Figuring the Self: Subject, Absolute, and Others in Classical German Philosophy (S U N Y Series in Philosophy) PDF
Preview Figuring the Self: Subject, Absolute, and Others in Classical German Philosophy (S U N Y Series in Philosophy)
Publishedby StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,Albany © 1997 StateUniversityofNewYork Allrightsreserved PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Nopartofthisbookmaybeusedorreproduced inanymannerwhatsoeverwithoutwrittenpermission. Nopartofthisbookmaybestoredinaretrievalsystem ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeansincluding electronic,electrostatic,magnetictape,mechanical, photocopying,recording,orotherwisewithoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofthepublisher. Forinformation,addressStateUniversityofNewYork Press,StateUniversityPlaza,Albany,NY, 12246 ProductionbyE.Moore MarketingbyFranKeneston LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Figuringtheself:subject,absolute,andothersinclassicalGerman philosophyIDavidE. KlemmandGunterZoller,editors. p. em.- (SUNYseriesinphilosophy) ChieflyproceedingsofaconferenceheldApr.9-11, 1992,atthe UniversityofIowa. Includesindex. ISBN0-7914-3199-1 (hc:alk. paper).- ISBN0-7914-3200-9(pbk. :alk. paper) 1.Self(Philosophy) 2. Absolute,The. 3.Philosophy, German-18thcentury. 4.Philosophy,German-19thcentury. 1.Klemm,DavidE., 1947- . II.Zoller,Giinter, 1954- III.Series. B2748.S44F54 1996 193-dc20 96-12018 CIP 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Introduction DavidE. Klemm and GunterZoller The selfis notoriously elusive. It is not something to be encountered likeotherthingsintheworld. Rather,itprovidestheveryperspectiveorstand pointfromwhichanysuchencounterwithotherthingscantakeplace.Accord ingly, our ordinary ways ofthinking about the world and its objects are ill suited to articulating the peculiar status and function of the self. Not surprisingly,then, philosophicalelucidationsoftheselfhavebeenthepointof origin for new ways ofthinking not only aboutthe selfbutalso aboutall the otherthingsfrom whichtheselfistobedifferentiatedandtowhichitisyetinti matelyrelated. This holds equallyforpastattempts, suchasDescartes' intro ductionofthecogitoastheultimatefoundationofcertaintyinknowledge,and contemporaryeffortsinphilosophyofmind, suchasthesemanticsofindexical self-reference. Aparticularlyintriguing wayofthinking abouttheselfcanbefoundin the work ofImmanuel Kant and his successors, the German idealists. In the decadesaround 1800,thesephilosophersdevelopeddetailedandvariedtheories thatplacethe selfatthe very centerofphilosophicalreflection. Theclassical Germanwayofthinkingabouttheselfischaracterizedbyadecidedly idealist bent.Theselfisunderstoodnotonlyasthegroundofallknowledgeconcerning the world, butalsoas the groundofthe veryreality ofthe world. Theidealist extension ofthe self's original, epistemological function to a larger, meta physical role made it imperative to develop a specific terminology that addressed the radical, world-constituting function ofthe self. The absolute ness ofthe selfas the universal condition ofreality was expressed by such constructsas"subject,""subject-object,"and"spirit." Twohundredyearsafteritsinception,theGermanidealistthinkingabout the selfis both a source ofembarrassment and a challenge. The unabashed vii viii Introduction idealiststanceoftheGerman idealistshasfound virtually nofollowers incon temporary philosophy, and even leads to revisionist, nonmetaphysical read ingsoftheclassicalGerman authors themselves. Andyetthesustainedreflec tion on the structure ofthe selfthat is to be found in Kant and his successors remains an important point oforientation and inspiration for historically informedattemptsatatheory ofhumanselfhood. Muchoftherecentattempts toretrieveclassicalGermanthinkingabout theselfforcontemporaryphilosophyofmindhaveoriginatedintheworkofthe German philosopher Dieter Henrich and a number ofhis associates, most prominently among them Manfred Frank. In works like theirs, historical researchintotheexceedinglydifficultcentralargumentsofKantandhisidealist successorsiscarriedoutinaspiritatoncecriticalandappreciative.Moreover, the reconstructionand assessmentofclassical German theories about the self hasbeenincreasinglyinformedbyrelateddiscussionsinanalyticphilosophyof mind, thus contributing to an emerging dialogue between different historical periodsandphilosophicaltraditions. Theessaysinthepresentvolumepartakeinthisongoingprojectofrein troducing classical German thinking about the selfinto contemporary philo sophicaldiscussion. TheyprovidetheEnglish-speakingreaderwithasurveyof the main issues and positions to be found in German thinking about the self around 