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Firebrand Waves of Digital Activism 1994–2014: The Rise and Spread of Hacktivism and Cyberconflict PDF

180 Pages·2015·2.813 MB·English
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Firebrand Waves of Digital Activism 1994–2014 Firebrand Waves of Digital Activism 1994–2014 The Rise and Spread of Hacktivism and Cyberconflict Athina Karatzogianni University of Leicester, UK © Athina Karatzogianni 2015 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-0-230-24246-3 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence p ermitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2015 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-56096-7 ISBN 978-1-137-31793-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137317933 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Karatzogianni, Athina. Firebrand waves of digital activism 1994–2014: the rise and spread of hacktivism and cyberconflict / Athina Karatzogianni. pages cm Includes bibliographical references. 1. Internet – Political aspects. 2. Cyberspace – Political aspects. 3. Hackers. 4. Political activists. 5. Political participation – Technological innovations. I. Title. HM851.K367 2015 303.48′34—dc23 2015015586 Contents Preface and Acknowledgements vi Introduction: Four Phases of Digital Activism and Cyberconflict 1 1 Origins and Rise of Digital Activism (1994–2007) 5 1.1 First phase (1994–2001): the origins of digital activism 5 1.2 Second phase (2001–2007): the rise of digital activism 15 2 The Third Phase (2007–2010): Spread of Digital Activism 25 2.1 Russia-related ethnonational digital activism and cyberconflicts 25 2.2 China-related cyberconflicts, dissidents, and nationalist hackers 41 3 The Fourth Phase (2010–2014): Digital Activism Invades Mainstream Politics 66 3.1 WikiLeaks: ideological and organizational tensions 66 3.2 WikiLeaks: impact on communication and International Relations scholarship 72 3.3 The ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings 90 3.4 The Snowden affair 106 4 The Future of Digital Activism and Its Studyy 121 4.1 Definition of digital activism and cyberconflict as an area of studyy 121 4.2 The agency problematique 123 4.3 The structure problematique 126 4.4 The affect problematique 128 Bibliographyy 142 Index 167 v Preface and Acknowledgements The research for this book was conducted between 2007 and 2014, in what was a period of intense cyberactivism in the global political arena: proliferation of socio-political activist networks; social-media-enabled political protests and mobilizations leading to social or political change; and increased resistance to surveillance and censorship of global communications, including leaks from government employees uncov- ering significant problems in the use of ICT by both states and corpo- rations. This book brings together work specifically relevant to media movements and radical politics and the interaction between states and corporations with these movements. In engaging with this work, I have incurred many intellectual debts. I extend my lasting thanks to all my colleagues at Hull and Leicester, who I often stopped in corridors to talk to between writing sessions. My list of gratitude for stimulating intellectual exchanges over the years includes Noel O’Sullivan, Andrew Robinson, Michael Schandorf, Christiana Gregoriou, Gillian Youngs, Cony Beyer, Phoebe Moore, Bev Orton, Mike Brayshaw, Adi Kuntsman, Korina Patelis, Petros Ioannidis, Popi Aggeli, Ming-Yeh, Gary Rawnsley, George Michaelides, Christos Sideras, Eugenia Siapera, Anthimos Tsirigotis, Artur Alves, Michel Bauwens, Zizi Papacharissi, Geert Lovink, Gabriella Coleman, Martin Gak, Patricia Clough, Rafael-Cohen Almagor, Richard Aldrich, James Zborowski, Maria Karanika, Marie-Hélène Bourcier, Mayra Rodrigues Gomes, Simon Willmetts, Peter Wilkin, James Connelly, David Lonsdale, Peter Young, Luke O’Sullivan and Panagiota Tsatsou. In addition, I extend my grati- tude to my students for many inspiring conversations. I have benefited from material support from the EU FP 7 MIG@NET project (http://www.mignetproject.eu/). I am grateful to this body for enabling me to travel widely for research; as well as to the University of Illinois in Chicago and the University of São Paulo for inviting me to visit and engage with staff and students. I am also grateful to the University of Hull for allowing me research leave, and to the University of Leicester for continuous support. I am thankful for the ESRC grant The Common Good: Ethics and Rights in Cyber Security (ERCS), which supported my research into the Snowden affair. I must also thank all the publishers and editors who have supported my work over the years and vi Preface and Acknowledgements vii the editorial team for this book. And no book on digital activism should omit thanks to online friends, who are too numerous to mention! I have published parts of the case studies included in this book over the past seven years (Karatzogianni, 2010; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2013; Karatzogianni and Michaelides, 2009; Karatzogianni and Robinson, 2014; 2016), and I am grateful to colleagues, editors and publishers for permission to use the material again. I have indicated in the text when this is the case and where the relevant study originally