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Essays in Ancient Epistemology Essays in Ancient Epistemology GAIL FINE 1 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,13/4/2021,SPi 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©GailFine2021 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2021 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2020952854 ISBN 978–0–19–874676–8 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198746768.001.0001 PrintedandboundintheUKby TJBooksLimited LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. Tothememoryofmymother and ToDebbieandDarrell Contents PrefaceandAcknowledgements ix 1. Introduction 1 PART I: PLATO AND [PLATO] 2. DoesSocratesClaimtoKnowthatHeKnowsNothing? 33 3. KnowledgeandTrueBeliefintheMeno 63 4. The‘TwoWorlds’TheoryinthePhaedo 94 5. EpistêmêandDoxa,KnowledgeandBelief,inthePhaedo 109 6. RecollectionandInnatisminthePhaedo 134 7. PlatoontheGradesofPerception:Theaetetus184–186 andthePhaedo 155 8. Meno’sParadoxandtheSisyphus 189 PART II: ARISTOTLE 9. AristotleonKnowledge 221 10. Aristotle’sTwoWorlds:KnowledgeandBeliefinPosterior Analytics1.33 243 PART III: SEXTUS 11. SkepticalDogmata:OutlinesofPyrrhonismI13 265 12. Subjectivity,AncientandModern:TheCyrenaics,Sextus, andDescartes 288 13. DescartesandAncientSkepticism:ReheatedCabbage? 325 14. SextusandExternalWorldSkepticism 356 References 391 IndexLocorum 407 Preface and Acknowledgements Thisvolumebringstogetherthirteenofmyessaysonancientepistemology,along with a new, synoptic introduction. The earliest of the essays was published in 2000;thelatestwerestillunpublishedwhenIsubmittedthisvolumetothePress. Theyareallreprintedherewithminorchanges.Forexample,thereareoccasional slightvariationsincontent.Somereferenceshavebeencorrected;andsometimes transliterations are used where the originally-published version used Greek. For variousreasons,somematerialthatwasoriginallyinthetextisnowinfootnotes; hence the footnote numbers in the essays as they appear here are sometimes differentfromthoseintheessaysastheyoriginallyappeared.Theessaysasthey wereoriginallypublisheddifferinstyle,usuallybecausethevenuesthatpublished themhaddifferenthousestyles.Inthisvolume,somechangeshavebeenmadeso asachievemoreuniformityofstyle. IntheIntroduction,Idiscusssomeoftheessays’mainthemesandindicatehow the essays fit together. I also occasionally criticize what I say in one or another essay;andsometimesIdiscussliteraturethattheessaysdiscussonlyverybrieflyor not at all. However, I have not done either of these things systematically or in detail. Nor does the Introduction defend my views in detail. It provides an overview;detailsarereservedfortheessaysthatfollow. Thechaptersthatfollowrecordvariousdebts.ButIshouldalsoliketorecorda few particular acknowledgments here: to Peter Momtchiloff and Henry Clarke, bothofOxfordUniversityPress,forhelpandencouragementatvariousstages;to Peter Osorio for compiling the list of references and the index locorum; and, as always,IowemoretoTerryIrwinthanIcansay. Theessaysprintedherewereoriginallypublishedasfollowsbelow.Theyappear herewiththekindpermissionoftherelevantpublishersand/oreditors. Chapter2. ‘Does Socrates Claim to Know that He Knows Nothing?,’ Oxford StudiesinAncientPhilosophy35(2008),49–85.OxfordUniversityPress. Chapter3. ‘Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy27(2004),41–81.OxfordUniversityPress. Chapter4. ‘The “Two Worlds” Theory in the Phaedo,’ British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (2016), 557–72. Reprinted by permission of the publisherTaylor&FrancisLtd,http://www.tandfonline.com. x    Chapter5. ‘Epistêmê and Doxa, Knowledge and True Belief, in the Phaedo,’ in FionaLeigh(ed.),ThemesinPlato,Aristotle,andHellenisticPhilosophy,BICS supplementaryvol.