Trends in Logic 42 Janusz Czelakowski Freedom and Enforcement in Action A Study in Formal Action Theory Trends in Logic Volume 42 TRENDS IN LOGIC Studia Logica Library VOLUME 42 Editor-in-Chief HeinrichWansing, Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum, Germany Editorial Assistant Andrea Kruse,Ruhr-University Bochum,Bochum, Germany Editorial Board Aldo Antonelli,University of California, Davis, USA Arnon Avron,University of TelAviv, TelAviv, Israel Katalin Bimbó,University ofAlberta, Edmonton, Canada Giovanna Corsi, University of Bologna,Bologna,Italy JanuszCzelakowski, University of Opole, Opole, Poland RobertoGiuntini, University of Cagliari,Cagliari,Italy Rajeev Goré,Australian National University,Canberra, Australia Andreas Herzig, University ofToulouse, Toulouse, France AndrzejIndrzejczak, University of Łodz,Łodz,Poland Daniele Mundici,University ofFlorence,Florence, Italy SergeiOdintsov, SobolevInstitute of Mathematics, Novosibirsk,Russia EwaOrłowska,Institute of Telecommunications, Warsaw, Poland PeterSchroeder-Heister, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany YdeVenema, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, TheNetherlands Andreas Weiermann, University of Ghent, Ghent, Belgium FrankWolter,University ofLiverpool, Liverpool, UK Ming Xu,WuhanUniversity, Wuhan,People’s Republicof China Founding Editor RyszardWójcicki, Polish Academyof Sciences, Warsaw,Poland SCOPE OFTHE SERIES The book series Trends in Logic covers essentially the same areas as the journal Studia Logica, that is, contemporary formal logic and its applications and relations to other disci- plines.Theseriesaimsatpublishingmonographsandthematicallycoherentvolumesdealing with important developments in logic and presenting significant contributions to logical research. Theseriesisopentocontributionsdevotedtotopicsrangingfromalgebraiclogic,model theory,prooftheory,philosophicallogic,non-classicallogic,andlogicincomputerscience to mathematical linguistics and formal epistemology. However, this list is not exhaustive, moreover, the range of applications, comparisons and sources of inspiration is open and evolves overtime. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6645 Janusz Czelakowski Freedom and Enforcement in Action A Study in Formal Action Theory 123 JanuszCzelakowski Department ofMathematics andInformatics University of Opole Opole Poland ISSN 1572-6126 ISSN 2212-7313 (electronic) Trends inLogic ISBN978-94-017-9854-9 ISBN978-94-017-9855-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9855-6 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015938093 SpringerDordrechtHeidelbergNewYorkLondon ©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpart of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission orinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilar methodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfrom therelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authorsortheeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinor foranyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade. Printedonacid-freepaper SpringerScience+BusinessMediaB.V.DordrechtispartofSpringerScience+BusinessMedia (www.springer.com) Preface The aim of this book is to present a formal theory of action and to show the relations of this theory with logic and other disciplines. The book concerns the semantic, mathematical, and logical aspects of action. Incontemporarylogic,reflectionsonactionsandtheirperformers(agents) have assumed a growing and expanding importance. The theme of action, particularly thatofeffectiveandrationalaction,isheavilyrootedinthepraxeologicaltradition. From the viewpoint of logic, the problem of action goes beyond traditional bran- ches of logic such as syntactics and semantics. The center of gravity of the issues theproblemofactionraisesissituatedontheborderlinebetweenlogicalpragmatics and praxeology. The book focuses on the following tasks: A. Description and Formalization of the Language of Action In the contemporary literature, one can distinguish at least seven approaches to action.Eachofthemoutlinesacertainperspectiveofactiontheorybybringingout some specific aspects of human actions. 1. The linguistic framing, initiated by Maria Nowakowska. Atomic (in other words: elementary) actions (procedures), as well as compound actions are dis- tinguished. Atomic actions are primitive and non-reducible to others. Compoundactionsaresetsoffinitesequencesofatomicactions.Ifoneidentifies thesetofatomicactionswithanalphabet,inthesenseofformallinguistics,each compoundactionbecomesalanguageoverthisalphabet,thatis,itbecomesaset ofwords.Foradescriptionofcompoundactionsonecanthenapplythemethods of mathematical linguistics. Compound actions can be—in particular cases— regular languages, context-free languages, etc. This formulation goes deeply into the theory of algorithms and is appropriate for describing routine, algo- rithmizable actions, such as the manufacture of cars or the baking of bread. v vi Preface 2. The dynamic logic approach. The view that human action is modeled on their resemblance of computer programs can be found in the works of many researchers (Boden, Segerberg, Suppes to mention a few). In this formulation, an action is identified with a binary relation defined on a set of states. This relation, called the resultant relation, assigns to each state a set of possible outcomes of the action, when the action is being performed in this state. Each pair of states belonging to this relation is called a possible performance of the action.Theformulation,inanaturalway,linksactiontheorywith(fragmentsof) settheory,whosemaincomponentsaregraphtheoryandthetheoryofrelations. 