Germany and the Second World War. Volume VIII, The Eastern Front 1943-1944 : the war in the East and on the neighbouring fronts

1340 Pages·2017·14.16 MB·English

by  Frieser

GERMANY AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR
VIII
TheEasternFront1943–1944:TheWarin
theEastandontheNeighbouringFronts

Germany and the
Second World War
Edited for the
Militärgeschichtliches
Forschungsamt (Research
Institute for Military History),
Potsdam, Germany
by
KARL-HEINZ FRIESER
VOLUME VIII
–
The Eastern Front 1943 1944: The War
in the East and on
the Neighbouring Fronts
KARL-HEINZ FRIESER
KLAUS SCHMIDER
KLAUS SCHÖNHERR
GERHARD SCHREIBER
KRISZTIÁN UNGVÁRY
BERND WEGNER
Translated by
BARRY SMERIN
BARBARA WILSON
Translation editor
BARRY SMERIN
CLARENDON PRESS (cid:1) OXFORD
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Contents
ListofIllustrations xv
ListofMaps xvi
ListofTables xx
NotesontheAuthors xxiii
Abbreviations xxv
KeytoSymbols xxxi
INTRODUCTION 1
PART I FROM STALINGRAD TO KURSK
byBerndWegner
I. BASIC PROBLEMS IN GERMAN CONDUCT OF THE WAR AFTER
STALINGRAD 7
1. StalingradaTurningPoint? 7
2. LossesandResources:TheChangingStrategicCoordinates 12
(a) TheManpowerSituationoftheEasternArmyandtheFailure
ofTotalMobilization 12
(b) MaterialLossesandOstensibleSuccessesintheWarEconomy 22
3. ‘FortressEurope’andtheProblemoftheSecondFront 30
II. GERMAN ALLIANCE POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF A SEPARATE PEACE 44
1. TheErosionoftheAxisPact 45
2. TheIllusionofaSeparatePeace 53
III. THE GENESIS OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK 62
1. BasicConsiderations 62
2. TheConflictovertheTimingoftheAttack 72
PART II THE BATTLE OF THE KURSK SALIENT
byKarl-HeinzFrieser
I. THE HOPELESS GERMAN STARTING POSITION 83
1. DisastrousPlanning:AFrontalAttackwithouttheElement
ofSurprise 84
2. RelativeStrength:AnAssaultagainstanAvalanche 86
(a) TheGermanPotentialintheKurskSalient 87
(b) TheSovietPotentialintheKurskSalient 93
(c) RatioofOpposingForcesinOperationCITADEL 95
(d) ComparisonofTotalPotentialintheKursk–OrelArea 97
vi Contents
(e) TheBottomLine:SovietSuperiorityandtheImpossibilityofa
DecisiveBattle 99
3. ‘FortressKursk’ 101
II. THE FAILURE OF OPERATION CITADEL 104
1. TheAbortiveSovietPre-emptiveStrike 104
2. TheFailedAttackbyNinthArmy(5to13July1943) 106
3. TheAdvanceofArmyGroupSouthupto12July 112
4. TheMythofProkhorovka 118
(a) TheSovietEncirclementPlan 118
(b) Prokhorovka:LegendandReality 120
(c) Balance-SheetoftheSovietDebacle 128
(d) Epilogue:TheTankBattlethatNeverTookPlace 134
5. Hitler’sOrdertoHalttheOffensive—‘VictoryThrownAway’? 138
(a) OperationROLAND’SChancesofSuccess 142
(b) TheDonets–MiusOffensive 143
(c) TheOffensiveintheOrelBulge 144
(d) TheAlliedLandinginSicily 145
III. OPERATION CITADEL—A TURNING POINT? 147
1. CausesoftheGermanFailure 147
2. QuantitativeBalance-Sheet:AsymmetricalLosses 150
3. TechnologicalandTacticalBalance-Sheet:TheQualitative
