Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality

317 Pages·2011·2.71 MB·English

by  David Baggett

Title Pages
(p. iv )
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• Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
• Baggett, David.
• Good God: the theistic foundations of morality / David Baggett and
Jerry L.Walls
• p. cm.
• Includes bibliographical references and index.
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• ISBN 978-0-19-975181-5 (pbk.: alk. paper)—ISBN
978-0-19-975180-8 (hardback : alk. paper)
• 1. Religion and ethics. 2. Religious ethics. I. Walls, Jerry L. II.
Title.
• BJ47.B34 2011
• 205—dc22 2010020028
• 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
• Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
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Foreword
The topics of God and morality have been deeply connected throughout the history of
philosophy, and the precise nature of this connection has been a source of lively debate
for just as long. Both concepts raise issues of perennial importance for human life and
our sense of our ultimate place in the world.
In recent years, questions about this connection have taken on additional weight.
There's been something ironically akin to an emotional camp-meeting style revival
among contemporary intellectual critics of religion who, in a torrent of immensely
popular books, have adopted the tone of an almost evangelical form of atheism, as odd
as that might sound. They write with great panache and pointed argument against the
truth and even basic reasonableness of religious belief, but the most salient feature of
their recent work might be their high-pitched rhetoric of moral outrage.
These “new atheists” in all the major bookstore chains fervently urge their readers
to adopt the view that any form of theism offering itself in the marketplace of actual
religious ideas—whether in a temple, mosque, synagogue, or church—is false, irrational,
and morally offensive. It's especially this latter charge that seems to fuel the entire
enterprise. In their appeal to readers, their rhetoric seems to rely on a fairly robust sense
of moral good and evil, as well as right and wrong. In fact, their arguments appear to
appeal both explicitly and implicitly to objective moral standards that, in their view, the
(p. x ) major theistic religions of the world flout. But honest accounts of the metaphysical
status characterizing the objective morality on which they take their stand are in short
supply.
To put the question as simply as possible: What would be the objective, ontological
nature of a moral principle, or moral standard, in a world where mind, soul, and
personhood were completely reducible to materialistic entities—whether finally spelled
out in the language of matter or physical energy? It's difficult, if not just impossible,
for these critics of theism to come up with an answer that seems any less “strange”
than the ultimate components of the philosophical worldview they are urging us so
passionately to avoid. But, notoriously, rejecting any objectively metaphysical basis
for moral judgments reduces them to some form of “I don't like it” or “My peer group/
cultural context/posse of fellow skeptics doesn't like it.” And this takes a considerable
amount of the sting out of any moral outrage that's being shown, to put it mildly.
Now, of course, the critics could argue that on any theistic metaphysical account of
the objectivity of moral principles as ideas in the mind of God, or as reflections of
the character of God, or as the necessary and eternal results of certain distinctively
divine actions, believers, if they were honest, should find many of their own views
just as morally reprehensible as the critics purport them to be. So, even if current
critics don't have the metaphysical leverage for a true and objectively compelling moral
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critique of theistic religion as it has played out through history, they could still mount
an inconsistency charge at all theists who endorse God as both morally perfect and
somehow the ontologically grounding source of moral objectivity. A perfectly good
being, they could argue, just would not command the slaughter of heathen, infidels, or
innocents, as the various primary religious literatures sometimes represent. But this
is not the strategy they need to justify their own intense righteous indignation about
religion and their efforts to offer generally persuasive arguments in favor of the atheistic
parsimony.
Atheists need to get as clear on the concept of God, the concept of morality, and the
ontological status of the purported referents of each of these concepts, as do the theists
whose views they eschew. And that's where the current book comes in and does quite a
job. David Baggett and Jerry Walls present some extremely creative and clear-headed
work here to untangle the cluster of issues surrounding all this. They are very well
informed about the classical and current positions that have been staked out on these
issues, and they are also suitably bold to take their own positions in ways that, in
my view, advance the discussion considerably. The arguments and clarifications in
these pages would be interesting (p. xi ) enough in their own right, but in light of the
current state of the public debate between theism and atheism, they take on even more
significance. We can only hope that all parties to the dispute will take a time-out to
explore these fundamental issues, read this book, and realize deeply all that is at stake in
their proper understanding.
Thomas V. Morris
Wilmington, North Carolina (p. xii )
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Acknowledgments
It's our delight to spend some moments identifying the many folks without whose
help this project could have never been accomplished. Dave's mentors Bill Stine, Herb
Granger, Mike McKinsey, and Bruce Russell provided invaluable help, unstinting advice,
and helpful criticisms on earlier drafts of various chapters. A dear old Wayne State
friend, Sloan Lee, has been a great source of encouragement and critique for over fifteen
years now, and words can't begin to express our appreciation to him; his comments on
some key chapters were a great help. Other old friends from years ago at Wayne, like
Steve Patterson, Ron Butzu, and Brian MacPherson, all deserve prominent mention and
warm thanks as well.
Elton Higgs, now an emeritus professor of English at the University of Michigan-
Dearborn and a longtime friend, deserves very special mention and thanks. Other
undergraduate professors of Dave's from UM-D many years ago, Paul Hughes and Elias
Baumgarten, were first instrumental at engendering his interest in these topics.
Mutual friend Mike Peterson of Asbury College was particularly helpful in enabling
