Hanisah Binte Abdullah Sani 1 Decentered despots

29 Pages·2017·0.23 MB·English

Hanisah Binte Abdullah Sani
Decentered despots: power and the making of the religious subject in the colonial state1
Abstract
Indirect rule singularly accounted for the massive expansion of British administration across
Asia and Africa from the late 19th century. However, this took a sharp turn several decades later
as the colonial administration grew more intrusive and heavy-handed over state matters. Most
significantly, the colonial state intensified the management and surveillance of religion on the
native states and debated over who qualified as a religious subject. Current explanations attribute
this to external pressures including a growing pan-Islamic and anti-colonial movement across the
colonies. This paper argues that surveillance on religion intensified in the early 20th century
because of stresses on the system of indirect rule characteristic of the principal and agent
problem. Using administrative reports, case files, and personal correspondences, this paper
examines the less considered paradox of indirect rule and how even as it accounted for imperial
expansion in late colonialism, it radically transformed the constitution of the native state by
decentering the native despot from his seat of traditional authority to eventually unravel indirect
rule from within.

1. Introduction
The study of state formation asks how to amass state power and maintain legitimate rule
(Herbst 2000, Adams 2002, Gorski 2003, Goldstone 2008, Mann 2012). This is especially so in
the context of the colonial state when rule is imposed from outside and from above often through
brute military might, which can then become too fragile and too costly to maintain for the long
run (Go 2009, Vu 2010, Steinmetz 2014, Wrytzen 2015). At its height, the British Empire was
the single largest empire in history comprising a quarter of the world’s population. Much of this
expansion from the late 19th century into the 20th century across Asia and Africa was attributed to
indirect rule (Fisher 1984, Robinson 1999). This was a form of governance where key features of
the native state such as its laws, religions, and customs were retained along with a co-opted
native leadership. Indirect rule, an inexpensive organizational solution was a most supreme
political innovation that solved the problem of legitimate rule in the colonial state. It is then

1 This is a draft of a working paper. Please do not circulate without permission. J
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puzzling when at the height of empire the administration reversed this long-standing policy. If
before, colonial administration on the Malay states minimally intervened in native affairs, it grew
more intrusive and heavy-handed over time. At the turn of the century, native affairs were no
longer safeguarded as the domain of traditional elites, following an unprecedented number of
administrative reports on religion and customs. These included reports on the importation of
publication material, legislation concerning religious teachings, and the propagation of religion.
Most conspicuously within this class of documents were reports on religious conversions. This
puzzle prompts a question for the colonial state formation literature: Why and how does the
compact of power and legitimacy in an indirectly ruled state breakdown?
Current explanations suggest that the empire had reached a critical point of organizational
mass during the early 20th century and so heaved under the weight of internal stresses. Further
compounded by the Great War (1914-18), the empire absorbed significant pressures both at
home and abroad, which undermined control over its extensive colonies. Others suggest that
native states grew increasingly belligerent due to a widespread anti-colonial sentiment at the turn
of the century, one that was distinctly religious in fervor that is the pan-Islamic movement across
the majority Muslim colonies (Lee 1942, Aydin 2007, Low 2008)2. Against explanations that
either focus on rot from within the empire or empowerment from across the colonies, I build on
literature on state formation to argue that the compact of power and legitimacy in the colonial
state broke down due to the principal and agent problem of parceling legitimate authority. In the
indirectly ruled state, labor required to sustain legitimate authority is categorically divided
between colonial administrators and native rulers3. Originally conceived to solve the problem of

