever
returntoafictivenaturalharmony,neithercouldsherecognisea“naturallaw”emanatingfromthe
cosmos, which lost its sacral status after the Gnostic tendency of the “Jewish-Christian teaching”
(Arendt1996,p. 52)hadbanishedcosmotheism. Fromthenon,anynormativeproposalbasedonthe
Greeknotionof“nature”(physis)andits“pseudo-Christian”(Arendt1996,p. 30)adaptationunderthe
nameof“order”(ordo)asan“everlasting,foreverlawfulstructure”(Arendt1996,p. 61)—isinvalid.
Paradiseremainsforeverlost.
This problematic finds its realisation in the section of Arendt’s dissertation entitled Ordinata
dilectio. It is the most unpersuasive part of the whole book—not so much because Arendt had no
idea how to play it out, but because she was not convinced at all by Augustine’s argumentation,
andexposedherdeepreservationperformatively;sheseeminglytriedtoproceedthisargumentation,
but the way she did so rendered it thin. It is a parody. At first glance, ordered love seems to be
anantidoteforpreviouslypresented,unpredictableburstsofpassiontowardstheOtherwhichended
withself-destruction. Itisaperfect“regulatorypointofreference”(Arendt1996,p. 37)providing
toolsforregulations,adaptations,andordering,appliedaccordingtothe“generalorderofeverything
thatis”(Arendt1996,p. 39);inotherwords,accordingtothevisionofapagangodunderstoodas
immutablewholenessoreverlastingnature. Arendt’stalentforwrongheadedrecapitulationsmade
herdescriptionoforderedloveturnintoadversepublicity,withbarelypent-uprevulsion,sinceitis
“unconcernedobjectivity”thatdetermines:
whatoughttobeloved. Loveitselfisaconsequenceofthisdetermination. Thesameistrueforthe
degreeofintensitythatlovewillspendonitsobject,dependingupontheorderthatassignseachtoits
properplace. Everyoneislovedasmuchasheoughttobe,nomoreandnoless. (Arendt1996,p. 38)
Natureputspeopleintheirplace. Noprotest, nocomplaint, nolamentisallowed. Onecouldask
towhatendsuchaloveispromotedwhichtreatsahumanbeingas“amere‘thing’tobeusedfor
the true life to come” (Arendt 1996, p. 38)? The bitter truth is that there is no other answer than
that: “the‘highestgood’isdrawnintothepresentandcandominateandregulatelifeinthisworld”
(Arendt 1996, p. 41). It means that the Christian theological concepts of providence, natural law,
andordocaritatisareinterrelated,formingadangerousmixturebyhelpofwhichsomepeoplecould
gainpoweroveranotherandrepressthem,“forthegoodofsomebody”. Thosewhocommandand
order,pretendingthattheyknowthis“good”,donotrespectenigmaofhumansingularity,fragility,
andinimitablenessgroundedingroundlessabyssofthemysteryofcreationepitomisedbyeachbirth.
AsArendtconcluded,orderedlovestays“inflagrantcontradictiontotheveryessenceofloveinall
itsforms”(Arendt1996,p. 42),becauseitdepersonalisestheneighbourwhoisnotrecognisedinhis
“concreteuniqueness”,but“insublimeindifferenceregardlessofwhatorwhoheis”(Arendt1996,
p.43).12 ChristianpassionnettedbycategoriesoftheGreekphilosophysquirmsinconvulsivemotion
ragingfromself-sacrificetoindifference—perversionofsufferingatitszenith.
ItisobviouslynotonlybecauseofthedemandsoftheGreekphilosophy,butfirstofallbecauseof
“life’sinstability”(Arendt1996,p. 17)thatmancouldnotfinditsfinaldestination. ButwhatArendt
recommendsforhumancondition’sinstabilitybynomeansresemblestraditionalistordo. Sinceitis
acreaturelylife,finiteandthusfarfromabsolute,itneedsaproperperspective,whichwouldrespect
the“limitationsofearthlylife”(Arendt1996,p.27).Therefore,thesenseofmeasureiscrucial—measure
notderivedfromextraterrestrialpatterns,bymeansofwhichlife“islookeduponfromtheoutside
(from outside the living person)” (Arendt 1996, p. 16), but elaborated on the basis of life’s own
limitations,tobeginwithbirthanddeath. Arendtkeptpersuadingthat“meetinglifefromtheoutside”
12 OnthatbasisshecriticizedevocationofloveforhumankindasabstractinOnRevolution.
Religions2018,9,371 9of24
(Arendt1996,p. 12)resultsinblaminghumanlifeforitsfinitude,treatingitlikeamaladyorcalamity,
intheend—asevil. Ifonecomparesfinitelifewithdurabilityofthings,nottomentionprevailing
forcesofnature,humanconditionalitymustlookmiserableandincurablytragic.
