Hannah Arendt and her Augustinian inheritance: love, temporality, and judgement

306 Pages·2015·23.47 MB·English

by  Chris White

Arendt øndher
Hønnøh
lnherit
Augustini øn ønc :
e
Loue, Temporølity, ønd
ludgument
By
Chris White
Centre of Europeøn Studies
lJnia ersity of Adeløide, Austrøliø
Møy,2001
copy of Thesis for submission to ø degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Dedicøted to Andrée Simone Hurburgh
Amo: Volo ut sis
Abstrøct
Arendt left an unfinished treatise of judgement and a neglect of her own beginnings in philosophy'
I intend to examine her initial study of the thought of Augustine and the concept of right love and
match this to her final concern with the thought of Kant and her particular notion of the judging
individual-in-the-world. An important emphasis will be placed on Arendt's 'idea of community' and
her reading of man as homo temporalis and as an extension to this I wish to propose an outline of her
intended treatise on judgement. To do this I will highlight the role of trinitarian thinking in her work
throughout her life and how this became the theme of her own world-view. From her analysis of
Augustine,s trinity of memory, understanding and love to her temporal divisions of promise-makit g,
forgiveness, and trust together with her final theory of the mind as thinking, willing and judging'
Arendt remained close to this methodological triadic imperative.
I argue that her final trinity although never written in her intended third volume on ]udgingnThe
Lrf, of the Mind series would have been remembrance, the understanding heart and some form of
Gemüt. This trinity defines her unwritten theory of judgement and can be constructed because of
Arendt,s temporal dimension of past possibility: a temporal dimension determined in reaction to
Augustine,s and Heidegger's emphasis on the future. This past possibility is her memory of the
present that locates a reference point for action. Her theory of judgement would have reflected this
possibility; a possibility captured by primitive Christianity and Roman experience of foundation, but
lost in an Athenian-Judaeo tradition of thought, but still captured within St. Augustine's words' For
Arendt this temporal dimension is achieved through storytelling where the individual history being
told unfolds between past and future, and can convey a valid authority of tradition to fellow
individuals-in-the-world in the form of a principle of judgement. I propose therefore that storytelling
in Arendt's thought reflects a temporal relationship between a theory of illumination and an ethic of
inspiration; a relationship which relates the validity of authority as principle in foundation.
Tøble Contents:
lntroduction:
Hønnøh Arendt: Looe ønil the Moment of luilgement 1
ChøpterTwo:
Hannah Arendt: Towmds the Possibility of luilgement 52
ChøpterThree:
The Storytelling Community of Homo Temporalis 89
Chapter Four:
Temporølity and the Principle of Action 1.30
Chapter Fiae:
Between Past and Future ønd aTtinity: Foundøtion,ImmortøIity, ønd Authority 164
Chøpter Six:
Arendt nndDe Trinitate; ludgement Between Past ønd Future 199
Chnpter Seuen:
Arendt, Kønt andherTheory of Judgement; Memory, Understanding and Love 233
276
Bibliogrøphy
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any
other degree or diploma in any university and that, to the best of my
knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or
written by another persory except where due reference is made in the text of
thethesis and
I grve consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library,
being available for photocopying and loan.
Signed:
Chris White
4 October 2001
Acknowledgments:
I wish to thank the University of Adelaide for providing finance to research
Hannah Arendt's archival material at the Library of Congress in the form of a
travel scholarship.
I would like to thank my initial supervisor Associate Professor Paul Nursey-
Bray and Dr. Wayne Cristaudo who ovefsaw the development, writing and
final execution of the thesis.
Thanks to especially Patrick Allington for his advice and expertise. Also
Simon Dry and Brian Pike for their intellectual companionship over the
years.
The thesis could not have been completed without the support of my
extended famity: Kathy, Frank, Stuart, Nan and Grandad, Sam, Clifton,
Christine, David, Max, and Mia. And thanks to the one Pefson who never
took me seriously, Mike Steer, and to all my colleagues at Prince Alfred
College.
