Great Dialogue of Nature and Space

215 Pages·1970·7.671 MB·English

by  Yves R. Simon

THE
GREAT
DIALOGUE
OF
NATURE
AND SPACE
Yves Simon
the great ideas of mankind
on the understanding
of nature, time, space
and the philosophy of science
The Great Dialogue
of
Nature and Space
Yves Simon
Edited by Gerard J. Dalcourt
jsixAGI BOOKS, INC.
33 Buckingham Dr. Albany, New York 12208
Copyright © 1970 by Paule Y. Simon
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 78-121000
SBN 87343-035-2
Manufactured in the United States of America by
the Hamilton Printing Co.
BOOKS BY YVES SIMON
Introduction a l’ontologie du connaitre
Critique de la connaissance morale
La Campagne d’Ethiopie et la pensee politique Fran^aise
Trois lemons sur le travail
Nature and Functions of Authority
La grande crise de la Republique Fran^aise
The March to Liberation
Prevoir et savoir
Community of the Free
Philosophy of Democratic Government
Freedom of Choice
A General Theory of Authority
The Tradition of Natural Law
Freedom and Community
The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space
CONTENTS
EDITOR’S PREFACE xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvii
I THE GREAT DIALOGUE OF NATURE AND SPACE
First main character is Aristotle, 1. Importance of recent
research on him, 2. Second main character is Descartes, 3.
Both wanted to develop a true science and philosophy of
nature, 4. History of the “saving the appearances’’ theory,
5. It is rejected by both Aristotle and Descartes, 8. The
notions of place, order and goodness, 9. Descartes adopted
a mathematical notion of order, 10. Aristotle’s view of the
sciences, 10. Mathematics not a natural science, 11. Des¬
cartes’ mathematization of nature, 13. Cartesian roots of
Idealism, 14. Main differences between Aristotle and Des¬
cartes, 17.
II HOW WE EXPLAIN NATURE
Wonder is the beginning of science, 21. So, art may serve
well as an introduction to philosophy, 22. Materialism is
the everlasting answer to the problem of change, 22. Mean¬
ings of materialism, 23. The importance of the anti-posi¬
tivist, Meyerson, 24. The early positivists, 24. Comte, 25.
Mach, 26. Meyerson’s notion of scientific explanation, 27.
Difficulties encountered in the interpretation of philosophers,
28. Meyerson’s Identity and Reality, 29. Materialism is
Parmenidean, 30. The kinds of change, 30. Meanings of
motion, 33.
vii
Vlll Contents
III THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF INERTIA
Both Aristotle and Descartes with all the mechanists grant
local motion a privileged position, 37. Descartes rejected
the Aristotelian notion of motion in favor of a mathematical
one, 37. Its fundamental feature is homogeneity, 39. Dif¬
ficulties involved by it, 41. Philosophical implications of
the principle of inertia, 43. The Galilean-Cartesian revolu¬
tion, 44. Philosophical interpretation of inertia still a ques¬
tion, 46. Evolution of Maritains’s views on inertia, 47. The
privilege of local motion in Aristotle results from his theory
of contrariety, 50. It is further based on the continuity of
motion that is entailed by the homogenity of quantity, 53.
Main differences between Descartes and Aristotle, 54.
IV THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHANGE
Aristotle defined motion in metaphysical terms, 59. Meyer-
son’s misinterpretation of the Aristotelian notion of potency,
60. The meaning of potency, 61. The logic of analogical
terms like act and potency, 63. Motion as an imperfect
act, 66. Aristotle’s examples of perfect acts, 67. Peirce, on
the contrary, considered thought to be only an action in
motion, 69. A further illustration: the difference between
a painter and a philosopher, 70. Motion involves two rela¬
tions of potentiality, 71. Bergson’s attempt to grasp the
reality of motion, 71. The difference between arrestation
and motion as exemplified in artistic activity, 73. Another
example: Zeno’s arrow, 74. The basic alternatives are a
teleological Aristotelianism and an anti-teleological mecha¬
nism, 74. Meyerson’s notion of teleology as an irrational,
77. His notion of reason seems similar to Kant’s, 78. And to
Polanyi’s, 74. Teleological explanations of nature are neces¬
sary but possible only to a limited extent, 80. The problem
is whether motion is a univocal or analogous concept, 81.
Aristotle considered it analogous, 82. The general criterion
of analogy applied to motion, 82. The broader concept of
motion, 83. Why philosophers use terms in extended senses,
83. In its broader senses motion is a metaphorical term, 84.
The difference between contemplation in God and in crea¬
tures, 85. But activity is an analogy of proper propor¬
tionality, 86.
Contents ix
V THE REAL AND THE IDEAL IN NATURE
The problem of the reality of motion, 89. Our concept of
motion has a unity that is not supplied by the real itself,
90. The same is true of time, 91. It is also true of non-
corporeal multitudes, 92. This helps explain the rise of
idealism, 93. This problem of motion is an instance of the
broader one of beings of reasons, 93. The meaning of “being
of reason,” 94. Logic is concerned primarily with them, 95.
They should not be confused with psychological realities, 97.
The meaning of “object,” 98. The relation between logic
and the real, 98. The degradation of logic, 99. Mathe¬
matical entities may also be beings of reason, 101. And they
always imply a condition of reason, 101. The myth of
mathematics, 102. The problem of abstraction versus con¬
struction, 103. It was falsified by the empiricists, 104.
Metaphysics also has its beings of reason, 105. Beings of
reason without a foundation in reality, 105. Relations may
also be beings of reason, 106. The unity of motion is a being
of reason, 107. This view does not entail the subjectivizing
of nature, 109. The error of confusing time as real and as a
being of reason, 109.
VI PLACE AND SPACE
The meaning of place and space: continuation of the
Aristotelico-Cartesian dialogue, 113. Modern thinkers tend
