From Plural to Institutional Agency: Collective Action II PDF
Preview From Plural to Institutional Agency: Collective Action II
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,23/9/2017,SPi From Plural to Institutional Agency OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,23/9/2017,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,23/9/2017,SPi From Plural to Institutional Agency Collective Action II Kirk Ludwig 1 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,23/9/2017,SPi 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©KirkLudwig2017 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2017 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2017941629 ISBN 978–0–19–878999–4 Printedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,23/9/2017,SPi For 林 世 娉 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,23/9/2017,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,23/9/2017,SPi Preface We are pre-eminently social beings. But this is not what makes us special: what makesusspecialisthatwemakeinstitutions.Therearenoothercreaturesweknow ofwhoarecapableofdoingthis.Othercreaturescanengageincooperativebehavior. Other creatures exhibit role specialization in a division of labor geared toward the collective good, e.g., termites, bees and ants. But no others can design and build institutions as we do. Institutions organize our activities by providing a differenti- ationoftransferablerolesdefinedintermsofhowtheoccupieristoactintentionally insocialcoordinationwithothersinlightoftheirinstitutionalroles.Akeydifference betweentheformsofsocialorganizationmadeavailablebyinstitutionsandthesocial organization of life in the termite mound or the beehive is that role specialization amongthesocialinsectsisbiologicallyprogrammed.Rolesininstitutionsincontrast are intentionally adopted. Their implementation requires the expression of our agency self-consciously as occupiers of those roles. Institutions are tools for coord- inating joint action in pursuit of collective goals over time. They are not physical tools,butsocialtools.Wedesignandimplementthem.Thelimitsontypesofroles arethelimitsofouringenuity.Institutionsarebothcrucialfor,andthecruciblefor, civilization.Theydominatemodernlife.Theyarewhatgiveusthegreatpowerthat wehaveachievedoverthenaturalworld.Ourmostpowerfulinstitutions,especially the nation state with its systems of laws—and the forms of governance, the instru- mentsofpower,theformsofbusinessorganization,includingthecorporation,which itmakespossible—outlastthelivesoftheindividualswhosustainthem,andformthe world into which we have been and into which all future generations will be born. Whatistheirnature?Fromwhencedoesthepowertomakeinstitutionsderive?To whatdegreedotheyhavealifeoftheirown?Howaretheysustained?Whatarethe conceptualresourcesthatgointotheirdesign?Whatarethepsychologicalresources needed to implement them? What makes us different? This book is concerned to answerthesequestions. Thisisthesecondvolumeinatwo-volumeprojectonthenatureandstructureof collectiveactionandintentionmoregenerally.Thefundamentaltenetoftheproject isthatallcollectiveintentionalaction,fromtwopeopletakingawalktogether,tothe ParisMobstormingtheBastilleonJuly14,1789,totheAlliedinvasionofNormandy on June 6, 1944, while not mere aggregates of individual intentional behavior, can still be understood ultimately in terms of concepts already in play in our under- standingofindividualagency. The first volume, From Individual to Plural Agency, concerned the analysis of plural action and intention—the analysis of action as expressed in plural action sentences(‘Weliftedapiano’),theanalysisofsharedintentionasexpressedinplural sentences about intention (‘We intended to lift a piano’), and the analysis of the collectiveintentional actionasexpressedinpluralactionsentencesmodifiedbythe adverb ‘intentionally’ (‘We lifted a piano intentionally’). The second volume con- cerns collective action expressed in grammatically singular action sentences. This OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,23/9/2017,SPi viii includesmostdiscourseaboutinstitutionalactionaswellastheactionsofinformal groupsthatcanchangetheirmembershipovertime.Examplesare: TheFederalReserveBankisgraduallyendingtheexpansionofitsbondholdings. DetroitfiledforbankruptcyonFriday. TheEuropeanParliamentmeetsinStrasbourgfor12partsessionseachyear. Surveillancevideoshowsthemobtryingtoforceentry. Largecrowdshavebeentippingovervehiclesandclashingwithlawenforcement inAmes. The second volume may be read independently of the first volume. Sufficient background from the first is provided in the second chapter. But the first volume