Introduction
Hønnøh Arendt: Looe ønd the Moment of ludgement
7.
Summøry of Argument
Arendt left an unfinished treatise of judgement and a neglect of her own beginnings in philosophy.
I intend to examine her initial study of the thought of Augustine and the concept of right love and
jtdgg
relate this to her final concern with the thought of Kant and her particular notion of the
individual-in-the-world. An important emphasis will be placed on Arendt's reading of man as homo
temporølis and therefore her temporal dimension of past possibility. As an extension to this, I wish to
propose an outline of her intended but unwritten treatise on judgement. To do this I will highlight the
role of trinitarian thinking in her work throughout her life and how the trinitarian dynamic originally
defined by Augustine became the theme of her own world-view' From her analysis of Augustine's
trinity of memory, understanding and love to her temporal divisions of promise-making, forgiveness,
and trust together with her final theory of the mind as thinking, willing and judging, Arendt remained
close to this methodological triadic imperative'
I suggest that her final trinity, although never written in her intended third volume on Judging in
The Life of the Mind series, would have been remembrance, the understanding heart and some form of
Gemüt.This non-theological trinity defines her unwritten theory of judgement and can be constructed
because of Arend.t's temporal dimension of past possibility: a temporal dimension determined in
reaction to Augustine's and Heidegger's emphasis on the future. This past possibility is her memory
of the present that locates a reference point for action. I suggest that her theory of judgement would
have reflected this possibility; a possibility captured by primitive Christianity and Roman experience
of foundation, but lost in an Athenian-Judaeo tradition of thought. This was because this possibility
was captured within St. Augustine's words, and Arendt, using Heidegger's lectures on the subject as
guidance, sought to delineate them for her own project. For Arendt, this possibility is a temporal
dimension and its impact is achieved through storytelling. In storytelling as illumination the
individual history being told unfolds between past and future, and can convey a valid form of
tradition to fellow individuals-in-the-world and establish a principle in judgement. I propose
therefore that storytelling in Arendt's thought reflects a temporal relationship between a theory of
illumination and an ethic of inspiration; a relationship which relates the validity of authority as
principle in foundation even if no substantial principle can be determined from Arendt's extant work'
(Ð
Arendt's I'Inwritten Treøtise on ludgement
Arendt knew from the start that the faculty of judgement provided no certainties'l The operation
of this faculty is obscure because it is about reflection and inner deliberation. The factors that make up
the process are vague - defying precise definition - and lacking any comprehensive standards for
evaluation. The contribution of discriminatiory discernment, imagination, sympathy, detachment,
impartiality, and integrity, (to use Maurizio Passerin d'Entréves' list), as secondary considerations
contribute to what is one of the most difficult subjects in political thought.2 Arendt tells us that
thinking, "prepares us ever anew to meet whatever we must in our daily lives'" But thinking was a
prelude period to judging: "That you must remain in a way empty after thinking ' ' " Arrd once you
are empty, then, in a way which is difficult to say, you are prepared to judge' That is, without having
any book of rules under which you can subsume a particular case, you have to say "this is good,"
"this is bad," "this is right," "this is wÍot:lg," "this is beautiful," and "this is ttgly"."3 This indicates the
reason why Kant's Critique of ludgemenf was so important to Arendt's understanding. It was not
because of her interest in aesthetics per se,but because the way we say "that is right, that is wrong" is
not very different from the way in which we say "this is beautiful, this ugly."" The purpose of this
thinking was to lead to judgement, "the truly political activity of the mind."4 \YVhen considering the
life of the mind after a period of exploring the life of the actor Arendt felt the blindness that derives
from the conviction of the future and the infallibility of progress leaves the pleasure of thinking
through remembrance, and willing was not in a struggle with judgement but rather should merely not
be dominated by it. Furthermore, in an indication of her overall intent, Arendt felt that the
relationship of these three faculties should be considered as a "treatise on good governance";
1 The meditatio ns tnLfe of the Mind are by no means conJident. It must be remembered rhatThe Life of the Mind was a product of
an impatient thjnker who could not afforâ the time for re-edits that the text demanded. The text of judging that Mary McCarthy
included in the second volume was actually the lecture notes from a political philosophy couse on 'Judgìng' that she presented
at the New School. Young-BnrchJ, HannahÁrendt: For Loae of the lNortd, (New Havery New York University Press, 1981), p' 470'
2MauÅziopasse¡in d' Ilnftèves, Modernity,lustice ønd Community, (Milan, Franco Angeþ L990) reprinted asThe Political
Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, (London, Routledge, 1994), p' 102'
3 This is ;a;t of a much more extensive quote (and printed in e of the World, p. 452) that was from a speech
to The A-merican Society of Christian Ethics, in Richmond, V 1973.T]ne transcript is in the Library of
congress. Reiner schürmann also sees significance in this speecì : on Judging and Its Issue" tnThte Public
Realln: Ë,ssays on Discursiue types in Potiticøt Philosophy, Reiner Schürmann, (ed.) (New York, State University of New York Press,
7e89), p.7.