2 Scholars disagree if there was indeed a concerted effort and real threat of pan-Islamic mobilization
or that it was imagined to be the case by an increasingly paranoid British empire.
3 Here I follow Weber’s typology of authority. Accordingly, there are three types of legitimate
authority that is legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic. I discuss these in greater detail in the
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alien control on native land, the delegation of native rulers to circumscribed domains of religion
and customs challenged the indivisible nature of traditional authority to undermine the structure
of the patrimonial state. This weakened the relationship between the ruler and his subjects to
ultimately unravel indirect rule from within. Because of this, the colonial administration sought
to fortify the patrimonial structure of traditional rule by reinforcing the bind between the native
ruler and his subjects through legal and rational means, including the codification of religious
laws and the systematization of the courts that administer them. This paper, which is an effort in
theory-building rather than theory-testing, aims to clarify indirect rule as a particular variant of
the principal and agent problem, which is that of parceling state power and types of legitimate
authority.
First, I show why the paradox of indirect rule is a theoretical problem for literature on
colonial state formation because of its controversial legacies on postcolonial state development
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002; Lange, Mahoney and Hau 2006; Gerring, Ziblatt and
van Gorp 2011). I discuss institutional literature on the legacies of colonial rule that suggest
indirect rule led to a politically fragmented state in the long run as evidenced in the plural legal
system and customary courts on postcolonial states (Lange 2004, 2006, 2009). Using the imagery
of the decentered despot, I theorize the paradox of power in indirect rule and consider how
colonial state power while successfully brokered through a network of principal and agents in the
short term, effectively undermined the indivisible nature of traditional authority to corrode the
structure of the patrimonial state and unravel indirect rule in the long run. I build this theory by
examining the case of the unfederated Malay states, and of Kelantan in particular, from 1903 to
1938 in three chronological sections so as to trace British administration from the heyday of

following sections.

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indirect rule, to the crisis of its administration, and finally to how it clamored to regain control on
native affairs. Finally, I discuss four cases of religious conversions in the colonial records to
illustrate how each case led to further legal and institutional reforms.

2. Decentered despots: the paradox of power in indirect rule
Indirect rule is a key feature of governance in late colonialism from the late 19th to the mid
20th centuries. Also referred to variably as hybrid rule, bifurcated state, rule by association,
institutional segregation4 or decentralized despotism5, it was a solution to the political problem of
governance in native states where centralized forms of traditional authority6 already exists7. By
the turn of the 20th century, territorial expansion on the British Empire in India, Malaya, Borneo,
and across Africa was attributed to indirect rule (Fisher 1984). In his seminal work, Mamdani
(1996) argued that shared governance of indirect rule produced the structure of mediated or
decentralized despotism. This was a system where native communities were reproduced within
the context of a spatial and institutional autonomy led by a native ruler who was either
selectively reconstituted or imposed on the hierarchy of the local state (17). In this case, natives
were subjected to a different system of laws that organized relations of labor, land, and loyalty
bound to native elites8. Indirect rule was devised as a political solution to the “native question”,

4 Both institutional segregation and rule by association were used in the French context of
colonialism.
5 Both bifurcated state and decentralized despotism were terms coined by Mamdani (1996) in the case
of British rule in Africa.
6 Gerring, Ziblatt, van Gorp and Arevalo (2011) suggest that indirect rule is the preferred form of
administration where the native state has a high level of “stateness”. This means when a state has high
measure of political centralization to include sovereignty, state capacity, infrastructural capacity, political
development, and institutionalization.
7 The architect of indirect rule was Frederick Lugard who applied this system of governance first on
the states of West Africa, and later expanded to other regions in Africa, in India and Malaya.
8 A system of decentralized despotism is contrasted with the centralized despotism of direct rule,
which is a feature of settler colonialism where natives were reintegrated and dominated in a semi-servile
and semi-capitalist agrarian relations (Mamdani 1996:17).
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which sought to stabilize alien rule in the colonies (Mamdani 1996, 2000; Herbst 2000).
And yet, as much as decentralized despotism was panacea to alien rule on the native state, it
presented a problem to the organization of political power, one that is less considered within the
literature. By his nature, the despot seeks complete domination and exercises indiscriminate will
over his subjects who were bound to him indefinitely. More often than not, this domination is
achieved through physical and ideological coercion so as to maintain a dependent and servile
subject class. What the system of decentralized despotism does is to disrupt this constitution of
patrimonial rule by restricting the otherwise unfettered power of the despot. This corrodes the
basis of his power to eventually transform the relationship between him and his subjects. As
despotic rule is decentralized in the colonial state, even more crucially it decenters the despot
from his seat of authority to gradually transform the hold he has over his subjects thus eroding
the basis of power and legitimacy in the traditional patrimonial polity. Over time, this gradual
corrosion of native power presents a serious problem for the colonial state since decentralized
despotism is only as successful as the strength of native rule.
This aspect of colonial rule that is the paradox of indirect rule presents a gap in our
understanding of colonial state formation during late colonialism. This affects how we assess the
ever-controversial legacy of colonial rule on postcolonial state development9, specifically what
remains of state politics following colonial rule (Subrahmanyam 2006, Staniland and
Naseemulah 2016). Institutional literature on the legacies of colonial rule argues that type of rule
that is direct or indirect depends on the strength of the precolonial polity (Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson 2002; Lange 2004, 2007; Mahoney, Lange and vom Hau 2006; Gerring, Ziblatt,

