German Idealism: An Anthology and Guide

474 Pages·2007·70.75 MB·English

by  Brian O'Connor

TheUniversityofChicagoPress, Chicago 60637
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations have been used to indicate where in the collected
German editions aparticular text can be found. The collections which are most
easily available are cited:
KAA Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian
Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900ff), 29 volumes
("Akadernie Ausgabe")
FW J. G. Fichte, l1!erke, edited by Immanuel Herman Fichte (Berlin: de
Gruyter, 1971), 11 volumes
SSW F. W J. Schelling, Sdmmtliche l1!erke, editedbyK. F.A. Schelling(Stuttgart:
Cotta, 1856-61), 14 volumes. A selection ofthese volumes can be found
in Ausgewdhlte Schriften, edited by Manfred Frank. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1985), 6 volumes
HW G. W F. Hegel, liVerke in zwanzig Bdnden: Theorie-liVerkausgabe, edited by
Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971),
20volumes
In the texts the abbreviationisfollowedbythe volume numberand thenthe page
numbers ofthe relevant German edition.
Introduction
German Idealism: Historical Issues
Inhistoriesofphilosophytheterm'GermanIdealism'hasservedconventionallyas
the collective name for the philosophies ofImmanuelKant (1724-1804),Johann
Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich WilhelmJoseph Schelling (1775-1854)
and GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). By as early as 1837-38, only
afew years after Hegel's death, and still during Schelling's lifetime, Carl Ludwig
Micheletpublishedthe two-volume Geschichte derletzten Systeme derPhilosophie in
Deutschlandvon KanthisHegel (History oftheLatestSystems ofPhilosophy in Germany
from Kant to Hege~, thereby grouping these four philosophers and their works
withinadeterminateepochofGermanphilosophy.1Clearly,Michelet'sconception
continues to informanapproach to the history ofphilosophy. The implication of
this approach is that an answer to the question of what we should consider to be
the philosophy ofGerman Idealism should be the ideasfound in the writings ofthese
philosophers. Andinlinewiththisapproachwecouldorganisethe datesofGerman
Idealism as beginning in 1781, with the publication ofKant's Critique ofPure
Reason, and ending in 1831, with Hegel's sudden death, one week after he had
signed the Preface to the second edition ofhis Science ofLogic.2 This Anthology
largelyfollows thatconceptionofGermanIdealismintakingselectionsfrommany
ofthemajorpublicationsofKant, Fichte,SchellingandHegelonthegroundsthat
these texts mark out the great achievements ofa particular period of German
philosophy.
As with all classifications, the historiographical category of'German Idealism'
mayhavepragmaticadvantages,butitleavesopensomesignificanthistoricalissues.
Firstofall, itislegitimate to questionwhetherKantcanbe reckoned amongstthe
German Idealists. Some, in fact, have suggested that he cannot be. Rather, Kant
mightbeseento occupythepositionofthephilosopherwho ends one epoch (ra
tionalism, empiricism, enlightenment) and smoothes the way for a new 'critical'
philosophy, which in its turn becomes the key reference point for the following
1Anotherearlypresentationofpost-Kantianphilosophy,fromaroundthesametime,asdirectlyshapedby
Kant is KarlRosenkranz's Geschichte der Kant'schen Philosophie, which appearedin 1840 as volume 12 of
ImmanuelKant'sSiimmtliche JtJierke, editedbyKarlRosenkranzandFriedrichWilhehnSchubert.
2RichardKronerseestheendof'thedevelopmentoftheGermanIdealismfromKantto Hegel'as 1821,
sincethatwas theyearof 'publicationofHegel'slastgreatwriting, his Philosophy ofRight': l/On Kant his
Hegel(Mohr:Tiibingen,2ndedition, 1961),p. 1.
2 Introduction
generations ofphilosophers. Indeed, in terms ofcontent, the basic approaches
ofthe post-Kantian philosophers are distinguished in some fundamental respects
by a direct departure from distinctions and principles which Kant regarded as
the essential achievements ofhis 'transcendental idealism'. Kant's successors be
lieved that his framework needed to be superseded in order to bring about what
they regarded as the 'consistent realisation' ofKantian discoveries. But in so do
ing they departed ultimately from the basis ofKant's philosophy, arriving at an
'absolute idealism' whose beginnings with Fichte Kant himselfhad expressly re-
jected. All ofthis would suggest that Kant is neither explicitly nor implicitly (in
terms ofphilosophical ambition) compatible with the post-Kantian direction of
thought, designated as German Idealism, which Kant himselfhad nevertheless
stimulated.
