Good Advice: Information & Policy Making in the White House

258 Pages·2000·1.591 MB·English

by  Daniel E. Ponder

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Good Advice
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Number Five
The Joseph V. Hughes, Jr., and Holly O. Hughes
Series in the Presidency and Leadership Studies
General Editor
James P. Pfiffner
Series Editorial Board
Peri Arnold
H. W. Brands
George C. Edwards III
Fred I. Greenstein
Erwin C. Hargrove
Charles O. Jones
Martha Joynt Kumar
Roger Porter
Stephen J. Wayne
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Good
Advice
Information &
Policy Making in
the White House
D A N I E L E . P O N D E R
Texas A&M University Press
College Station
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Copyright © 2000 by Daniel E. Ponder
Manufactured in the United States of America
All rights reserved
First edition
(cid:2)(cid:3)The paper used in this book meets the minimum requirements
of the American National Standard for Permanence
of Paper for Printed Library Materials, z39.48-1984.
Binding materials have been chosen for durability.
Texas A&M University Press expresses its appreciation for support
in publishing works on the presidency and leadership to
The Center for Presidential Studies
George Bush School of Government and Public Service
Texas A&M University
For a complete list of books in print in this series, see the back of the book.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ponder, Daniel E., 1966–
Good advice : information and policy making in the White House /
Daniel E. Ponder.—1st ed.
p. cm. — (Joseph V. Hughes, Jr., and Holly O. Hughes series in the
presidency and leadership studies ; no. 5)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn0-89096-913-2 (cloth)
1. Presidents—United States—Staff. 2. Political planning—United States.
3. United States—Politics and government—1977–1981. I. Title. II. Series.
jk552.p66 2000
352.23(cid:2)0973—dc21
99-047705
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To the memory of Patrick Joseph Fett (1959–96)
and
in celebration and anticipation of the life of Patrick Daniel Ponder (b. 1997)
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Contents
Preface ix
Part I. Theoretical Underpinnings
Chapter 1.Foundations of Presidential Analysis 5
Chapter 2.Presidents, the Presidency, and Information:
A Framework 22
Chapter 3.Analytic Method 48
Part II. Jimmy Carter’s White House
Chapter 4.Staff as Policy Director: The Department of Education
and Youth Employment 63
Chapter 5.Staff as Facilitator: Welfare Reform and Energy II 104
Chapter 6.Staff as Monitor: National Health Insurance and Civil
Service Reform 131
Part III. Conclusions and Implications
Chapter 7.Presidents and the Political Use of Policy Information 175
Notes 201
Bibliography 227
Index 237
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Preface
This book is about the politics of presidential advice. Specifically, it traces
how different modes of information (political and substantive) are inte-
grated into workable policy for the president. As such, it takes its cue from
many who have passed this way before. For example, advice interacts
stronglywiththevariousinformationperspectivesindeterminingthebar-
gainingtermsapresidentpursues.1MatthewDickinsonnotesthatRichard
Neustadt argues the best way to determine a president’s optimal bargain-
ing leverage is to acquire information in order to determine the trade-offs
and consequences of various bargaining choices.2Neustadt himself holds
that “a president is helped by what he gets into his mind. His first essential
need is for information.”3
In weaving an analysis of information and advice with staff dynamics,
this book fits into the larger literature of the presidency by providing a de-
tailed examination of the advisory process as it relates to the behavioral
consequences of presidential incentives and the preferences derived from
thoseincentives.Italsoexaminesthesubsequentquestionsoforganization
andinformationgatheringanddissemination.Acollateralinterestthatfur-
ther guides my analysis is whether or not there is a trade-off between the
president’s dependence on the competent policy advice of agents in the
bureaucracy on one hand, and the White House staff, which is assumed to
be responsive to the president, on the other. These two sets of advisers of-
ten differ in the kinds of advice they offer. In turn, these different advisory
perspectives can lead to very different conceptualizations of the shape pol-
icy initiatives should take. Furthermore, they often differ in their analysis
of outcomes relating to information gathering and processing, policy and
political analysis, and the character of presidential relationships with other
political actors. In short, these processes can yield outcomes that are re-
sponsive to presidential or bureaucratic goals, programmatic expertise, or
combinations thereof. My purpose in this book is to trace these dynamics
withinPres.JimmyCarter’sadministration,andtodrawlessons,whereap-
propriate, for the larger enterprise of presidency research.
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x Preface
The idea for this book can be traced back to a seminar on the presi-
dency and executive politics I took with Erwin C. Hargrove at Vanderbilt
University in the spring of 1990. One of the readings was Terry Moe’s
seminal work on the politicized presidency.4 I found Moe’s emphasis on
the decline of neutral competence and the rise of a politicized executive
branch to be fascinating developments in the larger context of American
politics and political institutions.
I subsequently determined that I could, through the study of a number
of well-chosen cases, “turn Moe on his head” by showing that presidents
do not necessarily centralize over time. I had a normative bias against cen-
tralization and hoped to prove that presidents need not centralize and, em-
pirically, do not. However, as I got farther and farther into theories and
hard evidence, I became more and more convinced that Moe was right
after all. One thing I did notice was that, although Carter did centralize
his policy-making apparatus in the White House, there was considerable
variation in his Domestic Policy Staff’s involvement. That finding led me
to trace variations in the centralizing strategy and ultimately resulted in
this book.
I benefited greatly from the valuable guidance the members of my dis-
sertation committee provided me. For their hard work and endless pa-
tience,IthankRobertH.Birkby,GeorgeJ.Graham,HughDavisGraham,
andBenjaminWalter.ErwinHargrove,thecommitteechair,deservesspe-
cial mention. He was always finding subtle and, unfortunately, not-so-
subtle flaws in my logic or analysis, provided unlimited encouragement,
and shared freely his seemingly bottomless insight into American politics.
He has continued to provide me with his unfailing support, including
reading and rereading drafts of the book manuscript, with enthusiasm for
the project and unfailing good humor. He has proven to be a most remark-
able mentor and friend.
My list of debts is long, but I am happy to acknowledge them. Suzanne
Werner was given the unenviable task of listening to me work out the
problems and issues as I grappled with them. I did the same for her, which
made it all the more special because neither of us had any real clue about
what the other was talking about. She and her husband Tim fed me warm
meals and let me sleep on their couch during my many data-collecting
trips to Atlanta, and I thank them for their hospitality and, especially, their
friendship.
Doug Lemke is a friend like no other. Intellectually curious, he was the
perfect graduate school companion. We have remained friends and confi-
dants through the subsequent humbling experience of job hunting and
settling into academic life.
Many others affected my career in general and the many drafts of this