From the Ashes of History: Collective Trauma and the Making of International Politics

263 Pages·2022·3.208 MB·English

by  Adam B. Lerner

From the Ashes of History: Collective Trauma and the Making of International Politics
Adam B. Lerner
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197623589.001.0001
Published: 2022 Online ISBN: 9780197623626 Print ISBN: 9780197623589
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Subject: Political Theory, International Relations ttp
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From the Ashes of History: Collective Trauma and the Making of International Politics
Adam B. Lerner
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197623589.001.0001
Published: 2022 Online ISBN: 9780197623626 Print ISBN: 9780197623589
FRONT MATTER
Acknowledgments  D
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Published: April 2022 n
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Subject: Political Theory, International Relations from
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This book represents the culmination of a multiyear journey across continents and scholarly disciplines. I em
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am thankful to have had numerous guides and fellow travelers. .o
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The research began in 2015 at the University of Cambridge. During my MPhil and PhD research (2015–2019), om
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I was lucky to bene�t from the mentorship of three fantastic scholars: Shailaja Fennell, Duncan Bell, and o
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Yale Ferguson. Their kindness, support, and insight were paramount in formulating the ideas in this book, /4
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and I am deeply grateful to each of them. I was also lucky at Cambridge to meet three close friends working 7
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on related subjects: Sean Fleming, Jaakko Heiskanen, and Lucas de Oliveira Paes. All of them have become /ch
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intellectual sparring partners and generously provided feedback on multiple chapters. Additionally, I would te
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like to extend my thanks to Shama Ams, Anjali Bhardwaj-Datta, Joya Chatterji, Lorena Gazzotti, Avneet 5
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Kaur, David Lowe, Giovanni Mantilla, Jason Sharman, Ayse Zarakol, and Maja Spanu—all of whom took part 6
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in this book’s ideation and re�nement. 8
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While doing archival research in India in 2018, I bene�ted from the support of the Carnegie Endowment for c
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International Peace’s India branch in Delhi, which provided research assistance during my tenure as a is
visiting scholar. I further bene�ted from the friendship and support of Satbir Bedi, Shashwat Silas, Sukrit ition
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Silas, and Neil Noronha. I would also like to extend my thanks to Vinod Jose and Hartosh Singh Bal, two e
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mentors from my prior career as a journalist who helped me navigate Delhi’s archives, libraries, and ice
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politics. us
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Once I began my appointment at Royal Holloway, University of London, in 2019, this book bene�ted 1
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immensely from the support of wonderful colleagues. In particular, I want to single out Laura Sjoberg, who S
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arrived at Royal Holloway after me but quickly became an ideal mentor and con�dant. She read book te
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chapters, helped me navigate revision and submission, and even provided vital good humor and be
encouragement during the worst periods of lockdown. I am similarly indebted to Ben O’Loughlin and r 20
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p. viii Michelle Bentley—friends and mentors who provided advice, support, and feedback. I would also like to
thank Antara Datta, Chris Hanretty, Sarah Childs, Thomas Stubbs, Daniela Lai, Dishil Shrimankar, and
Oliver Heath for reading chapters of the manuscript and providing advice during its revision. For engaging
with my work remotely and o�ering thoughtful feedback and guidance, I would like to thank Brent Steele,
Medha Kudaisya, Maria Mälksoo, Lene Hansen, Karin Fierke, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, and Dovile Budryte.
Paul Beaumont, additionally, provided enormous help and good humor during the �nal stages of revision.
During the publication process, I was lucky to receive the guidance and wisdom of Oxford University Press’s
senior editor Angela Chnapko—a true champion of scholarly research. A thanks are also due to the three
anonymous reviewers whose detailed comments helped improve the manuscript and see it across the �nish
line. Portions of chapters 5 and 6 were previously published in the European Journal of International Relations
and Perspectives on Politics, respectively, and I am grateful to both journals for granting permission to adapt
this work.