A further complication in the conventional conception ofGerman Idealismis
that it does not give explicit appropriate recognition to the rich and vibrant in
tellectual context ofthe period. Key to understanding the genesis ofwhat today
are regardedas the centralworksofFichte, SchellingandHegel-the three'great'
post-Kantian philosophers - is an appreciation ofthe significance ofa series of
further philosophers and their writings, even ifthese philosophers came later to
be virtually neglected. Their theories and the arguments they provided for them
served either as foils for contrast or as valuable philosophical contributions that
enteredpositivelyinto the theoretical conceptions ofthe German Idealists. Yet in
both cases the positions ofthese other philosophers were absorbed by the 'great
works' and thereby almost entirely removed from the further attentions ofthe
history ofphilosophy. We can take the case ofFichte's philosophy in relation to
its appropriation ofand debate with Kant's philosophy. Fichte does not directly,
as it were, take hold ofKant, but develops both his understanding ofKant as
well as his own conception ofphilosophy under the influence ofthose philoso
phers who had for their part already reacted to Kant: Friedrich HeinrichJacobi
(1743-1819), Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823), Salomon Maimon (1753
1800), GottlobErnst'Aenesidemus' Schulze (1761-1833),Jacob SigismundBeck
(1761-1840). Thesephilosophers, sometimesknown as the 'minorKantians', de
fended orproblematisedKant's transcendentalphilosophyfrom whatwereindeed
differing perspectives which would lead to distinctive conclusions. All in all this
prepared, however, for the further development ofGerman Idealism's distinctive
views ofthe problems ofKant's legacy.Johann GeorgHamann (1730-1788) and
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), amongst Kant's earliest critics, remain of
importance.
And with regard to the philosophical developments ofSchelling and Hegel
there are also numeroussignificantcontemporaneousintellectuals. Amongstthese
belong, most prominently, Friedrich Schiller (1759-1804), Friedrich Holderlin
(1770-1843), the early Romantics Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg; 1772
1801)andFriedrichScWegel(1772-1829),JohannFriedrichHerbart(1776-1841)
andJakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843). Ofparticular and direct significance is
Holderlin who, as their fellow student and friend at Tiibingen, shared in the
Introduction 3
earliestphilosophicalimpulses ofSchellingandHegel.3Whichofthe threewrote
the (subsequentlytitled) 'The OldestSystematicProgramme ofGermanIdealisnl'
(1796 or 1797) is stilldisputedtoday, butonthebasis oftheirintellectualoutlook
anyone ofthemis certainly the possible author.4 A precise reconstruction ofthe
forn'lsofidealismthatdevelopedafterKantwouldhavetosetouttheideasofaseries
offurtherphilosophersworkinginTiibingenandJenafron'l1790to 1794,amongst
them, in particular,Johann Benjamin Erhard (1766-1826), Friedrich Immanuel
Niethan1lller (1766-1848) and Immanuel Carl Diez (1766-1796), philosophers
who prepared the way for the development ofthought from Kant to Holderlin,
SchellingandHegel.5
Afurther complicationwiththe delimitationandcharacterisationofthe devel
opment ofGerman Idealism relates specifically to Schelling, in particular to his
late philosophy. The early Schelling certainly agreed with Fichte on some fun
damental issues, and in standard accounts ofthe period is placed between Fichte
and Hegel. The later Schelling cannot be so ordered both on the basis ofthe
content ofhis material and chronologically: he continued to produce significant
and original philosophical ideas long after Hegel's death. Son'le ofthese texts, in
fact, werespecificallyaimedagainstHegel's Idealism.6Sonomatterwhatwayone
mightinterpretthe philosophyofGerman Idealisn'l, beyondanybasic studyofits
works, itis clearthese days thatfocusingonHegelinaquasi-teleologicalnarrative
ofthoughtfrom KanttoHegel, asRichardKronerinhis two-volumeworkof1921
and1924suggested,isinadequate.7ThisdramaticsettingofHegel'sphilosophy- a
presentationinwhichHegel'sownteleologicalversionofthehistoryofphilosophy
is complicit - which presents and reduces a collection ofthinkers around 1800
exclusivelyin terms ofhowtheylead up to Hegel, has been challenged, notleast
from the quarter ofSchellingscholarship.8
Formanyyearsthisinterpretativefocus onHegelhasalsoservedto pushphilo
sophicalROITlanticisminto the background. Itis really onlyin the pastfew years
thatthemeaningofearlyRomanticism(Holderlin, NovalisandSchlegel) hasbeen
appreciated, both indeed in the context ofthe development ofGerman Idealism
aswellas, more originally, aconsiderationofitsalternativeforms ofphilosophical
3OnHolderlinasaphilosopher, seeespeciallyDieterHenrich, DerGrundim Bewusstsein. Untersuchungen
zuHOiderlinsDenken(1794-1795)(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1992).
