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This is an electronic reprint of the original article. This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail. Ahonen, Pertti Author(s): Title: Germany and the Aftermath of the Second World War Year: 2017 Version: Please cite the original version: Ahonen, P. (2017). Germany and the Aftermath of the Second World War. Journal of Modern History, 89(2), 355-387. https://doi.org/10.1086/691523 All material supplied via JYX is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and duplication or sale of all or part of any of the repository collections is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research use or educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must obtain permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone who is not an authorised user. Review Article Germany and the Aftermath of the Second World War* Pertti Ahonen UniversityofJyväskylä SomefifteenyearsagoRichardBesselandDirkSchumannobservedthathis- torians had “given enormous thought to how Europeans got into fascism and war”whiledevoting“relativelylittlethought”tothequestionofhow“people emerge[d]fromthesehorrors.”1Thiswasanaptpointatthetime,butthesitua- *ThebooksreviewedinthisessayincludeFrankBiessandRobertG.Moeller,eds., HistoriesoftheAftermath:TheLegaciesoftheSecondWorldWarinEurope(NewYork: BerghahnBooks,2010),pp.viii1322,$120.00;R.M.Douglas,OrderlyandHumane:The ExpulsionoftheGermansaftertheSecondWorldWar(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversity Press,2012),pp.xii1486,$40.00;SvenKeller,VolksgemeinschaftamEnde.Gesellschaft undGewalt1944/45,QuellenundDarstellungenzurZeitgeschichte,volume97,edited by the Instituts für Zeitgeschichte (Munich: OldenbourgVerlag, 2013), pp. viii1498, $91.00;YuliyaKomska,TheIconCurtain:TheColdWar’sQuietBorder(Chicago:Uni- versityofChicagoPress,2015),pp.viii1290,$45.00(cloth),$10.00–$45.00(e-book); MarkMazower,Jessica Reinisch, andDavid Feldman, eds.,Post-WarReconstruction inEurope:InternationalPerspectives,1945–1949,PastandPresentSupplements,vol- ume 6 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 368, £65; Gareth Pritchard, Nie- mandsland:AHistoryofUnoccupiedGermany,1944–1945(Cambridge:CambridgeUni- versityPress,2012),pp.xiv1250,$113.00(cloth),$88.00(e-book);JessicaReinisch,The PerilsofPeace:ThePublicHealthCrisisinOccupiedGermany(Oxford:OxfordUni- versityPress,2013),pp.336,$125.00;SagiSchaefer,StatesofDivision:Bordersand BoundaryFormationinColdWarRuralGermany,OxfordStudiesinModernEuropean History(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2014),pp.288,$99.00;AdamR.Seipp,Strang- ersintheWildPlace:Refugees,Americans,andaGermanTown,1945–1952(Bloom- ington:IndianaUniversityPress,2013),pp.xiv1286,$35.00(cloth),$28.99(e-book); HugoService,GermanstoPoles:Communism,Nationalism,andEthnicCleansingafter the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. x1378, $102.00(cloth),$39.99(paper),$32.00(e-book);EdithSheffer,BurnedBridge:HowEast and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.xxii1357,$29.95;PaulSteege,BlackMarket,ColdWar:EverydayLifeinBerlin, 1946–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. xxiv1348, $129.00 (cloth),$57.00(paper);TaraZahra,TheLostChildren:ReconstructingEurope’sFami- liesafterWorldWarII(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2011),pp.xii1308, $18.95(paper). 