(2021),27–46.UniversityofLondonPress. Chapter6. ‘Recollection and Innatism in the Phaedo,’ in G. Sermamoglou- Soulmaidi and E. Keeling (eds.), Wisdom, Love, and Friendship in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Daniel Devereux (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020),191–214. Chapter7. ‘Plato on the Grades of Perception: Theaetetus 184–186 and the Phaedo,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 53 (2017), 65–109. Oxford UniversityPress. Chapter8.‘Meno’sParadoxandtheSisyphus,’inG.GurtlerandW.Wians(eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 28 (2013), 113–46.Brill. Chapter9.‘AristotleonKnowledge,’Elenchos14(2010),121–55.Bibliopolis. Chapter10.‘Aristotle’sTwoWorlds:KnowledgeandBeliefinPosteriorAnalytics 1.33,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series vol. 110 (2010), 323–46.OxfordUniversityPress. Chapter11.‘ScepticalDogmata:OutlinesofPyrrhonismI13,’Methexis13(2000), 81–105.Editor:ProfessorFrancoTrabbatoni. Chapter12. ‘Subjectivity, Ancient and Modern: The Cyrenaics, Sextus, and Descartes,’ in J. Miller and B. Inwood (eds.), Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),192–231. Chapter13.‘DescartesandAncientScepticism:ReheatedCabbage?,’Philosophical Review, vol. 109, No. 2 (2000), 195–234. Reprinted by permission of Duke UniversityPress. Chapter14. ‘Sextus and External World Scepticism,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy24(2003),341–85.OxfordUniversityPress. 1 Introduction 1. Theessaysinthisvolumediscussancientepistemology,especiallyinPlato,Aristotle, and the Pyrrhonian skeptics. One central theme is cognitive conditions and their contents.¹ In particular, how are epistêmê, doxa, dogma, and the corresponding verbs, to be understood? Is epistêmê knowledge as it is conceived of nowadays? Aredoxa anddogma beliefasitisconceived ofnowadays?Considerationofsuch questionsshouldnotbelimitedtotheGreekwordsjustmentioned.SinceGreekhas a rich cognitive vocabulary, we should also consider other Greek words that are sometimestranslatedas‘knowledge,’suchaseidenaiandgignôskein,aswellasother Greekwordsthataresometimesthoughttoindicatebelief,suchashupolêpsisand oiesthai.Weshouldalsoconsiderwhatknowledgeandbeliefare. ThefirstworkinthePlatoniccorpusthatengageswithsomeoftheseissuesis the Apology,which I discuss in Chapter2. Socrates is often thought to havesaid thattheonlythingheknowsisthatheknowsnothing.Ifhesaysthis,andif‘know’ isusedunivocally,heseemstocontradicthimself.Forifheknowsthatheknows nothing,hedoesn’tknowanything,contrarytohisclaimtoknowsomething(viz., thatheknowsnothing).Ontheotherhand,ifhedoesn’tknowanything,thenhe can’tknowthatfact.Forifhedid,hewouldknowsomethingafterall.Yettheview that Socrates says that he knows that he knows nothing, though by no means universal,² is widespread.³ In Chapter2, I ask whether, in the Apology, Socrates says,orimplies,thatheknowsthatheknowsnothinginawaythatinvolvesself- contradiction.Ialsoconsidertherelatedbutdifferentquestionofwhetherhesays that he knows nothing, a claim that, unlike the claim to know that one knows nothing,isnotself-contradictory.