First published in Great Britain in 2006 by Pen & Sword Aviation an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd 47 Church Street, Barnsley South Yorkshire, S70 2AS Copyright © Martin W. Bowman, 2006 9781783409341 The right of Martin W. Bowman to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Typeset by Concept, Huddersfield, West Yorkshire Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI UK Pen & Sword Books Ltd incorporates the Imprints of Pen & Sword Aviation, Pen & Sword Maritime, Pen & Sword Military, Wharncliffe Local History, Pen & Sword Select, Pen & Sword Military Classics and Leo Cooper. For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact Pen & Sword Books Limited, 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk Table of Contents Title Page Copyright Page Introduction Acknowledgements CHAPTER 1 - Just to Get a Bed CHAPTER 2 - M for Mother CHAPTER 3 - The Nursery Slopes CHAPTER 4 - One Wing CHAPTER 5 - The Concealing Cloth CHAPTER 6 - My War CHAPTER 7 - The Last Op CHAPTER 8 - A Canadian in Bomber Command CHAPTER 9 - ‘If We Could Survive That, We Could Survive Anything!’ CHAPTER 10 - Memories of a 218 Squadron Bomb Aimer CHAPTER 11 - By Chance and Good Fortune CHAPTER 12 - ‘If Yer Can’t Take a Joke Yer Shouldn’t Have Joined’ CHAPTER 13 - There But for the Grace of God CHAPTER 14 - ‘The Condemned Men Ate a Hearty Breakfast’ CHAPTER 15 - Low Level to Stettin CHAPTER 16 - The Tour CHAPTER 17 - The Shining 10th CHAPTER 18 - Lady Luck CHAPTER 19 - Surrounds of Glory CHAPTER 20 - The Mystery of H-Harry Two CHAPTER 21 - Dresden CHAPTER 22 - The Grim Reaper CHAPTER 23 - Reflections APPENDIX 1 - RAF Bomber Command Operational Statistics APPENDIX 2 - RAF slang terms in common everyday use APPENDIX 3 - Glossary Index Phantom bombers on the old airfields Where do you fly tonight Are you off to visit Berlin, Hamburg, Nuremberg or Mannheim Or somewhere in the Ruhr, east of the Rhine Phantom bombers on the old airfields Where do you fly tonight Through a moonless or full moonlit sky Giving battle as you fly Returning shrouded, but with your spirits aces high Ghostly engines, silenced by time Outlined at dispersal by rings of rime With ghostly guns of noiseless rattle Patiently waiting the phantom hours of battle Phantom bombers on the old airfields Where do you fly tonight If you will only wait for me to join you In the air battles of long ago It will be in the company of my old aircrew The Bomber Airman’s Lament (Tune of: Empty Saddles in the Old Corral), Louis Patrick Wooldridge DFC Introduction It was an article of faith in the pre-war RAF that modern twin-engined bombers like the Hampden, Wellington, Whitley and Blenheim, with revolving machine- gun turrets and flying in close formation to maximise defensive fire power against attacking fighter aircraft, were unbeatable: ‘The Bomber Always Gets Through.’ It was even assumed that these aircraft didn’t need any form of fighter escort to reach and destroy their assigned targets. In the raw practice of war, however, this belief was rudely shattered. Bomber operations against elements of the German fleet at Brunsbüttel and Wilhelmshaven on 4 September 1939 were met with stiff opposition from both fighters and flak, two Wellingtons and five Blenheims being lost. The elderly Whitley squadrons in 4 Group were immediately employed in night leaflet-dropping operations, and made no appearance in daylight at all. The 3 Group Wellingtons and 5 Group Hampdens kept searching for the German navy in daylight during the remainder of September 1939 but the serious losses inflicted on 29 September, when a complete formation of five 144 Squadron Hampdens were destroyed over the German Bight between Heligoland and Wangerooge Island by Bf 109 fighters, soon convinced the Air Staff that a profound change of its daylight policy was necessary. It was two major disasters in December 1939 that finally persuaded the Air Staff that a radical change in direction was necessary if future bombing operations were to stand any chance of success. After April 1940 Bomber Command decided not to abandon completely the use of bombers in daylight. Although the Hampden and Wellington units largely shifted to night-time bombing, someone had to do the daylight offensive operations unless the RAF was prepared to admit that it had nothing for this most visible of its tasks. Thus the Bristol Blenheims and Fairey Battles in 2 Group and the AASF (Advanced Air Striking Force) stood forward as the best of a bad lot. When Bomber Command took the decision in May 1940 to start strategic bombing of Germany by night, there was little the Luftwaffe could do to counter these early raids, as no specialised night-fighting arm existed. The creation of a true night air defence of the Third Reich was dramatically accelerated when Göring ordered General Kammhuber on 17 July 1940 to create a night-fighting arm. By the end of 1940 the infant Nachtjagd had matured into three searchlight batallions and five night-fighter Gruppen. At least nineteen Bomber Command aircraft were destroyed in the ‘Kammhuber Line’, as the continuous belt of searchlights and radar positions between