From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation

310 Pages·2007·2.59 MB·English

by  Michael Kenney

FROMPABLOTOOSAMA

michael kenney
PABLO OSAMA
from to
Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies,
and Competitive Adaptation
the pennsylvania state university press
university park, pennsylvania
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Kenney,Michael,1967–
FromPablotoOsama:traffickingandterroristnetworks,
governmentbureaucracies,andcompetitiveadaptation/
MichaelKenney.
p. cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
isbn-13:987–0-271–02931–3(cloth:alk.paper)
isbn-10:0–271–02931–5(cloth:alk.paper)
1. Terrorism—Prevention.
2. Terrorism—Governmentpolicy.
3. Drugtraffic—Prevention.
I. Title.
HV6431.K4232007
363.325—dc22
2006037198
Copyright(cid:2)2007ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversity
Allrightsreserved
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
PublishedbyThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,
UniversityPark,PA16802-1003
ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress
isamemberoftheAssociationof
AmericanUniversityPresses.
Itisthepolicyof
ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPresstouse
acid-freepaper.ThisbookisprintedonNatures
Natural,containing50%post-consumerwaste,
andmeetstheminimumrequirementsofAmerican
NationalStandardforInformationSciences—
PermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterial,
ansiz39.48–1992.
Contents
Preface vii
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction:ClandestineActorsandCompetitiveAdaptation 1
1 TheArchitectureofDrugTrafficking 25
2 HowNarcosLearn 49
3 How‘‘Narcs’’Learn 79
4 CompetitiveAdaptation:TraffickingNetworksVersusLaw
EnforcementAgencies 103
5 HowTerroristsLearn 135
6 CompetitiveAdaptationCounterterroristStyle 167
Conclusion:BeyondtheWarsonDrugsandTerrorism 203
Notes 229
SelectedBibliography 263
Index 281

