From Defeat to Victory: The Eastern Front, Summer 1944

385 Pages·2016·4.78 MB·English

by  Charles J. Dick

From Defeat to Victory
MODERN WAR STUDIES
Theodore A. Wilson
General Editor
Raymond A. Callahan
Jacob W. Kipp
Allan R. Millett
Carol Reardon
Dennis Showalter
David R. Stone
James H. Willbanks
Series Editors
Decisive and Indecisive Military
Operations, Volume 2
From Defeat to Victory
THE EASTERN FRONT,
SUMMER 1944
C. J. Dick
Foreword by David M. Glantz
© 2016 by the University Press of Kansas
All rights reserved
Published by the University Press of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas 66045), which was organized by the
Kansas Board of Regents and is operated and funded by Emporia State University, Fort Hays State
University, Kansas State University, Pittsburg State University, the University of Kansas, and Wichita State
University
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Dick, Charles, author.
Title: From defeat to victory : the Eastern Front, summer 1944 / C. J. Dick ; foreword by David M. Glantz.
Description: Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, [2016] | Series: Modern war studies. Decisive and
indecisive military operations ; volume 2 | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016023609
ISBN 9780700622955 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 9780700622962 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Eastern Front. | Operational art (Military science)
—History—20th century. | Soviet Union—Armed Forces—History . | Military doctrine—Soviet Union—
History.
Classification: LCC D764 .D515 2016 | DDC 940.54/21—dc23 LC record available at
https://lccn.loc.gov/2016023609.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
The paper used in this publication is recycled and contains 30 percent postconsumer waste. It is acid free
and meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for
Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.
Contents
List of Maps and Tables
Foreword by David M. Glantz
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Selected Foreign Words
Introduction
An Essential Guide to Soviet Military Terms and Organizations
1. Soviet Doctrine and Praxis Prior to 1944
The Evolution of Prewar Soviet Doctrine
From Disaster to Success: The Course of the War, 1941–1943
An Unlikely Phoenix: Renaissance of the Red Army
German Errors as a Source of Soviet Salvation
The Development of Operational Art
The Third Winter and Spring: The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskiy Operation
Conclusions
2. Strategic Offensive Operations, Summer 1944
The Stavka’s Strategic Decision
The Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation, 23 June–31 July
The L’vov-Sandomir Strategic Offensive Operation, 13 July–29 August
The Yassi-Kishinev Strategic Offensive Operation, 20–29 August
Appendix: Soviet Operational-Level Logistics in 1944
Conclusions
3. Operational Art in Maturity, Summer 1944
Doctrinal Development
Operational Art in the Belorussian Operation
Operational Art in the L’vov-Sandomir Operation
Operational Art in the Yassi-Kishinev Operation
Conclusions about Developments in Operational Art in 1944
Appendix: Planning a Front Offensive
4. Some Conclusions
Coalition War
Intelligence, Deception, and Surprise
Operational Art in the West and East
5. Some Reflections about the Future
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Index
Maps and Tables
MAPS
1.1. Soviet Territorial Losses, June 1941–November 1942
1.2. Soviet Counteroffensives, November 1942–December 1943
1.3. The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskiy Operation, 24 January–17 February 1944
2.1. Stavka Strategic Concept for Offensives, Summer 1944
2.2. Belorussian Operation, 22 June–31 July 1944
2.3. The L’vov-Sandomir Operation, 13 July–29 August 1944
2.4. Yassi-Kishinev Operation, 20–29 August 1944
3.1. The Vistula-Oder Operation, 12 January–2 February 1945
TABLES
1.1. Expansion of the Red Army, 1939–1941
1.2. Comparative Production of Key Industrial Inputs, 1940 and 1942
1.3. Average Densities in Penetration Sectors in the Stalingrad Offensive
1.4. Average Operational Densities during the Kursk Counteroffensive
2.1. Soviet Order of Battle: Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation
2.2. Soviet Order of Battle: L’vov-Sandomir Strategic Offensive Operation
2.3. Soviet Order of Battle: Yassi-Kishinev Strategic Offensive Operation
2.4. Overall Losses and Write-Offs of Tank Army Armored Fighting Vehicles
(AFVs) in Selected Operations
2.5. Relationship between Medical Casualties and Force Ratios in the
Breakthrough Phase
3.1. Correlation of Forces at the Start of the Belorussian Operation
3.2. Average Operational Densities during the Penetration in the Belorussian
Operation
3.3. Average Operational Densities during the Penetration in the L’vov-
Sandomir Operation
3.4. Average Operational Densities during the Penetration in the Yassi-Kishinev
Operation
3.5. Operational Exploitation by Tank Armies, 1944
4.1. Disposition of German and Some German Allied Divisions, 24 June 1942
and 7 July 1943
4.2. Statistical Comparisons of Operation Cobra with the Belorussian and
L’vov-Sandomir Operations
4.3. Statistical Comparisons of Selected Soviet and Anglo-Canadian Operations
Foreword
This is the second volume of C. J. Dick’s comparative critique of the
differing approaches employed by the Allied powers as they conducted military
operations in western and eastern Europe against the Wehrmacht of Hitler’s
Germany during the summer of 1944. Unlike the first volume, which focuses on
how the Western Allies conducted warfare strategically and operationally, this
volume analyzes the Soviet approach to land warfare and finds it markedly
different and far more effective.
Titled From Defeat to Victory, this volume examines how the Soviet Union’s
Red Army conducted military operations in eastern Europe from late June
through September 1944. Rising from the ashes of embarrassing and costly
defeats in 1941 and 1942, the Red Army seized the strategic initiative in late
1942, consolidated its successes in 1943, and embarked on strategic offensives
in 1944 that broke the Wehrmacht’s back and paved the way to total victory in
1945. How, Dick asks, did this transformation occur, and what features marked
its success? The answer, he maintains, can be found in the series of major
strategic offensives the Red Army conducted during this period. His examination
of these offensives, set against the backdrop of doctrinal and institutional
changes that took place in the Red Army during 1942 and 1943, provides the
hallmarks of this answer. In short, despite the imposing difficulties it faced in the
first two years of the war, the Red Army ultimately learned how to wage war at
the operational level; this, in turn, generated strategic victory.
Juxtaposed against each other, these two volumes provide a valid basis for
comparing the Allied armies’ differing approaches during the war as a whole. To
this end, Dick demonstrates how different historical experiences, not the least
involving the type and scale of warfare, led East and West down different
conceptual paths. His analysis concludes that the Soviet path was better suited to
the nature of the Second World War on land. In short, the Soviets’ rigor in
theoretical analysis, coupled with skillful exploitation of greater and more
traumatic and costly experience, led them to evolve superior operational
concepts and techniques, as a comparative analysis of methods and results
clearly shows.