Finally, I am deeply indebted to my friends and family, scattered across the globe, who have provided their
support, encouragement, and love throughout this process. In particular, I want to thank my mom (Lisa
Horowitz), my dad (Bruce Lerner), and my sister (Kira Lerner), whose love and kindness kept me sane
during a long and di�cult research process. Partway through this journey, I was lucky to meet my partner,
Allicen Dichiara, and adopt our dog, Moose—they have since become my family. Once they entered the D
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picture, I couldn’t have imagined writing this book without them. w
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Collective Trauma and the Making
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of International Politics w
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Introduction ttp
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The varied origin stories that international relations (IR) scholars have proposed a
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for their discipline all share one thing in common. Whether they refer back to m
ic
the Peace of Westphalia following the Thirty Years’ War, the first “great debate” .o
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following World War I, or even Thucydides’s early classical realist account of the .c
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Peloponnesian War, they all envision the international political arena as forged /b
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in the wake of mass violence. Even alternative, critical accounts that locate IR’s o
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roots in long-s tanding imperial hierarchies, the international slave trade, or the 1
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twentieth century’s wave of decolonization similarly implicate the structural vi- 7
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olence of empire and racism, as well as the often violent expulsion of foreign a
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rulers.1 These mythologized origins allude to the pervasiveness of mass violence ter/3
in IR, with a role that extends well beyond inquiries into the discipline’s roots. 52
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Many of the institutions that scholars of international politics study—i ncluding 8
8
2
the borders that define states, the norms that delineate appropriate behavior, the 0
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organizations that manage interstate relations, and even the ideational lines be- y A
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tween “us” and “them”—s imilarly emerged due to tremendous bloodshed and q
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oppression. Just as medicine tends to pay disproportionate attention to diseases itio
n
of the body, IR tends to focus on diseases of world politics. S
e
Yet despite the disproportionate attention mass violence receives, IR schol- rv
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arship has a problematic tendency to accept its consequences at face value. s
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Typically, scholars follow an implicit “event” model of mass violence, based se
on linear, sequential timing2 and mechanistic notions of cause and effect. r on
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1 Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson, “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths te
That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies m
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39, no. 3 (May 2011): 735–5 8. e
2 For more on the politics of timing in IR, see Andrew R. Hom, “Timing Is Everything: Toward a r 2
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Better Understanding of Time and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 1 2
2
(March 1, 2018): 69–7 9; Andrew R. Hom, International Relations and the Problem of Time (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2020).
From the Ashes of History. Adam B. Lerner, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/ oso/ 9780197623589.003.0001
4 Theoretical Framework
This model understands violent episodes as having defined durations, begin-
ning with identifiable dawns and culminating in conclusive dusks. According
to such thinking, once a cataclysm finishes, its destructive consequences
become readily apparent and, potentially, quantifiable. Interest is piqued
as media report damages, often in the form of casualty counts, eyewitness D
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testimonies, or visuals of destroyed property. Shortly after, experts estimate n
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the costs of material damages, as well as a timeline and budget for repairs. ad
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Politicians— including international statesmen and stateswomen— craft d fro
plans for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Citizens on the ground soldier m
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on, finding ways to overcome difficulties and rebuild their lives. Over time, ttp
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as infrastructure is repaired and victims’ physical wounds heal, politicians ://a
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move on to new, more pressing issues. Mass violence thus fades from atten- a
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tion and is relegated to the past. Time stubbornly marches on. m
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Though perhaps intuitively appealing, pivotal global trends continually at- .o
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test to the inadequacy of this simplified linear event model of mass violence. .c
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The year 2020 alone (in which the bulk of this manuscript was written), with /b
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its compounding global tragedies, featured numerous shocks and shifts ex- o
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plicable only with reference to festering wounds of history that defy the event 1
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model’s assumptions. The Covid- 19 pandemic, for example, certainly caused 7
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new waves of death and destruction, but it also preyed on lingering struc- a
