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Gender Gap in Political Tolerance Author(s): Ewa A. Golebiowska Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Behavior, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 43-66 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/586585 . Accessed: 29/11/2012 06:41 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Behavior. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.216 on Thu, 29 Nov 2012 06:41:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Political Behavior, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1999 GENDERG AP IN POLITICATLO LERANCE Ewa A. Golebiowska While women and men do not differ in their attitudes in most areas, persistent gender differences have been identified in several issue domains, including support for civil liberties of political outgroups. Generally speaking, research shows that women are more reluctant than men to allow unpopular groups to exercise their constitutional rights; women also seem to differ from men in their choice of intolerance targets. While we have been cognizant of the existence of the gender gap in political tolerance since the beginning of survey research on the subject, we know less about its etiology. Using data from the 1987 Freedom and Tolerance National Survey and the General Social Survey from the same year, I explore the underpinnings of gender differences in political tolerance. To this end, I scrutinize explanations advanced in previous research on political tolerance (e.g., women's greater religiosity), propositions stemming from feminist theory (e.g., the notion of maternal thinking), as well as others that do not fit neatly into the above two categories (e.g., gender differences in commitment to democratic norms and political expertise). Because the implications of women's intolerance differ depending on whether their intolerance is focused on a single group or dispersed among several groups, I also examine the patterns in men's and women's choices of intolerance targets. Empirical analysis demonstrates that gender differences in commitment to democratic norms and political expertise (through the latter's influence on subscription to democratic norms), as well as threat perceptions, tolerance of uncertainty, and moral traditionalism (through the latter two's influence on threat perceptions), are the principal "culprits" for women's intolerance. Men's and women's choices of intolerance targets are largely pluralistically distributed and parallel, with only a few exceptions. Women exhibit a greater preference for the KKK and abortion groups (particularly those pro-choice in their orientation) as their least-liked targets. Men evince a preference for radical right-wing groups generally (and militarists in particular). The phenomenon of gender gap in partisan identification and electoral choice (with women favoring the Democratic party in both) has been attract- ing a lot of attention in recent years. Persistent gender differences in selected areas of public opinion have also been noted. These include the so-called compassion issues (issues relating to jobs, education, income redistribution, Ewa A. Golebiowska, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Eaton Hall, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155. 43 0190-9320/99/0300-0043$16.00/0 ? 1999 Plenum Publishing Corporation This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.216 on Thu, 29 Nov 2012 06:41:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 44 GOLEBIOWSKA and protection of the disadvantaged more generally) as well as issues impli- cating the use of violence and aggression (e.g., attitudes toward capital pun- ishment or defense spending) (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Erikson and Te- din, 1995). Gender differences also emerge in the area of support for civil liberties of political outgroups. Generally speaking, research has shown that women are more reluctant than men to allow unpopular groups to exercise their constitutional rights (e.g., Gibson, 1992; Marcus et al., 1995). Women may also differ from men in their choice of intolerance targets (Sullivan et al., 1982). While we have been cognizant of the gender gap in political tolerance since the beginnings of survey research on the subject, we know much less about its etiology. Using data from the 1987 Freedom and Tolerance National Sur- vey and the General Social Survey from the same year, I explore the underpinnings of men's and women's attitudes toward political outgroups they identify as their least-liked. Seeking to identify the causes of women's greater intolerance in a comprehensive manner, I scrutinize explanationsa dvanced in previous research on political tolerance (e.g., women's greater religiosity), propositions stemming from feminist theory (e.g., gender differences in threat perceptions and endorsement of traditional morality), as well those related to gender differences in political learning (e.g., gender differences in commitment to democratic norms and political expertise). Because the implications of women's intolerance are more noxious if it is focused on a single group rather than dispersed among several groups, I also examine how men and women differ in their choices of intolerance targets. PREVIOUSR ESEARCH Going back to Stouffer'sg roundbreakingr esearch on tolerance of communists, atheists, and socialists, researchers have identified small but consistent differences in men's and women's willingness to extend democratic rights to unorthodox political groups (Stouffer, 1955). While gender differences in political tolerance, usually defined as willingness to put up with group(s) one dislikes, have been noted in numerous studies since then (Nunn et al., 1978; Bobo and Licari, 1989; Gibson, 1992; Golebiowska, 1995, 1997; Marcus et al., 1995), previous researchers have either not been interested in exploring the etiology of women's intolerance or have not been highly successful in explain- ing what motivates it. Stouffer, for example, attempted to solve the puzzle of gender differences in support for the rights of