Preface
Tenyearsago,whileresearchingthisbookinColombia,ImetJoaquin
Buitrago,ayoungofficerwiththeColombianNational Police.Whileit
had been years since the U.S. government transformed Colombia into
acentralfrontinthewarondrugs,cocaineproductionwasincreasingly
dramatically. Contrary to popular misperception, the failure of Colom-
bian and American authorities to substantially reduce, let alone elimi-
nate,the cocainetrade was not dueto alack ofeffort. Inthetwo years
preceding our meeting, Buitrago’s agency, with substantial support
from Washington, spearheaded an intensive law enforcement crack-
down, targeting the leaders of Colombia’s drug ‘‘cartels.’’ In spite of
capturing many cocaine ‘‘kingpins’’ and disrupting their smuggling
networks, the illicit drug trade in Colombia continued to flourish, and
Iwashopingthegoodcaptaincouldhelpmeunderstandwhy.
Following a hackneyed Power Point presentation, designed for
American policymakers making their obligatory tour stop on the front
lines of Colombia’s war on drugs, we turned to the questions that
brought me to Buitrago. As we talked, rehearsed formality giving way
to candid expression, it became increasingly clear how troubled Bui-
trago was by the precarious situation in which he and his countrymen
found themselves. When I asked him why he risked his life for such
dangerous and seemingly futile work, he paraphrased a sentiment ex-
pressed by Colombia’s most notorious drug traffickers, the so-called
‘‘Extraditables,’’ who famously declared their preference for a tomb in
ColombiatoajailcellintheUnitedStates.‘‘Iwouldrathermysonsee
me dead in a tomb,’’ he said, his voice rising, ‘‘than say that I was
corrupt, or that I turned my country over to the traffickers!’’1 It was a
dramatic moment, a spontaneous admission by a foot soldier in the
war on drugs that, while things were not going particularly well, he
wasdeterminedtocontinuethefight.IencounteredCaptainBuitrago’s
dedication, if not always his eloquence, repeatedly among the dozens
ofU.S.andColombianlawenforcersIinterviewedinsubsequentyears.
Three years after meeting Buitrago, I sat down with ‘‘Homero,’’ a
former drug courier from Colombia who had worked his way up his
viii j Preface
illicitnetwork’s‘‘queerladder’’tobecomeawholesalecocainedistribu-
tor in the United States, prior to his arrest and incarceration for drug-
relatedoffenses.‘‘It’sawarondrugs,’’heconcededinourprisoninter-
view in central Florida. ‘‘I’m not saying that we’re prisoners due to an
injustice.No.Wewere,themajorityofus,involvedindrugtrafficking.
...ButItellyousincerelythatthisbusinesswillnotend,becausewhen
youcloseonedoor,thedrugtraffickersopenthreeorfourmore.’’2
If Captain Buitrago gives passionate expression to his and, by sym-
bolicextension,hisgovernment’sdeterminationtocontinuethestrug-
gle, Homero provides an important clue as to why Colombia and the
United States are not likely to win the war on drugs through supply-
controlstrategiesthatprivilegelawenforcement,druginterdiction,and
crop eradication. Acknowledging the insight in Homero’s comment,
this book sets out to explain it. I argue that the persistence of Colom-
bia’s drug trade comes in part from the ability of people like Homero,
andthecriminalenterprisestheyworkfor,tocreatemultipleentryways
foreverypathblockedbytheirgovernmentadversaries.Whatfacilitates
thismetaphoricalrevolvingdooraretheorganizationallearningcapaci-
ties of drug traffickers and law enforcers, who change their activities
in response to information and experience, store their knowledge in
practices and institutional memories, and select routines that produce
satisfactoryresults.
FiveyearsaftermyencounterwithHomero,ItraveledtoIsraelwith
agroupofAmericanscholarstolearnmoreaboutthecounterterrorism
challenges facing Israeli authorities. It was an intense and sobering
experience. One day we visited Gilboa Security Prison, a maximum-
security facility for political prisoners near Armageddon. Gilboa con-
fines 852 of Palestine’s toughest militants, including fighters from
Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
‘‘There are no stone throwers here,’’ we were told. Following another
Power Point presentation, this one apparently designed for American
journalists, policymakers, and academics making their obligatory tour
stop on the frontlines of Israel’s war on terror, the prison commander
entertained our questions. As he listened to my question about infor-
mation sharing and learning among detainees, the colonel gave a
knowingsmile.He readilyadmitted thatthiswasa problem.The pris-
oners, he said, gather information about their Israeli captors. They
share ideas with their fellow militants and plot operations, including
escape attempts and terrorist attacks. But the colonel quickly pointed
Preface j ix
out that the prison authorities also learn from the detainees. The au-
thoritiescultivateinformants intheprisonpopulation, whomthey use
togatherinformationaboutdetainees’plansandaspirations.Thecolo-
nelemphasizedthatonnumerousoccasionstheyhaveusedthisintelli-
gencetodisruptimpendingattacks.
After the briefing the colonel escorted us to the commons area in
theIsraeliArabsectionoftheprison,wherewespokefacetofacewith
several militants. One detainee I talked with vented his frustration at
what he called the Israeli occupation of Palestine. While he expressed
regret for killing an Israeli soldier, he complained about his treatment
inthejailandsuggestedthatthestruggleforPalestinianstatehoodwas
farfromover.
The visit to Gilboa prison and several other military facilities in Is-
raelconfirmedmysuspicionthatdrugtraffickersandlawenforcersare
not the only ones who learn. Secular and religious extremists and the
governmentstheyfightalsolearnfromexperience.Assuggestedinthe
colonel’s remarks, terrorists and counterterrorists not only learn, they
learn from each other, through complex interactions in shared social
systems, aphenomenon I refer toin this book as ‘‘competitive adapta-
tion.’’ And, as the jailed detainee implies, he and his colleagues are
prepared to continue the struggle, no matter how many militants the
Israelisincarcerate,nomatterhowmanyinformantstheyturn,nomat-
terhowmanysecuritywallstheybuild.LikeHomeroandCaptainBui-
trago, the Israeli colonel and the Palestinian prisoner symbolize this
co-evolutionarydynamic,astrugglethat,as Ishowin thisbook, favors
the traffickers and terrorists in significant, if not inevitably superior,
ways.
Colombia’stragedyisnotofitsownmaking,atleastnotentirely.After
all,millionsofAmericansregularlyconsumeits illicitwareswhiletac-
itly supporting a drug-prohibition regime that artificially inflates the
value of these commodities, allowing people like Homero to reap the
financial rewards of our ‘‘debauchery’’ and complacence. Like many
Americans,myowninitiationtothedrugtrade’smanifoldcomplexities
came on the demand side of the policy continuum: youthful experi-
mentationwithmarijuanaandalcoholproducedapsychologicaldepen-
dence of sorts, and at the worldly age of eighteen I found myself
sharing group therapy sessions in idyllic rural New Hampshire with
assortedother‘‘alkies’’andaddicts,allofusstrugglingtocometoterms