Fighter Command 1936 - 1968: An Operational and Historical Record

193 Pages·2007·80.78 MB·English

by  Ken Delve

Fighter Command
1936-1968
Fighter Command
1936-1968
AN OPERATIONAL AND HISTORICAL RECORD
KEN DELVE
x
Pen & Sword
AVIATION
First published in Great Britain in 2007 by Contents
PEN & SWORD AVIATION
an imprint of
Pen & Sword Books Ltd
47Church Street
Barnsley
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CHAPTERO NE Development, Roles and History .
Copyright © Ken Delve, 2007
CHAPTER Two Operations 98
ISBN I 844156139
CHAPTER THREE Operational Groups 183
The right ofKen Delve to beidentifiedas Author of this Work CHAPTER FOUR Aircrew Training . . 214
has been asserted by him in accordance with the
Copyright, Designs and PatentsAct 1988. CHAPTER FIVE Operational Aircraft 245
A CIPcatalogue record for this book is ANNEXES
available from the British Library. A: AOC-in-C Fighter Command . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
B: Battle ofBritain Squadrons . . 313
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted
C: Battle of Britain: Galland's View . 316
in any form or byany means,electronic or mechanical including photocopying,
recording or byany information storage and retrieval system, without permission D: Order of BattleJuly 1936 . 322
from the Publisher in writing. E: Order of Battle September 1939 . 323
F: Order of Battle August 1940 . . . 325
Typeset by Concept, Huddersfield,West Yorkshire
Printed and bound in Great Britain by G: Order ofBattle February 1941 . 327
CPI UK H: Order ofBattle April 1942 . 329
I: Order of Battle April 1943 . 332
J: Order ofBattleJuly 1944 . . 335
Pen & SwordBooks Ltd incorporates the Imprints of K: Order ofBattleJuly 1945 . . 337
Pen & Sword Aviation, Pen & Sword Maritime, Pen & Sword Military, L: Order of Battle April 1953 . 339
Wharncliffe Local History, Pen & Sword Select, M: Order ofBattleJanuary 1961 . . 341
Pen & Sword MilitaryClassicsand Leo Cooper.
N: Order ofBattleJanuary 1968 . 343
0: Claims World War Two . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
P: Definitionsof Operation Types . . 348
For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles pleasecontact
Q: Fighter Command Battle Honours . . 351
PEN &SWORD BOOKS LIMITED
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358
Website:www.pen-and-sword.co.uk INDEX
Fighter Command Badge
P ER ONE
Development, Roles and
History
orafewshortmonthsinlate 1940,FighterCommandoftheRoyalAir Force was
pitted against the might of the German Luftwaffe in a struggle that would help
~ ~, determinethecourseofthe Second World War. The Battle ofBritain willalways
remain the Command's 'Finest Hour' but itcomprisedonlya fewmonthsofa war that
~
lasted nearly six years- and Fighter Command was involved in active operations for
I I~ much of that time.
As with all history the benefits of hindsight and access to previously classified
~ ~
documentarysourceshasto bebalancedbythe researcher'sremoval intimeandcontext
from the period under study. To truly understand decisions, policies, actions and
attitudesisallbut impossible.This book covers theentire period of Fighter Command
from itsoriginin 1936to itsdemise- into StrikeCommand- in 1968.Whilst allperiods
of the Command are covered it is inevitable that the major focus is on the period of
'In front of a Portcullis a sword erect' (elements of the Badge were subsequently WorldWarTwo.Thebook hasbeendividedintofivemainsections:anIntroduction and
used by Strike Command). The sword is indicative of the Command's offensive Overview, which sets the framework for the development of Fighter Command and
includes both policyand politics;an Operationschapter, which focuses on the combat
operations and the Portcullis symbolisesitsdefensiverole;thisduality italso shown
operationsofthe Command;abrieflookateachofthe operationalGroups;anoverview
in the motto of 'Offence Defence'. The Badge was approved by in March 1945.
ofaircrew training:and, finally, an Aircraft chapter, looking in chronologicalsequence
at all operational aircraft types. The annexes provide a variety of historical data.
The chapters frequentlyquote extractsfrom the Operational Record Books(ORB)
of varioussquadrons; these have been selected as typical of the typeof missions being
flown.Itwouldbeimpossibleinabook ofthissorttoresearcheverysquadronrecordfor
Fighter Command and there aresimilar accounts, and perhaps better ones,in manyof
theother ORBs- ifa reader believes'his' squadron has been ignored Ican assure him
that that was not the intent!