1800,whilealsointroducingacontemporaryperspectiveonthehistor icalmaterial.Theessayspresent,discuss, andassessaccountsoftheselfinthe main philosophical authors oftheperiod. In addition totheprimaryfigures Kant, Schelling, and Hegel-some ofthe lesser-known participants in the debateontheselfreceivecriticalattention,amongthemthephilosophicalthe ologian Schleiermacher and the poets Holderlin and Novalis. In disciplinary terms,theaccountsoftheselfcoveredspanabroadrangeofareas,frommeta physics and epistemology through ethics, political and social philosophy to aestheticsandphilosophy ofreligion. The volumeas awhole thus provides a detailedandcomprehensiveintroductionto thephilosophyofGermanidealism throughthefocus ofthetheory oftheself. Theessaysareorganizedunderthreeheadings,eachofthemaddressing a'key conceptfor figuring the selfin classical German philosophy. PartOne examines the role ofthe selfas the subject underlying ourexperience ofthe world.ManfredFrankcarefullydistinguishesbetweenthefactthatselveshave consciousness oftheir very being ("subjectivity") and thefact thatselves are unique and not interchangeable ("individuality"). Frank places the Kantian and post-Kantiandiscussion ofthe selfinto the largercontextofmodernand contemporary thinking about mind and consciousness. Richard Aquila pro vides a detailed reading of Kant's account ofthe subject ofmental activity. Aquilastresses the proximity ofKant's doctrine ofinnersenseto anonmeta physicaltheory ofthesoul. KarlAmerikssurveystherecentinterpretationsof Introduction ix Kant's theory ofmind. Ameriks's critical assessment focuses on readings of Kant that draw on the work ofFichte. Gunter Zoller presents Fichte's tran scendentaltheory ofconsciousnessandself-consciousness. Zoller'semphasis is on themethodological requirements for an adequate accountofthe subjec tivityoftheI. PartTwoexaminesthedependenceoftheselfonsomeultimate,absolute ground. Dieter Henrich argues for the role ofmetaphysical thinking in our understanding ofthe selfand its place in the world. He focuses on the close connectionbetweentheself-relationexpressedinthefirst-person singularpro noun, "I," and thepure self-relationoftheabsolutedevelopedbyHegel. Jane Knellerexamines the accounts ofselfhoodthatcan be found in the novels of HolderlinandNovalis. Intheseliteraryconceptionsofselfhood, Knellerdetects acritiqueofFichte'stheoryofself-consciousnessandareturntoKant'sagnos ticism about the ultimate nature and origin ofthe self. Richard Velkley dis cusses the relation between selfand nature in Schelling's theory ofart. His focus isonthephilosophicalpotentialofartandontheroleoftheselfasartis ticgenius.DavidKlemmpresentsSchleiermacher'stheoryofmind,according towhichtheunityofthethinkingselfandthewillingselfliesinimmediateself consciousnessorfeeling. KlemmconcentratesonSchleiennacher'stheological interpretation ofimmediate self-consciousness as both an empirical feeling andatranscendentalcognitionoftheutterdependenceoftheself-positing"I" onanabsolutegroundhecalls"God." PartThreeisconcernedwiththemutualdependence ofselfandothers. WalterJaeschkeclarifiesHegel's complexposition onthe natureand value ofsubjectivity. He argues that Hegel's critique ofthe principle ofsubjec tivity in modern philosophy and romantic thought is entirely compatible with Hegel's own conception ofthe infinite subject as mediated with its ownother. Jeffrey Hoovercomparesthe accounts ofownershipinSchleier macher and Hegel. Hoover shows how social and economic relations with other selves are part of the concrete realization of the self. John Durham Peters examinesHegel's accountofsymbolicinteractionthroughlanguage.. Petersreads Hegel's treatmentofself-consciousnessandspiritasproviding a theory ofcommunication between selves. David Stern traces the Kantian heritage ofthe accounts ofselfhood in Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Stern diagnoses acontinuedpresenceofKant's emphasisonthe active andstruc turing function ofthe self. Earlierversionsoftenofthetwelveessayscollectedherewerepresented ataconferenceontheclassicalGermantheory oftheselfthatwasheldatthe UniversityofIowaunderthetitleFiguringthe SelfonApril9-11, 1992.The conference was sponsored by the Department ofPhilosophy, the School of Religion, and the Project on Rhetoric ofInquiry at the University ofIowa, withadditionalsupportfrom theNationalEndowmentfortheHumanities.The x Introduction conference was in turn the culminating event of a semester-long Scholars Workshop, directed by the editors ofthe presentvolume, and supportedby a grantfrom the NationalEndowmentfor theHumanitiesundertheauspicesof theProjectonRhetoricofInquiryattheUniversityofIowa. ThetwoessaysnotoriginallypresentedattheIowaconference,byMan