1 RichardBesselandDirkSchumann,“Introduction,”inLifeafterDeath:Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s (Cambridge, 2003),13. TheJournalofModernHistory89(June2017):355–387 ©2017byTheUniversityofChicago.0022-2801/2017/8902-0004$10.00 Allrightsreserved. This content downloaded from 130.234.074.151 on June 28, 2017 23:12:25 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 356 Ahonen tionhaschangedsignificantlysincethen.Fascismandthetwoworldwarshave, predictably, continued to elicit extensive attention from historians, but the af- termathof the Second World War has grown into an ever more popular area ofEuropeanhistory.Indeed,astrongcasecanbemadethatthepost-1945pe- riodisthemostvibrantsubfieldofmodernEuropeanhistorytoday,richinnew insightsandinnovations,itsappealenhancedbythesteadyavailabilityofnew sourcematerials. Muchoftherecentliteratureonpost–WorldWarIIEuropehasfocusedonthe relationshipbetweenthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,withitscatastrophic levelsofupheaval,violence,anddeath,andthepost-1945period,characterized byrelativestability,albeitagainstthebackdropofaloomingmushroomcloud. ThedegreetowhichEuropeanscontinuedtoliveunderwhatBesselandSchu- mannlabeled“theshadowofmassdeath”longaftertheendoftheSecondWorld War has been one of the central preoccupations of this body of scholarship.2 Thisarticlewillsurveysomeimportantrecentcontributionstothefield.Itsthe- maticfocuswilllieontheendandtheearlyaftermathoftheSecondWorldWar, withparticularemphasisonthetransitiontothepostwarera.Geographicallythe articlewillconcentrateonCentralEurope,inandaroundGermany.Theaimwill betoaddressseveralmajorinterpretativeissues,someofthemwellestablished pointsofdebate,othersmorerecentareasofcontroversy.Thearticlewillpro- gressthematically,inaroughlychronologicalorder,fromtheendoftheSecond WorldWartotheearlypostwarperiod. The End and StundeNull AsWilliamI.Hitchcockhaseloquentlyobserved,theendoftheSecondWorld WarbroughtliberationfromNazirule,withinandwithoutGermany,butitalso usheredin“atimeoflimbo,atimewithoutstructureorform,atimeofuncer- tainty, fear and loss” that brought “unbearable suffering” for very large num- bersofpeople.3Themostimmediatecauseofthatsufferingwastheenormous devastationthatthewarhadinflicted.Theextentofthematerialdestructionwas describedpoignantlybynumerouscontemporaryobservers,includingtheBrit- ishwriterStephenSpenderuponhisvisittoCologneinJuly1945:“Myinitial impression on passing through was of there being not a single house left. . .. The external destruction is so great that it cannot be healed. . . . The ruin of thecityisreflectedintheinternalruinofitsinhabitants....Theyresemblerather atribeofwandererswhohavediscoveredaruinedcityinthedesertandwhoare campingthere,livinginthecellarsandhuntingamongsttheruinsforthebooty, 2 Ibid.,4. 3 WilliamI.Hitchcock,Liberation:TheBitterRoadtoFreedom;Europe,1944–1945 (NewYork,2008),367. This content downloaded from 130.234.074.151 on June 28, 2017 23:12:25 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). Germany and the Aftermath of World War II 357 relicsof adead civilization. Thegreat city lookslike acorpse andsmells like one,too.”4Theenormoustollinhumanliveswasevenmoreshockingthanthe materialdamage.More than40millionEuropeanshadlosttheirlives because ofthewarandrelatedkillingoperations,includingtheHolocaust. Thisextremelevelofdevastationinthespringof1945,inturn,wasinlarge parttraceabletoonepeculiarityoftheconflict:NaziGermany’srefusaltogive upthefight,evenafterthecrushingsuperiorityoftheAlliedforceshadbecome obvioustomostrationalobservers.AsIanKershawhasargued,asituation in whichabelligerentpowerkeepsfightingtotheabsolutebitterendis“historically anextremerarity.”Modernwarshavetypicallyendedinnegotiatedsettlements orintheoverthrowoftheauthoritarianelitesthathadpushedtheircountriesto thebrinkofmilitaryannihilation.5InNaziGermany,neitherofthesethingshap- pened,andthewardraggedonuntilmostofthecountrylayinruins.Afewfacts illustratethedeadlytollthatthefinalphasesofthewarinparticularimposedon thecountry.Ofthe5.3Germanmilitarypersonnelwholosttheirlivesinthewar, 49percentfellinthetenmonthsfromJuly1944toMay1945.6Inthelastfour monthsofthewar,fromJanuarytoMay1945,moreGermanswerekilled,mostly