God as Value-Concept in Contemporary American Religious Thought

102 Pages·06.855 MB·English

by  Bejema, Jacob

QOS AS VALUE-CONCEPT IB COHTEMFOHAR3T AMEaiCAJI
RELIGIOUS THOUGHT ___; ;
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by
Jacob Bajema
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
in the Department of Philosophy, in the Graduate
College of the State University of Iowa
December, 1942
ProQuest Number: 10831747
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I wish to express my sincere appreciation to
Dr. Herbert Martin, Professor Wilfrid Sellars, Dr#
Everett Hall, and Dr. Gustav Bergmann for the help
given me in making this study#
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Chapter Page
I Introduction. • • .* * « • . • • • « • . • 1
II Jbclologlc&l Considerations. 10
Part 1 H* N. Wieman and his theory of value . . * * • * 10
Fart 2 D# €* Macintosh and his theory of value* • • • • 25
III H* H. Wieman fs Concept of God« « # * * * • # . • • • . . . 36
I?' t>. C. Macintoshes Concept of God* « « • • # . , . . . . • • 31
V Th© problem of Dis-value* • 63
Part 1 S* H. Wieman and the concept of die-value. • » « 68
Part 2 D. C* Macintosh and the concept of dis-valu© * * 73
VI Comparison and Conclusion • 84
Part 1 Comparison 84
A The concept of "value” 84
1 Mr. Wieman and his theory of "value". . . . . » 84
2 Mr# Macintosh and his theory of "value” • • • . 85
B The concept of "dis-value" 86
1 Mr. Wieman and the concept of "dis-value” * . # 86
2 Mr. Macintosh and his concept of "dis-value". . 86
C The concept of the "numenous”. • 87
1 Mr. Wieman and the concept of the "numenous". • 87
2 Mr. Macintosh and the concept of the "numenous" 88
D The concept of "God" « • • • # • • • • • • . . . . 89
1 MT* Wieman and the concept of "God” . . . . . . 89
2 Mr. Macintosh and the concept of "God”. • * » • 91
Fart 2 Conclusion • 92
Bibliography. 94
Chapter I
IHTROBUCTIGB
To grasp something of th© significance of current American reli­
gious thought, it is necessary to keep two contrasting modes of thought
In mind* These are naturalism on the one hand end theism on the other*
As to the nature of the opposition between them R« Sellars has stated the
situation, it would seem, with precision* "Upon this X think all natu­
ralists are agreed that between naturalism and theism it is a case of
either-or. Either a reality corresponding to the God-id©a is at th© cen­
ter of reality in a directing, planning way or there is no such reality*
In the latter case man is left to work out his own salvation as best he
can with a fairly stable planet under his feet* His is the adventure and
the go&l."^ The presuppositions of each proceed from opposite poles of
^"Religious Humanism,” The Hew Humanist, (Mfcy-JUne, 1935), p. 12.
departure* Th© on© insists, upon th© wei$it of the best in the Christian
tradition, that man's interpretive key to the meaning of the world and of
life is to be found in the revelatory basis of religious faith and human
experience. Such a faith would require the acceptance of the theory that
both man and his environing world are grounded in an Infinite Being*
More specifically the ground of all things incarnates himself in the
lives of persons. In sharp contrast with this view, there has grown up
another tradition idiich maintains that life and all it contains has e-
raerged from the natural order of things in terms of which it must be
explained*
That tli© above mentioned views must be set in contrast to each
other can be readily seen when a comparison is made between the
expressions of philosophical naturalism as those are embodied in non—
theistic humanism and some of the essential tenets of theism* These are
selected because the one is, seemingly, the logical outcome of science
elevated to a religious metaphysics, and th© other because it has been
the dominant religion of the past within the Christian tradition.
In drawing the lines of comparison between the two views, one
soon discovers that there are fundamental metaphysical differences* As
a philosophy theism is vitally interested in the nature of ultimate re­
ality* it is. its primary concern because an answer to the problem as to
the nature of ultimate reality will have a direct bearing upon all other
problems which th© universe offers* By way of simple example, if one
assumes, as the the 1st does, that the temporal must be explained in
terms of the eternal, in the sense that the universal and the eternal
are primary and the particular acid th© temporal secondary, then the cri­
terion and validity of knowledge cannot finally be found in observation,
analysis and experiment. For theism, metaphysical inquiry aims at an
ideally complete experience of reality as a single systematic whole. In
the constructing of this picture of the ideal, the theist proceeds by
means of two methods, namely, analysis and synthesis. With the aid of
the findings of science in so far as these are reasonably verified and
by the help of other disciplines, the theist attempts to interpret th©
world of man's experience in the developmental order of truth and real­
ity with which man has to do. But whatever the data, whatever light
science and philosophy present as to the nature of the universe in which
man lives, the theist seeks to interpret these in terms of certain funda­
mental . principles which he accepts as his initial starting point* In
this way something of a systematic experienced reality of the macrocosm
discloses itself to man, the microcosm, who makes the construction. But
» s "
since the theist has as his initial starting point on© ultimate princi­
ple of the whole rather than many distinct principles which characterise
the structure of reality, th© latter must be interpreted, if it is to be
interpreted correctly, in terms of a unifying purpose*
Since theism asserts that God is the Ultimate in the light of
which all things must be explained in the final end, all problems are,
in their last analysis, religious problems. It is precisely for this
reason that theism, in its best form, has never been able, even in its
most successful attempts, to disregard the physical world. It has never
quite gene to the extreme as Eastern religions have tended to do. On
the basis of historical evidence it is possible to show that theists
have sometimes entertained a too-circumscribed view of the natural order,
but this may be partly explained in terms of the fact that an undue em­
phasis has been placed upon the social interaction between the human and
the divine, between the human end the human* In the main, however, they