Origins and doctrine
Fighter Command was formed on 14July 1936,under thecommand ofAir Marshal Sir
Hugh Dowding, as part of a generalreorganisation of the RAF,and headquartered at
Bentley Priory, Middlesex. This reorganisation saw the Metropolitan Air Force split
into three operational Commands (Fighter, Bomber and Training). At the time of its
formation Fighter Command's equipment comprised a variety of biplane fighters, the
most modern ofwhich was the Gloster Gladiator. As the first RAF fighter with eight
machine-guns and an enclosed cockpit, the Gladiator represented a major advance on
previoustypesanddespiteitsobviouslimitationswasabletodistinguish itselfduringthe
Battle of Britain.
Since the early 1930s two key issues had plagued RAF planners- the percentage
of bomber to fighters in the overall strength of the RAF and the types of weapons
they should carry. There had been a glimmer of hope in the early I920s, a period of
doldrums for the RAF when its very existence as an independent service was under
2 FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968 DEVELOPME T, ROLES AND HISTORY 3
TheSiskin lI'asoneofthe inter-waragile billpoorly-armedfightersequipping the RAFs
fighterforce.
Fighter doctrineand tactics IIwedevelopedin the latterpart ofWorld War One. withaircraft
such as the Sopwith Camel. 1925theGovernment'sinterpretationof'assoon aspossible' changed to 'by 1935-1936.
Air Marshal SirJohn Salmond had taken over asAir-Officer-CommandingAir Defence
questionand itsmain 'strength'wasinremote partsofthe Empire suchasMesopotamia. ofGreat Britain inJanuary that year and hehad firmviewson air defence, which in his
In April 1923 the Steel-Bartholomew Committee on the Air Defence of Great Britain view- and hisexperience from World War One- included searchlightsand anti-aircraft
led to Government approval in June of a plan for a Home Defence air strength of guns. In thisstudy ofFighter Command onlyoccasional reference ismade to the other
52 squadrons, to include 17 fighter squadrons 'with as little delay as possible'. As a elements that made up the UK's air defence network. primarily because they were
percentage ofthe total strength the fighter element was poor - but this was the period independentCommands.It isworth noting thatthe'activedefence' planned for the UK.
whenairstrategistswereconvincedthat bomberswerethewaytowinwars.InDecember and to bein place by 1939.comprised2.232 heavyanti-aircraftguns,4,700searchlights
Map ofthe /923 Air Defence Plan.
When the Gladiatorenteredserviceit lI'asamajor improvement on thepreviousbiplanesbut
lI'asstillforfrom beingamodernfighter,although it remained infro nt-line service with the
RAFin theearlypart ofthe lI'ar.
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4 FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1 968 DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY 5
and 50squadrons offighter aircraft. However, on the outbreak of war there wereonly Specification FlO/35. Requirements for Single-EngineSingle-Seater Day and Night
695 heavy and 253light anti-aircraft guns and 2,700searchlights. Fighter
In December 1929andagain in May 1933the Government slipped the programme
back, the latter revision taking it to 1939-1940. This reluctance did not change until General.The Air Staff require a single-enginesingle-seater dayand night fighter which
1934,a yearafter Hitler hadcometo power inGermanyand therewasa realisation that can fulfil the followingconditions:
peaceinEuropewasbynomeansacertainty.Thenextfewyearssawachangeofattitude
a. Havea speed in excessofthe contemporary bomber of at least 40mph at
and a series of Expansion Plans, albeit stilldominated by strategic bombing.
15,000ft.
The 'bomber first' mentality that had dominated the Expansion Plansof the early
b. Have a number of forward firing machine guns that can produce the
1930sdid not changeuntilSchemeM,whichwasapproved in November 1938(after the
maximum hittingpower possibleintheshortspaceoftimeavailablefor one
Munich Crisis), with an effective date for completion of March 1942. This scheme
attack.
envisaged 163squadronsto bebasedintheUK,ofwhich64wereto befightersquadrons
(14ofthese being AuxiliaryAir Force), each with an establishment of 16 aircraft. The Performance.
table below presents thedetails for the Plans put forward between 1934and 1938. a. Speed. The maximum possible and not less than 310mph at 15,000ft at
maximum power with the highest possible between 5,000 and 15,000ft.
b. Climb. The best possible to 20,000ft but secondary to speed and hitting
RAF ExpansionSchemes, t934-1938
power.
Fighter UEfighter c. Serviceceiling. ot less than 30,000ft isdesirable.
