Fighting Talk PraegerSecurityInternationalAdvisoryBoard BoardCochairs LochK.Johnson,RegentsProfessorofPublicandInternationalAffairs,SchoolofPublic andInternationalAffairs,UniversityofGeorgia(U.S.A.) PaulWilkinson,ProfessorofInternationalRelationsandChairmanoftheAdvisoryBoard, CentrefortheStudyofTerrorismandPoliticalViolence,UniversityofSt.Andrews(U.K.) Members EliotA.Cohen,RobertE.OsgoodProfessorofStrategicStudiesandDirector,Philip MerrillCenterforStrategicStudies,PaulH.NitzeSchoolofAdvancedInternational Studies,TheJohnsHopkinsUniversity(U.S.A.) AnthonyH.Cordesman,ArleighA.BurkeChairinStrategy,CenterforStrategicand InternationalStudies(U.S.A.) The´re`seDelpech,DirectorofStrategicAffairs,AtomicEnergyCommission,andSenior ResearchFellow,CERI(FondationNationaledesSciencesPolitiques),Paris(France) SirMichaelHoward,formerChicheleProfessoroftheHistoryofWarandRegisProfessor ofModernHistory,OxfordUniversity,andRobertA.LovettProfessorofMilitaryand NavalHistory,YaleUniversity(U.K.) LieutenantGeneralClaudiaJ.Kennedy,USA(Ret.),formerDeputyChiefofStafffor Intelligence,DepartmentoftheArmy(U.S.A.) PaulM.Kennedy,J.RichardsonDilworthProfessorofHistoryandDirector,International SecurityStudies,YaleUniversity(U.S.A.) RobertJ.O’Neill,formerChicheleProfessoroftheHistoryofWar,AllSoulsCollege, OxfordUniversity(Australia) ShibleyTelhami,AnwarSadatChairforPeaceandDevelopment,Departmentof GovernmentandPolitics,UniversityofMaryland(U.S.A.) JusufWanandi,co-founderandmember,BoardofTrustees,CentreforStrategicand InternationalStudies(Indonesia) FareedZakaria,Editor,NewsweekInternational(U.S.A.) Fighting Talk FORTY MAXIMS ON WAR, PEACE, AND STRATEGY Colin S. Gray PRAEGERSECURITYINTERNATIONAL (cid:1) Westport,Connecticut London LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Gray,ColinS. Fightingtalk:fortymaximsonwar,peace,andstrategy/ColinS.Gray. p. cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN978–0–275–99131–9(alk.paper) 1.Militaryartandscience—Quotations,maxims,etc. 2.War—Quotations, maxims,etc. 3.Strategy—Quotations,maxims,etc. I.Title. U19.G738 2007 355.02—dc22 2007003039 BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataisavailable. Copyright(cid:1)C 2007byColinS.Gray Allrightsreserved.Noportionofthisbookmaybe reproduced,byanyprocessortechnique,withoutthe expresswrittenconsentofthepublisher. LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:2007003039 ISBN-13:978–0–275–99131–9 ISBN-10:0–275–99131–8 Firstpublishedin2007 PraegerSecurityInternational,88PostRoadWest,Westport,CT06881 AnimprintofGreenwoodPublishingGroup,Inc. www.praeger.com PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Thepaperusedinthisbookcomplieswiththe PermanentPaperStandardissuedbytheNational InformationStandardsOrganization(Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Thisbookisdedicatedtomyresearchstudents,pastandpresent. TheyhavetaughtmemorethanIhavetaughtthem. ContentiousThoughtsonWarandPeace Waristhefatherofallthings. HeraclitusofEphesus,540–480BC In Italy for thirty years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed—but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance.InSwitzerlandtheyhadbrotherlylove,500yearsofdemocracy andpeace,andwhatdidtheyproduce?Thecuckooclock. HarryLime,inthemovieTheThirdMan,1949 I hold it as a principle that the duration of peace is in direct proportion to theslaughteryouinflictupontheenemy.Theharderyouhitthem,thelonger theyremainquiet. GeneralMikhailSkobelev,1881 Contents Preface xi Introduction:GettingtheBigThingsRightEnough xiii PartI: WarandPeace 1 TheContextsofWarAreAllImportant 3 2 WarIsAboutPeace,andPeaceCanBeAboutWar 7 3 ItIsMoreDifficulttoMakePeacethanItIstoMakeWar 11 4 WarWorks!—ButAlwaysHasUnintendedandUnanticipated Consequences 16 5 PeaceandOrderAreNotSelf-Enforcing,TheyHavetoBe OrganizedandKeptbySomebody 20 6 NotOnlyPolities,butSocietiesandTheirCulturesMakeWarand Peace 24 7 ReasonReignsOverWar,butPassionandChanceThreatentoRule 28 8 ThereIsMoretoWarthanWarfare 32 9 PolicyIsKing,butOftenIsIgnorantoftheNatureandCharacter ofWar 36 10 WarIsAlwaysaGamble 40 PartII: Strategy 11 KnowledgeofStrategyIsVital:TheFlameofStrategic UnderstandingHastoBeKeptLit 47 viii Contents 12 StrategyIsMoreDifficultthanPolicyorTactics 50 13 BadStrategyKills,butSoAlsoDoBadPolicyandTactics 54 14 IfThucydides,Sun-tzu,andClausewitzDidNotSayIt,ItProbably IsNotWorthSaying 58 15 TheStrategic“ConceptduJour”WillBeTomorrow’sStale Left-Over,UntilItIsRediscovered,Recycled,andRevealedasa NewTruth 62 16 TheEnemyTooHasaVote 66 17 TimeIstheLeastForgivingDimensionofStrategy 70 18 FrictionIsUnavoidable,butNeedNotBeFatal 74 19 AllStrategyIsGeostrategy:GeographyIsFundamental 78 20 StrategyIsNotWhollyMilitary 82 21 TheImpossibleIsImpossible;ItIsaCondition,NotaProblemfor WhichaSolutionHasYettoBeFound 86 PartIII: MilitaryPowerandWarfare 22 PeopleMatterMost 93 23 MilitaryPowerIsTrumpsinPolitics 97 24 MilitaryExcellenceCanOnlyBeVerifiedbyPerformanceinWar 101 25 MilitaryExcellenceCannotGuaranteeStrategicSuccess 105 26 VictoryinBattleDoesNotEnsureStrategicorPoliticalSuccess, butDefeatAllbutGuaranteesFailure 109 27 ThereIsMoretoWarthanFirepower:TheEnemyIsNotJusta TargetSet 112 28 LogisticsIstheArbiterofStrategicOpportunity 115 PartIV: SecurityandInsecurity 29 BadTimesReturn 121 30 ThereAreAlwaysThugs,Villains,Rogues,andFoolsOutThere, asWellSomeinHere,WhoMeanUsHarm 124 31 SuperthreatsDoAppear 127 32 PrudenceIstheSupremeVirtueinStatecraftandStrategy 131 33 StrategicHistoryPunishesGoodIntentions 134
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