(... )uponallthismisery,philosophysmilesitsemptysmileand,withitsoutstretchedindexfinger,
showsthecreature,whoselimbsaretremblinginfearforitslifeinthisworld,aworldbeyond,ofwhich
itwantstoknownothingatall. Formandoesnotatallwanttoescapefromsomechain;hewantsto
stay,hewants—tolive. (Rosenzweig2005,p. 9)
Influenced by Rosenzweig, Arendt continued his neues Denken, especially when she rotated the
perspectivestofavoursingularityagainstWholeness. Todoso,shesometimestooklibertiesmocking
sanctity: “For man, eternity is the future, and this fact, seen from the viewpoint of eternity, is of
course a contradiction in terms” (Arendt 1996, p. 16). Absurdity helps to show how absurd is to
forcehumanbeingstoimitateidealisedprojectionsofabsoluteness. Forinstance,Arendtcriticized
purethinkingabstractedfromalivingsubjectivity: “Fromtheviewpointoflifethisstateinwhich
man’s spirit relates to itself is a kind of death. For to the extent that we are alive and active (and
desire is a form of action), we necessarily are involved in things outside ourselves and cannot be
free”(Arendt1996,p.21). Cannotbefreeinanabsolutesense,Ishouldadd. Ourfreedomispossible
onlyintheabsenceofabsolute. Ifinlieuofcelebrationofthisconditionedfreedom,manstartsto
desireeternity,akindoftimewithoutspace,thenitpoisonsfinitudewithnostalgiaforanexistence
freedfromanymovementandinterminglingwithmatter. TothatArendtrespondedwithahighly
polemicalsentenceinterwovenasacounterpointbetweenverses,inwhichshedepictedtrancesof
PlotinusandAugustineabouteternity: “Whatpreventsmanfrom‘living’inthetimelesspresentislife
itself,whichnever‘standsstill’”(Arendt1996,p. 16).13
Arendt protected the exceptionality of human condition so that it would not dissipate into
shapelesseddyingofcosmicbecoming.Thisdoesnotmeanthatsheavoidedtranscendinglife,crossing
theboundariesofbirthanddeathintotwotypesofnothingness. However,aswewillsee,theclinching
iswheretheobservationpostwillbelocated: whetherwelookatthecoldcosmos,oritlooksatusand
chillstheblood.
3. DamnedCreatures
Althoughthecentralquestionofthedissertationisneighbourlylove,thefirstpartdealswith
solipsism of the subject desiring God, while the second part concerns inversion of this longing,
namely a path that an individual follows backwards, looking through his origin for the Creator.
ThiscompositionitselfoutlinesArendt’scriticalstance: sinceonlythethirdpartopensthepossibility
oflovingone’sneighbours,inthepreviousonesareaderfindsnothingbutaporias,obstacles,impasses,
andcontradictions.Happinessturnsouttobeunreachable,lifeisbitter,God’sgracefades—alienation
in full swing. “Can life be said to exist at all?” (Arendt 1996, p. 14)—asked Arendt, leading
Augustine’s doubts to completion. In her mouth this “doubt” concerning life turns almost into
akindofDoceticheresy: Augustineisaccusedofhamperingtherecognitionofthecarnal,earthly
presenceofhisneighbours.
The problem resides in the ideal of self-sufficiency, das Autarkieideal (Arendt 1929,
p. 27).14 Philosophical vision of the absolute inherited by Augustine—immovable, omnipotent,
omniscient—hangsovermenasasignthattheyarealwaysinferior. Consequently,desireofeternal
life,withitsaspirationofbeinginGod,withGod,likeGod,bringsaboutthat“man’spresentlifeis
beingneglectedforthesakeofitsfuture,andlosesitsmeaningfulnessandweightincomparisonwith
thattruelife”(Arendt1996,p. 27). Cravingfortimelessdelight“proceedstostriptheworldandall
13 ThatiswhyArendtwascriticalaboutnuncstansalsoinherlastwork,Willing.
14 InthetextIuse“autarchic”asderivativefrom“autarchy”,althoughitsmeaningas“absolute”producesadditionalaftersound.
Religions2018,9,371 10of24
temporalthingsoftheirvalueandtomakethemrelative. (... )Sincetheywillnotlast,theydonot
reallyexist”(Arendt1996,p. 14).