3. Stitsemanticsgivesanaccountofactionfromaperspectiveinwhichactionsare seennotasoperationsperformedinanactionsystemandwhichyieldnewstates ofaffairs,butratherasselectionsofpre-existenthistories(ortrajectories)ofthe system in time. Stit semantics is therefore time oriented, and time, being a situational component of action, plays a special role in it. 4. A special framing of the subject area of action is offered by deontology and deonticlogic.Itisfromthedeontologicalperspectivethatatypologyofactions is determined; here, forbidden, permitted, and obligatory actions are distin- guished.Thisformulationbindsactiontheorywithjurisprudenceandthetheory of norms. 5. ThefifthperspectiveofactionoriginatesfromDynamicEpistemicLogic(DEL), the logic of knowledge change. DEL is concerned with actions which change statesofagents’knowledgeandbeliefs.DELbuildsmodelsofthedynamicsof inquiry and accompanying flows of information. It provides insight into the properties of individual or group agents (knowers) and analyzes consequences of epistemic or verbal actions. Public announcements may serve asan example [see van Benthem (2011); van Benthem et al. (2013)]. 6. A pragmatic approach to action is developed by decision theory. From the perspective of this theory, ‘decision making is a cognitive process resulting in the selection of a course of actions usually among several alternative scenar- ios’—see Wikipedia. Decision theory therefore differentiates between problem analysis, which is a part of the cognitive process, and the selection of an appropriate course of actions by the agent(s). The information gathered in problem analysis at each stage of decision making is then used toward making furthersteps.Decisiontheoryisnotconcernedwiththeperformabilityofactions but rather with their costs—some actions turn out to be less or more profitable than others. In other words, decision theory views actions as decisions and assesses the latter in terms of costs or losses. 7. Game theory is a study of strategies and decision making. There is no strict division line between game theory and decision theory. It is said that game theory may be viewed as interactive decision theory because it builds mathe- matical models of conflict and cooperation between rational decision-makers. Preface vii B. Models of the Action Theory Inviewofthedifficultyindeterminingtheadequatelanguageofactions,oneshould not expect a theory to be defined in an axiomatic way. The natural compromise consists in defining some intended models of action. In this book, two classes of models are discussed: (cid:129) the class of elementary action systems, (cid:129) the class of situational action systems. Thesecondoftheclassesincludesthefirstoneasalimitcase.Themodelsallow for unification of most of the formulations of action theory mentioned in (A). On thegroundoftheabove-mentionedmodels,onecandefinecompoundactions(asit is done in the models considered by Nowakowska); likewise, one can reconstruct models for dynamic logic. In terms of action systems it is possible to determine notions of permitted, obligatory, and forbidden actions that are fundamental to deontology. Thebookalsooutlinestherelationsobtainingbetweensituationalactionsystems and situational semantics. C. Performability of Actions The central problem that action theory poses for itself to solve is to provide an adequate concept of the performability of action. The performability of actions dependsontheparameterwhichisthestateofanactionsystem(seepointB).What ismore,theverynotionofperformabilityitselfinnotofanabsolutecharacterbutis relativized to a possible manner (aspect) of performing an action: for example, an actioncanbephysicallyperformable(e.g.,drivingacaralongaone-wayroadinthe opposite direction), when one takes into account technical limitations while being legally non-performable—if one takes into account (as in the example given) the limitations arising from the regulations contained in the highway code (actions in fraudemlegis).(Inthisexample,thenon-performabilityofactioninthelegalsense means that the action is forbidden.) One of the aims of the book is to present the definition of performability (atomic and compound ones) formulated in terms of elementary and situational action systems. D. Actions and Their Agents Actions are performed by single persons (individuals), teams of people (collective groups), robots, and groups, these being combinations of collective bodies,robots, andmachines.Performersofactionsarereferredtowiththecollectivetermofagent viii Preface of action. The literature on the subject is quite extensive and is focused on pro- viding truth-conditions for sentences of the form: a is the agent of the action A. The above problem has been analyzed by Brown, Chellas, Horthy, Kanger, Pacuit, Segerberg, van Benthem, von Wright, and many others. An initial discus- sion of the issue requires accepting certain ontological assumptions first. Actions (and acts) are correlated with changes in states of affairs. Besides the states, cate- goriesofactionsandtheiragentsaredistinguished.Moreover,inthisbook,thereis introducedthenotionofthesituationalenvelopeofanactionthattakesintoaccount