TurnaroundinFavourofGermanArmour 157
(a) ‘TigerShock’andSovietArmour’s‘TechnologyGap’ 157
(b) TacticalEfficiency 164
4. StrategicBalance-Sheet:CITADEL—OnlyaVirtualTurningPoint 168
IV. THE SOVIET COUNTER-OFFENSIVES 171
1. TheOrelCounter-Offensive(OperationKUTUZOV),12Julyto
18August1943 172
2. TheBelgorod–KharkovOffensiveof3to23August
(OperationRUMYANTSEV) 188
3. BalanceofLossesinthe‘GreatestBattleinHistory’ 200
PART III THE PERPLEXITIES OF WAR: THE SOVIET
THEATRE IN GERMAN POLICY AND STRATEGY
FROM THE SUMMER OF 1943
byBerndWegner
I. THE SOVIET THEATRE OF WAR IN GERMAN POLICY AND
STRATEGY FROM THE SUMMER OF 1943 209
II. FROM THE SETBACKS IN THE SUMMER OF 1943 TO A PERMANENT
CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP 213
Contents vii
III. THE ABANDONMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ISOLATION
OF GERMANY 230
IV. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EAST? ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ AND
THE DILEMMA OF INTERCONNECTED WAR 243
1. FührerDirectiveNo.51 243
2. ScorchedEarth 253
3. TheEastWallDebate 266
PART IV THE SWING OF THE PENDULUM: THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE EASTERN FRONT FROM
SUMMER 1943 TO SUMMER 1944
PROLOGUE: THE ‘FORGOTTEN YEAR’ 273
I. THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARMY GROUP NORTH FROM LENINGRAD
TO THE BALTIC 274
Karl-HeinzFrieser
1. DefenceagainstSovietOffensivesintheSecondHalfof1943 275
2. WithdrawaltothePantherLineintheBaltic(14Januaryto
1March1944) 280
3. Summary:TheBeginningoftheEndintheNorth 290
II. THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARMY GROUP CENTRE TO BELORUSSIA
UP TO THE SPRING OF 1944 293
Karl-HeinzFrieser
1. DevelopmentsuptoMid-September1943 293
2. WithdrawaltothePantherLine(16Septemberto2October1943) 297
3. TheWinterBattlesof1943–1944:An‘UnknownWar’ 301
(a) ThirdArmouredArmyintheWinterBattlesofVitebsk 307
(b) FourthArmyinthe‘HighwayBattles’nearOrsha 318
(c) NinthArmyintheDefensiveBattlestotheEastofBobruisk 327
(d) SecondArmyandProtectionoftheOpenSouthernFlank 330
III. ARMY GROUP SOUTH’S WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS IN THE UKRAINE 338
Karl-HeinzFrieser
1. IntheShadowofKursk:DefenceagainsttheTwoSovietRelief
OffensivesontheSouthernWing(17Julyto2August1943) 338
2. TheCollapseoftheFronttotheEastoftheDnieper
(16Augustto15September1943) 343
(a) TheSovietAdvanceintotheDonetsBasin 351
(b) TheCrisisontheNorthernWing 352
3. TheWithdrawaltotheDnieperuptotheEndofSeptember1943 354
(a) TheDisputeoverWithdrawal 354
viii Contents
(b) The‘Panther’WithdrawaltobehindtheDnieper
(16to29September) 356
(c) TheSovietAirborneOperationatBukrinon24–25September 358
4. TheBattleoftheDnieperLine(29Septemberto
23December1943) 361
(a) FourthArmouredArmyintheKievSector 362
(b) EighthArmyintheLeeoftheWind 372
(c) FirstArmouredArmyatZaporozhye 374
5. TheStartoftheSovietDnieper–CarpathianOffensiveatthe
Turnof1943/4 379