The root of the problem lies deeper. Self-sufficiency meets its limits everywhere. Because
of the dialectics of life, which continues its development due to changes, to live means to move,
neverstandingstill.15 Thisprovokesfrustration. AndsinceGodinAugustineisbydefinitionthe
highestgood,theonlyobjecttobeblamedislifeorhumanbeing,or—inarefinedversion—fallen
humannature. Thus,Arendt’sintuitionleadshertolocatethesourceoftheproblemsarticulatedby
Augustineinhisveryattitudetowardslife: “Onceweassumetheperspectivethatwenolongerview
lifeas‘beforedeath’butas‘afterdeath,’deathequalizesbydevaluinglifeassuch”(Arendt1996,p.76).
Although Arendt discussed many influences which shaped Augustinian thought, she never
mentionedManichaeism,neitherGnosticismingeneral. Buthereitwouldbeverymuchaccurate
toseenotonlyStoicandNeoplatonicdimensionsintheidealofautarchy, butalsotheManichean
backgroundofsomemotives,likeregressionandwithdrawalfromtheworldnolessthantheshiftfrom
totalconcentrationofinwardnesstothesacrificeoftheself,whichArendtcalled“pseudo-Christian”
(Arendt1996,p.30).Lateron,shenotedtheexistenceofsomeChristiantypeofself-denial,butwithout
detail.16 Nevertheless,ArendtenumeratedessentialfeaturesofloveaccordingtoPaulofTarsus,who,
unlikeAugustine,hadclaimed: thatperfectionispossiblealreadyinfinitelife,notonlyinheaven;
thatlovewon’tceaseineternity;thatintheafterlifeGodwillbelovedbythesamelovethroughwhich
s/heisloved(Arendt1996,pp. 30–32). Onthecontrary,forAugustinetheManichean,worldand
creaturesremaininsuchadeepdebasementthattheydonotdeservetobeloved. “Manshouldnot
loveinthislife”(Arendt1996,p. 30),becauseanypossibleobjectoflovecannotcomparewithGod.
Accordingly,loveinanycaseshouldnotbeaccompaniedbyenjoyment(frui). Theonlycharacteristic
ofcaritasthatprovidespeoplewithaforetasteofeternityisfearlessness. Butdisappearanceofthe
fearofdeathresultsinforgettingaboutmortality(Arendt1996,p. 29),abandonmentofthehuman
conditionandachievementofataraxicindifference.17 Thisindifferencetoone’sowndeath,however,
could affect attitude towards others. Fleeing from evil nature and avoiding intense relations with
people,solipsistsubjectivityseeksitsonlyrefugeinGod. Butthisgod,whomtheisolatedindividual
worshipssoferventlyinalanguageofphilosophy,istheancientcosmosindisguise.
4. Indifferencevs. Singularity
Loath reference to life comes from a certain vision of the cosmos treated as a pattern and
afundamentwhichhumanfinitudeshoulddependon. Worse,iftheHebrewGod—philosophically
dissectedbytheologians—adoptstheattributesfromthecosmicWholeness,whichwasthecasein
theChristiantheology. “Ithink,andhopetoshow,thatitispreciselythenotionofGodassummum
bonumthatcreatesthedifficulty”(Arendt1996,p. 44)—withthisstatementwhichleavesnodoubt
aboutherintentions,Arendtclosedthefirstpartofthedissertation. Inthesecond,“natalist”part,
the quest for one’s origin plays the main role. Despite the obvious fact that its appearance seems
tobecontradistinctivelyinfinitesimalincomparisontothemagnitudeofcosmos,birthbecomesthe
Archimedeanpointforadefenceofafragileprocessofindividuation.
IntheworldconstructedbyAugustine,nobodyisinterestedinourhappiness,everyonelives
alone facing death and meanwhile experiencing disillusionment because of desires. “The Creator
remainsforeveridenticallythesame,independentofhiscreationandwhatevermayhappenwithinit”
15 GiorgioAgambencannotbealegitimatecontinuatorofArendt’sforthisreasonalonethathisdeconstructionofWestern
metaphysicscontainsaversiontowardsmovementandmoving(Agamben2013,p. 95). ForArendt“calmquietude”
(Arendt1996,p.19)isasrareaslove,nottomentiontheabsolutecalmnesswhichsimplyequalsdeath(Arendt1996,p.13).
16 Arendt’sgeneralstancetowardsChristianityonecouldexplainthisway:whenshewrotethat“contemptfortheworldand
itsgoodsisnotChristianinorigin”(Arendt1996,p.20),shedidnotclaimthatneitherChristiantraditionsnorecclesiastical
lawsaredeprivedofthisGrundbefindlichkeit.
17 ThesearecryptotheologicalmotivesinheritedbyAgambenfromMartinHeidegger; Agamben’selaborationoflimbo
containstheminanutshell.