such parameters accompanying an action as: time, location, order of actions, etc. Adifficultpartofthetheoryisthequestionoftheintentionalityofanaction,e.g., whentheintentionoftheagentistoperformanaction,yet—foravarietyofreasons— theagentdesistsfromperformingit.Thenotionalapparatuspermitstheintroduction ofclear-cut criteria for differentiating between singleactions(whentheagent isan individual) and collective actions (when the agent is a collective body), as well as betweenone-timeactions(suchasthestabbingofJuliusCaesar)andactionsunder- stoodasatype(e.g.,stabbingasatypeofcriminalaction). The problem area of verbal actions and models of information flow which accompanies actions requires special treatment. This question is not studied in the book; nevertheless, the models of action to be developed allow for their extension over verbal actions. In this context, one can modify the existing models of belief systems deriving from Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. E. Probabilistic Models of Action ThenotionofperformabilitymentionedinCisnotprobabilisticbutbinary:agiven action A is either performable or not in a definite state u. This notion does not encompass some aspects of the performability of actions as, e.g., quality grading (poor, medium, good performance, etc.). One framework that brings theories of action closer to probability calculus and decision theory introduces a quantitative measure of the degree of performability of an action. It is the probability of per- formability of an action in a given state u. Also introduced are other measures of performabiltysuch as the probabilityof the transition of thesystemfrom one state to another on the condition that an action is performed. The measure is, to use the simplest example, the probability of hitting—in the determined initial conditions u—the ‘bull’s-eye’ with an arrow shot from a bow (the intended state v). The performed action is here shooting an arrow at a target. Two types of probabilistic models of action are distinguished. The emphasis is put on their practical applications. The relevant models are constructed from ele- mentary systems (point B) by introducing (conditional) probabilities of transition fromonestatetoanother,undertheassumptionthatthegivenactionisperformed. (The notion of the performability of an action is distinguished from a possible performance as well as from a performance of an action—the latter being a one- time act, belonging to the situational surrounding of the system of action.) Preface ix F. Relationship with Deontic Logic A significant feature of action theory is its firm rooting in the theory of law and theory of legal and moral norms. This part of action theory is called deontology. The central place in it is occupied by deontic logic. This is still an area which is characterized by the existence of disparities concerning fundamental matters, the proliferationofformallogicalsystems,aswellasalackofmathematicalandlogical results of generally recognized significance and depth. In the formulations of deontic logic known from the literature, deontic operators are considered as unary sentence-generating functors defined on sentences. In semantic stylizations, these formulations distinguish permitted, forbidden, and obligatory states of affairs. Inthisbook,aformulationofdeonticlogicispresented,accordingtowhichthe deontic operators belong to quite a different category: they are defined on actions, and not on states of affairs. Thus, in this formulation, these are actions that are permitted, forbidden, or obligatory entities, and not sets of states. It leads to two simple formalized systems of deontic logic, whose semantics is founded on ele- mentaryactionsystems.Thedifferencebetweenthesystemsconsistsinthefactthat thefirstonevalidatestheso-called closureprinciple,while theother rejectsit. The closure principle says that every action which is not forbidden is permitted. These systemsarefreefromdeonticparadoxes.Completenesstheoremsforthesesystems are proved. Deontic models of compound actions are also considered. The book presents a new approach to norms. Norms in the broad sense are viewed as certain rules of action. In the simplest case they are instructions which, under given circumstances, permit, forbid, or order the performance of an action. G. Relations with the Theory of Algorithms and Programming The theory of algorithmizable actions is a vital part of action theory. Here, algo- rithmizable actions are set against actions that are creative, single, and unique in their nature. There is no satisfactory definition of algorithmizable actions. According to an informal definition,analgorithmisasetofrulesthatpreciselydefinessequenceof actions. Instances of algorithmizable actions are regular or context-free compound actions.According to theabove linguisticapproach, regular (respectively, context- free) compound actions are defined as regular (context-free) languages over the alphabet consisting of atomic actions. Apartofthebookestablishescertainresultsonalgorithmizableactionsreferring to the notion of an action program. The prototype here is the meaning of the term “program”, with which it is invested by computer science. The above-mentioned problemareadisplaysrelations withalgorithmic logicinthesenseofSalwicki and the theory of algorithms; yet, it is not identical with them.
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