4 the e'mptiness that A¡endt has spoken about enables someone to judge "without any preconceived system." See Young-
Bruehl, F or l-oae of the World, p. 453.
2
suggesting that the faculties of thinking, willing and judgement should balance and check each other'S
It is in 'Willing' that Arendt provides an insight into her own ontological underpinning of her
philosophy of politics. Returning to Augustine and the concept of natality she observes the ability of
the Occidental tradition to cloud this concept by returning to the idea of the older to stop the
recognition of the new. This continual denial by especially the tradition of political theory, however,
can be usurped, in Arendt's eyes, by one potential alternative. \ trhile this is introduced as the potential
ontological underpinning of aVirgilian philosophy of politics, it describes Arendt's own perspective'
This alternative, and therefore Arendt's own particular purpose, is provided by Augustine the Roman,
not as a Christian, and "the only philosopher the Romans ever had"' The simultaneous creation of
man and time defines man as homo temporalis and makes him novel through the occurrence of
natality.6
Arendt's attraction to Augustine is partly his formative influence on the development of western
thought.T His use of the various traditions - neo-Platonic and Stoic in this instance - became the
foundation of succeeding interpretations especially, and for Arendt's understandi^g i. particular, the
concepts of the individual and the community. The dyramics that Arendt perceived in the continuing
treatment of these elements find their initial articulation in Greek and particularly Platonic
philosophy. Flowever, the essence of Plato's understanding is intensified by the Neo-platonic
philosophers, and especially plotinus.s The division between aita actiaa and aitø contemplntiaø becomes
intense in plotinus' work and became a significant influence on the formation of Augustine's Christian
understanding.g The indication of this is seen from reading Augustine. However, it was not the
Christian Father that reveals this link, rather it is the Roman mind of Augustine that provides an
initial rmderstanding of this development. fust as Augustine was the constant companion of Arendt,
Cicero was also always utilised when she turned to the tradition to try and clarify a point being made'
69 (013824) Arendt writes to Kenneth Thompson of the sking for funds'
in the following manner: "I want to analyse, describe ¿ three mental
are constitutive"for all potitical action: thinking, action, first discovered
and which were the events and experiences that causéd men to become aware of them in Western Flistory? What happened to
each of them in the modern age? Ánd which are their [marietxyJ political functions? And behind all these seemingly academic
problems looms the question.."How can we approach the quest-ion of evil in an entirely secular setting? How do we know good
from bad?"
