Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life PDF
Preview Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life Derk Pereboom 1 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries #DerkPereboom2014 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2014 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2013943741 ISBN 978–0–19–968551–6 PrintedinGreatBritainby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. Contents Acknowledgments vi Introduction 1 1. DefendingaSourceView 9 2. ProblemsforEvent-CausalandNon-CausalLibertarianisms 30 3. TheProspectsforAgent-CausalLibertarianism 50 4. AManipulationArgumentagainstCompatibilism 71 5. FreeWillSkepticismandRationalDeliberation 104 6. MoralResponsibilitywithoutBasicDesert 127 7. FreeWillSkepticismandCriminalBehavior 153 8. PersonalRelationshipsandMeaninginLife 175 Bibliography 200 IndexofTopics 215 IndexofNames 217 Acknowledgments ResearchonthisprojectwasfacilitatedbysabbaticalfromCornellUniversityin Rome,ItalyintheSpringSemesterof2012.Iamgratefultotheparticipantsinmy graduateseminaratCornellintheSpringSemesterof2011,inwhichIpresented thematerialincludedinthisbook.Iwouldalsoliketothanktheparticipantsin my other courses on free will at the University of Vermont and at Cornell University. Two courses at Cornell were held in the Cornell Law School and co-taught with Will Provine, Professor of Evolutionary Biology, and David Levitsky, Professor of Psychology. Two very productive summer seminars on free will at the Central European University in Budapest were co-taught with Mark Balaguer, Michael McKenna, Dana Nelkin, Timothy O’Connor, Thomas Pink, Paul Russell, and Andras Szigeti. Discussions with faculty and students in allofthesecoursesinseminarsweresplendidandenlightening. Iwishtothankaudiencesatthefollowingschools,meetings,andconferences forcommentsanddiscussionofthechaptersofthisbook:Chapter1:University ofArizonaandUniversityofAlberta;Chapter2:PacificDivisionoftheAmerican Philosophical Association, San Diego; Chapter3: University of Idaho—Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference and Université Paris-Sorbonne; Chapter4: Central European University, Budapest; Chapter5: Florida State University and the Second On-Line Philosophy Conference; Chapter6: University of Arizona and University of Tennessee; Chapter7: Università Roma III and University of Chicago Law School; Chapter8: University of California, San Diego, University ofFribourg,Switzerland,andUniversityofTennessee. Thanks in addition to audiences at Yale University; University of California, Riverside; SUNY Brockport; Brandeis University; City University of New York GraduateCenter;UniversityofMassachusetts,Amherst;UniversityofSanFran- cisco; University of Minnesota, Morris; Colby College; University of California, San Diego; Calvin College; Wheaton College; University of Colorado, Boulder; Dartmouth College; Washington State University; University of Vermont; Uni- versity of Alabama; Florida State University; Cornell University; West Point Military Academy; Georgetown University; University of Miami; Rutgers Uni- versity; Salisbury University; Marist College; New York University; University of Rochester; University of Western Ontario; University of Calgary; Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand; Canterbury University, Christchurch, New Zealand; Australian National University, Canberra; Monash University, OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,6/1/2014,SPi acknowledgments vii Melbourne, Australia; University of Melbourne, Australia; University of Valen- cia, Spain; Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Università Roma III,Rome,Italy;andUniversityofPadua,Italy. Personal gratitude for valuable discussion is due to Robert Allen, Carla Bag- noli, Helen Beebee, Karen Bennett, Robert Bishop, Gunnar Björnsson, Mick Capraru, David Christensen, Randolph Clarke, Justin Coates, Mario DeCaro, Oisin Deery, John Fischer, Ish Haji, Ian Hensley, James Hobbs, Sofia Jeppsson, RobertKane,ErinKelly,Hilary Kornblith,ArthurKuflik,DavidLevitsky, Brian Leiter, Don Loeb, Stephen Mahaffey, Patrick Mayer, Kelly McCormick, Carlos Moya, Will