FM 34 37 Echelons Above Corps ( EAC) Intelligence And Electronic Warfare ( IEW) Operations

149 Pages·1991·2.2 MB·English

*FM 34-37
FIELD MANUAL HEADQUARTERS
NO. 34-37 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 15 January 1991
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 34-37, 30 September 1987.
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Preface
In the mid-seventies, two manual further supports Army
events created a void in doctrine described in FM 100-5
echelons above corps (EAC) and FM 100-20.
intelligence doctrine and force
structure: the transition of This manual is not designed
Army doctrine from field Army nor intended to be a
to EAC and the implementation descriptive tactics,
of decisions resulting from the techniques, and procedures
Intelligence Organization and (TTP) manual. The uniqueness
Stationing Study. In 1982, the of the EAC theaters in which
Army Chief of Staff approved the IEW units are located
the changes resulting from this prohibits such a task. The
document for planning geographical and operational
purposes. During this time, US focus of the theaters, along
Army Intelligence and Security with command and National
Command (INSCOM) completed the Command Authorities (NCA)
EAC Intelligence, Security, and guidance, orients the specific
Electronic Warfare Architecture IEW support missions; for
Study . This was the base example, functional and
document for EAC intelligence regional tailoring to best
and electronic warfare (IEW) achieve the assigned mission.
force development. FM 100-16,
published in April 1985, Chapter 1 describes how the
incorporated key IEW doctrinal general political and military
principles. environment of theaters of
operation are formed. It also
This manual applies those describes how the IEW structure
principles to the Military forms to the operational level
Intelligence (MI) brigades focus of the theaters and
(EAC) that support IEW in supports the Army’s AirLand
different theaters. The Battle Doctrine and IEW
brigades are the critical parts doctrinal principles and
of the IEW structure tasks. All intelligence
established at EAC. The IEW disciplines have been included
functions of the MI brigades in the functional description.
(EAC) forge the links with the
EAC staff, the echelons above The remainder of the manual
corps intelligence center discusses the organization of
(EACIC), echelons corps and the MI brigades (EAC) under the
below (ECB), other MI brigade new “L” series tables of
elements, other services, and organization and equipment
national level intelligence (TOEs) . These TOEs provide the
agencies. framework for describing the
missions and functions of the
This manual provides the brigade and its subordinate
doctrine for EAC IEW units. These TOEs may be
operations, including augmented with tables of
organizations, missions, distribution and allowances
functions, and capabilities of (TDAs) force structures.
MI organizations at EAC. This However, such TDA organizations
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are theater dependent and are The proponent of this
not included in this manual. publication is HQ, USAICS.
Send comments and
This manual is for recommendations on DA Form 2028
commanders, staff, and key (Recommended Changes to
personnel of all EAC Publications and Blank Forms)
organizations--combat, combat directly to Commander, US Army
support (CS), and combat Intelligence Center and School
service support (CSS). It (USAICS), ATTN: ATSI-TD-DP,
describes the organization and Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000.
functions of theater level IEW
units and how they support the This manual complies with
formulation of operational STANAG 2084. It does not
level intelligence. It thus implement any international
lends support to the standardization agreement.
operational planning by all
Army units within their Unless this publication
functional missions. It should states otherwise masculine
also be used by members of nouns and pronouns do not refer
United States Army Training and exclusively to men.
Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
service schools and other This publication does not
military organizations. contain copyrighted material.
