Finland’s Search for Security through Defence, 1944–89 PDF
Preview Finland’s Search for Security through Defence, 1944–89
FINLAND'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY THROUGH DEFENCE, 1944-89 Also by Risto E. J. Penttilli PUOLUSTUSLINJAT (LINES OF DEFENCE) Finland's Search for Security through Defence, 1944-89 Risto E. J. PenttiHi Palgrave Macmillan ISBN 978-1-349-11638-6 ISBN 978-1-349-11636-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-11636-2 ©Risto E. J. Penttilii 1991 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1991 978-0-333-52585-2 All rights reserved. For information, write: Scholarly and Reference Division, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 First published in the United States of America in 1991 ISBN 978-0-312-04895-2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data PenttiHi., Risto E. J., 1959- Finland's search for securuty through defence, 1944-89/Risto E. J. Penttilii. p. em. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-312-04895-2 1. Finland-Military policy. 2. Finland-Foreign relations Soviet Union. 3. Soviet Union -Foreign relations - Finland. 4. Finland-foreign relations-1945- 5. Soviet Union-Foreign relations- 1945- I. Title UA829.F5P45 1990 355'.03304897 - dc20 90-34613 CIP Contents Acknowledgements vii Map of Finland viii Introduction 1 1 'The Years of Danger', 1944 6 The Political Context 6 The Modernist Reaction 9 The Traditionalist Reaction 17 The Peace Treaty of 1947 23 2 The Cold War Reaches the North, 1948-49 26 Nordic Adjusbnent to Peace 26 The Finnish-Soviet Treaty 29 A Communist Coup in Finland? 34 The Rumour Behind NATO 37 3 'Do Not Tease the Bear', 1949-55 42 Finland's Low-Profile Defence Policy 42 Declining Military Preparedness 48 'Teaching Modernism' 51 Renewed Attention to Armed Defence 55 4 The Soviet Withdrawal from the Porkkala Naval Base, 1956 61 The Political and Military Significance of the Porkkala Base 61 Soviet Foreign Policy and the Withdrawal from Finland 65 Soviet Strategic Thinking and the Withdrawal from the Porkkala Base 71 The Finnish Reaction to the Soviet Withdrawal 75 v vi Contents 5 One-Armed Neutrality, 1956-61 77 Kekkonen Takes Charge 77 Modest Military Spending 82 Military Procurement from the Soviet Union 85 'Total Defence' 89 6 The Note Crisis: Its Strategic Reasons and Consequences, 1961-63 93 The Military Context to the Soviet Note 95 The Defusion of the Crisis 100 New Emphasis on Finland's Defence Preparedness 103 The Nordic Balance 108 7 Security through 'Active Foreign Policy', 1964-70 111 Foreign Policy Regains Predominance 111 Territorial Defence 115 New Declared Defence Policy 120 The Fall of the Commander-in-Chief 124 8 Neutrality Under Pressure, 1970-81 127 Soviet Criticism of Finland's Neutrality 128 The Upgrading of Finland's Defences 133 Cruise Missiles and the Threat of Invasion 140 The Downgrading of Sweden's Defences 144 9 Towards Symmetric Defence, 1982-89 149 The Post-Kekkonen Era 149 High-Profile Defence 153 Challenges of the Future 159 Appendix: Note on Military Expenditure, 1960-88 163 Notes 166 Select Bibliography 196 Index 205 Acknowledgements This book is based on my doctoral dissertation at Oxford. Consequently, I am in a debt of gratitude to several British academics. I wish especially to thank Dr Roy Allison for his insightful supervision and invaluable support. I am also beholden to Professor Adam Roberts who, during the early stages of my study, helped me to focus my research on Finland's defence policy. Professors Robert O'Neill and Anthony Upton deserve a special mention for invaluable suggestions as how to best convert the thesis into a (hopefully) interesting book. Man does not live of books alone. I wish to extend my warmest thanks to Reverend Bill Sykes for his contribution to my non-academic education at University College, Oxford. In Finland I am indebted to more people than I can mention here: bit I would like to record a special debt of gratitude to Dr. Marui Haikio, Dr Pauli JIDenpaa and Mr Rene Nyberg for stimulating discussions, comments and encouragement. I am also grateful to my interviewees in Finland. Without their comments my understanding of Finland's defence policy would have remained very limited. I would also like to thank the Finnish Institute of Military Science for providing me with a working space during the summer of 1989. In Sweden I am particularly beholden to Dr Bo Huldt for the use of the facilities at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. I would like to acknowledge the financial support I have received from the Academy of Finland, the Puolustusvoimien Tuki Foundation and the Rotary International Foundation. Last but by no means least, I am grateful for the support and tolerance of my parents, my siblings and my friends both in Great Britain and in Finland. vii '.;". . .~.::: Barents Arctic :. .......... ;.. .. .. ea \ I --,---- ------- (' II SWEDEN ~ SOVIET UNION ~ (U.S.S.R.) FINLAND Frontiers of 1939 Map of Finland Introduction This book looks at the development of Finland's international position in the postwar era. In contrast to most studies dealing with this issue, the present book does not attempt to evaluate the conduct of Finland's foreign policy. Instead the argument concentrates on the defence component of Finland's security policy. Finland's history as well as its strategic position has always been marked by the country's proximity to the Soviet Union or Russia. Finland was part of the Russian empire for more than a hundred years from 1809 to 1917. Since its independence in 1917 Finland has shared a long land border with the Soviet Union. Because of this geographic proximity it is not surprising that Finland has had to deal with keen Soviet interest, and sometimes even suspicion, about the character and aims of Finland's security policy. Despite this close attention and suspicion on the part of the Russians, Finland has been successful during the time period covered in this study in building up a position of neutrality which includes an efficient but non-provocative defence component. This book attempts to explain how this position was achieved. Clausewitz, who divided wars into total and limited wars, emphasised that the defence of a country had to be tailored according to the type of war a state was likely to be involved in. A state could not use the same type of defence against an enemy intent on occupying the country as against an enemy intending only to utilise (or occupy) a limited area of that state.l This expressed Finland's dilemma after the war: it continued on the one hand to defend itself against the eventuality of a Soviet occupation while on the other hand it had to develop its defence potential against any possible use of Finnish territory or airspace by NATO or the Soviet Union to attack each other. The basic questions that this study addresses arise from this dilemma of Finland's defence tasks: to what extent has Finland's post-war defence policy (both declared and actual) been determined by the threat of a Soviet occupation of Finland? Additionally, to what extent has Finland's defence policy been tied to the possibility that Finnish territory or airspace would be used for an operation against one of Finland's neighbours? And most sig nificantly, what role did Finland's defence preparations for these two threat scenarios play in the development of Finland's international position?
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