Schleswig-Holstein and northern France were christened by the British bomber crews. A total of fifty-nine RAF bombers were shot down by Nachtjagd during May 1942, about half of which were claimed during the night of 30/31 May when the first Millenium or 1,000 Bomber Raid was made on Cologne. A force of 1,046 aircraft set out and forty bombers and two Intruders were lost — a 3.8 per cent loss rate. A further 116 aircraft were damaged, twelve so badly that they were written off. The fires burned for days and 59,100 people were made homeless. The second 1,000 Bomber Raid, against Essen, took place on the night of 1/2 June with a force of 956 bombers. Some bombers returned early with mechanical and engine problems. Thirty-one aircraft failed to return. A third 1,000 Bomber Raid took place on the night of 25/26 June when 1,006 aircraft, including 102 Wellingtons of Coastal Command, attacked Bremen. June 1942 saw a record 147 Bomber Command aircraft destroyed by Nachtjagd. During September 1942 eighty-six Bomber Command aircraft were lost. With the coming of autumn weather and a decrease in Bomber Command activity, during October 1942, only thirty-eight bombers were destroyed. In January 1943, the acute U-boat danger that threatened to sever the vital lifelines between the UK and the US pulled Bomber Command away from the strategic area bombing campaign against German cities and it led to a series of raids against U- boat bases in France and Northern Germany, which would last until the start of the Battle of the Ruhr two months later. By early 1943, Kammhuber’s defence line had been completed and Lichtenstein AI-radar equipped aircraft were now capable of exacting a maximum toll of 6 per cent bomber casualties on any deep penetration raid into the Reich. Thus, Bomber Command losses rose rapidly during the first few months of 1943. The date 5/6 March has gone into history as the starting point of the Battle of the Ruhr, Bomber Command’s spring offensive for 1943. Operational statistics for the period of the Battle of the Ruhr (5/6 March to 23/24 July 1943) reveal that a staggering 1,000 Bomber Command aircraft were lost from 23,401 sorties dispatched, or 4.3 per cent. Bomber Command introduced a series of new tactics during the Battle of Hamburg (24/25 July to 3 August 1943). The massed bomber stream, new target-finding radar (which permitted the bombers to find bomber stream, new target-finding radar (which permitted the bombers to find their targets individually through heavy cloud and in the moonless periods), new target finding and illuminating tactics that were concentrated in the élite Pathfinder Force (PFF), and last but not least, the (radar) jamming device code- named ‘Window’, all resulted in complete chaos in Germany. Unable to obtain a true picture of the air situation, and unable to control the night-fighters in the air, at a stroke the German air defence found itself reduced to the bare elementals of night-fighting. During the Battle of Hamburg Window prevented about 100 to 130 potential Bomber Command losses. Over four nights 3,000 bombers dropped 10,000 tons of HE (high explosive) and incendiary bombs to devastate totally half of the city and kill an estimated 42,000 of its inhabitants. After the fourth raid on the night of 2/3 August, a million inhabitants fled the city. Albert Speer, Minister of War Production, warned Hitler that Germany would have to surrender after another six of these bombing raids. On the night of 30/31 March 1944, Bomber Command suffered its highest loss of the war on the Nürnburg raid when sixty-four Lancasters and thirty-one Halifaxes (11.9 per cent of the force dispatched) were lost (and ten bombers crash-landed in England). The famous Avro Lancaster was the most successful bomber used by the RAF in the Second World War and in 1944 it established its superiority over every other type. By March 1945 there were no fewer than fifty- six squadrons of Lancasters in first-line service with Bomber Command. From April 1944 Bomber Command became engaged in the preparations of D-Day, mainly focussing on transportation targets in France. It is a popular belief that after the Battle of Berlin, Bomber Command crews had it relatively easy — less deep penetration raids into Germany, more shallow penetration trips into France to disrupt German communications in preparation for Operation Overlord, fewer losses to Luftwaffe night-fighters and smaller percentage losses as Bomber Command grew larger by the month during the spring and summer of 1944. During the prelude to the invasion of Normandy, Bomber Command had been controlled by the Supreme Allied Commander. With the Allied armies advancing into France, in September 1944 the Chief of Air Staff once again gained control of the Command for a new precision bombing campaign aimed at oil and transportation targets, and for a resumed area bombing campaign. Devastating raids by over 1,000 bombers became fairly commonplace, whilst operational losses began to fall quite dramatically. The early months of 1945 saw a tremendous increase in Bomber Command’s operations, both in tempo and number, forty raids being mounted in February