A University of Sussex DPhil thesis Available online via Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/ This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details Geoffrey Hill: Poetry, Criticism and Philosophy Alex Pestell DPhil University of Sussex September 2011 2 Acknowledgements My thanks to Keston Sutherland, whose guidance, support, and meticulous feedback over the course of this thesis has been invaluable. My thanks also to Brian Cummings, who gave useful advice in the early stages of this project. I’m grateful to the staff at Leeds University Library for their help with the Geoffrey Hill archive. For their conversation, advice and good cheer over the course of this project thanks are due to Christoforos Diakoulakis, Alex Howard, Seda Ilter, Ben Jones, Michael Kindellan, Angelos Koutsourakis, Anthony Leaker, Peter Nicholls, Richard Parker, Ben Pestell, Karen Schaller, David Tucker, and Karen Veitch. Finally my thanks to my parents and my grandparents for their patience, encouragement and support. 3 UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX ALEX PESTELL DPHIL GEOFFREY HILL: POETRY, CRITICISM AND PHILOSOPHY SUMMARY This thesis examines the role played by philosophy in the poetry and criticism of Geoffrey Hill. Despite countless references to philosophy throughout Hill’s critical authorship, there exists no study of any length on this vital aspect of his thought. Through close readings of his poetry, criticism, and archival material, I attempt to demonstrate that philosophy has played a more crucial role in Hill’s work than has hitherto been assumed. Hill’s sceptical attitude to philosophy is intimately connected with his understanding of poetry as a sensate form of cognition. My thesis examines the ways Hill’s poetry and criticism responds to the challenges imposed upon this scepticism by a tradition of philosophy that emphasises the importance of the aesthetic to its analyses of modernity’s contradictions. I argue that a tradition of Anglophone Idealist thinkers, from S.T. Coleridge, via T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley, to Gillian Rose, is of sustained relevance to Hill’s work, shaping the way he thinks about politics, ethics and literature. In particular, German Idealism’s attempts to negotiate universality and particularity via an emphasis on the aesthetic bases of critical thought lay the groundwork for an understanding of poetry as a mode of cognition. Reading Hill’s poetry from For the Unfallen to Oraclau/Oracles, I try to show the ways in which problems traditionally conceived of as philosophical can be cognised in prosody and syntax. In part a vindication of Hill’s elevation of poetry over philosophy, these readings also show the degree to which Hill’s ‘craft of vision’ is indebted to conceptual and aesthetic models supplied by philosophy. 4 Contents List of abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 5 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 6 1. ‘Vision’ as the domain of poetry .................................................................................... 7 2. Anglophone Idealism’s dissatisfaction with modernity ............................................... 15 3. Poetry’s dissatisfaction with modernity ....................................................................... 22 SECTION I: COLERIDGE’S INFLUENCE ................................................................................ 36 Chapter 1: Imagination ..................................................................................................... 37 1. Lyric as diagnosis ......................................................................................................... 39 2. The imagination’s role in subjective aesthetic reflection ............................................. 45 3. Imagination and the common sense ............................................................................. 53 Chapter 2: The Drama of Reason ..................................................................................... 66 1. The ‘drama of reason’ .................................................................................................. 66 2. Coleridge’s aesthetics and literary criticism ................................................................ 78 3. Living Powers .............................................................................................................. 85 4. Sensus communis: a ‘decaying sense’ .......................................................................... 92 SECTION II: VICTORIAN IDEALISM AND OBJECTIVITY .................................................... 100 Chapter 3: Art of Judgement .......................................................................................... 101 1. The role of legislative metaphors in philosophical and poetic judgement ................. 105 2. What is Popular Philosophy? ..................................................................................... 113 3. Popular philosophy as impediment to poetic thought ................................................ 