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CHAPTER 1
FORMULATION OF ARMY THEATER
INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT
The focus of this manual is capabilities and threats to the
on the MI brigades (EAC). nation and on a thorough
These brigades are found in, or assessment of potential
are focused upon, operational enemies.
theaters worldwide where US
forces may be employed to Military power in support
support or protect US national of national strategy is based
security interests and/or those on deterring and, if this
of our Allies. In order to fails, successfully executing
recognize the important role MI assigned missions. Unified
brigades (EAC) play in these Commanders in Chief (CINCs)
theaters, one must first execute the use of military
understand other factors which power in support of US national
influence and shape military strategy. Their strategic
policy within the theaters. guidance is expressed in terms
of--
AirLand Battle Doctrine
requires that the IEW system o Aims (to deter or, if
provide timely and accurate necessary, to fight and win).
multidiscipline intelligence,
electronic warfare (EW), and o Resources (the forces and
counterintelligence (CI) to all sustainment allocated to a
echelons. To ensure victory on region).
the battlefield, the campaign
plan in a theater of operations o Limiting factors (what
calls for the achievement of they must do and cannot do in
the theater's strategic goals. applying those forces).
The success of the IEW mission
to support attaining these Military strategy is the
goals depends on detailed combination of military
planning and execution of all objectives (ends), military
phases of IEW operations. concepts (ways), and military
force (means) to achieve
THEATER OPERATIONAL national security policy
CONSIDERATIONS objectives. Effective military
strategy includes all aspects
National strategy is the of preparing military power for
plan or expression of the its most effective application
coordinated use of national on a global or regional scale
power which includes political, to achieve or secure national
economic, psychological, and objectives. The CINC’s
military power during peace, mission, then, is to translate
crisis, or war to secure the strategic guidance received
national objectives. It is into operational terms so that
based on both national he and subordinate commanders
can apply military power
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through deterrence or, failing hence, the application of
that, the conduct of combat combat to defeat an enemy.
operations. I t --
LEVELS OF WARFARE o Sets the objectives and
pattern of military activity.
For the Army, military This is generally characterized
strategy, operational art, and by maneuver of large units
tactics are the broad divisions against an enemy’s centers of
of activity used to describe gravity.
the operational continuum of
warfare. A successful strategy o Focuses on attaining
achieves national and alliance strategic goals in a theater of
political objectives with war or theater of operations
minimal cost in lives and through the design,
money. organization, and conduct of
campaigns and major operations.
These three activities, in
the context of AirLand Battle o Frequently emphasizes
Doctrine, have been described joint and combined operations
as perspectives of the to achieve ultimate success.
operational continuum. (The
concept of “levels” has become Tactical Level
synonymous with that of
“perspective.“) Each of these The tactical level includes
levels generates its own the tactics and techniques used
implications for IEW planning. by maneuver units (corps and
Additional details on the below) to destroy the enemy or
levels of warfare are in seize objectives during battles
FM 100-5 and FM 100-20. and engagements.
Strategic Level STRUCTURE OF A THEATER FORCE
The strategic level The operational activities
includes US national strategy described above create the
to deter nuclear attack against backdrop for understanding Army
the US and its Allies; the IEW support to EAC. The Army,
conventional defense of all as the land-based component of
allies; the defense of AirLand Battle Doctrine, is
continental United States forward deployed into the
(CONUS); and the ability to unified theaters around the
deal with other contingencies world. The Army force is
at the lower end of the tailored according to the
operational continuum (for nature of the military threat,
example, low-intensity as well as political, economic,
conflicts [LICs]). psychological, and geographic
factors. These five “factors
Operational Level of power” affect the conduct of
warfare and mold the CINC’s
The operational level military strategy for the
creates the link between theater. Hence, they have a
national and military strategy;
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direct effect on the theater intelligence requirements of
Army component commander’s each theater are unique.
mission planning. Differences within each theater
of war include--
OPERATIONAL LEVEL
INTELLIGENCE o The nature of alliances.