withintheReich,thanin1942and1943puttogether.Justifiably,then,whathap- penedinGermanyinthefirstmonthsof1945hasbeencalleda“killingfrenzy” unmatchedinhistory.7 But what made this historical anomaly possible? Why did the Nazi regime anditsmachineryofdeathkeepgrindingonuntiltheveryend,despitethein- creasingobviousnessoftheloomingdefeatandtherapidlyaccumulatingtollof deathanddestruction,increasinglywithinGermanyitself?Unsurprisingly,these questionshavebeendebatedextensivelyeversincetheearlypostwaryears.One setofexplanationshasstressedthecausalroleofNaziterror,implicitlyorexplic- itlyseparatingthebulkoftheGermanpopulationfromtheregime,sometimes with apologetic undertones.8 More recently, the prevailing tendency has been toarguetheoppositebyemphasizingtheregime’sfundamentalconnectionwith mostoftheGermanpopulation,particularlythroughthewidespreadacceptance ofthenotionofaraciallydefinedVolksgemeinschaft,or“people’scommunity,” whichdividedthein-andout-groupsinadeeplyNazifiedsociety,providingco- hesionfortheformer.Accordingtothisview,astrongpopularidentificationwith theregimeanditsgoalspersistedamongthebulkofthepopulationuntilthebitter 4 Spender,citedinHitchcock,Liberation,182–83. 5 IanKershaw,TheEnd:Hitler’sGermany,1944–45(London,2011),6–7. 6 Ibid.,379. 7 RichardBessel,Germany1945:FromWartoPeace(London,2010),11. 8 Forpioneering,nonapologeticstudiesthatpositedafairlycleardividebetweenthe regimeandthepeople,seeMartinBroszatetal.,eds.,BayerninderNS-Zeit.Studien undDokumentationen,6vols.(Oldenbourg,1977–83). This content downloaded from 130.234.074.151 on June 28, 2017 23:12:25 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 358 Ahonen end,fuelingadesperateandvindictivesurgeofviolenceagainstperceivedene- miesasthesystementereditsdeaththroes.9 Transcending this polarity, scholars such as Ian Kershaw and Stephen G. Fritzhaveidentifiedamultiplicityoffactorsthatcontributedtothepeculiarbe- haviorofGermansinthewar’sfinalmonths.Whileacknowledgingthesignif- icanceofNaziterrorandofcontinuing—albeitby1945drasticallyreduced— popularidentificationwiththeregime,theyhavedrawnattentiontoadditional causalelements.Theseincludetheperceivedlessonsof1918,particularlytheim- portanceofpreventinganyallegedlyprematurecapitulationonthehomefront; thesignificanceofgrassrootsagencyandradicalizationinarapidlycollapsing, highlyfragmentedpoliticalsystem;andthepowerfulnegativebondsamonghard- coreperpetrators,manyofwhomregardedafighttothefinishastheonlyavail- ableoption.10 SvenKeller’smonographVolksgemeinschaftamEndeisanotablecontribu- tiontotheongoingdebateabouthowtointerprettheThirdReich’sfinalstages. KellerfocusesonaparticularaspectofNaziGermany’scollapse:theEndphasen- verbrechen, that is, the criminal acts, particularly murder and manslaughter, committedduringthewar’slastmonths,mostlyonGermansoil,rangingfrom variousarbitrarykillingstothemassmurderthatcharacterizedthedeathmarches ofconcentrationcampinmatesandothervictims.Drawingprimarilyonjudicial recordsfromthepostwartrialsofsomeoftheperpetrators,Kelleraddressesthe questionsof“whytheperpetratorskeptmurdering evenwhendefeat wascer- tain andwhyNationalSocialismandtheNationalSocialistregimewereableto stimulateviolentbehaviouruntiltheveryend”(7).Hisanswersrevolvearound the concept of a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft, which in his view provided a broad “legitimizingframeoforientation”fortheoutburstofviolenceatthewar’send (425).ThenotionofaVolksgemeinschaftamalgamatedadeadlymixofideolog- icalconstructsthatpropelled continuedviolence,evenwhenthebattlefor the thousand-yearReichhadevidentlybeenlost.Particularsignificanceaccruedto thedemonizationofperceivedtraitorsandracialenemiesandtothedesiretopre- empttheallegedmistakesof1918bysuppressinganysignsofpossibletreason withtheutmostruthlessness.Inaddition,asenseofbeingcaughtupintheweb ofa“NationalSocialistworldview”drovenotonlymanymurdersbutalsonu- meroussuicides(430).Naziideologythereforeremainedthekeymotivatingforce forthekillersofthefinalhour,butitseffectswerebolsteredbyseveraladditional factors,includingheightenedemotionalreactions,especiallyfearandadesirefor 9 ExamplesincludeFrankBajohrandMichelWildt,eds.,Volksgemeinschaft.Neue Forschungen zur Gesellschaft des Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt, 2009); Peter Fritz- sche,LifeandDeathintheThirdReich(Cambridge,MA,2008). 