Francis Hutcheson and contemporary ethical theory, PDF
Preview Francis Hutcheson and contemporary ethical theory,
FRANCIS HUTCHESON AND CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORY . * N UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA MONOGRAPHS NO. 12 Hutcheson Francis \ \ and \ Contemporary Ethical Theory By WILLIAM BLACKSTONE T. n DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA University of Georgia Press Athens 1965 To Kenn and Jackie who encouraged ' Copyright (e) 1965 University of Georgia Press Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 65-13201 Printed in the United States of America by Printing Department, University of Georgia Contents Preface vii Introduction I. 1 Hutcheson’s Moral Sense Theory II. 11 III. The Hutcheson-Price Controversy 41 on the Foundation of Morals IV. Hutcheson’s Arguments Against 53 the Rationalists V. Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory 66 Notes 82 Index 87 % Among the eighteenth century British moralists, Francis Hutcheson, for the most part, has been ignored. David Hume, the most radical exponent of the moral sense theory and the empirical perspective, has been given by far the widest Hume attention. acknowledges Hutcheson’s influence, and there is in fact little in Hume’s moral philosophy which cannot be traced to Hutcheson. Adam Smith, a pupil of Hutcheson at the University of Glasgow, was strongly in- fluenced by Hutcheson in the development of both his moral philosophy and economic theory. Though somewhat indebted to Shaftesbury, Hutcheson may be called the father of the empirical-inductive approach to ethical questions in the eigh- teenth century. Hutcheson also made significant contributions my to the theory of utilitarianism. If analysis is correct, he also anticipates current discussions on the limits of rational justification in ethics and is a precursor of at least significant parts of the contemporary emotive and non-descriptive theory of ethics. In spite of the influence and import of Hutcheson’s ethical theory, there is no comprehensive, analytical treatise on Hutcheson’s position. There are several works about him, but they are largely biographical and historical in scope. They do not offer detailed analysis of Hutcheson’s account of moral judgments and his account of justification in ethics. Nor do they relate Hutcheson’s theory to contemporary ethical theory. It is hoped that this book will help fill that gap. am indebted to Professor Bernard Peach of Duke Uni- I To versity for earlier direction of research on Hutcheson. the University of Georgia I am indebted for research time used in the preparation of this and other projects. I am also grateful for a grant from the General Research Fund of the University Vll HUTCHESON AND CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORY vill of Georgia, making possible the publication of this work. I must also thank Mrs. Sybil Bridges for her excellent typing, Miss Callie McWhirter and Mr. Ralph Stephens of the my University of Georgia Press for their aid, and wife, Jean, for her proofreading and encouragement. W. T. Blackstone Philosophy Department University of Georgia Chapter I Introduction In eighteenth century England there was a heated con- troversy between empiricists and rationalists concerning the foundation of morals. T. he rationalists, a group including Richard Price, Gilbert Burnet, William Wollaston, and Samuel Clarke, argued that reason is the foundation of morals. The empiricists, a group including Lord Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume, maintained that a sentiment or moral sense, not reason, is the foundation of morals. The rationalists maintained that moral distinctions exist in “the nature of things” and that they are discerned by reason. Morals are not to be viewed simply as matters of taste. In fact, moral distinctions have objective validity independently of the feelings, tastes, or sentiments of men. The empiricists, on the other hand, maintained that moral dis- tinctions, duties, and obligations were a direct result of the fact that men have moral senses, sentiments, or dispositions of a certain kind. Reason has an important role in moral disputation, but it is not responsible for our awareness of moral distinctions or obligations. In general the rationalists maintained that the empiricists’ position committed one to the view that morals are a matter of taste or mere feeling, The the consequence of which is extreme ethical relativism. empiricists denied that this inference could be drawn from their moral sense theory. Throughout the empiricist-rationalist controversy on the foundation of morals a systematic ambiguity existed in the On question itself, “What is the foundation of morals? many occasions the question appears to be that of (1) what way causes or motivates one to respond morally in the in 1 2 HUTCHESON AND CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORY which one does. On other occasions the question seems to be that of how one comes to be aware of n\oral distinctions and duties. The question clearly involves, however, not only these issues but also (2) a request for the justifying grounds of one’s moral judgments. This request for justification in- volves the following subsidiary questions, often today char- acterized as metaethical. (3) What are the meanings of moral concepts such as “right,” “good,” and “obligatory” and how is one to interpret sentences in which they occur? Do these concepts designate objective properties, refer to sentiments, or express feelings? What kind of reasoning is moral reasoning and what kind of certainty do we have in morals? The question, “What is the foundation of morals?”, involves at least the aforementioned questions. However, most of the eighteenth century British moralists discuss all these issues, in a very confusing manner, as if they were discussing one clear-cut issue. Thus we find both Hume and Hutcheson, on many occasions, giving us a causal analy- sis of our moral attitudes, whereas it is clear that both ethi- cal theorists are more fundamentally concerned with the foundation of morals in the sense of moral criteria or standards for acting, the attempt to justify those standards, and the attempt to characterize accurately moral discourse. Hutcheson, in particular, in attempting to answer the question, “What is the foundation of morals?”, confuses these different kinds of issues. In this monograph we will analyze in some detail the ethical theory of Francis Hutcheson,1 one of the principal representatives of the empiricist side of this eighteenth century controversy on the foundation of morals. Our analysis will pay specific attention to the ambiguity of the question, “What is the foundation of morals?”, and the different issues confusedly discussed under this question. It is hoped that our analysis will help to get rid of some of the obfuscation centering around the question, “What is the foundation of morals?”, and, specifically in regard to Hutcheson, to provide a critical exegesis of his ethical theory. Francis Hutcheson was born on the eighth of August, 1694, in Drumalig, Ireland. His father was John Hutcheson! originally from Scotland, the minister of a “dissenting” con-
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