communists, atheists, and socialists by hypothesizing that they arise due to gender differences in education, religiosity, personal anxiety, and exposure to diversity outside the home, among other things (1955).' Much to his surprise, controlling for these variables did not completely eliminate gender differences in attitudes toward the This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.216 on Thu, 29 Nov 2012 06:41:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions GENDERG AP IN POLITICATLO LERANCE 45 groups on which his research focused.2 Undaunted by his relatively fruitless quest for the sources of women's intolerance, Stouffer speculated that differences in child-rearing practices (with parents giving boys more freedom) might be responsible for men's greater openness to political diversity. A later replication of Stouffer'sw ork not only confirmed the persistence of gender differences in tolerance but also demonstrated their increasing diver- gence (Nunn et al., 1978). While both women and men became more tolerant of communists, atheists, and socialists, to put it differently, the gender gap in attitudes toward those groups grew even wider. Nunn, Crockett, and Williams similarly found themselves at a loss when trying to account for these findings and could do no more than muse that "inequalityb etween the sexes restricts the diversity of experience for women in comparison with men, resulting in lower tolerance among women than among men" (1978, p. 120). More recent and methodologically sophisticated examinations of attitudes toward political diversity, while generally pointing to gender differences in tolerance, similarly left the reasons for their existence largely shrouded in mystery (e.g., Gibson, 1992; Golebiowska, 1995; Marcus et al., 1995; cf. Sullivan et al., 1982).3 Women's consistently greater reluctance to put up with political outgroups is puzzling in light of research demonstrating that women may be less racist, less punitive, and more supportive of social equality than men (e.g., Sidanius, 1993; Pratto et al., 1997). Women are also more approving of homosexuality, profess greater liking for homosexuals, and are more likely to have homosex- ual friends (even though they may not be any more approving than men of civil rights and liberties for homosexuals) (e.g., Herek and Glunt, 1993; Herek and Capitanio, 1996; Kite and Whitley, 1996). Women's greater intolerance of political targets is counterintuitive because women are lower in social dominance orientation, an important mediator in the relationship between gender and various measures of support for social equality. Put differently, women are generally more prone to reject the domination of one group over another, suggesting that they might be more charitable in their views toward political targets as well (Pratto et al., 1997). The question of why women are generally more intolerant than men pre- sents more than an interesting empirical phenomenon. The underpinnings of women's attitudes toward political outgroups are important to understand in light of the recent disappearance of the gender gap in voting turnout. Be- cause women are beginning to participate in politics as much as or even more than men and constitute a majority of the American population, their attitudes have important implications for the well-being of unpopular groups. Understanding the processes that lead women to be more intolerant is important, in short, because it has implications for tolerance of political competi- tion, a crucial characteristic of a democratic system of government (whether or not one agrees on its other attributes) (e.g., Gibson, 1998). This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.216 on Thu, 29 Nov 2012 06:41:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 46 GOLEBIOWSKA While attempting to get to the heart of gender differences in the extent of political tolerance, it is also worthwhile to examine a related facet of men's and women's attitudes toward groups outside American political mainstream. Previous research has found that men and women differ in their choices of intolerance targets (Sullivan et al., 1982). Women in the study in question conducted in the late 1970s were more likely to choose targets with religious significance (e.g., atheists or abortion groups) whereas men were more likely to choose targets with ideological significance (e.g., communists or socialists). Even when they named an identical target, women were more likely to offer religion-based objections to the group whereas men were more likely to op- pose it on ideological grounds (Sullivan et al., 1982). Whether women's intolerance has more recently been focused on a single group or distributed more pluralistically is important to examine because of different implications of focused vs. pluralistic intolerance for political repression. If women's intolerance is focused, the possibility of repression directed at their "favorite" target group is higher than if their intolerance is directed at multiple targets (Sullivan et al., 1982). CONCEPTUALF RAMEWORK Extensive research and theorizing focus on gender differences in attitudes and their origins (e.g., Sapiro, 1983; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Conover, 1988; Mueller, 1988; Clark and Clark, 1996). One body of thought attempting to account for differences in women's and men's attitudes is a diverse constel- lation of ideas known as feminist theory (Conover, 1988; Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Hyde, 1996). While feminist theory is multifaceted, "a central core to most of feminist theory . . . emphasizes the importance of gender roles as powerful forces on human behavior"( where gender refers to social constructions of what it means to be female or male) (Hyde, 1996). Advocates of this perspective, to paraphrase, interpret the differences between women and men as social constructions emanating from different roles that men and women play in a patriarchical society (e.g., Conover and Sapiro, 1993). Women develop distinctive attitudes because of gender differences in socialization generally and the