4A translationofthis text- 'MtestesSystemprogrammdes deutschenIdealismus'- canbefound in the
collectionThePhilosophyofGermanIdealism(NewYork:Continuum,1987),editedbyErnstBehler.
5OnthisquestionseeDieterHenrich's comprehensive, two-volumework, Grundlegungaus dem Ich. Un
tersuchungen zur VOr:geschichte des Idealismus. Tiibingen- Jena 1790-1794 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004), the
productofmanyyearsofresearchintotheintellectualpathsfromKanttoGermanIdealism.
6Cf. F. W J. Schelling, trans. and ed. AndrewBowie, On the History ofModern Philosophy (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress, 1994)(ZurGeschichtederneuerenPhilosophie, SSWX).
7Seenote2.
8WalterSchultz's Die VOllendung des deutschen Idealismus inderSpiitphilosophie Schellings (The Completion of
GermanIdealism inSchelling's LatePhilosophy) (Pfullingen: Neske, 2ndedition, 1975) stronglydisputesthe
notion behind the Kant to Hegel to narrative. See also Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European
Philosophy(London:Routledge, 1993).
4 Introduction
enquiry, an appreciation independent of, yet directly competitive with, current
interests in German Idealism.9
Wecansee, then, thatthereareseriousreasonsagainstsimplyequatingtheterm
'German Idealism' with the four names Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel and
with asingle linear consecutive development ofphilosophical theory. Beside the
standardaccount:
(a) 1781 to 1831: Kant- Fichte- Schelling- Hegel,
atleasttwofurtherconceptionsofthisperiodofGermanphilosophyareproposed,
one more restrictive, whichleaves outKant, and starts with Fichte:
(b) 1793 to 1831: Fichte- Schelling- Hegel
andamaximalvariantwhichbeginswiththefirstpublisheddocumentmarkingthe
emergence oftranscendental idealism, De mundisensibilis atque intelligibilisforma et
principiis(Kant),andwhichalsotakesaccountofthelateSchelling,ScWeiermacher
and Schopenhauer:
(c) 1770 to c.1860: Kant - Fichte - Schelling I - Hegel - Schelling II -
Schleiermacher- Schopenhauer.
In recent years important English language scholarship that analyses the philo
sophical context ofGerman Idealism has appeared. Frederick C. Beiser, in The
Fate ofReason, follows the path from Kant to Fichte, dealing in particular with
Hamann,Jacobi, Mendelssohn, Herder, Reinhold, Schulze and Maimon.10 And
inhis extensivework, German Idealism: The StruggleagainstSubjectivism, heconsid
ers Kant, Fichte and Schelling as well as Holderlin, Novalis and ScWegel during
the years 1781 to 1801.11 Apart from the four 'greats', Terry Pinkard's presen
tation, in his book German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy ofIdealism, ex
plicitly includesJacobi, Reinhold, Holderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, Schleiermacher
and Fries, and also, indeed, Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard.12 A contribution to
the Cambridge Companion to German Idealism gives further view to the place of
Feuerbach, Marx andKierkegaardin this tradition.13 A comprehensive panorama
ofGerman Idealism, it is clear, would have to deal with all the thinkers named
9As examples ofthis new appreciation ofthe philosophical contribution ofRomanticisnl, see, for in
stance, ManfredFrank, EinfiihrungindiefriihromantischeAsthetik: Vorlesungen (Frankfurt: SuhrkampVerlag,
1989), (UnendlicheAnnaherung): DieAnfangederphilosophischenFriihromantik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997);
BarbelFrischmann, VomtranszendentalenzumfriihromantischenIdealismus:J G. FichteundFr. Schlegel(Pader
born/Miinchen/Wien: FerdinandSchoningh, 2004), Charles Larmore, The RomanticLegacy (NewYork:
ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1996).
