From the Normandy Beaches to the Baltic Sea: The Northwest Europe Campaign, 1944-1945 PDF
Preview From the Normandy Beaches to the Baltic Sea: The Northwest Europe Campaign, 1944-1945
FROM THE NORMANDY BEACHES TO THE BALTIC SEA FROM THE NORMANDY BEACHES TO THE BALTIC SEA The Northwest Europe Campaign, 1944–1945 Alan J. Levine Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Levine, Alan J. From the Normandy beaches to the Baltic Sea: The northwest Europe campaign, 1944–1945 / Alan J. Levine p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-96920-7 (alk. paper) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Western Front. I. Title. D756.L48 2000 940.54′21—dc21 99-059562 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2000 by Alan J. Levine All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 99-059562 ISBN: 0-275-96920-7 First published in 2000 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 To my uncle and aunt, Ismel and Joy Levine Contents Introduction ix 1. Prelude, Planning, Preparation 1 2. The Normandy Beachhead 51 3. The Liberation of Western Europe 77 4. The Fall Fighting on the German Frontier 103 5. The German Counteroffensives in the Ardennes and Alsace 145 6. The March to Victory, January–May 1945 169 Notes 205 Bibliography 207 Index 215 Introduction ISntroductiono many books have been written about Eisenhower’s campaign in 1944–1945 that an additional one, at this late date, probably requires explanation. This book is the result of the realization that there is a strange gap in the vast (if uneven) literature about this last phase of the war against Nazi Germany. There is no serious study, and certainly no up-to-date study of manageable size, that covers the entire campaign and the operations of all the Allied armies. In fact, there seems to be no overall study of any size that is truly “Allied” in approach. Chester Wilmot’s The Struggle for Europe and Russell Weigley’s Eisenhower’s Lieutenants are magnificent works—and the present book could not have been written without them (or the many fine official histories of the war); but the former is decidedly British in orientation, while Weigley never pretends to be dealing with anything but the American Army. A “national” approach to the liberation of Europe is simply inade- quate. One result is that many people in the United States are surprised to learn that half, or more, of the fighting in Normandy was done by the British and Canadians, while the tone of much British writing is such that it is hard for many to realize that by the last campaign in Germany the Anglo-Canadian forces formed less than a quarter of Eisenhower’s command. Curiously, Americans tend to be even more ill-informed about the efforts of our fellow North Americans than about those of the British forces. One reason for this is undoubtedly the simple fact that, by the standards of the NATO era, the American and Canadian armed forces had remarkably little to do with each other before and during World War II. But the Canadians, on several occasions, carried x From the Normandy Beaches to the Baltic Sea out the most important tasks facing the Allies, and I have tried to correct the common tendency to neglect Canadian operations. Correcting a lack of balance along national lines is not my only goal. I have tried to supply an account that explains not only what happened but why, and the relationship of the campaign in Northwest Europe to the fighting earlier and elsewhere. Nor have I sought to merely summa- rize the prevailing accounts of the campaign; as will be apparent to military historians, some of my conclusions are far from orthodox. I have tried to emphasize important things that have been relatively neglected—notably the air, maritime, and logistical aspects of the cam- paign. The latter did not suddenly cease to be important once the Allies were established in Normandy. Taking, opening and keeping open ports to ensure that the Allied armies were properly supplied was a critical problem that shaped the whole campaign through the fall of 1944 and even after, for Hitler’s purpose in attacking in the Ardennes in December 1944 was to deprive the Allies of Antwerp, their main supply base. Recognition of this point also suggests some unorthodox conclusions about the effectiveness of the “fortress” ports with which Hitler was so obsessed. My examination of this and other aspects of the Allies’ logistical problems also suggests some serious qualifications to the usual assumptions that the Allied, and especially the U.S., armies always benefited from luxurious supplies during World War II. It is also critical to my detailed discussion of the great controversy over whether Eisenhower missed an opportunity to end the war in 1944. Along the way I have also tried to draw attention to some other neglected issues and relatively unknown but important aspects of the campaign—notably, the battles for Chartres, the Mons pocket, Nuremberg, and above all the fight for the Antwerp approaches. Though the most important struggle of the fall of 1944, the struggle to open Antwerp has been relatively neglected by American (though not British) historians. Some of my conclusions about various operations— notably, the invasion of southern France and the “Market-Garden” operation that culminated in the defeat at Arnhem are a bit different from those that have been prevalent, at least among American histori- ans. I have also tried to integrate a proper emphasis on air support of the land battle into my account. It will be apparent that it was powerful, effective, and costly. One of the striking things about the popular approach to the air war since 1945 is that, while there has been a remarkable amount of condemnation—sincere or not—of the suffering inflicted on German and Japanese civilians by strategic bombing, there has been very little recognition of the destructiveness of Allied tactical bombing, although that often troubled not only Allied correspondents but also soldiers during the war. Even in Germany, direct support of the ground forces invading the country sometimes caused as much damage
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