10 Kershaw,TheEnd;StephenG.Fritz,Endkampf:Soldiers,CiviliansandtheDeath oftheThirdReich(Lexington,KY,2004). This content downloaded from 130.234.074.151 on June 28, 2017 23:12:25 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). Germany and the Aftermath of World War II 359 revenge,aswellascertainlong-standinginfluencesinGermansociety,suchas “radicalnationalism”and“thecanonoftraditionalmilitaristicvalues”(432). Keller’s interpretation may not be radically new, but it does provide a con- vincing,insightful,andrichlydetailedaccountofthedynamicsontheground intheThirdReich’sfinalmonths.Hisnumerousillustrativecasestudiesofvio- lentincidentsareespeciallystriking.AlthoughKellerdoesnotpositionhimself explicitlywithintheexistinghistoriography,hisanalysisusefullycomplements thesimilarrecentinterpretationsbyKershawandFritzincombiningideological andotherexplanatoryfactors.Anothermeritofthebookisthat,atleasttangen- tially,italsoengageswithanadditionalinterpretativethemelinkedtotheendof WorldWarIIinGermany,namely,theideaof1945asaStundeNull,orzerohour, forthecountry. TheconceptofaStundeNullemergedattheendofthewartodenotearad- icalrupturewiththepastandtheprospectofanew,unencumberedbeginning. Althoughitpossessedacertainamountofappealinmanycountries,itsattrac- tionwasstrongestinGermany,forobviousreasons.11Historianshavetendedto behighlycriticaloftheconceptanditsuses—again,especiallyinGermany— primarilyontwogrounds.First,theideaofaStundeNullobviouslydownplays or rejects continuities across the divide of 1945, and, second, it has typically servedapologeticfunctions,explicitlyorimplicitlydistancingpostwarGermans fromtheNaziregimeanditscrimes.Ofthemanydismissalsoftheconcept,Lutz Niethammer’s is among the most quotable. According to him, “the so-called ‘zerohour’”capturedthe“wishfulthinkingoftheGermans”that“everything wasoverandforgotten”oncetheThirdReichhadreacheditsignominiousend.12 The critiques of the concept are strong and valid, certainly on the level of subsequentrationalizationsandhistoricalinterpretations,wherethenotionofa StundeNullisbothanalyticallyinaccurate,giventhemultiplicityofcontinuities itobscures,andmorallydubious,inviewofitsapologeticapplications.Andyet, onthelevelofcontemporaryindividualperceptionsatthewar’send,theconcept islesseasytodismiss.SvenKellermakesthispointsomewhatobliquely,avoid- ingthewords StundeNullbutemployingtheterm “pointzero” (Nullpunkt)to similar effect. According to him, the anticipated collapse of the Third Reich formedtheNullpunkt,whichdefinedGermans’futureperspectivesinthewar’s finalstages.Normativeassessmentsoftheanticipatedpointzerovaried,depend- ingonaperson’spositionandoutlook,fromadeeplydreadedpointofcollapseto 11 RichardOvery,“Interwar,War,Postwar:WasThereaZeroHourin1945?,”inThe OxfordHandbookofPostwarEuropeanHistory,ed.DanStone(Oxford,2012),60–78. 