traditional designation of women for the private sphere in particular. One can surmise that some of these attitudes will have implications for tolerance of political diversity. I consider a number of possi- bilities below.4 The idea that women's lower tolerance is related to their dominance of the private sphere was originally suggested by Stouffer, and then echoed by others who followed in his footsteps. Stouffer (and later Nunn et al., 1978) theorized that women qua guardians of the domestic sphere may be more intolerant because of their limited exposure to diversity (1955). Stouffer'st he- This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.216 on Thu, 29 Nov 2012 06:41:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions GENDERG AP IN POLITICATLO LERANCE 47 ory about the linkage between women's traditionalr oles and their intolerance, however, may not have been sufficiently broad. A variant of the gender differences theory I draw on, the maternal thinking perspective, has broader implications for understanding women's responses to political diversity.T he maternal thinking perspective suggests that women develop distinctive attitudes because of their responsibility for the domestic sphere and their interest in the "preservation,g rowth, and acceptability"o f their children (Ruddick 1980, p. 348). Ruddick, a principal proponent of the maternal thinking view, argues further that the "mothers'" interest in the preservation of their children can lead to fearfulness, excessive control, and rigidity.5D ue to their interest in the preservation of children, women might be more hesitant to embrace change or deviation from "normality"t o the extent that such change or deviation potentially challenges the safety of their children and families. In a related vein, women should find outgroups more menacing than men do because their "unusualness"p otentially challenges the stability and predictability of their families' environment (or further exacerbates the unpredictability that may already be inherent in it). Women, for these reasons, might also develop less tolerance of uncertainty and cling to traditional conceptions of morality more strongly than men. And all of these characteristics,i n turn, should affect their readiness to put up with political diversity. Another process might be responsible for gender differences in tolerance, though one which complements rather than contradicts the above expectations stemming from feminist theory. Gender differences in political learning, including gender differences in political expertise (well established in previous research) and hypothesized gender differences in commitment to abstract democratic norms, might hold one key to unlocking the puzzle of gender differences in political tolerance. Survey after survey demonstrates continuing gender differences in political expertise (generally defined as a combination of interest in and knowledge about politics). Despite their ad- vances in behavioral political participation, women continue to exhibit lower levels of psychological involvement in politics and possess lower levels of fac- tual knowledge about it (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Tolleson- Rinehart et al., 1996; Verba et al., 1997).6 The deficit in women's political expertise might partially account for their lower tolerance because political novices (those relatively uninterested in and unknowledgeable about politics) have been shown to exhibit less tolerance than political experts (e.g., Marcus et al., 1995). Levels of political expertise might also affect tolerance indirectly through their influence on support for abstract democratic norms, one of the strongest predictors of political tolerance. This possibility grows out of Sniderman'sr e- search and theorizing on the linkage between personality and democratic politics (1975). Sniderman proposes that commitment to democratic norms is This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.216 on Thu, 29 Nov 2012 06:41:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 48 GOLEBIOWSKA acquired through learning (1975). Since discussions concerning the importance of democratic norms and their application to specific outgroups are most likely to take place among political elites, norms commitment should be correlated with a solid knowledge base about politics. If the linkage between political expertise and political tolerance is partiallym ediated by commitment to democratic norms, then women and men may differ in their tolerance because of the former's expected lower commitment to abstract democratic norms. In sum, it is possible that gender differences in learning about politics and democratic norms partially explain why women are less tolerant than men.7 Previous research on political tolerance points to one more explanation for gender differences in tolerance (though one which, as has been established by others, unlikely accounts for these differences in toto). Because women have been traditionally more religious than men, and the religiously devout tend to be less willing to put up with political deviance, gender differences in religiosity might hold a partial solution to the puzzle of gender differences in tolerance (e.g., Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al., 1982). THEP ATHWAYBSE TWEENG ENDERA ND POLITICATLO LERANCE: EXPECTATIONS The theoretical model in Figure 1 summarizes the expected nature of the linkages between gender, political tolerance, and the mediating variables re- ferred to above. For simplicity of exposition, controls used in the estimation of each path are not listed (see Appendix B for equations used to estimate each path). These controls include sociodemographic variables (e.g., education, age, race), political variables (e.g., ideological self-identification), and psychological variables (psychological security). As suggested in Figure 1, consistent with the political learning explanation, I expect that one reason why women are less tolerant is because they are more likely than men to be political novices. Women, in a related vein, because of their lower levels of political