9 There is a lot of controversy on the topic of the legacies of the colonial state, which have recently
become a matter of heated discussion. Apologists of empire including Niall Ferguson (2003) and Deepak
Lal (2004) argue that the colonial experience brought great development into the colony. Others including
Acemoglu et.al (2002) argue that colonialism brought a “reversal of fortune” where rich precolonial states
became worse off and poor precolonial states became better off.
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van Gorp and Arevalo 2011). Where the measure of “stateness”, that is its degree of political
organization is high in the precolonial polity, the colonial administration will apply indirect rule.
This results in a politically fragmented state as evidenced in the measure of customary courts on
the state (Lange 2004, 2009)10. However, fragmented political authority in the indirectly ruled
state is yet under theorized. Specifically, the institutional outcomes that persist into the
postcolonial state and their controversial legacies, in this case the customary courts require
keener assessment.

2.1. The principal and agent problem of indirect rule
To theorize the paradox of power in indirect rule and the decentered despot, I make two
moves with the literature. Literature on state formation are in different ways addressing the
“agency problem”, that is how to keep state agents and other elites in line and how to structure
various incentives to do so. This is so since the accumulation of state power depends to a large
degree on the successful constitution and performance of state legitimacy (Reed 2019). At the
root of it, indirect rule is an organizational solution to a political problem that is to broker power
where state penetration or full domination is limited. Because of this, indirect rule presents yet
another variant of the principal-agent problem in the organizational literature on state formation
(Adams 1996, 2005). Accordingly, the principal-agent problem is a problem of control where the
agent (state officials) has more information and incentive to act independently of the principal
(ruler). This eventually undermines the structure of patrimonial power when state officials
choose to make decisions that will benefit themselves at the expense of the ruler. One excellent
illustration is the case of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in Batavia, now Jakarta in

10 The reverse is true in the case of a weak precolonial polity. Here, the colonial administration will
apply direct rule and organize a politically centralized state without customary courts.

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Indonesia, in the late 17th century. Here, Adams (1996) showed how the VOC through the
Heeren XVII (principal), gradually lost trade monopoly because colonial merchants who
managed the VOC factory (agents) had over time colluded with private and semiprivate traders
who also controlled the English East India Company (EIC) factories. These emergent trade links
eventually diminished the monopoly of the VOC to strengthen the prominence of the EIC in
Batavia. Since Adams, there has been a flurry of scholarship considering how trading empires
structured a system of actors and institutions to manage power in the patrimonial state (Ermakoff
2008, 2011; Norton 2014; Wang 2014; Erikson and Samila 2015). Accordingly, because the
patrimonial organization in trading empires was both a political and economic enterprise, power
in the patrimonial state was multivocal. It was multivocal because it attended to multiple and
interrelated organizational goals of extracting surplus and extending sovereign reach, which
meant that both economic and political goals were conjoined in their daily activities at each node
of the network (Adams 1996:15).
I extend this framework to consider how power is brokered through the patrimonial structure
of indirect rule in the colonial state (Charrad and Adams 2015). An important distinction
between the patrimonial network of Dutch trading empire and British indirect rule is that power
is not multivocal. Rather, power is categorically demarcated between colonial actors and native
rulers with the former taking charge of all state affairs while delegating matters to do with
religion and customs to the latter. At the signing of the Pangkor Treaty in 1874 that officiated
colonial incursion into the Malay States first through Perak and later extended to Selangor,
Pahang and Negeri Sembilan, the British Resident agreed to terms with Sultan Abdullah that the
Resident shall be consulted on all state affairs accept matters to do with religion and customs,
which will be left entirely to the Sultan. This cleaved state affairs into two distinct domains even
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though such a distinction did not exist in the first place. This categorical parceling of political
power in indirect rule solved the problem of multivocality. By relegating to traditional rulers the
domain of religion and customs, they were consequently fenced out of other state affairs
including trade, taxation and labor so as to ensure full autonomy for colonial administration in
matters of state extraction. Unlike the multivocal nature of power between the principal and his
agents in the trading empires, power in indirect rule was categorical.
The colonial administration’s categorical parceling of religion and customs to the native
rulers is so as to preserve but contain in a way that was most manageable the flourishing of
traditional authority between the native ruler and his subjects who make up the masses in the
colonial state. By siphoning traditional authority off to the native agent, colonial administration
figured they solved the problem of state legitimacy and management of the masses under alien
rule. However, the successful performance of traditional authority breaks down as soon as it is
curtailed. Therefore, the structure of indirect rule offered only a short-term solution to amassing
state legitimacy but was not sustainable in the long run.
During the early 20th century, indirect rule in Malaya began to unravel. In 1895, the four
western states signed a treaty of federation to come together under a centralized administration to
bring the state councils together under a federal council, which was established six years later in
1909. The Residents on each state reported to a Resident-General who then reported to the High
Commissioner who was also the Governor of the Straits Settlements. But this arrangement did
not last for very long and eventually broke down less than two decades later in 1927 with the
reorganization of the federal council. In between this time, the British administration pushed the
remaining five unfederated states on Malaya including Johore, Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis and
Kedah to join the federation to varying successes. To better understand the unraveling of British
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administration in Malaya, I examine the principal and agent relationship that organized indirect
rule. Specifically, how the categorical parsing of legitimate power created the problem of the
decentered despot to eventually unravel the principal and agent relationship that organized
indirect rule in the colonial state.