Scheme Approved Effective Squadrons squadrons squadron d. Endurance. Y.hour at maximum power at sea level, plus one hour at
maximum powerat whichenginecan be runcontinuouslyat 15,000ft.This
A 18Jul 1934 31Mar 1939 84 28+5 12
should provide \I, hour at maximum power at which engine can be run
C 21May 1935 31Mar 1937 123 35+5 12
F 25Feb 1936 31Mar 1939 124 30+5 14 continuously(for climb, etc), plus one hour at the most economicalspeed
H 14Jan 1937 31Mar 1939 145 34+9 14 at 15,000ft (for patrol), plus Y.hour at maximum power at 15,000ft
J 22Dec 1937 Summer 1941 154 38+9 14
(for attack).
K 14Mar 1938 31Mar 1941 145 38+9 14
L 27Apr 1938 31Mar 1940 141 38+9 16
M 7Nov 1938 31Mar 1942 163 50+14 16 Armament. Not less than 6 guns, but 8 guns are desirable. These should be located
outsidetheairscrewdisc.Reloadingintheairisnot requiredandthegunsshouldbefired
Note: Approved - Date the scheme was approved by the Cabinet; Effective - Date at which the byelectrical or means other than Bowden wire. It is contemplated that some or all of
scheme should be complete;Squadrons- Total home-based squadrons; Fighter squadrons - Regular
these guns should be mounted to permit a degree of elevation and traverse with some
squadrons+auxiliarysquadrons:UEfightersquadron- Aircraftestablishment.
form ofcontrol from the pilot's seat.
Thiswasofcourseonlya paperairforce;thedesiretohave64squadrons,eachwith Ammunition. 300rounds per gun if8gunsare provided and 400 roundsper gun ifonly
16aircraft- and withtherequisite pilots,ground staff, equipment and airfields- had to 6 guns are installed.
be transferred into reality.That meant takingshortcutswith theaircraft types, 'form a
squadron with whatever was10 hand and re-equip it later' and pressure to find pilots, View.
and train them in the minimum period of time. Both oftheseaspects would cause the a. The upper hemisphere must besofar aspossibleunobstructed totheviewof
Command problems. the pilot to facilitatesearchandattack.Agood viewfor formation flyingis
required.
b. A fieldofviewof about 10degreesdownwardsfrom the horizontal lineof
Roleof the Fighter
sight over the nose is required for locating the target.
The concept of the fighter aircraft had been born in World War One, when
manoeuvrability was one of the key performance criteria; for the Royal Flying Corps!
Handling.
RoyalAir Force,theexperience withmonoplaneshad beenanunhappyoneand thewar
a. A high degree ofmanoeuvrability at high speeds is not required but good
ended with small,single-seat highly-agile biplanes,armed with two 0.303inguns,as the
control at lowspeeds isessential.
standarddayfighter.Thesituationdidnot change overthenext 20yearsand theRAF's
b. The aircraft must be a steady firing platform.
fighter squadrons continued to fly a range of delightful little fighters that by the late
1920shadallbutlosttouchwiththerealitiesofafutureairwar- buttheRAF'sdoctrine, It is interesting to look at how the fighter requirement had changed during the
tactics and training had also not changed. It was not until the early 1930s that a more 1930sas thisexplainsthedevelopmentofboth the aircraft's capabilitiesand the tactical
realisticspecification fora futurefighterwas issued. However, Specification FIO/35still doctrine.Duringthe 1930sthe basicconceptswerestillthosethat had beendeveloped in
encapsulatedthe1930'sfighterdoctrine;thefollowingextractsillustratethemajorpoints. the latter years of World War One;with no significant combat experience in the 1920s
6 FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968 DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY 7
andintheabsenceofconflict (and funding)noappreciabledevelopmentoftechnologyor
tactics thiswasnot reallysurprising.The main fighter specification thateventually ledto
the new generation of fighters was F7/30 for a 'Single-Seater Day and Night Fighter.'
This Specification was dated October 1931 and the General Requirements paragraph
included statements suchas'a satisfactoryfighting viewisessentialanddesignersshould
consider the advantages offered in this respect by the low-wing monoplane or pusher.
The main requirements for the aircraft are:
a. Highest possible rate ofclimb.
b. Highest possible speed at 15,000ft.
c. Fighting view.
d. Capability ofeasy and rapid production in quantity.
e. Ease ofmaintenance.
