Going To War With Iraq: A Comparative History Of The Bush Presidencies PDF
Preview Going To War With Iraq: A Comparative History Of The Bush Presidencies
THE EVOLVING AMERICAN PRESIDENCY Going to War with Iraq A Comparative History of the Bush Presidencies Joseph M. Siracusa Laurens J. Visser The Evolving American Presidency Series Editors Michael A. Genovese Loyola Marymount University Los Angeles, CA, USA Todd L. Belt Graduate School of Political Management George Washington University Washington, DC, USA This series is stimulated by the clash between the presidency as invented and the presidency as it has developed. Over time, the presidency has evolved and grown in power, expectations, responsibilities, and authority. Adding to the power of the presidency have been wars, crises, depressions, industrialization. The importance and power of the modern presidency makes understanding it so vital. How presidents resolve challenges and paradoxes of high expectations with limited constitutional resources is the central issue in modern governance and the central theme of this book series. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14437 Joseph M. Siracusa • Laurens J. Visser Going to War with Iraq A Comparative History of the Bush Presidencies Joseph M. Siracusa Laurens J. Visser School of Global Studies School of Global Studies Royal Melbourne Institute Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology of Technology Melbourne, VIC, Australia Melbourne, VIC, Australia The Evolving American Presidency ISBN 978-3-030-30162-0 ISBN 978-3-030-30163-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30163-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Joel Carillet / E+ / Getty Image This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland P reface The Persian Gulf, standing astride the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important choke points, remains an alluring, intractable, and hazardous region for political, social, and economic interests, as suc- cessive US administrations have found out. Incidentally, it is for those very same reasons that the Persian Gulf remains an area of diverse research and academic inquiry. With crises occurring, once again, across the Middle East, the Persian Gulf has returned to the forefront of the political minds of many, not least the decision-makers in Washington, who feel the over- whelming pressure of history as they seek to unravel and navigate the American presence in the region. This research began with the intention of illustrating, through the col- lection of historical materials, the United States at war with Iraq since 1991, stressing that the 2003 intervention against Saddam Hussein was just the latest military foray into a war with Iraq that had never ended. However, as a picture emerged of US presidents deciding to go to war, there were two presidents and two conflicts, in particular, that came into focus, and the research shifted into a comparative history of George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, father and son, facing the issue of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein at home and abroad, and the resulting conflict with Iraq. Of all the literature that purports to show a history of contemporary US foreign policy in Iraq, a comparative history of these two presidents and how they arrived at the decision to go to war is missing. Although there are studies that illustrate the military rationale of the conflict, empha- size the international theories that help explain the conflict, and the popu- lar histories and autobiographical accounts that personalize the politics, v vi PREFACE there is not a study that compares and contrasts George H. W. Bush and his son, George W. Bush, in order to ask, Why did the United States go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003? Therefore, this book presents a comparative history of the US decision to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003 that contrasts George H. W. Bush and George W, Bush, and their separate decision-making processes. In order to present a multifaceted history of this area of US foreign policy making, the history is divided into two separate frames that juxtapose how each president viewed Saddam Hussein and the separate origins from which the decision to go to war emerged. First, there is a focus of the issue of Saddam Hussein at home. In this frame, the domestic origins of the decision to go to war illustrate the domestic pressures that influence presidential decision-making. Through op-eds, media commentary, public speeches, memoirs, and news report- ing, an historical narrative can be constructed that emphasizes a national context of presidential decision-making. Second, equally important, there is a focus on the issue of Saddam Hussein abroad. In this frame, the diplo- matic origins of the decision to go to war show a very different range of pressures on presidential decision-making. Instead of a strictly internal focus, it is US diplomatic correspondence, United Nations Security Council meetings, and US foreign policy documents which construct a contrasting international history of the decision to go to war with Iraq. As a consequence, these histories show that each president had a differ- ent view of the issue of Saddam Hussein, focusing separately, and with drastically different justifications, on his intentions and capabilities as Iraq’s leader. For George H. W. Bush, it was Saddam Hussein’s capabilities that forced the decision to go to war. For George W. Bush, it was rather Saddam Hussein’s intentions. The result is the comparative history that unfolds in the following pages. This comparative history, we believe, is able to explore the lead up to conflict with Iraq in 1991 and 2003, while capturing the issue of Saddam Hussein at home and abroad, illustrating both the domestic and diplomatic origins of the US decisions to go to war. The research creates an historical narrative that helps answer why the United States went to war and com- pares the similarities and the differences in the foreign policy making of both George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush. It is the perfect starting point to the broader question of war and peace in the Middle East that dominates the twenty-first century. Moreover, we have an obligation to remember and learn, as agreed upon conclusions, as to why event played PREFACE vii out as they did, particularly as they are likely to shape current public dis- course, as well as serve as future foreign policy axioms in Washington and elsewhere. In this sense, it is absolutely crucial that students of modern history and politics, no less than the political successors of the Bushs— who compete for the authorship of “Who lost Iraq?”—develop these con- clusions with far more care than has been characteristic in the past. There is much at stake. Melbourne, VIC, Australia Joseph M. Siracusa Laurens J. Visser c ontents 1 C apabilities and Intentions 1 2 This Will Not Stand, 1989–1991 11 3 Authorizing the Use of Force, 1989–1991 53 4 An Axis of Evil, 2001–2003 91 5 The Land of Harun al-Rashid, 2001–2003 135 6 Remembering America Going to War in Iraq 177 Bibliography 191 Index 195 ix CHAPTER 1 Capabilities and Intentions A favorite theory of mine—to wit, that no occurrence is sole and solitary, but is merely a repetition of a thing which has happened before, and perhaps often. —Mark Twain (The Jumping Frog: In English, Then in French, Then Clawed Back Into a Civilized Language Once More by Patient, Unremunerated Toil [Harper Brothers, 1903], 64) In 2004, at the Baghdad Operations Center in Iraq, it was the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that had the chance to interview Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein before he was transferred over to the authority of the newly implemented Iraqi government. The responsibility for conversing with Saddam fell to FBI agent George Piro, and that Piro relished the opportunity to press the fallen dictator for insight into his style of leader- ship and process of decision-making for all those decades Saddam held on to power. But what Piro wanted most, and what the US government was adamant had been a fact, was information from Saddam that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorism, justifying the per- ceived threat he posed to international security. In one casual conversation, Piro pressed Saddam for the reason he was so obstinate toward the United Nations weapons inspections. According to Saddam, the reluctance to open Iraq up to weapons inspectors was a regional © The Author(s) 2020 1 J. M. Siracusa, L. J. Visser, Going to War with Iraq, The Evolving American Presidency, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30163-7_1
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