fredFrankandDieterHenrich, wereincludedinordertoprovidesomeofthe GermancontextfortheworkoftheAmerican-basedscholarsrepresentedinthis volume. Frank's essay was publishedoriginally underthe title "Subjektivitat undIndividualitat: UberblicktibereineProblemlage,"inSelbstbewuf3tseinund Selbsterkenntnis (© 1991 Philipp Reclamjun. GmbH& Co., Stuttgart). Hen rich'sessay, originallyentitled"SelbstbewuBtseinundspekulativesDenken," waswrittenfortheFrenchjournal Critiqueandthus withaFrenchaudiencein mind. It subsequently appeared in Fluchtlinien: Philosophische Essays (© SuhrkampVerlagFrankfurtamMain 1982).Thetwoessaysweretranslatedby GunterZollerandappearherewiththekindcooperationoftheauthorsandthe permissionofthepublishers. ThepiecesbyFrankandHenrichexemplifytwomainpositionsincurrent German thinking about the self. Frank contrasts the semantic and epistemo logical orientation ofthe account ofselfhood in analytic philosophy ofmind withtheconstitutiveroleofunderstandingandinterpretationinself-conscious individualsasemphasizedbythehermeneuticaltradition.Bycontrast,Henrich draws on the tradition ofHegelian metaphysics and portrays the selfas tran scendingthenaturalworldanditsontologyofindividualityaltogether,relating itinsteadtotheabsoluteconceivedasmediatedself-relation.WhileFranksug gestsacomplementaryrelation betweenContinentalandanalyticthinking on themind, Henrichradically challengesthe naturalismunderlying virtuallyall currentaccountsofmindandself. TheeditorswishtothanktheircolleaguesintheDepartmentofPhiloso phy,theSchoolofReligion, andtheProjectonRhetoricofInquiryattheUni versity ofIowaforsupportingtheScholarsWorkshop andtheconferencethat providedthebasisforthiscollectionofessays. Specialthanksgototheexecu tive director ofthe Projecton Rhetoric ofInquiry, Kate Neckerman, and her staff,fortheirvaluablehelpwithallphasesoftheproject,fromthegrantwrit ing through the Workshop and conference organization. Valuable technical support in preparing the translation ofDieter Henrich's essay was provided byMaureneMorgan. FollowingtheleadoftheIowaconference,aninternationalconferenceon the selfin German philosophy was held at the University ofNotre Dame in April 1994.Avolumewithpapersfromthatgathering,editedbyKarlAmeriks --------- Introduction xi and Dieter Sturma, has since appeared under the title The Modern Subject: Conceptions ofthe Selfin Classical German Philosophy (Albany: State Uni versityofNewYorkPress, 1995).Thatvolulllecontainstwofurtherpiecesby ManfredFrankalong withessays by German and American scholar-philoso phersandincludesabibliography. Part One Self and Subject 1 Subjectivity and Individuality: Survey ofa Problem* ManfredFrank "Subjectivity"and"individuality":withthesewords,twostatesofaffairs areevokedwithwhichwebelieveourselvestobefamiliaratalltimes. Afterall, theystandforpreciselythoseobjects,amongalltheobjectsintheworld,which wetaketobeourselves.Weare,first, subjectsingeneral,thatis,beingsthatare notjust what they are but that have as an essential property self-conscious ness ofthis their being. And we are, second, individuals, that is, unique and unmistakablesubjects. Welivein suchanintimateanddoubt-freefamiliarity with ourselves that the mere question regarding our subjectivity might seem aberrant, abusinesstypicalofidlephilosophers.Theremay oeotherquestions that cannot be answered, which may even be without meaning, such as the question of whether we have a soul and, if so, whether it is immortal, or whether there is an external world independent of our consciousness, or whether our moral conscience acts according to evident reasons. All these questions have indeed been posed by the metaphysical tradition. They are of vitalinterest. Thosequestions are genuine, where "genuine"means thattheir answers are not obvious, that they cannot even be given in a final form exceptintheunsatisfactorymannerofdissolvingratherthansolvingtheprob lem atissue, thatis, making itdisappearas aproblem. Thelatteris Wittgen stein'stherapeuticprocedure,whichregardsmetaphysicalthinkingasakindof diseasefrom whichphilosophy wants to heal humanity as thoughfrom some plague. Bycontrast,thequestionconcerningtheessenceofsubjectivityandindi vidualityisobviouslyalreadyansweredthroughtheself-consciousexistenceof the one who posesthe question. In orderfor himorherto be able to askthat question,heorshealreadyhadtobefamiliarwiththestateofaffairsdesignated by those concepts. And no state of affairs in the world could be more inti- 3 4 SelfandSubject matelyfamiliartousthanthisfamiliarityitself: thatstrangelyelusivecognition that turns phenomena into the experience ofphenomena and that as it were turns on a light in the darkness that covers the unconscious. Thus on first