12 LutzNiethammer,“Privat-Wirtschaft.ErinnerungsfragmenteeineranderenUmer- ziehung,” in “Hinterher merkt man, daß es richtig war, daß es schiefgegangen ist.” Nachkriegserfahrungen im Ruhrgebiet, ed. Lutz Niethammer (Berlin, 1983), 28. The translationisfromBessel,Germany1945,396. This content downloaded from 130.234.074.151 on June 28, 2017 23:12:25 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 360 Ahonen along-awaitedmomentofliberation,butthesenseofaprofoundandfundamen- talruptureontheimmediatehorizonwasever-presentandreal(2,433–34). In recent publications, Richard Bessel has made similar points, albeit more forcefullyandwithdirectreferencetothenotionofaStundeNull.Whilefully acknowledgingits“contradictions”andotherflaws,includingitsexculpatorychar- acteristicsanditsneglectofimportantcontinuities,hehasneverthelessstressed theterm’swidecontemporaryusagebyGermansatthewar’s end.Amidstthe shockanddevastationoftotaldefeat,inastateofdisorder“thelikeofwhichGer- manshadnotseensincetheThirtyYears’War,”thenotionofa“zerohour”made sense to many.13 Everyday experiences were marked by strong discontinuities inanewandunpredictablepolitical,social,andeconomicsettinginwhichim- mediateconcernsofsurvivaldictatedthepatternsofdailylifeandpeopleeffec- tively“hadtostartagainfromscratch.”14Therefore,Besselargues,“therecanbe littledoubtthattheendofthewarmeantaprofoundbreakinthebiographiesof millionsofGermans,whoperceivedthisasapersonal‘zerohour.’”15 ThebroaderpointthatBesseldevelopsonthisbasisisworthquotingatlength: Ourtaskislesstojudgethantounderstand.OfcoursemanyGermanswerekeenin1945 toleaveanunedifyingandtarnishedpastbehind,butthatispartofthestoryandnotthe pointoftellingit.Byrefusingtoacknowledgetheterminologyemployedbythepeople wholivedthroughtheseawfultimes,weriskfailingtocomprehendfullywhathappened, anditssignificance.If,seducedbythedesiretoemphasizetheimportanceofcontinuities overthe1945divide,werisklosingsightoftheextenttowhich1945wasabreak,ofthe extenttowhichdiscontinuitiesratherthancontinuitiesframedpeople’sexperiences,and thewaysinwhichtheyunderstoodthoseexperiences.Whiletheconceptofa“zerohour” mayhaveofferedaconvenientescaperoutefromthenightmareofwarandNazism,that doesnotmeanitshouldbedismissedoutofhand.16 Bessel’spointisimportant,notonlyvis-à-visthespecificnotionofaStunde NullbutalsomoregenerallyabouttheendoftheSecondWorldWar.Hisargu- mentaccentuatestheneedtoexamineMay1945anditsimmediateaftermathas acrucialmomentinitself.Thathasnotbeendoneverymuchsofar.Thespring of1945hastypicallyfeaturedintheliteratureinoneoftwoways:asacodato thestoryofthewarorasaprequeltowhatcameafter,especiallytheriseofthe ColdWar.HistorianswoulddowelltodwellontheendofWorldWarIIandits immediateaftermathatmorelengthandinmoredepth,taking“thelatespring andearlysummerof1945”asa“periodofutmostsignificance,”toquoteGar- 13 Richard Bessel, “Establishing Order inPostwar Eastern Germany,” inMazower etal.,eds.,Post-WarReconstruction,143–44. 14 Bessel,Germany1945,394. 15 Bessel,“EstablishingOrder,”144. 16 Bessel,Germany1945,396. This content downloaded from 130.234.074.151 on June 28, 2017 23:12:25 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). Germany and the Aftermath of World War II 361 eth Pritchard’s study Niemandsland (28). This was, after all, a fundamentally importanttransitionalmoment,atimeofuncertaintyandopennesswhenthefu- turewasextremelyunclearandnumerousdifferentarrangementsandoutcomes seemedpossible, at least for a time.17 Oneaspectoftheopennessofthemomentin1945thathasgeneratedsignif- icantdebateisthepossibilityofa“thirdway”forpostwarGermany—theidea that a different path forward, a “vision of social and political change situated somewhere between or beyond the starkly polarized options of Stalinism and theanti-Communistconsensusofthe‘West’”mighthavebeenviable.18Under- pinningthedebate,whichflourishedmostlybetweenthe1970sandthe1990s, werecontrastingevaluationsofthepotentialofthegrassrootsantifascistinsti- tutionsthatemergedinGermanyaroundtheendofthewar.Composedpredom- inantlyofCommunistandSocialistactivistswithstronganti-Nazicredentials, theseantifascistcommitteestried,foratime,tochallengemoreconventionalpo- liticalauthorities.Sympathetichistorianshaveviewedthemaspioneersofgrass- rootsdemocracywhocouldhaverestructuredGermansocietyinaprogressive, democratic-socialist