10FrederickC.Beiser, TheFateofReason:GermanPhilosophyfromKanttoFichte(Cambridge,MA/Lonclon:
HarvardUniversityPress, 1987).
11Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism) 1781-1801 (Cambridge,
MA/London:HarvardUniversityPress,2002).
12TerryPinkard, GermanPhilosophy 1760-1860(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002).
13KarlAmeriks, 'The Legacy ofIdealisminthe PhilosophyofFeuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard', The
Cambridge Companion to German Idealism (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 2000), editedbyKarl
Ameriks.
Introduction 5
above, aswellaswiththepoliticalandscientific conditionsofthe earlynineteenth
century.
In view of the enormously demanding and complex thoughts of all these
philosophers, it is extremely difficult to strike a good balance between, on the
one hand, working out a common horizon of problems within which they
operate and, on the other, a differentiated appreciation oftheir heterogeneous
styles and ways ofthought. Undoubtedly the philosophical starting point ofthe
salient philosophers ofthis period is substantially provided by Kant's project of
a transcendental philosophy founded on a critique ofreason. It is at this point that
we find their commonality, the basis ofa cotnn'lon intellectual context. At the
same time, however, their different forms and ways ofinterpreting and devel
oping this common point have to be appreciated in their distinctiveness. This
contrasts with the approach in which some oftheir central thoughts have been
reconstructed to fit a progressive narrative path which is, in effect, a develop
ment from the critical Kant through the early Fichte and the early Schelling up
to Hegel's system. But it is obviously missing something to consider the philo
sophical conceptions ofthese four authors as a whole as the consecutive genesis
ofasystem. Eachofthemtakes his ownpath, following onlyinpartthe thought
processofarespective 'predecessor',which,however, isfurtherdevelopedinother
directions.
AnAnthologysuchasthisone,whichintroducesreadingsfromthe centraltexts
ofGermanIdealism,cannotmeetthedemandoffullydocumentingthecomplexity
ofthe developing theories ofthe period. It can take only a small selection, and
this should be representative. The concentration on Kant, Fichte, Schelling and
Hegelis,allinall,thebestwayofdoingjusticetothisrequirement. Theconsensus,
from German Idealisnlscholarship, remains, with due regardto the contributions
ofotherphilosophers, that the most influential and in'lportant authors are indeed
Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. This Anthology therefore takes selections, in
Englishtranslations, frommanyofthemajortexts ofthesefourphilosophers (and,
additionally, aselectionfrom Friedrich Schiller, 1759-1805).
Despite the individualityofphilosophicalpersonalities, and the variety oftheir
particularandheterogeneous theories, fundamentalissuesbothessentialandcom
monto GermanIdealismcanbeidentified. As 'idealists' theytake up the concept
ofreason (Vernunft), understood in the broadest sense as covering all epistemic
(cognitive, rational) structures, capacities and performances. All the supposed de
ternunations ofreason are to be fully developed from the inherent moments of
reasonitself.AndinKant'ssenseofthe 'Copernicanturn'- theturntoknowledge
assuch; the turnawayfrom the worldas itissupposedto be 'in-itself'- the prin
cipleslyingbehindthefundamentalformal constitutionoftheworld- thatis, the
mostgeneralprinciplesofthe 'lawsofnature'- aretobelocatedindeterminations
developed by reason itself. This notion is based on the beliefin the autonomy of
reason, that is, that human beings can accept as knowledge only those proposi
tionswhich canbe made transparentto reason. Knowledge, inotherwords, isnot
determined by parts ofthe world which stand beyond reason but by a coherent
6 Introduction
system offundamental categories and principles generated by reason itself.14 In
thiswaythe autonomyofreasonbecomesvisiblethroughthesystematicunityofallof
itsdeterminingmoments.AndfortheGermanIdealiststhese 'self-determinations'
are understood as the ground ofacontentfuland rationally explicated concept of
freedom preciselyinthattheygivehun1.anreasonauthorityoverwhatshouldcount
as true.