to consider space a primitive notion, 113. But Aristotle did
not, 114. Aristotle’s categories and place, 114. His theory
of place is the main one, 115. It is based on the fact of
anti-metastasis, 115. The relation of philosophy to facts, 115.
Aristotle’s notion of place, 116. His final elaboration of it,
117. His classic definition of it, 118. The motionlessness
of place entails difficulties, 118. As a result, scientists prefer
to speak of space, 119. The relation between place and
space, 119. Space may be real or a being of reason, 114.
Space and idealism, 121. For Descartes there are no natural
places, 121. Aristotle and teleology, 122. For him finality
involved place being natural, 123. The teleology of place
is relative to the universe, 123. The Stoics, 123. The Stoic
universe, 124. Aristotle’s relation to the Stoics, 125. Sum¬
mary, 125. Conclusion, 126.
X Contents
VII TIME
The Aristotelian discussion of time is basic, 129. Analysis
of Aristotle’s procedure, 129. The problem of the reality
of time, 131. Time is a being of reason, 131. Time not
identical with motion, 132. Time as duration, 132. Dura¬
tion with and without motion, 133. Activity and duration
without motion are qualitatively supreme but brief, 133.
Notion of duration is analogous, 134. Usefulness of poets
on the subject of time, 136. Newtonian and Kantian time a
simulacrum, 136.
VIII PHILOSOPHERS AND FACTS
I. The Notion of Empirical Science. Ambiguity of the terms
“empirical science” and “deductive science,” 139. The points
of view from which the various sciences may be said to be
rational or empirical, 139. Since all sciences are based on
facts, the problem is to determine the nature of the facts
on which philosophy is founded, 144. II. The Notion of
Fact. Facts are empirical absolutes, 144. The differentiation
of the various sorts of facts, 145. It is impossible to incor¬
porate into philosophy a scientific fact as such, 149. III.
The Myth of a Philosophy Based on Scientific Facts. Scientism
is rife among scientists, 149. It has also been adopted by
various philosophers, 150. As Bergson has shown, it is
sophistic, 151. IV. Common, Scientific and Philosophical Ex¬
perience. All the fundamental philosophical facts are derived
from common experience, 153. But many vulgar facts are
not philosophical ones, 154. Philosophical facts may also
be derived from scientific experience, 155. The establish¬
ment of moral facts, 158.
IX SCIENCE, SCIENTISM AND REALISM
I. Epistemological Pluralism. Scientism and its opponents,
163. Philosophical disciplines are the most truly scientific,
165. Science has evolved pluralistically, 166. The reaction
of various Thomists, 167. Scientism the counterpart of
ontological integralism, 169. Pluralism justified by the
analogy of being, 169. II. The Reality of Scientific Objects.
Some apologists make use of a faulty epistemology, 170.
Contents xx
Some principles of criticism, 171. Philosophy seeks to know
the real just as it is, 172. The problem of scientific theories
of structure, 173. The physicist as such seeks the real but
as mathematician does not, 174. III. Philosophical Experi¬
ence. The philosopher must establish his own facts, 177.
X CHANCE AND DETERMINISM IN PHILOSOPHY
AND SCIENCE
I. Chance. Chance for the physicists, 181. And for com¬
mon sense, 181. And for Cournot, 183. Common sense
view is governed by practical concerns, 183. II. Chance and
Determinism. Indeterminacy presupposes determinacy, 184.
Contingent beings have an historical necessity, 185. Some
have claimed for them an essential necessity, 185. But
chance events do not have a real cause, 186. Why rationalists
deny the reality of chance, 187. Common sense explanations
of chance, 188. Chance and providence, 190. III. Chance
on the Microphysical Level. Chance here plays a greater
role, 190. So, statistical laws replace causal ones, 191. This
constitutes perhaps the most radical of all scientific revolu¬
tions, 192. It has led some to deny any order in the world,
194. IV. Indeterminism in Physics. Different philosophical
frames of reference possible, 195. Determinism for the
physicists, 197. Physics’ “Crisis of Indeterminism,” 198.
Philosophic consequences, 198. V. Philosophy within Sci¬
ence. Planck’s realism, 200. Antinomic tendencies of scien¬
tists, 202. Two states of the philosophy of nature, 203. Im¬
portance of cosmic images, 203.
EDITOR’S PREFACE
Yves Simon was born in Cherbourg in 1903. Despite a child¬
hood illness which left him lame, he pursued his studies vigor¬
ously. After attending the Lycee Louis Le Grand in Paris, he
did graduate work at the University of Paris where, besides tak¬
ing his licenciate in letters, he also received a diploma of higher
studies in philosophy and a certificate of studies in the sciences.
After four years in medical school he decided to dedicate him¬
self totally to philosophy and so went on to take his licenciate
and then his doctorate in philosophy at the Catholic Institute in
Paris.
After teaching for eight years at the Catholic University of
Lille, he was invited in 1938 to the University of Notre Dame,
where he stayed for ten years. He then joined the Committee of
Social Thought of the University of Chicago Graduate School,
where he taught until 1959 when illness forced his retirement.
During his whole teaching career he was also in great demand
as a lecturer; the reasons why this was so are well exemplified by
his Aquinas Lecture at Marquette on The Nature and Func¬
tions of Authority and the Charles Walgreen Lectures at the
University of Chicago, entitled Philosophy of Democratic
Government. They manifest the same qualities which made him
one of the great teachers of our time: depth and clarity of vision
combined with a flashing lucidity. He died in 1961.
Simon’s voluminous output deals mainly with three areas:
political philosophy, metaphysics and ethics. Especially note¬
worthy are his Introduction a I’ontologie du connaitre, Critique
Xlll