6 Li¡e o¡ the Mind,yoI.2Wilting,MaryMcCarthy, (ed.) (New York, Harcourt Brace & Company, 7978), p.217 lhercalter referred
to asWillingl
7 This is especially true, Arendt thinks, of the temporal trnderstanding that pervades his work. See Arendt's discussion of
,,Traditioni,, p. A (OZalSO; in her "Introduction" tó her course "F istory of Political Thought" given at Berkeley in 1955'
8p lSoeteii uJ.s M o.r RThiset, Spitmotpinliucisty: Tohf eV iRsoioønd, tot¡ aEntse.r n\4itiyc,h (aCeal mCbharisdeg-,e i,n Ctroa.m Abrrnidogled UI.n Divaevrisdistyo rPù re(Cssh,i c1a9g6o7,) , Cph' icLa8g1o a nUdn iavlseors Pityie rPrer eHssa,b1o9t9,3), p'
98.
e Arendt,s rather severe reading of the irnplications of Plato's thought becomes clearer when this is taken into consideration An
interesting take on this relationãhip see Paul G. Kuntz, "Practice and Theory: Civic and Spiritual Virtues in Plotinus and
Augusdnã,' in Arbeit, Musse, Mediiation: Studies in Vita Actiaa a td Vitø Contemplatioa, Brian Vickers, (ed') (Zürich, Verlag der
Fachvereine, 1991).
J
The number of Ciceronian quotes by Arendt is not a coincidence as many of the elements in Arendt
that surprise a contemporary reader are evident in the works of a Roman mind. The Cicero that
Arendt saw is captured by Emerson when he describes Cicero's contribution to humanity as the
picture of a man thinking.lO Ttris man thinks with upmost human dignity and yet acknowledges
equally those elements of the human existence that guide and limit this thought; the human passions,
the individual's fraglltly, and the brief moment on earth between'not yet' and'no more/' Cicero,
writing for the citizen with a blend of the political and the contemplative, is Arendt's
unacknowledged role model'l1
These two influences must be seen, however, in the context of the Heideggerian in Arendt's
framework, especially his reading of temporality, which provides an indication of why Arendt tumed
to Kant to accomplish her final purpose. Returning to the early influence of Heidegger's reading of
Aristotle especially regarding the Greek's archøi, Arendt is seeking a foundation that contains the
principle. In the manner of this searcþ Arendt reflects Heidegger's methods discussed in Being and
Time.WhaT needs to be acknowledged is that Arendt's particular method of thinking was also a
statement of what she thought thinking was as a practice. FIer concern is with the 'break of tradition'
and its consequence for modernity and elements of thought in the succeeding era'12 Her reaction to
Heidegger's thinking was based on its futural perspective, one shared by Augustine, but yet
Augustine's also contains a relationship to the past. The 'not yet' in Heidegger's thought was integral
to the notion of understanding.ra The purpose of his new way of thinking was to unleash thought in
the present from that element of control. Flowever, the 'no more' was not entirely redundant in
relation to this methodology of thought. The past still had a role, if it could be harnessed
appropriately in a method of return and recovery.la This is clearly seen in Being and Time when
10 MacKendri essay "On the Oversoul" also suggested that the "soul
answers neve l{ow therefore can Augustine seek to speak and persuade
the ineffable? eks to use both persuasion and illumination as di¡ection for the
neighbour. For a further discussion of this see the int¡oduction by Quincy Howe Jr. lor Selected Sermons of St. Augustine, ttans.
and ed. Quincy Howe jr., (London, Victor Gollancz,1967), p' v
11 It is not a coincidence that when asked to write a laudatio for Karl ]aspers in Men in DarkTimes that Arendt turns to Cicero to
introduce her Karl Jaspers.
12 This is very evideniin her commentary on Benjamin that accompanied the collection of his essays she edited for publication.
See especially ,,Walter Benjamin: L892-\940: An Introduction" in Walter Benjamin, llluminøtions, Hannah A¡endt, (ed.) (London,
Fontana Prcss,7992), p. 50'
though it can mean in the presence (of someone or something),
root-structure thus detetmining it to mean the present (as in past
eing ønd Time, [Robinson translation], p. 47 , n.2'
be, this battle against those subtle forces conspiring to forgetfulness and thereby resulting in a loss of our own humanily is
Hannah Arendt's most enduring contribution to pótiticat th"oty." Bernstein follows this up saying that " . . it is a description
which has powerful normatirre ãonsequences . . ..-" though he never explicitly explains the possibilities of this understanding'
4