The German Idealists, in their very differing ways, were ofcourse not satis
fied with explanations ofthis basic project ofthe autonomy ofreason in merely
programmatic form, but rather, in more orless systematic ways, worked through
the spectrum ofthe different disciplines and basic areas ofphilosophy. This An
thology reflects that range ofconcerns: we have assembled texts by Kant, Fichte,
SchellingandHegelonthefollowingtopics: epistemology, moralphilosophy, po
liticalandsocialphilosophy, aesthetics (with acontributionfrom Schiller's work),
philosophyofhistory, philosophyofnature andphilosophyofreligion. The indi
vidualintroductionsto eachpiecedealwith the content, motivationandsituation
ofthe particular text in the work and the immediate intellectual context ofthe
philosopherconcerned. However, with aview to settingoutthe broadercontext
ofthe specific philosophical concerns it is useful to supplement the individual
introductions to each text with more general considerations ofthe essential and
fundamental thoughts ofthe German Idealists onthese areas ofphilosophy, start
ing with the historical context ofmodern philosophy and in particular with the
constellation oftheories developedbyKant.
Subjectivity and Metaphysics: The Foundations
and Method of Knowledge
Modernity
This Anthology opens with a passage from a famous chapter ofKant's Critique of
Pure Reason, entitled 'TranscendentalDeduction ofthe Pure Concepts ofUnder
standing [Categories],. Its main argument introduces the notion ofthe 'I think'
and provides an analysis ofthe conditions ofself-consciousness. Subjectivity is
placed at the 'highest point' ofphilosophy in this text. Although Kant's theory
ofthe'!' represents arevolutionary developmentin the historyofphilosophy, the
basic thought ofaphilosophy ofsubjectivity has apre-history which it is impor
tant to consider. During the n1.odern period the question ofthe foundation of
knowledge claims, a question linked to the emergence ofthe modern empiri
cal sciences, moved firmly to the centre ofphilosophical theory. The n1.ethod of
epistemologicalanalysis was reflection onthe cognitive capacities ofthe knowing
14AmatterofsomecontroversybetweenKant, Fichte, SchellingandHegelisthatofwhetherreasonhas
toapplyitsprinciples (conceivedofas'forms') toa'given' externalworld(the 'material') orwhetherthe
principlesofreasonaresufficientdeterminationsoft~!_~~~~~~}-_~h91~ ---------------
Introduction 7
subject. Perception andthought were analysed as the immanent conditions ofthe
subject. Significant sources ofthe beginnings ofthe early n'lodern philosophy of
the subject in this sense are found in Rene Descartes' (1596-1650) Meditationes
deprimaphilosophia (1641) andJohnLocke's (1632-1704) Essay on Human Under
standing(1690). Knowinghas epistemicauthorityonthebasisofcriteriaanchored
inthe understanding ofthe subject, orthe knower, andinthe correctapplication
ofthesecriteria. Rightintothetwentiethcenturymodernphilosophyisto alarge
extentmarkedbythe concernfor a theoryofsubjectivity.
Butitwasnotonlyinepistemologythatthisturntowardsthesubjectwascarried
out. It is the case too in political philosophy. In the contract theory ofthe state,
as developed n'lost significantlyby Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in his Leviathan
(1651),15 thefoundation oflegitimatepoliticalrule relatesbackto thewillandthe
capacityfor free agreement ofthe subjects (individuals) concerned. The political
authority ofstates is anchored in normative criteria, which are themselves bound
to the rationality ofsubjects.
In the modern era a fundamental conceptual controversy runs through epis
temology and metaphysics: the controversy between rationalism and empiricism.
WhilstBaruchde Spinoza (1632-1677), GottfriedWilhelmLeibniz (1646-1716)
andChristianWolff(1679-1754) - to name onlythemostinfluential-developed
comprehensive systems ofrationalistic metaphysics, following after Descartes, the
Anglo-Saxon empirical theory ofknowledge, connected with Locke, led into a
critiqueofmetaphysics. Andthenconceptssuchasidentity, substanceandcausality,
soul, freedom and God were exposed by David Hume (1711-1776) as 'fictions'
(extrapolations, imaginations) without epistemologicalfoundations.