providestheconceptualfoundationforthesecond.Itisonlybyfirstunderstanding the structure of plural intentional action and the nature of the intentions of those participating in it—we-intentions vs. I-intentions—that we can understand what is going on in institutional action or in the expression of group agency in mobs and crowds.Forultimatelyinstitutionalaction,andmobactioninasimilarway,restson our capacity to conceptualize what we do as collective intentional action. It is by employingconceptsoftypesofrolesincollectiveintentionalactionthatweareable to describe institutional structures, which we can then conceive of as persisting throughtheinterchangetheparticularfillersofthoseroles. Thefirstvolumearguedforthemultipleagentsaccountofpluralagencyandthe shared plan account of we-intentions. On the multiple agents account of plural agency, for us to do something together is just for each of us (and no one else) to contributetobringingitabout(insomerelevantwayorways).Onthisaccount,the truth conditions for ordinary plural statements about group action do not require groupagentsperse.Thesharedplanaccountofwe-intentionsholdsthatwhenone intends to participate in joint intentional action, one intends to do something to contributetobringingitaboutthat,atthetimeofaction,wedosomethingtogether in accordance with a shared plan. For us to share an intention, on this account, is forusalltowe-intendthatwedosomething.Forustodoittogetherintentionallyis forusalltocarryoutourwe-intentionssuccessfully.Thisreducessharedintention tosharedwe-intentions,andexplainswhatisspecialaboutwe-intentionsasrelating not to their modebut to their content, but in doing so it appeals to no irreducible concepts involving intentional group behavior. Thepresentvolumeextends thisaccounttothecontextofinstitutional andmob actionexpressedingrammaticallysingularactionsentences.Thecentralideaisthat institutionsaresystemsofstatusroles(citizen,senator,judge,professor,lawyer,and soon),wherestatusrolesarestatusfunctionsassignedtoagentsinsocialtransactions requiring theintentionalexpressionoftheirownagency.Statusfunctionsarefunc- tionsthatthings(persons,objects,events,processes)haverelativetosocialtransac- tions only in virtue of the participants (in a certain sense) assigning them those functions.Thiscomesaboutfromtherelevantsocialtransactionsbeinggovernedby constitutiverules(rulestheintentionalfollowingofwhichconstitutetheactivitythey govern)thatspecifyfunctionalrolesforobjects,whichrequirethosewhoparticipate inthemtocoordinateonthesamethingsasfillingthoserolesinordertocarrythem OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,23/9/2017,SPi ix out.Sharedpoliciesregardingwhichthingsortypesofthingstocoordinateongive risetoconventions. These conventions aretheinfrastructureof socialreality.Insti- tutional membership per se is also a status role, hence, socially constructed, not natural,andistypicallytimeindexed.Inthisliesthesolutiontomostofthepuzzles about how to extend the account of plural agency to the domain of grammatically singularactionsentences.Itisthecontentionofthisbookthatallofsocialrealityis madeofthesebasicingredients. The preface to the first volume reviewed the intellectual history of the project. There remains here the task of thanking the many people who havecontributed to mythinkingabout thetopics of this bookandhelped me toavoid mistakes,and of apologizingtothoseIforgettomention.MygreatestintellectualdebtsaretoDonald Davidson and to John Searle whose influence on my thinking will be apparent on almosteverypage.Ioweagreatdealtothepioneersofthetheoryofcollectiveaction andintention,MichaelBratman,MargaretGilbert,andRaimoTuomelainaddition toSearle.Ihavelearnedalotfromthem,andthoughIhaveinmanyplacestakena different path, whatever contributions I have to make rest on theirs. Among the manywhohavecontributedtomythinkingandhelpedmewiththeircriticismsand questions are John Biro, Daniel Buckley, Sara Chant, David Copp, Aaron Edidin, ZacharyErnst,LucaFerrero,HanaFilip,CharlesHermes,MarijaJanković,Michael Jubien, Daniel Linsenbardt, Paul McNamara, Larry May, Seamus Miller, Anna Moltchanova, Wade Munroe, Marina Oshana, Greg Ray, Abe Roth, Kevin Savage, AndrewSmith,ErnieSosa,andGeneWitmer.Iowethanksalsotothreeanonymous readersforOxfordUniversityPressforhelpfulcommentsonthepenultimatedraftof thebook.Thankstoallofthemfortryingtosetmestraight.Finally,Ithankmywife, Shih-PingLin林世娉,forsupportandencouragement,forreadingthemanuscript and giving me characteristically brutal feedback, and for innumerably many other graces. I do claim solely for myself, however, the authorship of all the errors that remain,andremainsofaroverlooked,inthebook.
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