God and Other Minds : A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God

287 Pages·1968·6.01 MB·English

by  Alvin Plantinga

GOD AND OTHER MINDS
A Study of the Rational Justification
of Belief in God
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
General Editor
Max Black, Cornell University
Editorial Committee
Charles A. Baylis, Duke University
William Frankena, University of Michigan
Morton White, Harvard University
Induction and Hypothesis: A Study of the Logic of
Confirmation. By S. F. Barker.
Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.
By Roderick M. Chisholm.
The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics.
By Kurt Baier.
Religious Belief. By C. B. Martin.
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of
the Two Notions. By Jaakko Hintikka.
Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some
Medieval and Modern Theories.
By Peter Thomas Geach.
Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.
By Sydney Shoemaker.
God and Other Minds: A Study of the
Rational Justification of Belief in God.
By Alvin Plantinga.
GOD AND
OTHER MINDS
A Study of the Rational Justification
of Belief in God
By Alvin Plantinga
Cornell University Press
ITHACA AND LONDON
Copyright © 1967 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review,
this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any
form without permission in writing from the publisher. For
information address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts
Place, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 1967 by Cornell University Press.
Published in the United Kingdom by Cornell University Press Ltd.,
2-4 Brook Street, London W1Y 1AA
Second printing 1969
Third printing 2972
Fourth printing 1975
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 67-20519
International Standard Book Number 0-8014-0338-3
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
To Kathleen

Preface
IN this study I set out to investigate the rational justification
of belief in the existence of God as He is conceived in the
Hebrew-Christian tradition. Part I examines natural theology,
an important traditional approach to this matter, by consider-
ing in turn the cosmological, ontological, and teleological argu-
ments for the existence of God. These arguments are, I believe,
worthy of serious and detailed study; and the last one is not,
perhaps, completely without promise. Nevertheless it is open
to a serious objection (developed in Chapter Four); along with
natural theology generally it must finally be judged unsuccess-
ful.
Part II considers natural atheology, the attempt, roughly, to
show that, given what we know, it is impossible or unlikely
that God exists. Here I consider the problem of evil, verifica-
tionism, the paradox of omnipotence, and an ontological dis-
proof of God's existence. None of these survives close scrutiny;
VII
Preface
the verdict must be that natural atheology is no more success-
ful than natural theology.
Since neither natural theology nor natural atheology offers a
satisfying solution to the problem at hand, I try in Part III
another approach to it by exploring its analogies and connec-
tions with a similar question—the "problem of other minds."
In Chapters Eight and Nine, I defend the analogical argument
for other minds against current criticism and argue that it is
as good an answer as we have to the question of other minds.
But in Chapter Ten it turns out that the analogical argument
finally succumbs to a malady exactly resembling the one afflict-
ing the teleological argument. I conclude that belief in other
minds and belief in God are in the same epistemological boat;
hence if either is rational, so is the other. But obviously the
former is rational; so, therefore, is the latter.
My thanks are due to Professor Max Black for helpful edi-
torial suggestions, and to George G. Harper, who read the en-
tire manuscript and saved me from much stylistic gaucherie.
My thanks also to the Journal of Philosophy for permission to
incorporate a few paragraphs of "Kant's Objection to the On-
tological Argument" (LXIII [1966]) in Chapter Two; to the
Philosophical Review for permission to reprint "A Valid On-
tological Argument?" (LXX [1961]) as part of Chapter Two;
to the Review of Metaphysics for permission to reprint brief
portions of "Things and Persons" (XIV [1961]) in Chapters
Eight and Nine as well as sections of "Induction and Other
Minds" (XX [1966]), which here appear as parts of Chapters
Eight and Ten; and to Cornell University Press and George
Allen & Unwin Ltd for permission to include in Chapter Six a
revised version of "The Free Will Defence," which originally
appeared in Philosophy in America, Max Black, editor (Ithaca
and London, 1965).
viii
Preface
I take this opportunity to record my abiding gratitude to sev-
eral of my teachers, including Cornelius A. Plantinga, William
K. Frankena, and Henry Stob. I must make special mention of
William Harry Jellema, whose magnificent teaching and think-
ing kindled my enthusiasm for philosophy and have served as
models ever since.
In writing this book I have had the benefit of stimulating
discussion and penetrating criticism from a large number of
friends, colleagues, and students—especially William P. Alston,
Charles Landesman, Jr., Ian Mueller, and Nicholas Wolter-
storff. I am particularly eager to acknowledge my indebtedness
to the members and former members of the Wayne philosophy
department—especially Richard L. Cartwright, Hector Casta-
fieda, George Nakhnikian, and (perhaps most of all) Edmund
L. Gettier, III, and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. It would be hard to
overestimate their contribution to this book; I have learned
more from them than I can say.
ALVIN PLANTINGA
Calvin College
Grand Rapids, Michigan
January ig6y
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