Kant: TranscendentalPhilosophy
Kant saw himselfcompelled by reason to undertake a revision ofthe 'method of
metaphysics'asitwascleartohimthatunderthemethodologicalpresuppositionsof
previousphilosophynoendwasinsighttothecontroversy- betweentheessentially
rationalistandempiricistapproaches- whichhaddraggedonfor centuries.16 The
end result is the Critique ofPure Reason. The title originally planned was The
Limits ofSensibility and Reason.17 Both titles provide us with inforn~ationon two
fundanlental features ofthe method employed by Kant. (a) Philosophy must be
self-critique: itis an examination ofthe presuppositions and powers ofreason by
reason itself. There cannot be any other instance ofthe critique ofreason than
what reasonitselfprovides. Reason mustmake itselfintelligible to itselffrom out
ofits own resources. Itisin this principle that there lies the fundamental sense of
15ThebasicframeworkofthecontractualisttheoryofthestatewasinfactalreadysetoutbyHobbesinhis
earlierDeCive(1642).
16See UntersuchunguberdieDeutlichkeitder Grundsatzedernaturlichen Theologie undderMoral (Investigation
into the Clarityofthe Principles ofNatural Theologyand ofMorality) (1764), KAA II, 286, Letterto
JohannHeinrichLanlbert(1728-1777)31December1765,KAAX,56.
17SeeLettertoMarcusHerz,7June1771,KAAX,123.
8 Introduction
autonomy,whichKantascribestoreason. (b) Philosophyn~ustexplaintheoriginand
the objectivevalidityofthe conceptsusedbyus. Thequestionofwhetheraconcept
has its origin inrepresentations ofsensibility orhas emerged exclusivelyfrom the
understandingdependsonwhetherthe conceptis objectivelyvalidandhowfarits
validityextends.ForKant, critiquemeanscarryingoutaprecisedemarcationbetween
sensibilityand understandingas wellas an appropriate delimitation ofthe claims of
validity for our concepts. We must look at this issue briefly, in order to see the
philosophicalconstellationestablishedbyKantwithwhichphilosophersafter1781
were confronted.
ForKantwhatcritiqueneedstonegotiateaboveallarethoseconceptsandprin
ciples we do not gain inductively fron~ experience (empirical concepts), but are
available to us apriori. Amongstthese concepts are, in particular, those ofclassical
metaphysics: space, time, identity, substance and causality, as wellas freedom, soul
andGod. Metaphysicsconsistspreciselyindevelopingapriorisystemsofprinciples
with such concepts. According to Kant the main objective ofa critical philoso
phy must therefore be analysis ofthe conditions ofthe possibility ofnon-empirical
knowledge. A philosophy built on a critique ofthe conditions ofknowledge is
what Kant calls transcendental philosophy. Since it is exactly this objective which
establishes many ofthe presuppositions for the further development ofGerman
Idealismwe needto lookmore closelyatthefundamentals ofthe methodandthe
systematicityofKant's conception oftranscendentalphilosophy.
The history ofphilosophy provided Kant with numerous examples ofsystems
ofreason, from Plato right up to his own time. The seventeenth and eighteenth
centuriesweretimesofblossomingfortherationalisticsystemsofmetaphysics.But,
thanks to the acute criticismofthe empiricistHume, ithadbecome questionable
whether and to what extent the a priori concepts and principles, which were
used in these systems, could be deemed to be objectivelyvalid and the extent to
which they amounted to knowledge. And beyond that it was also unclear, from
a methodological point ofview, how a sound basis for alleged apriori principles
couldbe established.
The first and most important step in addressing these issues is, according to
Kant's philosophy, the precise distinction between, and respective epistemological
delimitationof, sensibilityandunderstanding,perceptionsandconcepts, empirical
and a priori propositions, analytic and synthetic propositions. Kant's view that
previous systems ofmetaphysics had no plausible methodology led him to try to
set out these distinctions and delimitations. The n~etaphysicalsystems claimed an
aprioriknowledgewithoutbeingabletoindicateexactlywhatconstitutedorgave
rise to this kind ofknowledge, what Kant termed 'synthetic apriorijudgements'.
Kant therefore places at the centre ofhis critical transcendental philosophy the
question '[h]ow are apriorisyntheticjudgmentspossible?'18
Thedoubtfulpossibilityofsuchjudgementsdependsonwhethertheaprioricon
cepts, which are used in suchjudgements, canbe demonstrated to be objectively
18ImmanuelKant,trans.NormanKempSmith, CritiqueofPureReason(London:Macmillan, 1927),B19.