expertise, should be less strongly com- mitted to abstract democratic norms. Their weaker commitment to democratic norms, in turn, should partially account for their greater intolerance. Because of their socialization into maternal roles,8w omen should exhibit less tolerance of uncertainty, perceive more threat from political outgroups, and subscribe to more traditional conceptions of morality. Women's greater religiosity, consistent with previous research on political tolerance, should con- tribute to their greater intolerance. I expect that gender differences in these six predictors should partially, if not completely, account for differences in men's and women's attitudes toward their least-liked groups (hence the direct link between gender and political tolerance is left in the model). This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.216 on Thu, 29 Nov 2012 06:41:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions O m z V m ci) -;'oO0 2 0 FE- = r- ;o m 0 r) z m z FIG. 1. Simplified theoretical model of political tolerance. See Appendix B for controls used in each equation. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.216 on Thu, 29 Nov 2012 06:41:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 50 GOLEBIOWSKA While the relationship between gender and political tolerance should be mediated by the variables listed in Figure 1, more distal processes might also be at work. Religiosity, tolerance of uncertainty, and moral traditionalism, hypothesized to intervene directly in the linkage between gender and political tolerance, might also affect it more indirectly through their influence on threat perceptions (those religious, unable to tolerate uncertainty, and high in moral traditionalism should perceive more threat from unorthodox groups). Religiosity, in addition, should be associated with support for moral traditionalism and tolerance of uncertainty (religious individuals should generally subscribe to more traditional notions of morality and should be more reluctant to tolerate uncertainty). Finally, perceived threat might interfere with the learning of democratic norms and through this influence indirectly affect political tolerance (those perceiving more threat from groups they dislike should exhibit weaker commitment to abstract democratic norms) (Sniderman, 1975; Gibson and Tedin, 1986). DATA,M EASURESA, ND METHODOLOGY Data from the 1987 Freedom and Tolerance in the United States Survey (FTUS) and the 1987 incarnation of the General Social Surveys (GSS) are used (Gibson, 1987; Davis and Smith, 1994). The former was based on re- interviews with a random subsample of respondents to the 1987 General So- cial Survey (Gibson, 1987; Davis and Smith, 1994). Data from the FTUS were merged with the 1987 GSS to take advantage of sociodemographic information about the respondents that was not collected separately in the FTUS. The resultant data set is chockful of indicators of tolerance as well as a variety of predictors relevant to the study of its etiology. I use questions rooted in the least-liked paradigm to measure political tolerance (e.g., Sullivan et al., 1982). In this paradigm, respondents are asked to identify the groups they dislike the most and are subsequently asked whether they would allow members of those groups to engage in a variety of activities (e.g., make a speech, stage a public rally, run for office, or teach in local schools). All measures of tolerance are coded from "very intolerant" to "very tolerant"; all predictors are coded with an expectation of a positive relationship with tolerance (e.g., religiosity is coded from "very religious" to "very non- religious").9F or ease of interpretation, all variables are transformed to range from 0 to 1. The wording of all tolerance indicators and the most important predictors can be found in Appendix A. Difference of means tests (t-tests), cross-tabulation analysis, and path analysis are used to estimate the hypothesized relationships. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.216 on Thu, 29 Nov 2012 06:41:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions GENDERG AP IN POLITICATLO LERANCE 51 RESULTS Gender Differences in Target Selection I commence this investigation of gender differences in political tolerance by comparing and contrasting men's and women's choices of intolerance targets. Table 1 contains simple cross-tabulation results showing how men and women differ in their selections. The last column in Table 1 contains the results of difference of means tests used to examine gender differences in the likelihood of mentioning each group. For the sake of simplification, groups mentioned sporadically by either male or female respondents have been placed into an "other"c ategory. Generally speaking, men's and women's choices of least-liked groups are pluralisticallyd istributed and similar, with only a few exceptions. Women are more likely than men (though not significantly) to mention the KKK as their "favorite"t arget and significantly more likely to mention an abortion group (particularlyo ne that is pro-choice in its orientation). Men are significantly more likely to choose radical right-wing groups (militarists, Nazis, and the KKK combined) as their least-liked, particularly" favoring"m ilitarists as their top choice. TABLE 1. Gender Differences in Target Selection Men Women Difference Significance Communists 19.4 19.2 (-0.2) .29 Atheists 9.2 10.7 (1.5) .81 Radical righr 60.3 58.3 (-2.0) .01 KKK 38.5 44.8 (6.3) .59 Militarists 13.7 5.4 (-8.3) .00 Nazis 8.1 8.1 (0.0) .55 Homosexuals 5.9 5.5 (-0.4) .44 Abortion groups' 1.7 4.5 (2.8) .02 Anti-choice 0.3 0.9 (0.6) .31 Pro-choice 1.4 3.6 (2.2) .03 Other 3.5 1.8 (-1.7) .02 Difference column: (% of women) minus (% of men) mentioning a particular group. Significance column: p-value from a t-test comparing gender differences in the likelihood of mentioning a particular group. 'The sum total mentioning KKK, militarists, and Nazis. hBoth anti- and pro-choice. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.216 on Thu, 29 Nov 2012 06:41:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions