Grand Strategy in the War Against Terrorism PDF
Preview Grand Strategy in the War Against Terrorism
GRAND STRATEGY IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM Also in this series Non-State Threats and Future Wars edited by Robert J.Bunker Deterrence in the 21st Century edited by Max E.Manwaring Peace Operations Between War and Peace edited by Erwin A.Schmidl Towards Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations edited by Max G.Manwaring and John T.Fishel Warriors in Peacetime:The Military and Democracy in Latin America edited by Gabriel Marcella Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War edited by Peter R.Young GRAND STRATEGY IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM Editors THOMAS R.MOCKAITIS De Paul University, Chicago PAUL B.RICH University of Cambridge FRANK CASS LONDON • PORTLAND, OR First published in 2003 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED Crown House, 47 Chase Side Southgate, London N14 5BP This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS c/o ISBS, 920 NE 58th Avenue, Suite 300, Portland, Oregon 97213–3786 Website: www.frankcass.com Copyright © 2003 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Grand strategy in the war against terrorism 1. War on Terrorism, 2001–2. Strategy 3. Special operations (Military science) 4. Islam and terrorism 5. World politics, 1995–2005 I. Mockaitis, Thomas R., 1955–II. Rich, Paul B., 1950–III. Small wars and insurgencies 363.3’2’0973 ISBN 0-203-48908-X Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-58276-4 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-7146-5313-6 (cloth) ISBN 0-7146-8268-3 (paper) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Grand strategy in the war against terrorism/editors, Thomas R.Mockaitis, Paul B.Rich —1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5313-6 (Hardback)–ISBN 0-7146-8268-3 (Paperback) 1. War on Terrorism, 2001–2. Strategy. I. Mockaitis, Thomas R., 1955–II. Rich, Paul B., 1950–III. Title. HV6431.G728 2003 973.931–dc22 2003016417 This group of studies first appeared in a Special Issue on ‘Grand Strategy in the West Against Terrorism’ of Small Wars & Insurgencies (ISSN 0959–2318) 14/1 (Spring 2003) published by Frank Cass All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers of this book. Contents Preface vii Introduction 1 Paul B.Rich Winning Hearts and Minds in the ‘War on Terrorism’ 21 Thomas R.Mockaitis Al Qaeda and the Radical Islamic Challenge to Western Strategy 39 Paul B.Rich Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’: A Victory for a Conventional 55 Force Fighting an Unconventional War Warren Chin United States Special Operations Forces and the War on Terrorism 75 Anna Simons and David Tucker Warfare by Other Means: Special Forces, Terrorism and Grand 89 Strategy Alastair Finlan Muslims, Islamists and the Cold War 105 Ghada Hashem Talhami An Ambivalent War: Russia’s War on Terrorism 123 Stephen Blank 11 September 2001 and the Media 147 Philip Towle Bringing it All Back Home: Hollywood Returns to War 163 Susan L.Carruthers Information Age Terrorism and Warfare 177 Kevin A.O’Brien Conclusion: The Future of Terrorism Studies 201 Thomas R.Mockaitis vi Abstracts 207 About the Contributors 211 Index 213 Preface The title of this volume names a fervent hope rather than an actual reality. Nothing like a ‘grand strategy’ currently directs the war on terrorism. Since 11 September 2001, Washington has crafted some ad hoc responses to perceived terrorist threats, focusing in particular on state sponsorship. Following the successful campaign in Afghanistan, the US has moved on to Iraq with a handful of reluctant allies trailing in its wake. Meanwhile a sultry covert war grinds inexorably on, scoring small victories along the way—an arrest here, an assassination there, an occasional interdiction somewhere else. All of these moves target Al Qaeda, affiliated organizations or individuals. Not a single policy initiative addresses the root causes of terrorism. Each of the following essays addresses an aspect of what should be a comprehensive strategy for the current war. All the authors share some key assumptions. They see terrorism as a weapon, not an end in itself. Al Qaeda and its affiliates operate in a host of countries with the tacit if not active support of at least some segment of the larger population. Each writer recognizes that while military force must be applied, it is neither the only nor even the primary means of confronting the threat. Special forces have figured prominently in the struggle and will continue to do so because they are best equipped to do civic action and to use force in a highly focused manner. American special forces, however, have concentrated too much on their military task and not enough on their civic action role. Civic action is, in fact, ‘winning hearts and minds’ by a different name. ‘Hearts and minds’ has been trivialized without being understood. Stripped of sentiment and ideology it means nothing more than addressing the causes of unrest upon which an insurgency feeds. By addressing these causes threatened states can hope to wean moderates away from extremists and perhaps elicit cooperation that produces sound intelligence upon which military forces can act. None of these ideas is new. Many of us have been presenting them over the past decade or longer. We have watched counterinsurgency become low-intensity conflict and then morph into operations other than war and now become ‘counter- terrorism’. A rose by any other name has just as many thorns. The shape of the threat keeps changing but not its essential nature. The context in which these shadow wars must be fought has, however, changed dramatically. To use a cliché, viii the world has grown smaller and much more interconnected. Satellites, mobile phones, and the Internet allow for rapid communication to all parts of the globe. They have extended the reach of information and ideas and unavoidably magnified the scope and range of terror. Several of the essays in this issue deal with the crucial aspect of information warfare. No scholarly work can ever claim to be definitive, least of all one compiled in just over a year since the event it analyzes. Research and publication are, however, part of a dialogue, an on-going conversation in which one work stimulates further study and generates new ideas. With that end in mind we offer this collection of essays in the hope that it will start or at least be part of an exchange that some day leads to a grand strategy in this war that seems likely to be with us for a long time to come. THOMAS MOCKAITIS, Chicago, 111. PAUL RICH, London, June 2003 Introduction PAUL B.RICH The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001and subsequent activities of Al Qaeda and its allies have given vent to considerable debate over the nature and role of international terrorism in the post-Cold War global order. Al Qaeda is one of several of examples of what some analysts see as a new form of ‘new’ or ‘postmodern’ international terrorist organisation which is neither securely linked to any one particular state patron nor especially constrained by any limits on the use of violence.1 Al Qaeda has proved to be a remarkable and highly adaptive international network of terrorist organisations which, since 11 September 2001, have been capable of regrouping into a series of looser organisations that have launched a series of smaller bomb attacks, of which the most spectacular to date has been the bombing in the island of Bali in October 2002.2 Al Qaeda has shifted its focus to smaller scale operations using a large number of new recruits and has shown itself capable of responding to the US-led campaign that overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, depriving it of its major base of operations. The surprise and ferocity of the attacks have ensured that Al Qaeda and its supposed ‘leader’ Osama bin Laden a status verging on the mythological in contemporary media portrayals of terrorism. Perhaps much of this is due to a general combination in many Western journalistic circles of fear and fascination. In reality it is likely, as the interior minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Nayef, has suggested, that bin Laden is really the instrument of a much wider organisation and is only at the ‘top’ of Al Qaeda from the mass media’s point of view.3 A similar view has been expressed by some Western writers, including the novelist Gore Vidal who has suggested that the figure of a lone crazy man bin Laden has been chosen by a ‘Bush junta’ in Washington to help persuade the US public to support a war in Afghanistan.4 There are certainly some Scarlet Pimpernel qualities to bin Laden who appears to have the capacity to disappear and then miraculously resurface in some new region of the world. Even if bin Laden is eventually killed and Al Qaeda defeated, the organisation will in all likelihood continue to have the capacity to reproduce itself—like a magic broom—and create a whole new series of terrorist organisational networks in the Middle East and| Islamic world that will continue to threaten Western interests and security.
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