direction, had theynot been pushed aside by the occupa- tionforces,withtheencouragementofreemergingnativeelites.19Althoughmore criticalobservershavedismissedtheantifascist committees asirrelevantfoot- notes,lackingpopularsupportorwiderinfluence,controversiesaboutalleged missedopportunitiesandalternativepost-1945sociopoliticalscenariosdidswirl aroundthemforsometime.20FollowingthecollapseofEastEuropeanstateso- cialism,thesedebateslargelyceased,however,andGeoffEley,forone,hasla- mentedthefactthat,asaresult,“theexcitingbuttransitoryopennessofthepolit- icalcircumstancesproducedbytheendofthewar[has]recede[d]almostentirely fromview.”21 Gareth Pritchard has revisited these questions in Niemandsland, a detailed casestudyofthebiggestbitofterritoryindefeatedGermanythatwascontrolled bylocalantifascistactioncommitteesinthespringandearlysummerof1945:an areaapproximatelythesizeofgreaterLondonandwithatotalpopulationofhalf amillion,inthewesternErzgebirgemountains,ontheborderbetweenCzech- oslovakiaandtheGermanprovinceofSaxony.Forunclearreasonsthisstripof 17 SeeKonradH.Jarausch,AfterHitler:RecivilizingGermans,1945–1995(Oxford, 2006),esp.19–101;EdwardN.Peterson,TheManyFacesofDefeat:TheGermanPeo- ple’sExperiencein1945(NewYork,1990). 18 Geoff Eley, “Europe after 1945,” History Workshop Journal 65 (Spring 2008): 208. 19 ExamplesincludeLutzNiethammer,U.Borsdorf,andPeterBrandt,eds.,Arbei- terinitiative1945(Wuppertal,1976);GeoffEley,“LegaciesofAntifascism:Construct- ingDemocracyinPostwarEurope,”NewGermanCritque67(1996):73–100. 20 See,forexample,DanielRogers,PoliticsafterHitler(NewYork,1995). 21 Eley,“Europeafter1945,”208. This content downloaded from 130.234.074.151 on June 28, 2017 23:12:25 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 362 Ahonen land,knownlocallyatthetimeasNiemandsland,remaineddefeatedbutunoccu- pied,sandwichedbetweenBritishandSovietareasofcontrol,betweenApriland June1945.Duringthesetwomonths,antifascistactioncommitteescomposedof localGermans,mostlyCommunists,tookchargeoftheareaandproceededto address the many practical issues that required attention, from reestablishing public order to paving the way for postwar political, social, andeconomic ar- rangements.Thisexperimentinleft-winglocalcontrolendedinmid-June1945 astheRedArmymovedinandincorporatedtheareaintotheSovietoccupation zone. Pritchard provides a lively,detailed reconstruction of the short but eventful historyofNiemandslandonthebasisofextensivearchivalresearch.Healsouses hiscasestudytoaddressmuchlargerhistoriographicalissues,aboveallthelong- standing question of whether the autonomous antifascist groups could have servedasthebasisfora“thirdway”forpostwarGermany.OnthatpointPritchard is unequivocal. While awarding the Niemandsland antifascist action commit- teeshighmarksfortheirsuccessinaddressingpracticalday-to-daychallenges facing the region—success that he labels “truly remarkable”—he is very dis- missive of them as a potential basis for an alternative societal model (117). Inhisview,thecommittees,withtheirCommunistdomination,drewonavery limitedsocialconstituencyrootedintheprewarCommunistmilieuinwhichthe activistshadbeensocialized.Theactivistswereoverwhelminglymale,middle- agedorolder,militant,andingoodpartdrivenbyapreoccupationwithlocalcon- cerns,suchasoldpoliticalandpersonalfeuds.Inpursuitoftheirgoals,theywere “high-handedandautocratic.”A“vastgulf”separatedthissmallminorityfrom the bulk of the population, with suspicion and disdain rife on both sides. The antifascistcommittees“didnotenjoyanysignificantdegreeofpoliticalsupport,” andtheyoffered“nopotentialwhatsoever”foranalternative,democraticsocial- ism(216). Intheirwiderfunction,theantifascistgroupswereinstead“byfarthemost