Provine, Sam Reis-Dennis, Philip Robichaud, Adina Roskies, Paul Russell, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Sydney Shoemaker, Sean Stapleton, Jordan Thomson,JonathanVance,ManuelVargas,DavidWiderker,andRuYe. IamespeciallygratefultoGunnarBjörnsson,AustinDuggan,LouisdeRosset, CarlGinet,MichaelMcKenna,ShaunNichols,CarolinaSartorio,DavidPalmer, Al Mele, Seth Shabo, and Patrick Todd for comments on one or more chapters and valuable discussion of free will and moral responsibility over the years. Special thanks to Dana Nelkin and Chris Franklin for reading the entiremanu- scriptandprovidingsplendidcommentsandongoingdiscussion.Thanksalsoto theanonymousreviewersforOxfordUniversityPressforexcellentcomments. Chapter1 includes most of “Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection,” Philosophical Issues 22 (2012), pp. 298–315, and featuresafewsubstantialrevisionsandadditions. Chapter5 is a revised version of my article “A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation,” Journal of Ethics 12 (2008), pp.287–307. Chapter6isasubstantiallyreworkedversionof“FreeWillSkepticism,Blame, andObligation,”inNealTognazziniandD.JustinCoates,eds.,Blame:ItsNature andNorms,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2013,pp.189–206. Chapter7 is based on “Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Punishment,” in ThomasNadelhoffer,ed.,TheFutureofPunishment,NewYork:OxfordUniver- sityPress,2013,pp.49–78. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,6/1/2014,SPi Introduction Oneofthemainconcernsinthehistoricalfreewilldebateiswhetherthesortof free will required for moral responsibility is compatible with the causal deter- mination of action by factors beyond the agent’s control. An action will be causally determined in this way if causally relevant factors occurring or active priortotheagent’scomingtobe,andthusbeyondhercontrol,togetherwithfacts about the laws of nature, also beyond her control, ensure the occurrence of the action by a causal process that begins with those preceding causal factors and endsin the occurrenceof the action.An actionwillalsobe causally determined by factors beyond the agent’s control if its occurrence is ensured by a causal processthatoriginatesinGod’stimelesswillingandendsintheoccurrenceofthe action.SinceHume(1739/1978),thesensethatthecausalhistoryofouractions threatens the free will required for moral responsibility has prominently been extendedtowhetheritiscompatiblewithindeterminacyinaction.Theposition I advocate in this book is that this sort of free will is incompatible with causal determination by factors beyond the agent’s control and also with the kind of indeterminacyinactionthatHumehadinmind,andthatasaresult,itisunlikely thatwehavethefreewillrequiredformoralresponsibility.1 1 Inmyviewit’spreferabletoformulatethefirstofthesehistoricalconcernsintermsofaconflict between an action’s being freely willed and its being causally determined by factors beyond the agent’s control (Sartorio ms; cf. Pereboom 2001). The more common formulation, as a conflict betweenanaction’sbeingfreelywilledandthetruthofcausaldeterminism,ischallengedbyJoseph Campbell(2007,2008,2010).Campbell’sobjectiontargetstheConsequenceArgument(Ginet1966, 1990; Van Inwagen 1975, 1983), and his claim is that this argument relies on the contingent assumptionthattheagenthasaremotepast—apastbeforesheexisted—andhencedoesnotshow thatfreeactionisincompatiblewithdeterminismperse.AliciaFinch(2013)defendstheConse- quence Argument against Campbell by way of the trans-temporality thesis, on which an agent’s performingafreeactionatatimerequiresthatatanearliertimeitwasuptotheagenttoperformthe actionatthelatertime.Finch’sstrategyistoarguethatthelawsandthestateoftheworldatthe earliertimearenotuptotheagent,andifcausaldeterminismistrue,thisnot-up-to-nesstransfersto theactionatthelatertime.CarolinaSartorio(2014)respondstoCampbellbydefendingtheview thatthecoreincompatibilistconcernisnottheincompatibilityoffreewillandcausaldeterminism, butratherfreewillandactionsbeingcausallydeterminedbyfactorsbeyondtheagent’scontrol,and Ithinksheisrightaboutthis.
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