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DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY -. POSTGRADUATE SCHOOl N>* MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 nclassified :urity Classification ofthis page REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE aReport Security Classification: Unclassified lbRestrictive Markings iSecurity Classification Authority 3 Distribution/Availability ofReport jDeclassific?tion/Downgrading Schedule Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Performing Organization Report Numbers) 5 Monitoring Organization Report Numbers) aName ofPerforming Organization 6bOffice Symbol 7aNameofMonitoring Organization [aval Postgraduate School 38 Naval Postgraduate School BAddress 7bAddress(city, state, andZIP code) lonterey CA 93943-5000 Monterey CA 93943-5000 iNameofFunding/Sponsoring Organization 6bOffice Symbol 9 ProcurementInstrument Identification Number (ifapplicable) ddress (city, state, andZIP code) 10Source ofFunding Numbers Program Element No Project No Task No Work Unit Accession No 1 Title FROMSAC TO STRATCOM: The OriginsofUnified CommandOverNuclearForces 2Personal AuthorGregory S. Gilmour 3aType ofReport 13b Time Covered 14Date ofReport (year, month, day) 15Page Count 84 laster's Thesis From To 93/06/17 5Supplementary Notation The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of le Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 7 Cosati Codes 18 Subject Terms teld Group Subgroup Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force, Navy, Service Rivalries, Strategic Air Command ? Abstract (continueon reverseifnecessaryandidentify by block number) This thesis examines the creation ofUnited States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). This assessment reviews the past and icent attempts to create a unified command over strategic nuclear forces. Interviews conducted by the author with the major idividuals involved in the current creation of STRATCOM, along with a historical review ofpast attempts to consolidateinuclear Drces provide the basis for this thesis. In examining why STRATCOM was created, two competing arguments were used \o nswer the question presented. The main argument for the creation of STRATCOM was the fact that there was no need to keep trategic nuclear forces in separate commands at the end of the Cold War. The counter argument is that the Goldwater-Nicihols Act f 1986 alone forced the creation of STRATCOM. The results from this research show that there is now a trend among the lilitary leaders to cooperate among themselves. The author uses the reasons for the creation of STRATCOM as a possible lueprint for how the Services will react to possible Unified Command Plan changes in the future. Distribution/Availability ofAbstract 21 Abstract Security Classification _X_ unclassified/unlimited sameasreport DTIC users Unclassified 2aName ofResponsible Individual 22bTelephone (include Area Code) 22c Office Symbol L Mitchell Brown III 408 656-2286 NS/Br D FORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APRedition may be used until exhausted security classification ofthis page All other editions are obsolete Unclassified Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. FROM SAC TO STRATCOM: The Origins of Unified Command Over Nuclear Forces by Gregory S. Gilmour Lieutenant, United States Navy B.A., The Citadel, 1986 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 1993 ABSTRACT This thesis examines the creation of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). This assessment reviews the pastand recentattempts to create a unified strategic command overnuclearforces. Interviewsconductedby the author with themajor individualsinvolved in the currentcreation of STRATCOM, along with a historicalreview of past attempts to consolidate nuclear forces provide the basis for this thesis. In examining why STRATCOM was created, two competing arguments were used to answer the question presented. The main argument for the creation of STRATCOM was the fact that there was no need to keep strategic nuclear forces in separate commands at the end of the Cold War. The counter argument is that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 alone forced the creation ofSTRATCOM. The results from this research show that there is now a trend among the military leaders to cooperate among themselves. The author uses the reasons for the creation of STRATCOM as a possible blueprint for how the Services will react to possible Unified Command Plan changes in the future. in IKet>'t> tj TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 5 ...... A. BACKGROUND OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 5 B. JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF (JSTPS) 10 . C. NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE 13 III. THE ORIGINS OF A STRATEGIC COMMAND 17 A. INTRODUCTION 17 B. THE CARRIER VS. THE BOMBER DEBATE 17 C. THE ADMIRALS REVOLT 21 . . . . D. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CARRIER ISSUE 25 . E. THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE STRATEGIC ........ FORCES 29 F. CONCLUSION 37 . IV. DEFENSE REORGANIZATION IN THE 1980'S 39 A. INTRODUCTION 3 9 B. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986 40 C. THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN (UCP) /UCP REVIEW OF 1987 44 D. CONCLUSION 47 IV DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOl MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 V. THE END OF THE COLD WAR ERA 5 A. INTRODUCTION 5 B. THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD AT THE JCS 50 C. THE END OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 58 D. A NEW ERA OF SERVICE COOPERATION 60 E. CONCLUSION 63 VI. CONCLUSIONS 65 BIBLIOGRAPHY 7 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 74 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This thesis examines the creation of the newest unified command: United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) The . thesis delves into two periods in history. The first period begins with the implementation of the 1948 Key West Agreement to 1960. The second period begins with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and concludes with the formal establishment of USSTRATCOM on 1 June 1992. The first period is examined with regard to the historical significance of the unified strategic command issue. This period is used to explain the origins of the Air Force and Navy rivalry. While there was certainly another rivalry between the Army and Navy, this portion of the thesis focuses on the issues that put the Navy and the newly created Air Force 'at odds. The Bomber vs. Carrier debate and the Air Force's first attempts to consolidate all strategic nuclear forces under one unified command are examined to put the establishment of STRATCOM in historical perspective. The second period begins following passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This period is used to examine the reasons why a unified strategic command was created after thirty years of continual fighting between the Air Force and the Navy. Two main arguments are examined to determine why USSTRATCOM was created. The first argument is that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 alone forced the creation of the new command. The second competing argument is vi