120 Chapter 4: ‘The strife of phrase’ .................................................................................... 130 1. Wavering thought ....................................................................................................... 130 2. What is a Bradleian poem? ........................................................................................ 140 3. Optional / obligatory music and its role in judgement ............................................... 144 4. Ephemeral thought ..................................................................................................... 157 SECTION III: WORDS AND THINGS ................................................................................... 170 Chapter 5: Performative Speech..................................................................................... 171 1. The example of Ezra Pound ....................................................................................... 174 2. Speech-acts ................................................................................................................. 180 3. The diagnostic word in Hill, Pound, and Austin ........................................................ 184 4. Blindness and stultification ........................................................................................ 194 5. Words and things ....................................................................................................... 202 Chapter 6: Poetry and Value .......................................................................................... 214 1. Intrinsic value ............................................................................................................. 215 2. Civil Power and Intrinsic Value ................................................................................. 223 3. ‘In Memoriam: Gillian Rose’ ..................................................................................... 231 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 239 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 248 5 List of abbreviations C Canaan (London: Penguin, 1996) CCW Collected Critical Writings, ed. Kenneth Haynes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) CP Collected Poems (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985) LL The Lords of Limit (London: André Deutsch, 1984) O Oraclau / Oracles (Thame: Clutag Press, 2010) OS The Orchards of Syon (London: Penguin, 2002) SC Scenes from Comus (London: Penguin, 2005) SS Speech! Speech! (London: Penguin, 2001) T1 A Treatise of Civil Power (Thame: Clutag Press, 2005) T2 A Treatise of Civil Power (London: Penguin, 2007) TL The Triumph of Love (London: Penguin, 1999) WT Without Title (London: Penguin, 2006) 6 INTRODUCTION What follows is a study of the role philosophy plays in the work of Geoffrey Hill. Philosophy is often presented by Hill as ancillary or even antithetical to poetry. Poetry is, or ought to be, ‘simple, sensuous and passionate’: a matter of the instinctual apprehension of sensate particulars.1 By contrast, philosophy is suspected of flattening out the granular surface of lived experience in the name of a systematic model of this experience. Philosophy might offer coordinating perspectives in Hill’s work, as when F.H. Bradley is quoted in the epigraphs to Hill’s Collected Critical Writings and Without Title, or when Simone Weil stands at the head of ‘The Pentecost Castle’, but in the main its role in what Hill calls ‘the craft of vision’ – the effort to obtain critical purchase on objective truth – is downplayed.2 Perhaps for this reason, critics have not yet produced any study, book chapter, article or monograph devoted to understanding Hill’s relationship to philosophy. Briefly, the argument in this thesis is not only that philosophy warrants this kind of attention, but that Hill’s conception of poetic ambition, of what poetry can and should strive to achieve, rests to a large extent on concepts and practices supplied by philosophy. Moreover, I will argue that Hill’s investment in philosophy is in fact committed to a particular tradition, that of an Anglophone Idealism derived from German Idealism. This is a tradition about which Hill has written at some length: most obviously in his essays on T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley, but also in occasional meditations on the thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Gillian Rose. But my evidence for Hill’s commitment to this tradition 1 Blake Morrison, ‘Under Judgment’, New Statesman 2551 (1980), 212-4, at 212. Hill is quoting Milton, ‘Of Education’. 2 See CCW vii, WT vii, CP 137. 