(a) FourthArmouredArmy’sWithdrawalandFirstArmouredArmy’s
Counter-Attack 381
(b) EighthArmyatKirovograd 387
6. TheBreakoutfromtheCherkassy–KorsunPocket(24January
to17February1944) 388
(a) TheEncirclement(24to31January) 388
(b) TheReliefAttacks(1to16February) 391
(c) TheConflictaboutthePocketandtheDecisiontoBreakOut 398
(d) TheBreakouton16–17February 403
(e) SummingUp:‘NoStalingradontheDnieper’ 409
7. TheWithdrawalBattlesofFourthArmouredArmyintheNorthern
UkrainefromtheEndofJanuarytoApril1944 413
(a) TheKovelGap 414
(b) TheSovietAttacktowardstheSouth 415
(c) TheTarnopolDisaster 420
(d) TheBehaviourofthePopulationintheUkraineandGalicia 426
8. TheBreakoutbyFirstArmouredArmyfromtheKamenets
Podolsky‘MovingPocket’ 427
(a) TheEncirclementofFirstArmouredArmy 429
(b) Manstein’sUltimatumtoHitler 433
(c) TheBreakoutbyFirstArmouredArmy 435
(d) Outlook 439
9. Manstein’sDismissalandthe‘EndofOperations’ 442
IV. THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARMY GROUP A THROUGH THE CRIMEA
TO ROMANIA 446
KlausSchönherr
1. TheKubanBridgehead 447
2. FromtheWotanLinetotheDnieper 454
3. TheCrimeaintheWinterof1943/4 460
4. Nikopol 465
5. TheWithdrawaltotheBug 474
6. FromtheBugtotheDniester–IaşiPosition 476
7. TheLossoftheCrimea 483
Contents ix
PART V COLLAPSE IN THE EAST: THE WITHDRAWAL
BATTLES FROM THE SUMMER OF 1944
I. ERRORS AND ILLUSIONS: THE GERMAN COMMAND’S
MISCALCULATIONS IN THE EARLY SUMMER OF 1944 489
Karl-HeinzFrieser
1. ‘AttackorPerish’:Hitler’sAuto-SuggestiveVictoryEuphoria 490
2. ‘WindowofVulnerability’:TheRiskyNeglectoftheEasternFront
inFavouroftheWestern 492
3. ‘TheBalkansortheBaltic’:TheDelusionofaDecisiveSoviet
Offensive 497
4. TheDangerIgnored:GermanEnemyIntelligenceandthe
BelorussianBalcony 501
(a) TheConfusionabouttheSovietPointofConcentration 501
(b) ArmyGroupCentre’sInconsistentAssessmentoftheEnemy
Situation 503
(c) The‘Trilemma’FacedbyForeignArmiesEast 509
(d) TheCausesoftheErroneousAssessmentbyGermanEnemy
Intelligence 511
5. Hitler’s‘FortifiedPlaces’:TheDoctrineofSelf-Imposed
Encirclement 514
II. THE COLLAPSE OF ARMY GROUP CENTRE IN THE SUMMER OF 1944 522
Karl-HeinzFrieser
1. TheAsymmetryofForces 522
(a) TheSovietPotential:AnUnprecedentedConcentrationofForce 522
(b) ArmyGroupCentre:AHouseofCardsabouttoCollapse 524
2. TheMilitaryPlanning 532
3. OpeningPhase:TheOperationalBreakthroughontheWings
(22to28June1944) 534
(a) TheDisasterofThirdArmouredArmyatVitebsk 536
(b) TheWithdrawalofFourthArmyatMogilev 539
(c) TheEncirclementofNinthArmyatBobruisk 541
4. TheFormationofthePocketatMinsk(28Juneto4July) 544
(a) TheCounter-Attacksby5thand12thArmouredDivisions 546
(b) TheDownfallofFourthArmyinthe‘MovingPocket’ 548
5. TheFightingduringWithdrawaltoPolandandLithuania
(4to31July) 555
(a) Model’sCrisisManagement 555
(b) The‘ZeitzlerPlan’Controversy 557
(c) TheCounter-AttackatVilniusandWithdrawaltothe
Brest-Litovsk–KaunasLine 560
(d) DangerontheFlanks:1stBelorussianFront’sAdvanceto
theVistula 563