This wasa lengthydocument and amongst the keyprovisionswas that the 'aircraft HurricaneprototypeK5083flew illNovember 1935- themodernagehadarrivedand600 had
must havea highdegree ofmanoeuvrability.' Bythe timeofFI0/35thisrequirementhad alreadybeenordered'off thedrawingboard'.
been toned down as being 'not required'. The aircraft was to have provision for four
0.303inVickersguns and a totalof2,000roundsofammunition,with a minimumsupply specification is issued to govern the production of a day fighter in which speed in
of400 rounds per gun, as wellasbeingable to carryfour 20lb bombs.It stated that two overtakingtheenemy at 15,000ft,combinedwith rapidclimb to thisheight,isofprimary
ofthe guns wereto bein thecockpit,with interruptergearifrequired,and the othertwo importance. In conjunction with this performance the maximum hitting power must
incockpitor wing.Therewas no requirementforan enclosed cockpitand thepilot'sview be aimed at, and 8 machine guns are considered advisable.' No mention here of
was a prime concern: 'the pilot's view is to conform as closely as possible to that manoeuvrability;what is needed is to catch the enemy (bomber) and hit him hard in a
obtainablein'pusher'aircraft.' Virtuallyallofthese requirementscould besaid to apply singleattack.Allofthiswasencapsulated in FI0/35but with the added provisionsunder
to an aircraft that suited the latter part ofWorld War One, such as the Sopwith Camel 'Handling' that emphasised the requirement forthe fighter to be 'a steadygun platform'
or Bristol Fighter but with (slightly) improved inwhicha 'highdegree ofmanoeuvrabilityathighspeedsisnot required.' Ofcourse,the
performance. If the manufacturers had followed British were not alone in this fighter theory and in Germany the Bf 110came from a
these requirements to the letterthen the Spitfire and similarbomber-destroyer requirement. Thelatterproved a disasterindayfighting andif
Hurricane might never have been born. theRAF'snewdayfighter had been ofasimilarilkthen the Battle ofBritain would have
In terms of overall air doctrine the emphasis beenshort-lived - and lost. Ratherthan entering the annals as oneofthegreat fighters,
was on the bomber - the 'war-winning' weapon a Spitfire to this requirement would have followed the Defiant into the records as a
that will always get through no matter what the glorious failure (as a day fighter).
defenders try and do, but it was not until the mid From its first flight on 6 November 1935 the Hawker Hurricane showed every
1930s that a fighter specification addressed the indication of being a winner; true it did not have the agility, and some would argue
problem of shooting down these 'war winners'. beauty,ofthe olderbiplanesbut itlooked thepart ofa modernfighter - and it had eight
Whilst the basic provisions of F7/30 could be said guns. An order for 600 was promptly placed and two years later the first Hurricanes
to describe an agile, manoeuvrable fighter, those of entered squadron service, going to III Squadron at ortholt to replace Gauntlets; by
F5/34(dated 16 November 1934)tipped the balance summer 1939 the number ofsquadrons had increased to 12and the Hurricane was the
to what is best described as a bomber destroyer. most significant fighter in the Order of Battle. By that time it had been joined by the
The introduction to this specification stated that: SupermarineSpitfire,which had first flownfivemonthsafterthe Hurricanebut had been
'the speed excess of a modern fighter over that of slightlyslowerinproduction development,the firstmachinesnotjoining 19Squadron at
a contemporary bomber has so reduced the chance Duxford until August 1938.The Spitfire toowasanimmediate hit with those whosawit
of repeated attacks by the same fighters(s) that it andcertainlywith thosewhoflewit;true,bothtypeshad teethingtroublesandbothwere
becomes essential to obtain decisive results in the lackingwhatwouldsoonbeconsidered asessentialoperationalequipment, but theywere
shortspaceoftime offered for one attack only.This nevertheless an indication ofmassive progress.
Two otheraircraft typesentered servicewith the Command in responseto doctrine
that called for a 'turretfighter',asabomber-destroyer,and long-rangefighter. Itmustbe
Notonly theaircraft but also thetactics remained
remembered too that at this time the threat was perceived as bombers from Germany
out-of-dateill/a the 1930s; Hawker Demonsof
23 Squadron; theSquadrondid1I0t re-equipfrom bombersthat would have to flysucha distance that single-seat fighter escort wasnot an
Demons until December 1938. option.The Boulton Paul Defiantwasthe turretfighter with itsfour Browningsina rear;
8 FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968 DEVELOPMENT. ROLES AND HISTORY 9
bomber. would flystraightand levelwhilethe fightersqueued up to attack it!The three
main attacks. as directed in 1938. were:
No. 1 Attack was a succession of single aircraft attacking a single bomber
fromastern.withSectionsstepped downinlineastern behind thetarget.