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tural injustices in social and political systems, stemming from legacies of ter/3
mass violence that hibernate politically during periods of prosperity.3 State- 52
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led responses to the pandemic, including public finger-p ointing and immi- 8
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gration restrictions, similarly reflected deep-r ooted global hierarchies and 0
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rivalries, developed due to mass violence and subsequent, ongoing suspi- y A
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cion and tension.4 In the midst of shutdowns and simmering frustration, the q
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May 2020 death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police officers itio
n
ignited outrage and protests across the globe. This transnational movement S
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focused not only on the specific heartbreak of Floyd’s death but also on larger rv
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questions of how the legacy of past violent oppression such as slavery, im- s
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perialism, and Jim Crow lives on in present- day institutions and practices.5 se
r o
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1
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3 Richard A. Oppel Jr. et al., “The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity of Coronavirus,” New York S
Times, July 5, 2020, https:// www.nyti mes.com/ inte ract ive/ 2020/ 07/ 05/ us/ coro navi rus- lati nos- afri e
p
can- americ ans- cdc- data.html?refe rrin gSou rce= artic leSh are. te
4 Jessica Chen Weiss, “How Coronavirus Changes the Political Outlook in China and the U.S.,” mb
Wnaavsih ruinsg- ctohna nP goesst-, p Aoplirtii cl a2l-3 o, u2t0l o2o0k, -h cthtpinsa:/-/ u wsw/ .w.was hing tonp ost.com/ polit ics/ 2020/ 04/ 23/ how- coro er 2
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5 Chaseedaw Giles, “Op- Ed: I’m a Black Social Media Manager in the Age of George Floyd. Each 22
Day Is a New Trauma,” Los Angeles Times, June 23, 2020, https:// www.lati mes.com/ opin ion/ story/
2020- 06- 23/ soc ial- media- tra uma- black- killi ngs.
Collective Trauma 5
Meanwhile, nationalist politics in Israel, Hungary, India, China, the United
States, and elsewhere have capitalized on pandemic- related frustrations
to promote narratives of past suffering and future glory. In the summer of
2020, the German government even shut down one quarter of its most elite
special forces unit after discovering far- right members parroting Nazi- era D
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conspiracy theories about internal enemies backstabbing the nation.6 As wn
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the Pulitzer Prize–w inning author Viet Thanh Nguyen titled his book on ad
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Vietnam’s memory of war, “Nothing Ever Dies.”7 But if that’s the case, why do d fro
some memories lie dormant for generations only to arise anew? m
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In this book, I advocate a new approach to understanding how histories ttp
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of mass violence reverberate in the present that complicates the event model ://a
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and its logics. This approach recognizes how the legacy of mass violence can a
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persist over time, radiating out through networks and power structures, m
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reshaping international political actors and their logics of action. To fully ac- .o
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count for these enduring impacts, I argue for understanding the sociopolit- .c
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ical processing of mass violence via the lens of collective trauma. Drawing /b
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on the interdisciplinary insights of trauma studies scholarship, I develop this o
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lens to understand not only how individuals respond to mass violence but 1
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also how the aftermath of mass violence becomes politically embedded over 7
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time, liable not only to shape dominant modes of thinking but also to resurge a
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in importance during pivotal moments and motivate action. While ration- ter/3
alist approaches may envision idealized actors disregarding the “sunk costs” 52
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of past suffering and focusing solely on future risks and choices, I argue that 8
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collective trauma can shape how actors interpret this future, its logics, and 0
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its lingering injustices. In the aftermath of mass violence, collective trauma y A
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can constitute understandings of self and other that frame notions of recon- q
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ciliation, rehabilitation, and recovery. Only by developing a theoretical lens itio
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attuned to collective trauma’s varied, context- specific permutations can the S
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IR discipline fully grasp the world that mass violence has helped create. rv
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Take as a concrete example the 1945 charter of the United Nations s
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(UN), the preeminent international organization of the twentieth century. se
Mainstream rationalist IR theory has traditionally understood the organi- r on
1
zation either via the realist paradigm’s logic, as a forum for self-i nterested 9
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6 Katrin Bennhold, “Germany Disbands Special Forces Group Tainted by Far-R ight Extremists,” e
New York Times, July 1, 2020, https:// www.nyti mes.com/ 2020/ 07/ 01/ world/ eur ope/ ger man- spec ial- r 2