appeared. In doing so, I am opening my modest and often inadequate research vault in the hope that scholars of digital activism and cyberconflict might discover continuities, patterns and discontinuities, as well as paradoxes to aid the analysis of future cases, for they are virtually certain to emerge. This book is dedicated to my family in Greece, my son Sebastian and his dad, Tim Hawkins, who is still tolerant of my frequent absent- mindedness, travelling and smashing of kitchenware. Introduction: Four Phases of Digital Activism and Cyberconflict This book introduces four waves of digital activism and cyberconflict. Digital activism began in 1994, was transformed by the events of 9/11, peaked in 2011 with the Arab Spring uprisings and then entered a trans- formative phase of control, mainstreaming and co-optation, accentu- ated by the Snowden revelations in 2013. Digital activism is defined here as political participation, activities and protests organized in digital networks beyond representational politics. It refers to political conduct aiming for reform or revolution by non-state actors and new socio-po- litical formations such as social movements, protest organizations and individuals and groups from the civil society, that is by social actors outside government and corporate influence. Cyberconflict is defined as conflict in computer-mediated environments and it includes interac- tions between actors engaged in digital activism to raise awareness for a specific cause and struggles against government and corporate actors, as well as conflicts between governments, states and corporations. The rationale for distinguishing these phases is based solely on political effects, rather than technological developments. The first phase, covering the years 1994–2001, encompasses the origins of two phenomena. With the invention of the World Wide Web in 1991 by Tim Berners Lee, the digitization of production in the 1980s could finally be networked, and many-to-many broadcasting was no longer a far-fetched reality. The optimism of the early 1990s that digitality would bring an economic, socio-political and cultural revolution ended in the last years of that decade with the bursting of the dot.com bubble, which caused a rethink. Nevertheless, consumers were able and eager to interact and participate in the creative process and this was changing the relationship between 1 2 Firebrand Waves of Digital Activism 1994–2014 existing industries, technologies, audiences and markets. The commu- nication landscape of the 1990s was effectively described by McLuhan’s ‘global village’ (1989); De Sola Pool’s (1983) argument about the arti- ficiality of a media separation based on political economy rather than technological characteristics; Rheingold’s (1994) first take on the power of virtual communities; Jenkins’ (2006) convergence theory explaining the shifting of balance with the intertwining of grassroots and corpo- rate media; and Castells’ (2000) ‘network society’. Activism during that period included the alternative peer-produced Linux operating system started by Linus Torvalds in 1991 (the road had been opened by Richard Stallman’s free software in the 1980s); the online transfer of ethnoreli- gious conflicts (the Falun Gong in China, the Tamil in Sri Lanka, the Kosovo war, the Israel-Palestine conflict); the use of ICTs by social move- ments and protests, such as the Zapatista movement in Mexico, which dropped guerrilla war in favour of digital engagement in 1994; the birth of IndyMedia during the anti-globalization protests in Seattle in 1999; and the overthrow of Estrada through the use of mobile phones in 2001. By the first year of the new Millennium, digital activism was a global force to be reckoned with. The second phase is from 9/11 to 2007. It starts with 9/11, because the Al Qaeda network’s attack on the Twin Towers in the US not only had a profound impact on news coverage (the internet’s audience skyrocketed and the media industry was transformed) but also prompted political transformations both in the US and at the global level that led to the War on Terror, a crackdown on civil liberties, securitization and mili- tainment, among other phenomena. The subsequent Afghanistan and Iraq wars heightened the impact of internet politics on the global public sphere and increased digital activism in the form of anti-war protest, in which ICT was used to accelerate its mobilization. The Iraq war (2003– 2011) came to be known as the first internet war, because the digital revolution ensured that independent voices and new media actors were able to challenge the official narrative of the War on Terror and offer an alternative. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars were the dominant spheres of digital activism and cyberconflict in that period, but there were other notable examples: the socio-political mobilization in Ukraine’s Orange Revolutions (2004–2005); hacktivism during the Republican Convention in the US 2004; the Madrid and London Al Qaeda bombings; continuing resistance in China; the ICT impact on the Lebanon war in 2006; and the Estonian cyberattacks of 2007. The third phase, from 2007 to 2010, started with the South Ossetia conflict. In 2008, Senator Barack Obama exploited the power of social

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