FINLAND'S WAR OF CHOICE: The Troubled German-Finnish Alliance in World War II

463 Pages·2011·4.38 MB·English

by  Henrik Lunde

Published in the United States of America and Great Britain in 2011 by
CASEMATE PUBLISHERS
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Copyright 2011 © Henrik O. Lunde ISBN 978-1-935149-48-4
Digital Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-037-4
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CONTENTS
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PROLOGUE
1. FROM FLIRTATION TO COALITION
2. PLANS, PREPARATIONS, AND DEPLOYMENTS
3. OPERATION PLATINFUCHS
4. OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL FINLAND
5. THE FINNISH OFFENSIVES
6. COALITION PROBLEMS AND SOVIET COUNTEROFFENSIVES
7. ABORTED PLANS AND DASHED HOPES, 1941–42
FRONT WITHOUT COMBAT ACTIVITY—JANUARY 1943–JUNE
8.
1944
9. SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE—JUNE 9–21, 1944
10. SOVIET OFFENSIVE ENDS—FINLAND LEAVES THE WAR
11. FROM FRICTION TO FIGHTING
12. THE 20TH MOUNTAIN ARMY’S KATABASIS
EPILOGUE
APPENDIX I: COMPARATIVE GENERAL OFFICER RANKS
APPENDIX II: OPERATIONAL CODE NAMES
APPENDIX III: FINNISH AND RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHIC NAMES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
MAPS
1. Finland
2. Planned Operations
3. The Litsa Operational Area
4. Salla/Kayrala Offensive
5. III Corps Operations
6. Kayrala Encirclement and Drive to the Verman Lakes
7. Karelian Offensive 1941
8. Karelian Isthmus Offensive 1941
9. Supply and Evacuation Routes Across Lake Ladoga
10. Soviet Karelian Isthmus Offensive 1944
11. Soviet East Karelia Offensive 1944
12. German Disengagement and Withdrawal—September 1944
Soviet Pechenga–Kirkenes Offensive—October 1944
13.
14. German Withdrawal into Norway—October–November 1944
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In the Winter War (November 1939–March 1940), Finland was left alone to face
Soviet aggression with only a modicum of assistance from Western countries.
Many books and studies have been written about this conflict. The extensive
coverage in English of this three-and-a-half month struggle should not be
surprising—for it represented the gallant fight of a democratic “David” against a
totalitarian “Goliath.” The bravery and determination of the Finns against
insurmountable odds captured the imagination of the whole world.
The same is not true for the much longer and bloodier war that Finland fought
against the Soviet Union at the side of Germany from 1941 to 1944—and their
subsequent campaign to drive the Germans out of Finland in 1944–45. It might
be true, as Olli Vehviläinen writes, that the war in North Europe was “buried
under the avalanche of more newsworthy events in the greater war,” but this was
not the only reason.1
Professor John H. Wuorinen writes the following in the foreword to his book,
based on an anonymous Finnish manuscript, which he edited and published in
1948:
A document which tries to give an objective account therefore cannot be
published without unpleasant consequences for author and publisher alike. If this
were not so, this book would no doubt have been published in Finland months
ago, and the name of the Finnish author would occupy the customary place on
the title page.2
While it is difficult to pinpoint how long after the war the condition described by
Wuorinen persisted, it is worth noting that that the official history of Finland’s
involvement in World War II was not finished until 1994, more than thirty years
after a similar multi-volume history about the war in Norway was completed.
The war at the side of Germany was not viewed in the same manner in the West
as was the Winter War—it was not seen as a courageous and gallant fight to
preserve democracy and freedom against a giant totalitarian neighbor. While
numerous works on the war have been published in Finland, it is to be deplored
that virtually none have been translated into English. The war at the side of
Hitler was not one that brought pride to the nation and was a period many Finns
would rather forget. Due to the lack of impartial and balanced treatment, large
segments of the public in the US and Europe continue to believe that Finland
found itself at the side of Germany in 1941 because it was attacked by the Soviet
Union.
The Finns also refer to the war at the side of Germany as the “Continuation
War,” an attempt to depict it as a continuance of the Winter War in order,
perhaps, to obtain a more favorable reception both domestically and
internationally. Both this attempt and the insistence that it was an independent
war waged against the Soviet Union fail to stand up to close scrutiny. It has
proven hard to overcome the fact that Finland was the only democratic country
at Hitler’s side.
The Finns’ own views about the war at the side of Germany have changed over
the years. In the earlier period there was a tendency to emphasize the error of
their decision to align themselves with Germany. Later, they appear to have
come to the conclusion that the war was a struggle for survival and that the
government made what it thought to be the least harmful choice among bad
alternatives. While validating the fact that Finland found itself in an isolated and
dangerous position after the Winter War and the German conquests in the West,
this book will also demonstrate to the reader that there were other alternatives,
which were not seriously pursued.
A defensive alliance between Finland, Norway, and Sweden after the Winter War
as proposed by Finland and supported by the other two was not specifically
prohibited by the Peace of Moscow or its protocols and should have been
pressed harder by all countries. It was a serious policy mistake by the Soviet
Union to oppose the formation of such a defensive alliance. It may well have
spared the whole of Scandinavia from involvement in World War II. Similarly,
the military political union proposed by Sweden and accepted by Finland later in
1940 would have benefited the Soviet Union as it specifically ruled out a Finnish
war of revenge.
While examining these issues, the main purpose of the book is to deal with the
unique problems that arose from an ill-prepared coalition between a democracy
and a dictatorship. This book addresses the problems caused by differing war
aims and the failure to make plans much past the initial assaults. Following
Germany’s victories in France and the Low Countries in 1940, it became
axiomatic in both Finland and Germany that bringing about the military collapse