glance, our questions concerning the ontological and epistemological status ofsubjectivityandindividualityseemeithersuperfluousorevensuspicious. I Will this impression persist, ifwe take the time for a second glance? Are not those very states of affairs about which we have the feeling ofan unsurpassablecertaintyandfamiliarity inreality amongallthephenomenaof theworldthatarethemostthoroughlyconcealed?Andisitnotratherthecase thatthesubjectivitythatweeachareinanunmistakableway(orpretendtobe) al",/ays remains a sealed book that obstinately resists being opened, exactly becauseofitsenormousfamiliarity? Heideggeroncespokeofthesubjectsthat we are as beings that are neitherclose nor transparentto themselves: we are "creatures ofdistance."1 And in his lectures on the Basic Problems ofPhe... nomenology from the summer semester of 1927 (the year ofpublication of BeingandTime)hesays: Viewedontically, weareclosestofalltothebeingsthatweourselvesare andthatwecallDasein;forwearethisbeingitself.Nevertheless,whatis nearesttousonticallyisexactlyfarthestfrom usontologically. Descartes entitles thesecondofhismeditationsonmetaphysics"Onthe nature of thehumanmind,thatitisbetterknowntous thanthebody."Despiteor precisely because ofthis alleged superiorfamiliarity ofthe subject, its modeofbeing is misunderstoodandleapedovernotonly in Descartes buteverywhereintheperiodfollowing him,sothatnodialecticofmind canoncemorereversetheeffectofthis neglect? Heideggersoughttomakethestructureofthisbeingintelligiblefromits veryproblematiccharacter.Heterms"Dasein"thebeingthathasthedistinction of being problematic to itselfregarding its very own being. In Sartre this becomes the locution that subject is "a being whose characteristic mode of beingconsistsinthe factthatin its very beingitquestionsitsbeing" andthat "consciousness is almost a kind ofontological interrogation."3 Heidegger's own formulation, from which Sartre's takes off, canbe found in section4 of BeingandTime. ThereDaseinispresentedasthatbeingfor which"initsvery Being [...JthatBeingisan issue."4ThusDaseinwouldhavethe structureofa self-relation, it would be autoreflective. Heidegger has expressed the same thoughtbysayingthatDaseinisaccessibletoitself("disclosed,"ashesays)in SubjectivityandIndividuality 5 the light ofa given understanding ofBeing, and this in such a way that the ecstaticopeningtowardsomeotheristhegroundforitsfamiliarity withitself. In the lectures of 1927 mentioned above, the reflection-model that informs Heidegger's elucidation ofthe structure ofsubjectivity appears more clearly yet: Reflection in the sense ofa turning back is only amode ofself-appre hension, butnotthemode ofprimaryself-disclosure. The wayin which the selfis unveiled to itselfin the factical Dasein can nevertheless be fittinglycalledreflection,exceptthatwemustnottakethisexpressionto mean what is commonly meant by it-the ego bent around backward andstaringatitself-butaninterconnectionsuchasismanifestedinthe opticalmeaningoftheterm"reflection."Toreflectmeans,intheoptical context,tobreakatsomething,toradiatebackfromthere,toshowitself inareflectionfrom something.s Thus,theselfthatweare(ortakeourselvestobe)wouldnotbeoriginally disclosedto itself. Its self-consciousness would only come aboutthrough the reflectionoftheworldtowhichitisfirstcompletely"givenaway."Hence,the selfthatweourselvesare(ortakeourselvestobe)wouldnotbeoriginallydis tinguished by self-consciousness. Rather, self-consciousness would be a "derivativemode"ofsomemoreoriginalstructure,thatoftheunderstanding(of Being),andthisinsuchamannerthatitwouldbepartofthestructureofsub jectivitytoposethequestionconcerningBeingandalsotointerpretitselffrom acertainunderstandingofBeing(asresultsfrom answeringthequestioncon cerningBeing).Thus,intelligibilitywouldbesomethingthatprecedeswhatour traditioncalls"self-consciousness,"itsapriori(intheliteralsenseoftheterm).6 Jean-Paul Sartre has objected to this, arguing that ifDasein were ini tially deprived ofthe dimension ofconsciousness, then at some later pointit couldonlyregainconsciousnessatthepriceofcircularity.Indeed, whatwould an understanding be that does not include a consciousness ofbeing such an understanding? ButthisattempttoshowfirsttheescapeofselffromtheDaseinisgoing toencounterinturninsurmountabledifficulties; wecannotfirstsuppress thedimension"consciousness,"notevenifitisinordertoreinstallitsub sequently. Understanding has meaning only ifit is consciousness of understanding.7 Thisisnottodenythatbeingaselfincludesaself-relationofunderstanding(or arelationtoBeing, whateverthatmaymean). Sartreonlydeniesthatthisrela tionprecedesthesubject'sbeingfamiliarwithitself,andfurtherdeniesthatthis
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