importantlocalagentfortheSoviets.”Theyhadwanted“Communistdomina- tion”allalong,andwhenthechancetosecurethatobjectivearrived,withthear- rivaloftheSovietauthorities,an“almostseamlesstransition”ensued,as“manyof themostprominentpeopleintheNiemandslandantifas[antifascistcommittees] wentontoenjoylongandsuccessfulcareersasfaithfulservantsoftheEastGer- manstate”(217).Furthermore,theadvance ofSovietruleineasternGermany fueled anti-Communism in the country’s western regions, as long-established, homegrown anti-Communist forces took advantage of the rising rift between theAllies,manipulatingittotheirgain.Theendresult,accordingtoPritchard, wasastarkdualityinearlypostwarGermany,with“onlytwopossibleprinciples aroundwhichpostwarpoliticscouldbeorganized”:either“antifascism”or“anti- Communism....Inshort,Germanyafter1945couldhaveantifascismoritcould havedemocracy,butitcouldnothaveboth.Therewasno‘thirdway’”(229). This content downloaded from 130.234.074.151 on June 28, 2017 23:12:25 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). Germany and the Aftermath of World War II 363 Pritchard makes his points forcefully, with extensive supporting evidence. Manyofhisargumentsarepersuasive,includinghisperceptivecaseforthesig- nificanceofdomesticandevenlocal—ratherthaninternational—factorsinex- plainingthepoliticalriftsandultimateColdWardivisionsofpostwarGermany.22 Buthisfinalconclusionsseemoverlysweeping.ThepolarizedwayinwhichPrit- chardreducesthepoliticalchoiceinGermanyin1945toadecisionfororagainst Communismhasarathercategorical,eventeleological,ringtoit.Doesthatas- sessmentreallyreflectthefullrangeofpossibilitiesin1945?Similarly,although heclaimsthattheNiemandslandantifascistcommitteeswere“morethanlikely” tobe“representative”ofthoseintherestofGermanyor,indeed,“entirelytypi- cal”ofthem,thatcrucialpointisassertedratherthansystematicallysubstantiated (213–14).WerethecommitteesreallysosimilartothoseoftheRuhrarea,forin- stance,despitetheprofoundstructuralandotherdifferencesbetweenGermany’s industrialheartlandandthelargelyruralborderregionthatPritchardexamines? Overall,then,Pritchardhasdeliveredavaluable,engagingstudythatcastssig- nificantnewlightonthetransitionfromtheSecondWorldWartothepostwar erainGermany.Buthehasnotnecessarilyutteredthefinalwordaboutpossible alternativescenariosinthattransition,especiallyinthecountryasawhole. Reconstruction and Postwar ThetransitionawayfromwarwastheobviouskeychallengeinGermanyand the rest of Europe in spring and summer 1945. Such a statement seems self- evident at first, but oncloser inspection itraises fundamental questions. Even the technical end point of the war calls for some reflection. In certain places, suchasFinlandorRomania,thefightinghadceasedwellbeforeGermany’ssur- renderonMay8,andinotherareas,rangingfromtheSovietUnion’swestern borderlandstoGreece,guerrillawarfareandcivilwar–likeconflictswouldcon- tinueforyears.EvenwithintheReich,May8wasbynomeansanabsolutedi- vide.Germanmilitarycourtscontinuedtopassdeathsentencesevenafterthat date.Thelastexecutionofa“militarydeserter”bytheGermanauthoritiesoc- curred as late as May 11, in Flensburg, on the orders of the successor regime ofAdmiralKarlDönitz,withBritishtroopsalreadypresentinthetown.23 ApartfromfactualissuesabouttheelasticityoftheSecondWorldWar’send- pointinEurope,thetransitionawayfromthewaralsoraisesmorefundamental 22 SeealsoPatrickMajor,TheDeathoftheKPD:CommunismandAnti-Communism inWestGermany,1945–1956(Oxford,1998). 23 AxelSchildt,“TheLongShadowsoftheSecondWorldWar:TheImpactofEx- periencesandMemoriesofWaronWestGermanSociety,”inExperienceandMemory: TheSecondWorldWarinEurope,ed.JörgEchternkampandStefanMartens(NewYork, 2010),201. This content downloaded from 130.234.074.151 on June 28, 2017 23:12:25 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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