0
for ces- far- right.html. 2
2
7 Viet Thanh Nguyen, Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2016).
6 Theoretical Framework
great powers to exert influence, or via the liberal paradigm’s logic, as a co-
operative institution that helps states negotiate mutually advantageous
outcomes. Yet in addition to these explanations, the UN also has deep roots
in collective trauma, articulated explicitly in its founding documents. The
UN’s first mission, the charter states, is “to save succeeding generations from D
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the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to n
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mankind.”8 Though the goal of preventing war’s future costs can certainly be ad
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understood rationally, divorced from history, this statement is explicitly ret- d fro
rospective— informing the institution’s understanding of this “scourge” were m
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the failures of both previous generations of leaders and, implicitly, its insti- ttp
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tutional predecessor, the League of Nations. In the new body’s first session, ://a
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alongside administrative matters and pressing international issues such as a
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the refugees stranded across the globe, the General Assembly passed a res- m
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olution condemning the crime of genocide, inspired, no doubt, by the mass .o
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violence perpetrated by Nazi Germany. Rather than employing stale bureau- .c
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cratic language, the text resonated deeply with prevailing psychoanalytic /b
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conceptions of trauma from the period, stating that genocide “shocks the o
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conscience of mankind” and is “contrary to moral law and to the spirit and 1
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aims of the United Nations.”9 7
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The tension inherent in processing a diverse array of others’ pain, in- a
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cluding that of millions who perished in prior conflicts and genocides, and ter/3
articulating it as a motivation for collective action alludes to the complexity 52
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inherent in collective trauma as an international political phenomenon. 8
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These diplomats’ actions, I argue, cannot be understood solely as a rational- 0
b
ized effort to prevent the costly recurrence of violence. Such an explanation y A
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lacks specificity for why they framed problems in this historically informed q
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way. A complete explanation must also account for the context of the UN’s itio
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founding, informed by a recent history of mass violence on a horrific scale. S
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It must recognize that beyond strategic material goals, the founders were rv
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also motivated by a desire to bear witness to the collective trauma that had s
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resulted from previous diplomatic failures. Despite the difficulties in articu- se
lating the legacy of mass violence, collective trauma informed not only how r on
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they understood the potential consequences of global conflict but also how 9
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they envisioned potential future solutions. p
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8 United Nations, “United Nations Charter,” http:// www.un.org/ en/ char ter- uni ted- nati ons/ . 22
9 United Nations General Assembly, “96 (1). The Crime of Genocide” (1946), https://u nd ocs.org/
en/ A/ RES/ 96(I).
Collective Trauma 7
Before proceeding, it’s worth acknowledging that the example of the UN
is a deliberately provocative one. Indeed, the term “collective trauma,” which
I employ throughout the book, can seem misplaced when used to describe
the stodgy work of elite diplomats, gathered in cosmopolitan Western cities,
passing resolutions that impact most people’s lived experience only indi- D
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rectly. Most of those who negotiated the UN’s charter had not fought on the n
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battlefields of World War II, nor had they stared down the Nazi gas cham- ad
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bers. Though many worked on international political issues during the war d fro
effort, they often learned of mass violence solely through government and m
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media reports, witness testimony, or even simply public discourse. This dis- ttp
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tance is suggestive of the broader observation that often those elite actors best ://a
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equipped to avoid the most acute violence of international politics are also a
d
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those who both often order it and exert outsize control in shaping domestic m
ic
and international responses. In presenting work on collective trauma at con- .o
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ferences and workshops, I’ve similarly encountered resistance to extending .c
o
m
the term “trauma” to collectives, beyond specific psychiatric diagnostic cri- /b
o
teria applied in clinical settings. Doing so, some contend, may dilute the o
k
/4
necessary attention paid to the very real pain of those suffering from post- 1
4
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traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This disorder, which I discuss at length 7
/c
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throughout the book, is especially prevalent among survivors of combat, a
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wartime sexual violence, and natural disasters— all central concerns for IR ter/3
scholarship. Victims of these forms of violence are often poorly represented 52
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in international politics, and their experiences rightly deserve scholarly at- 8
8
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tention. Some may fear that broadening the term “trauma” to collectives 0
b
undermines this book’s primary goal of orienting scholarly attention to un- y A
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seen aspects of the aftermath of mass violence. q
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Yet despite the worthiness of focusing attention on individuals’ struggles itio
n
with psychic trauma, this medicalized interpretation is a limited one, S
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representing only a single vantage point on the larger issues implicated in rv
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mass violence’s multivalent social, psychological, and political processing. s
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Though elites often avoid direct experiences of mass violence, they are se
deeply implicated in the international political systems that both inflict this r on
1
violence and are subsequently tasked with interpreting and responding to 9
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it. Individuals may be the primary nodes for experiencing mass violence, p
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but its effects seep out, shaping political cultures and the institutions that m
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govern them. Similarly, mass violence experienced and interpreted by larger r 2
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communities and their institutions can reverberate back on individuals 2
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and frame their thinking, making trauma particularly difficult to isolate in
8 Theoretical Framework
individuals’ psyches.10 Indeed, this macropolitical regulation of individual
interpretations is often poorly captured by the norms of medical diagnoses.