have insisted upon the unity of the universe in spite of the fact that
such an insistence raised practically insurmountable obstacles# Even
the Medievalist was fully aware that nature, which is sometimes hostile,
sometimes friendly or indifferent to human values, must nevertheless be
considered as an integral part of th© universe in which man lives#
? In contrast with the above view which is ultimately a form of
ontological idealism, religious humanism accepts a naturalistic philoso­
phy as its fundamental basis. Such men as J, Dewey, E. Scribner Ames,
A. Eustace Hay don, R* w* Sellars, and H* R. Wieman (to mention only a
few of the outstanding leaders) have become the champions not only of
naturalism but also of religious humanism; they have sought to develop a
religion which is in accord with a naturalistic outlook# Parenthetically
it may be stated that H, R, Wieman, although he is admittedly a
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naturalist in his philosophy, would refuse to be linked with the reli­
gious humanist movement»
It is not possible to give, even in brief, an account of con­
temporary naturalism. As a philosophical movement, which dates back to
the ancient Greeks, it has undergone various changes, R. W« Sellars, a
defender of what he calls New Naturalism or Now Materialism, distin­
guishes it from the older form* Hie maintains that the older naturalism
"which linked its fortunes with extreme mechanicalism and sought to re­
duce man to a turmoil of blindly whirling atoms" has been found to be
untenable, largely-because it failed to acknowledge "man's unique place
i
in nature and the possibilities on the value-side of human life," He
■ ■ ----- - — - I....... --.....-............................ - - - ■ ... ....- n -------
*R, W, Sellars, Th© Principles and Problems of Philosophy
(Maomillan, New York)7T-*^^------ ~-------------------
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asserts further that "the basic thesis of all naturalism is that man is
a part of nature as an orderly and self-contained spatio-temporal system,"
But reality must not be thought solely in terms of the inorganic sciences
because, by thinking it in that way, the tremendous importance of the
qualitative will be ignored. Life’s meaning is not determined by a com­
parison between the vast expanse of the universe in terms of which man
dwindles into insignificance, but rather by the intrinsic meaning which
life may have when goals and objectives are realised. In another connec­
tion he states his view still more explicitly. There he declares: "The
new materialism acknowledges the immense variety and fertility of the
physical and will reject none of its actual forms, from a tar-dust and
the stripped atoms of incandeeoent suns to the primeval slime of the sur­
face of this world of ours and the intricate organisation of human
brains. Back of pomp and circumstance, back of love and beauty and
tragedy and happiness, lice natter* in short, the physical is but an­
other term for being, for existence*"*
R. W* Sellars, Th© Hiilosophy of Physical Realism (TJ&cmillan,
1_ 932. )V , p, 6, ■ ii mu I •“*■» ■ ■—w— — nmmm M M M p a m a i
Although the position of New Naturalism, as it is defended by
R* W, Sellars cannot be identified with the views held by such men as
J* Dewey, 15* Scribner. Ames, A* Eustace Hayden, H* H* Wieman and others,
there is enough agreement to warrant a common classification* Yet this
should not blind us to the fact that there are also fundamental differ­
ences • For example, R* W* Sellars would definitely disagree with these
men on episteraological issues* But all (except H* H* Wieman) are in ac-
/
cor dance upon one points The fundamental doctrines of theism are inde­
fensible in the light of contemporary modern thought* In an official
statement, which appeared in the May-June, 1933, issue of the Hew
Humanist a number of votaries of religious humanism presented their
Manifesto* It is not necessary for our purpose to eater into all th©
doctrines set forth in this document, but merely to point out th© gen­
eral trend of it*
According to this Manifesto th© new faith it presents must
supplant th© faiths now discredited* It advocates a religion in which
th® focal point is man rather than God* Due to th© impact of scientific
i
knowledge, •Quo stress upon empiricism as a method of inquiry, and the
t-:
interest developed in value-theory since the last quarter of the nine­
teenth century, there has resulted a re-onforcement of the naturalistic
approach to the world and human values* G. EU Broad even believes that
the naturalistic viewpoint is fairly representative of th© modem atti­
tude toward transcendental values* "Whether this is true or not, it may
be s&id that a number of thinkers such as Perry * Sellars, Prall, Dewey
and others, have attempted to formulate a theory of values which is in
accordance with naturalism;
Religious humanism denies the transcendental status of values*
In so far as the religious humanist retains the concept "God,** it series
as a symbol for man’s highest ideals and the physical and the social
processes which realise them* E* Scribner JUaee defines God as the
"reality conceived as friendly, as furnishing Support for man’s exist­
ence and for the realisation of ideal ends*"* thus there has been a
‘hs* S* Ames, Religion (Henry Holt, Hew York, 1929), p* 178,
shift from a oosmie-C£&ber*dness to a man-centeredness* As to the atti­
tude which the religious humanist takes toward the cosmos, ix may vary
from a high degree of optimism to abject pessimism* E. Scribner Ames is
optimistic because there Is some love within the universe* J* W* Kruteh,
on the other hand, regards the world as a place in which an unresolvable
discord is the fundamental fact* But whatever the religious attitude
may be, man, in his struggle to achieve what values he ruay both for him­
self and for his fellowmen, looks in vain to some Cosmic Power who may
be friendly to man’s endeavors« In the world in which man livoe, he is
"left to work out hie own salvation as best he can with a fairly stable
planet under his feet*H If man is to believe in some cosmic ground
which may be regarded as supporting human values, he can find it only in
the fact that nature itself is fairly reliable for practical purposes*
By means of scientific knowledge man can obtain an insight into the en­
vironing world so that he may learn to adjust himself to its demands*
In addition, by means of scientific method and technique man can, in an
increasing measure, bring nature under a control so that it may serve as