2.2. The indivisible nature of traditional authority
The next move to make with the literature is to refract the principal and agent framework of
indirect rule through a typology of legitimate authority. Weber (1922) suggests that there are
three types of legitimate authority i.e. traditional, charismatic and legal-rational. While they can
and do co-exist, it is often the case that at any one time one form of authority dominates.
Traditional authority is authority that has been accepted for the longest time and is typically
characteristic of the feudal state. Charismatic authority is wielded by a powerful personality and
often features in all state forms. Legal-rational authority is characteristic of the modern state
where individuals are bound by a system of rules and regulations. Under indirect rule, power is
categorically parcelized to ensure that there will not be overlaps in state affairs. This functional
differentiation and specialization is to solve the problem of multivocality. Most classical
theorists agree that division of labor will result in more effective governance. However, the
problem arises when this functional differentiation maps onto competing forms of authority, as is
the case with the traditional ruler in the colonial state. The parceling of state affairs and the
relegation of religion and customs to the traditional ruler both circumscribes and restricts his
power to eventually undermine the basis of his legitimacy. This highlights the nature of
traditional authority that is distinct from other types of authority. Just as how charismatic
authority depends on the longevity of the powerful individual and legal-rational authority
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depends on a sustained and formalized bureaucracy, traditional authority depends on the
complete and indiscriminate power of the ruler over his subjects. When the ruler ceases to wield
unmitigated power over his subjects, over time his authority will break down.
At the turn of the century, there was an upswell of mass disquiet across the Malay States.
Most notably, the To’ Janggut Rebellion11 on the state of Kelantan in 1915 alerted the colonial
administration to a growing rift between the native rulers and peasants. This was an
unprecedented situation that took the British administration by surprise. Before this, the
administration was supremely confident with the model of shared political power fashioned with
traditional rulers. So long as they secured buy-in among local rulers, they assumed the masses
were surely corralled. But they soon learned that mass rebellions were symptomatic of grassroots
disaffection with local rulers. Consequently, British administration reversed their longstanding
policy on the Malay States. For many decades they left religion and customs entirely to the
traditional rulers but this gradually changed at the turn of the century as the hold of traditional
rulers over their subjects flagged. To counter the unraveling of indirect rule on the Malay states,
the colonial administration conceived to strengthen the bind of the native subject to his
traditional ruler. To do this, they pushed for the rationalization of religious and customary laws
and the formalization of the courts that administer them in a bid to reinforce traditional authority
through legal and rational means.
If indirect rule was conceived to protect the patrimonial structure of the traditional Malay
polity through the categorical parceling of authority on the colonial state so as to maintain the
feudal relationship between the Malay ruler and his subjects, the less considered and unintended
consequence was that this system gradually eroded the very political structure it sought to

11 To’ is a Kelantanese honorific for an elder man and janggut is Malay for beard. The religious
symbolism of this rebel rouser, since the long beard often denotes male Muslim piety, is not lost to the
administration.
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