Freedom, God, and Worlds

259 Pages·2012·1.325 MB·English

by  Michael J. Almeida

Freedom, God, and Worlds
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Freedom, God,
and Worlds
Michael J. Almeida
1
3
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Contents
Acknowledgments x
Introduction 1
0.1 TheAimsandStructureofthisBook 1
1. AModerateAnselmianPlea 13
1.0 Introduction 13
1.1 TheFailureofTraditionalAnselmianism 15
1.2 ADilemmaforTraditionalAnselmianism 26
1.3 ModerateAnselmianism 28
1.4 DefendingModerateAnselmianism 30
1.5 ConcludingRemarks 32
2. MetaphysicalAtheologicalArgumentsandthe
FreeWillDefense 34
2.0 Introduction 34
2.1 Plantinga’sReconstructionoftheLogicalProblemofEvil 36
2.2 EpistemicMatters 43
2.2.1 TheisticDefenseanditsAlternatives 44
2.2.2 ModalEpistemicMatters 46
2.3 TheFreeWillDefense 50
2.3.1 Preliminaries 50
2.4 ProvingConsistency 52
2.5 TransworldDepravity 55
2.6 IndividualEssences,Haecceities,andDepravity 59
2.7 UniversalTransworldDepravityisNotEnough 64
2.8 ConcludingRemarks 67
3. ThreeImportantObjections 69
3.0 Introduction 69
3.1 TheProblemofSanctifiedAgents 71
3.1.1 ThreeProblemsinFormulation 72
3.2 SanctifiedEssencesandDepravedEssences 75
3.3 UniversalTransworldDepravity,Super-Sanctified
Essences,andtheChallengeofEvil 80
3.4 IntraworldDepravityandtheChallengeofEvil 84
3.5 IntraworldDepravityandUntrustworthyEssences 86
3.5.1 LibertarianFreedomandCounterfactualsofFreedom 87
3.5.2 ChanceandCounterfactuals 89
viii CONTENTS
3.6 TheProblemofSelectiveSignificantFreedom 92
3.6.1 SelectiveSignificantFreedomandUniversal
TransworldDepravity 93
3.6.2 SelectiveSignificantFreedomandR3 97
3.6.3 AFinalArgumentAgainstSelectiveSignificant
Freedom 99
4. UnrestrictedActualization,Freedom,andMorally
PerfectWorlds 101
4.0 Introduction 101
4.1 ACounterexampletotheAnalysisofTransworldDepravity 103
4.2 PredictingandProphesyingPerfectWorlds 105
4.2.1 PredictionDeReandPredictionDeDicto 107
4.3 WhichWorldsCouldGodhaveCreated? 108
4.4 WeakEssentialismandStrongEssentialism 111
4.5 PrevolitionalCounterfactuals 113
4.6 FatalismandSignificantFreedom 118
4.6.1 ANon-OckhamistResponsetoTheologicalFatalism 125
4.6.2 FatalismandModalContextualism 127
4.7 ProblemsfromPoweroverthePast 129
4.7.1 BringingAboutGod’sBeliefs 129
4.7.2 BringingAboutGod’sPredictions 131
4.8 ConsequencesfortheFreeWillDefense 133
5. TheLogicalProblemofEvilRedux 135
5.0 Introduction 135
5.1 God’sPowerandMorallyPerfectWorlds 138
5.2 AnImpossibilityArgument 139
5.2.1 TheLogicalProblemofEvilReduxand
ConsistencyProofs 145
5.3 God’sBadWorlds 145
5.4 AnImpossibilityArgument:BestWorlds 148
5.4.1 TheLogicalProblemoftheBestPossibleWorld
andConsistencyProofs 152
5.5 AnImpossibilityArgument:GoodEnoughWorlds 153
5.5.1 TheValueAddedArgument 156
5.5.2 ConclusionsaboutGoodEnoughWorlds 159
5.5.3 TheLogicalProblemofGoodEnoughWorlds
andConsistencyProofs 160
5.6 AWordonNaturalEvils 160
5.6.1 TheLogicalProblemofNaturalEviland
ConsistencyProofs 165
5.7 SomeStrikingConclusions 166
5.8 TheMoralofImpossibilityArguments 168
CONTENTS ix
6. FourImportantObjections 170
6.0 TakingStock 170
6.1 Heller’sWorstWorld 171
6.1.1 TheWorstWorldArgument 172
6.2 Let’sBeSerious:ThereisGratuitousEvil 174
6.3 GodCanExistAlone:CatastrophicWorlds 177
6.4 IstheActualWorldaWorstWorld? 178
6.5 TheProblemofHorrendousEvils 179
6.5.1. HorrendousEvilandDefeatingEvil 181
7. FourMoreObjections 183
7.0 TheProblemofDivineFreedom 183
7.1 TheProblemofNoBestWorld 186
7.2 TheEvidentialArgumentfromEvil 191
7.3 EvilandNon-HumanAnimals:TheDarwinian
ProblemofEvil 193
7.3.1 Neo-CartesianWorlds 196
7.3.2 AnImpossibilityArgument:Evolutionarily
PerfectWorlds 200
7.3.3 AnAtheologicalRejoinder 206
8. RedeemingWorlds 211
8.0 RedeemableEvilandGratuitousEvil 211
8.1 PlantingaonRedeemingWorldsorFelixCulpa 215
8.1.1 TheTheodicalArgument 217
8.1.2 Non-DivineRedemptiveSuffering? 219
8.2 KantianProblemsandWreckedLives 220
8.2.1 ShouldWePreventSuffering? 222
8.2.2 InformedHypotheticalConsent 224
8.3 Double-EffectandTheodicy 226
8.4 RedeemedWorldsandDouble-Effect 228
9. Conclusions 229
9.0 OnDogmasinPhilosophicalTheology 229
9.1 DivinePredictionsandtheLogicalProblemofEvil 231
9.2 ResolvingtheLogicalProblemofEvilRedux 233
9.3 ResolvingOtherProblemsinPhilosophicalTheology 234
9.4 RedeemingWorlds 237
Bibliography 240
Index 247