7 will be drawn not just from a study of Hill’s critical commentary upon these writers, but from close readings of his prose style and his poetry, in order to demonstrate the impact of Anglophone Idealism upon the texture of his writing. In reading the syntax and prosody of Hill’s criticism and poetry in the light of the ideas developed by Coleridge, Green, Bradley, and Rose, I hope to disclose a far greater reliance upon philosophy’s modes of cognition than heretofore suspected. The rest of this introduction considers in what ways poetry and philosophy might be thought to inhabit overlapping domains of inquiry. In particular, it focuses upon the ways in which both poetry and philosophy, through a diagnosis of contradictions and an imagining of alternatives to contemporary experience, express a dissatisfaction with modernity. It offers some theoretical context, setting out the main outlines of the philosophical tradition in which I argue Hill’s work is most invested. It then offers a detailed close reading of an early Geoffrey Hill poem in an attempt to demonstrate what a philosophical poem might look like from the point of view of its syntax and prosody, rather than from the point of view of any content which might be taken to be philosophic. First, though, I will briefly consider some of the concepts, attitudes, and practices at stake in Hill’s poetic practice as they bear upon philosophy. 1. ‘Vision’ as the domain of poetry What is the status of visions in Hill’s work? On occasion, as here in ‘Of Commerce and Society’ (CP 46-51), Hill betrays a deep suspicion for the claims of the visionary: 8 Statesmen have known visions. And, not alone, Artistic men prod dead men from their stone: Some of us have heard the dead speak: The dead are my obsession this week But may be lifted away. (CP 49) This suspicion is audible in the poem’s metre. The first stanza begins with two lines of pentameter, but almost immediately the trochees of the first sentence come up against the rhythmic ambiguity of ‘have known’. The emphasis might rest on either syllable. If it rests on the ‘have’, the sentence appears defensive or regally insistent: politicians have known visions, whatever others might say. Alternatively, it might be read with the emphasis on ‘known’, in which case the weight is more equally distributed, and suggests some kind of narrative. In what way have statesmen ‘known visions’? How is this different from the visionary experiences attributed to prophets and artists? But the issue isn’t seriously considered, or is assumed as incontrovertible fact, for a new sentence importunately breaks into the rhythm: ‘And, not alone, / Artistic men prod dead men from their stone’. A claim for artistic vision opportunistically butts in, rather as the molossus ‘men prod dead’ interrupts the presiding rhythm. We then hear the voice of artistic connoisseurship as the following lines relax into irregular tetrameters, padded out by unstressed syllables to reinforce the informality of the occasion. ‘Some of us have heard the dead speak’ coyly hints at arcane knowledge, but makes light of the affair the better to impress the audience; it comes across as the diction of a creative writing veteran vaunting his vatic status. No wonder Jeffrey Wainwright can write of this passage, ‘No sooner has the speaker pretended to visionary knowledge than the claim is undermined, trashed even, by a scepticism that 9 sees it as an affectation, something like a nervous headache’.3 Vision, here, is barely distinguishable from narcissism. However, Hill’s scepticism is not impervious to the seductions of the visionary tradition. In a much later poem, ‘On Reading Milton and the English Revolution’, occurs a line which is suggestive for Hill’s understanding of poetry’s role in modernity: ‘The craft of vision is what I make of this’. Vision, on this account, clearly has a role to play in Hill’s ‘craft’. Note, here, how vision’s status is downgraded to a contingent, spontaneous object of artifice rather than a heaven-sent gift: art is subjective, provisional, and not subordinate to any pre-existing universal concept, category or criterion. This is a familiar position in the theories of continental aesthetics, from Hegel onwards. 4 No longer subject to the coordinating authorities of the church and monarchy, art acquires a degree of autonomy, and with it the privilege of critical distance. That Hill conceives of this distance as critical, and not just as the expulsion of art into the domain of the pastime or the decorative, is suggested by his use of the theologically-loaded ‘vision’. Vision suggests a faculty more transcendent than simple sight, though close natural observation is a staple of Hill’s poetic gestural repertoire. Hill has written that ‘“vision” is too commonly taken to mean effortless, unimpeded rapture’ (CCW 318), and it will become clear that a deep suspicion of the unimpeded intellect is a recurrent feature of Hill’s authorship. But in a paradox that will be frequently encountered in what follows, vision, as a diagnostic grasp of some objective 3 Jeffrey Wainwright, Acceptable Words: Essays on the poetry of Geoffrey Hill (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 19. 4 See G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, tr. T.M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), i, 51. For more recent examples, see J.M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992) and Gerald L. Bruns, On the Anarchy of Poetry and Philosophy: A Guide for the Unruly (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006).
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