For this reason, I employ throughout this book the alternative term “col-
lective trauma,” reflecting an approach in tune with what I see as a more com-
prehensive reading of the term’s long- term, multivalent evolution into the D
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twenty- first century. Originally stemming from the Greek for “wound,” the n
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concept of “trauma” has developed substantially over time, from the physical ad
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to the neurological and later the psychological and social. Indeed, the contem- d fro
porary PTSD diagnosis itself reflects a compromise forged in the late 1970s m
h
to meet specific demands within American psychiatry.11 Unsurprisingly, it ttp
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exhibits numerous shortcomings and biases that have led to ample critical ://a
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re- evaluations.12 Scholars have argued that PTSD is both over-a pplied and a
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under- theorized13 and that it neglects mass violence’s multifaceted impacts m
ic
beyond isolated individuals’ brains. By the final decades of the twentieth cen- .o
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tury, scholars in the humanities and social theory thus began conceptual- .c
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m
izing trauma in new ways to better capture those interpretive qualities often /b
o
overlooked by the medical establishment.14 Traumatic shocks impact how o
k
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individuals grapple with their own experiences not only psychologically but 1
4
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also spiritually, socially, and politically. Trauma thus plays a complex role in 7
/c
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shaping individuals’ representations of such experiences, as well as interpret- a
p
ations by others (including political leaders) who may not have experienced ter/3
violence firsthand. Literary theorist Cathy Caruth, a leading voice in the in- 52
8
6
terdisciplinary field of trauma studies, has thus defined trauma more broadly 8
8
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as a delayed response to an “overwhelming experience of sudden or cata- 0
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strophic events.” This delay, she posits, problematizes “referential” models of y A
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history based on linear timing— including, I would argue, the “event” model q
u
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that dominates IR— raising questions of how to represent violence not yet itio
n
S
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10 For further elaboration of this conceptual framework, see Adam B. Lerner, “What’s It Like to Be us
a S1t1a tSee?e A Anll Aanr gVu. mHeonrwt fiotzr, S PtaTtSeD C:o An sSchiooruts Hneisstso,”r yIn (tBearnltaimtioonrae:l JThohenosr yH 1o3p, knion.s 2 U (nJuivlye r2s0it2y1 P):r 2e6ss0,– 28 061.8); er on
Hannah S. Decker, The Making of DSM- III: A Diagnostic Manual’s Conquest of American Psychiatry 1
9
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). S
12 See, for example, Vanessa Pupavac, “Pathologizing Populations and Colonizing Minds: e
p
International Psychosocial Programs in Kosovo,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27, no. 4 te
m
(October 2002): 489– 511; Vanessa Pupavac, “Therapeutic Governance: Psycho-S ocial Intervention b
a n1d3 TArlaluanm Yao Ruinskg ,M Thaen aHgaermmeonnty,” oDf iIslalustseiorsn 2s:5 I,n nvoe.n 4ti (nDg ePcoesmt- Tbrear u2m00a1ti)c: 3S5tr8e–ss7 D2.isorder (Princeton, NJ: er 2
0
Princeton University Press, 1997). 22
14 Yoav Di- Capua, “Trauma and Other Historians,” Historical Reflections/ Reflexions Historiques 41,
no. 3 (2015): 1–1 3.