FINANCIAL CRISIS, CONTAGION, AND CONTAINMENT FINANCIAL CRISIS, CONTAGION, AND CONTAINMENT FROM ASIA TO ARGENTINA Padma Desai PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD Copyright © 2003 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 3 Market Place, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1SY All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Desai, Padma. Financial crisis, contagion, and containment : from Asia to Argentina / Padma Desai. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-691-11392-0 (alk. paper) 1. Financial crises. 2. Economic stabilization. I. Title. HB3722 .D47 2003 332'.042—dc21 2002031745 British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available This book has been composed in Sabon Printed on acid-free paper. ∞ www.pupress.princeton.edu Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 For TN āchāryah pūrva-rūpam, antevāsy uttara-rūpam, vidyā samdhih (Taittirīya Upanisad, 1.3.3) Contents Preface 1 1. Introduction 2. The U.S. Economy in Transition 13 3. The Euro: Teething Troubles and Faltering Responses 46 4. Japan: The Lost Decade of the Nineties amidst Policy Paralysis 70 5. The Asian Financial Crisis 86 Blocks 1. What Are Fundamentals? What Are Structural Issues? 99 2. The Current Account and the Exchange Rate 107 3. Financial Liberalization, Capital Account Decontrol, and the 110 Regulatory Framework 4. The East Asian Crisis: A Crisis of Over-Investment or Unregulated, 117 Premature Capital Flows? 119 6. The Asian Crisis Chronology 7. The Ruble Collapses in August 1998 136 Block 5. The Ruble: Premature Capital Account Convertibility 156 8. Contagion from the Ruble to the Real 162 9. Beyond Bangkok: Crisis Erupts in Buenos Aires and in the Bosphorus 172 10. The Contagion 197 11. International Monetary Fund to the Rescue: How Did It Fare? Badly 212 Blocks 6. Was There Moral Hazard in the Asian Financial Crisis? 242 247 7. How Much Corruption? Does Corruption Matter? 253 8. Chilean Capital Inflow Tax 256 9. Capital Account Convertibility in China and India: A Cautionary Tale of Two Countries 263 12. Crisis Prevention and Containment: The Next Steps in Financial Reform 285 References Index 293 Preface THE BORROWING BINGE of the eighties and the nineties was a pervasive phenomenon in the global economy. Japanese businesses borrowed heavily and invested unwisely in the eighties. U.S. households went overboard in stretching their finances in the second half of the nineties. Businesses, banks, and several governments in emerging market economies accumulated unsustainable foreign debt obligations. There was however a difference in the process in the developed group at the center and the vulnerable economies at the periphery of the international financial system. Borrowers in the developed market economies managed their debt burden, by source and duration, of their free will. Their policy makers undertook homegrown measures for battling the consequences of the resulting economic booms. By contrast, the emerging market economies analyzed in this book invited financial and currency crises in their economies from destabilizing foreign capital flows. These flows resulted from a premature opening of their financial systems in an environment of hothouse pressure that emanated from private and institutional lenders in the U.S.-led developed center. From Asia in 1997 to Argentina in 2002, these countries struggled with the consequences of externally imposed financial crises and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-led policy prescriptions that they did not own. I adopt this comparative center-periphery framework in the book for tracing the origins and spread of financial crises. I also employ it for arguing that emerging market economies with weak institutions and political maneuverability cannot be expected to grow crisis-free in a world of unrestricted capital mobility and floating exchange rates which are the latest magic bullets uncovered by the IMF. Even the U.S., eurozone, and Japan, advanced market systems with institutional capabilities and open economy adaptability face problems, which I
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