⁴ ¹ Cognitiveconditionsincludestatesofknowingandbelieving,aswhenJohnknows,orbelieves, that2+2=4.Cognitivecontentsincludewhatisbelievedandknown,e.g.that2+2=4. ² Seee.g.C.C.W.Taylor,Socrates:AVeryShortIntroduction(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2nded.,2019),44–50. ³ Foronerecentexample,seeS.Bakewell,HowtoLive(London:ChattoandWindus,2010),124.For another, see H. Lagerlund, Skepticism in Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2020), who says that ‘Socratesfamouslyproclaimedthatheknowsthathedoesnotknowanything’(2;cf.26).Icitefurther examplesinChapter2. ⁴ Onemightarguethatitimpliesacontradiction,sinceitisanassertion;and,accordingtooneview, ifoneassertsthatp,onetakesoneselftoknowthatp.Butthatviewofassertioniscontroversial;and IsuggestinChapter2thatPlatodoesnotacceptit. EssaysinAncientEpistemology.GailFine,OxfordUniversityPress(2021).©GailFine. DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198746768.003.0001 2  AtAp.21b4–5,Socratessays: ForIamawareofbeingwiseinnothing,greatorsmall. Egôgardêoutemegaoutesmikronsunoidaemautô(i)sophosôn. This passage isn’t explicitly self-contradictory, for it uses two different cognitive phrases,sunoidaemautô(i)andsophosôn.However,thepassagewouldbeimpli- citly self-contradictory if these phrases were synonymous, or if to suneidenai somethingimpliedbeingsophoswithrespecttoit.⁵ However,toknowsomethingwouldnotusuallybethoughtsufficientforbeing wisewithrespecttoit.⁶Itwouldnormallybethoughttobemoredifficulttoattain wisdomthantoattainjustanyoldknowledge.IfSocratesclaimstoknowthatheis not wise, that does not imply a contradiction unless the knowledge he takes himself to have is wisdom. But the Apology does not support that view. Indeed, itisnot evenclear thatsuneidenai isbeingusedforknowledge:thewordcan be used for being aware of something in a way that falls short of knowing it. In Chapter2,IarguethatSocratesissayingeitherthatheknowsthatheisnotwise (whereknowingsomethingfallsshortofbeingwisewithrespecttoit);orelsethat he is aware that he is not wise (where being aware of something falls short of knowingit).Neitherclaiminvolvesorimpliesacontradiction.⁷ Onemightarguethatif,inAp.21b4–5,Socratesclaimstolackallwisdom,he contradictstheoracle’sclaimthatnooneiswiserthanheis(21a)andthatheis wisest(21b).Fortheoracledoesn’tlie(21b).OnesolutionistosaythatSocrates disclaims wisdom onlybefore hearing whatthe oracle said;after hearing whatit said, he decides that he is wise after all. He doesn’t contradict himself, holding bothpandnotpatthesametime;rather,uponreflectionhechangeshismind.⁸ Idefendadifferentsolution,accordingtowhich,evenafterreflectingonwhat the oracle said, Socrates continues to believe that he lacks all wisdom. This is consistentwithwhattheoraclesays.ForSocratescanbewiserthanotherswithout anyofthembeingwise,justasonepersoncanbewealthierthananotherwithout ⁵ ThisishowRichardKrautunderstandsthepassage.Hetranslates‘sunoida’as‘know,’andsaysthat ‘youcannotknowthatyouarenotwiseeveninasmallway;fortoknowsomethingistohaveasmall amountofwisdom’:SocratesandtheState(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984),272n.44. ⁶ InRep.428c–429a,Platotakessophiatobejustonekindofepistêmê.However,inMeno96e–100c heusesavarietyofcognitivetermsinterchangeably,includingsophiaandepistêmê.Tht.145d7–e6 explicitlyidentifiesepistêmêandsophia. Despitethis terminologicalvariation,Platooftenseemsto recognizedifferentkinds,orlevels,ofepistêmê. ⁷ Eitherway,ontheinterpretationI’vesuggested21b4–5usestwodifferentcognitivetermsfortwo differentcognitiveconditions.GregoryVlastos,bycontrast,arguesthatSocratesnotonlytakesavariety ofcognitivetermstobesynonymousbutalsotakeseachofthemtobeambiguousasbetweentwo sensesof‘know,’whichVlastoscalls‘certainknowledge’and‘elencticknowledge.’Seehis‘Socrates’ DisavowalofKnowledge,’PhilosophicalQuarterly35(1985),1–31.ReprintedinG.Fine(ed.),PlatoI, 64–92,at82–4,91.SomecommentatorsagreewithVlastos’sbasicpointbutfavordifferentsensesof ‘knowledge’thanhedoes. ⁸ Forthisview,seeKraut,SocratesandtheState,271.