us to lay out the chapter on the problem of evil, for which we're deeply appreciative.
Jerry's Notre Dame friends David Elliot, Alan Rhoda, and Claire Brown provided helpful
criticism (David read the whole manuscript). Thanks to each of you, along with Jerry's
former student Kyle Blanchette who, like Dave Elliot, read the whole manuscript for us,
offering a variety of useful criticisms and suggestions. And former Notre Dame professor
and (p. xiv ) now public philosopher extraordinaire, Tom Morris, deserves thanks as
much as anyone, both for his encouragement and support, as well as his groundbreaking
work in philosophical theology that helped shape so many of our own views, not to
mention the Foreword.
Dave's longtime friends Ginger Asel and Cathy Chulis provided, appropriately enough,
crucial moral support. LU friends Thom Provenzola, Ed Martin, Gary Habermas, Dave
Beck, Mike Jones, Gaylen Leverett, and Mark Foreman deserve many warm thanks as
well for their assistance at key junctures of the project. Thanks to LU for providing Dave
with a course reduction in the spring of 2009, which helped immensely in bringing the
project to conclusion. A group of students at LU deserve special mention, meeting with
Dave once a week during the fall 2009 term at Barnes and Noble to go over a chapter
of the book while imbibing insane quantities of caffeine, offering their takes and asking
their sometimes challenging questions: Lucas DelPriore, Michael Anthony Stearns,
Michael Huesser, Steven Oakley, Joshua Walker, and Mark Dickson. We're excited to
anticipate the trajectory of your careers; it's been an honor working with you.
Thanks to the philosophy club at King's College and LU for spirited discussions
(apologies for not mentioning all the students involved, although we must specifically
mention Samuel Loncar, Steve Hudson, J. T. and Roger Turner, Maria Owen, Ryan
Page 1 of 2 Acknowledgments
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Andrews, Albie Powers, Mike Pasquini, Wesley Grubb, and David Lahm). We received
helpful insight and criticism from attendees (especially John Hare) at a 2003 Oxford
Philosophy conference hosted by the SCP and BPS, the participants in the philosophy
colloquium at the 2005 Oxbridge conference, the Virginia Philosophical Association
meeting in Lynchburg in 2009, the 2007 and 2009 Evangelical Philosophical Society
meetings in San Diego and New Orleans, respectively, and the Eastern regional meeting
of the Society of Christian Philosophers at Wake Forest in 2010. James Madison's Bill
Knorpp deserves many thanks for pressing us on issues relating most particularly to
the first appendix. Thanks to Alvin Plantinga and Mark Murphy for access to yet-to-be-
published papers read at the Notre Dame weekly philosophy colloquium. Greg Bassham,
Bill Irwin, Regan Reitsma, Bill Drumin, Henry Nardone, and Kim Blessing, old friends
at King's, are all warmly thanked and remembered.
Thanks to Philosophia Christi for permission to reprint portions of “On Whether God
Can Sin,” Fall 2003, and “Bruce Russell's Analogy and the Problem of Evil,” Winter
2006; and to Eerdmans Publishing Company for permission to reprint a slightly
modified version of “Outrageous Evil and the Hope of Healing: Our Practical Options,”
which first appeared in Immersed in the Life of God, edited by Paul L. Gavrilyuk et al.
(2008).
(p. xv ) Jerry wishes to thank the Center for Philosophy of Religion at Notre Dame,
where he spent the 2009–2010 academic year as a Research Fellow, which allowed
significant time to work on this book among other projects. Thanks also to Karen “Katie”
Tallon for suggesting the title over lunch one day.
It has been a pleasure, as always, to work with Cynthia Read and Oxford University
Press. Thanks to Ashley Polikoff, production coordinator at OUP; Dorothy Bauhoff, the
copyeditor; and J. Olivia Mary, project manager at Spi Global, for their excellent work.
Finally, I (Dave) would like to thank my co-author, who is one of my dearest and oldest
friends and most important mentors. (p. xvi )
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Introduction
David Baggett
Jerry L. Walls
In July 2009, former NFL quarterback Steve McNair, a married father of four children,
was found dead, along with his twenty-year-old girlfriend Sahel “Jenny” Kazemi. The
story made national news for several days when it was discovered that she had shot him
and then turned the gun on herself, because she was distraught when she came to the
conclusion that he was not going to marry her, contrary to what she had apparently been
led to believe. As the story unfolded, it also sparked considerable debate about McNair's
legacy, because he was very popular and highly admired, not only in Tennessee where
he had played for most of his career and continued to live, but in the larger athletic
community as well. Many came forward with tributes to McNair as a great leader and
a model citizen because of community service he had done in both Tennessee and his
home state of Mississippi, while others argued that the recently disclosed facts about his
life disqualified him from such a lofty status.
One of McNair's more provocative critics was the controversial sportswriter Jason
Whitlock, who pointedly took exception to the notion that McNair was a great leader,
1
noting that leadership begins at home. What is interesting for our purposes are the
reasons that Whitlock was critical of McNair. He made it clear from the outset that
he was not assuming the role of “morality police,” and a few short paragraphs later
reiterated that he was “not some sanctimonious moralizer.” McNair's extramarital affair
was not what bothered him. What did bother him, however, was that McNair showed
(p. 2 ) himself to be a lousy father by spending “so much time chasing a Nashville
waitress that he created the impression he lived with her.” Fatherhood, he noted, is a
serious responsibility that requires substantial commitment and sacrifice. Children
deserve our very best and should never have to settle for anything less.
What we find both fascinating and telling here is the fact that Whitlock engages in
some rather serious moral judgment of a fellow human being while denying that he is
“some sanctimonious moralizer.” In so doing, his analysis and critique are fairly typical
reflections of the postmodern moral condition.
It has often been observed that postmodernity is characterized by fragmentation, a
deep sense of incoherence resulting from the shattered visions of modernity. This
is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the moral realm, where pre-modern and
modern accounts of right and wrong have largely been rejected, even while vestiges
and fragments of traditional morality may still be retained and hold conviction. What
is often perplexing is why those fragments remain and continue to have force. So one
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