By definition, IEW EAC o Enemy military
organizations perform their capabilities.
functions at the operational
level. In executing o Political and military
intelligence operational objectives in theater.
responsibilities, the IEW
organization must support both o Geography.
the CINC’s operational planning
and the intelligence o Popular support for US
requirements of Army forces strategic objectives.
charged with conducting those
operations. The CINC and Campaign planning defines
component theater commanders the organization of resources
must consider the above factors required to defeat enemy
into their military strategy to centers of gravity. It is
identify enemy centers of based on a thorough
gravity and targets that, when understanding of the political,
attacked, will impact on these economic, geographic, and
centers. They must also be demographic features of a
considered to protect friendly region.
centers of gravity. IEW
support to the theater must Figure 1-1 shows how the
concentrate on identifying Army IEW system focuses support
these centers of gravity. on the Army’s operational force
structures. The diminishing
The NCA, through the Joint length of the lines indicates
Strategic Capabilities Plan the relative value of the
(JSCP)-- intelligence to the different
levels of the structure of
o Provides the planning warfare. The figure shows that
guidance for developing theater the greatest amount of both
operations plans. tactical and strategic
intelligence occurs at the
o Develops strategic operational level. It is here
concepts and establishes that the integration process
military objectives. has the most influence on
military strategy.
o Identifies resources for
employing and sustaining Tactical intelligence is
theater forces in peacetime and formed from combat information
wartime. and analytical processes of
units involved in tactical
The military strategy, operations. Strategic
force structure, and intelligence is generated by
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national intelligence agencies military-strategic objectives.
and is sent down to operational Also , intelligence activities
forces. The IEW system are focused on analyzing enemy
connects strategic and tactical military capabilities, probable
intelligence activities, intentions, vulnerabilities,
supporting the combat forces at weaknesses, and political and
all echelons. military interests in the
region.
Operational level
intelligence is required for DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES
planning and conducting
campaigns within a theater. At The IEW system’s doctrine
the operational level, for EAC IEW organizations
intelligence concentrates on applies to every echelon,
collecting and analyzing regardless of where they
information that identifies and operate. The IEW system
locates strategic and provides for specific IEW
operational centers of structures, beginning at the
gravity. Successful attack of armored cavalry regiment (ACR)
these centers achieves friendly or separate brigade level and
political and theater ending at the departmental or
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national level. The IEW views the battlefield. All
structure at each echelon is commanders view the battlefield
designed primarily to support in terms of time, space, and
the combat commander at that area. These factors influence
echelon. The IEW structure at a commander’s information
successively higher echelons is requirements.
also designed to support IEW
units at echelons below it. The battlefield commander’s
area of operation (AO) includes
The IEW architecture has all the territory he can
been developed as a mutually presently attack or defend.
supporting system providing The commander’s area of
connectivity, cooperation, and interest (AI) extends beyond
coordination among IEW the AO to include areas in
structures at all echelons. It which enemy forces capable of
recognizes that IEW operations affecting future operations are
at each echelon are not found. These areas have
independent. IEW operations at influenced how IEW structures
higher echelons assist lower at different echelons are
echelons in meeting their organized. The IEW
mission objectives. organizations which are organic
to force echelons concentrate
The IEW principles that their resources on providing
guide mutual support are-- intelligence regarding their
AO. It then requests from and
o Operating on a 24-hour depends on the IEW organization
basis. at the next higher echelon for
intelligence regarding its AI.
o Basing operational
elements to facilitate a The AO and AI of a theater
peace-to-conflict transition. will be defined according to
the guidelines above and the
o Dedicating communication missions assigned to the
links to ensure timely support theater commander. In a
to all echelons and adjacent non-linear battlefield
forces. situation, these guidelines
might more appropriately
o Employing in an economy translate into circles; the
of force each echelon's finite radii of which would correspond
IEW assets according to the to the guidelines.
supported force commander’s
priorities. At EAC intelligence support
for the theater AI comes from
ECHELON INTERDEPENDENCE department level, other
services, and national
The dependence each agencies. The EAC IEW
echelon’s IEW organization has structure is organized to
on higher commands and each manage this vast coordination
echelon's responsibility to effort. The result is getting
subordinate commands is best the right intelligence into the
explained by how a commander
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