The Section Leaderopensfireat400yardsand maintainshisfireonthe
target at this range until he decides to break away. with the procedure
then followed by his umber 2and umber 3.
o. 2 Attack was pretty much the same except that the Sections were not
stepped down but fanned out to rear and flanks of the bomber.
o. 3 Attack was an attack by a vic Section of 3 against a vic of three
bombers.with thenormal plan beingfor twoSections abreast toengage
two groups ofbombers. one Section breaking left aftercompleting the
attack and the other breaking right.
There werenumerousothersetattacks forsingle-engineand turretfightersbut these
threeencapsulate a number of the major problemsthe fighters wereto encounter when
TheSpitfireprototypeflew inearly 1936but didnot entersquadronserviceuntil August 1938
the shooting war started. Firstly. the determination that 400 yards was the optimum
- only ayearbefore the war.
range to open fire and that the fighter should maintain this range until out of
the prototype flew in August 1937 and the type entered servicewith 264 Squadron in ammunition(or shotdown).Whilst there wassomevariationonthisdirective.theystill
December 1939. by which time the concept was already being questioned. The Bristol involved an error of appreciation ofthe real optimum harmonisation and engagement
Blenheim was thelong-rangefighter and startled the RAF when it flewin 1936. as this range.Secondly.therigid natureofthetacticswastotallyunsuited to thefluidnatureof
private venture for a bomber had far better performance than any of the fighters in 'modern' air combat. These lessons were soon to be learnt.
service. Fighter Command wasduly impressed and an order for 150 Blenheim fighters Waralmostcameinautumn 1938withtheso-called MunichCrisis;ifithaddone so
wasplaced.themainrolebeinglong-range bomber-destroyer. for whicha forward-firing then itwould havefound Fighter Command ina parlousstate intermsofaircraft andits
four-gun armament pack was added. Hawkinge-based 25 Squadron was first to equip Controland Reporting(C&R) organisation.The Command needed the extra year that
with the Blenheim IF day fighter. December 1938. camefollowing PrimeMinister evilleChamberlain's meeting withAdolfHitlerand the
Despitethearrival ofnewaircraft.thebasictacticsremained unchangedandin 1938
doctrine wasstillbasedon a limited numberofwell-rehearsed - but unproven- Fighter Catterick March1940. Blenheim219 Squadron;althoughthe Blenheimssawsomeserviceas
CommandAttacks.whichseemedto bebasedon the premisethatthetarget.alumbering dayfightersit wasinthenight rolethat they becameanimportant element ofFighter
Command.
Blenheim of 600 Squadronat Manstonmid1940;the Blenheim enteredservicewith Fighter
Commandasalong-rangefighter- in whichroleit wouldharebeenadisaster.
10 FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968 DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY II
now infamous 'peace in our time' agreement. During that year more modern fighters At the first meeting of the Committee for Scientific Survey of Air Defence, in
enteredserviceand theirpilotsgainedexperience,theC&Rorganisationgrewinsizeand January 1935, the problems highlighted bythe previous year's exercisewerediscussed,
experience and the airfield building programme started in earnest. aswerethe prospectsofanyscientificbreak-through that might providean answer.The
Committeemembersconsulted Robert Watson-Watt, head oftheradio research branch
ofthe ationalPhysical Laboratory,as to thefeasibilityofusingradio waves.Amonth
Control and Reporting- and integrated defence
later he presented his thoughts on how to use such radio waves to detect aircraft, the
There is one line in the 1965 'Battle of Britain' film where Dowding is asked if he is
principle being to 'bounce' the waves off the aircraft and pick up the echo. Within a
'trustingin radarand prayingto God',to whichhe replied that hewas 'trustingin God
matter of weeks an experiment had been arranged using the BBC's transmitter at
and praying for radar'. It is a well-established part of the Battle of Britain story that
Daventry.Theidea wasfor anaircraft toflythroughthecentre ofthetransmittingbeam
radar was thesecret weapon that saved theday. How true isthis?
while Watson-Watt and his colleagues attempted to detect its presence on a cathode
Theearly 1930'sBritishAir DefencePlan wasbaseduponthatemployedduringthe
ray oscillograph. It worked as planned, the passage of the aircraft causing a blip
First World War andcomprised anAircraft FightingZone 15mileswideand 150miles
on the equipment. Allthat was needed now was high-level support for development of
long, from Duxford and around London to Devizesin Wiltshire.Thiswasdivided into
the technique, and that came from Air Marshal Hugh Dowding, the Air Member for
ten sections, each 15 mileswide and with one
Research and Development.
or more dedicateddayfighter squadrons,with
The radio research station at Orfordness became the experimental site for the
associated searchlights and anti-aircraft guns.
development of RDF (the name was notchanged to radar until 1941), and throughout
There was an additional ring of searchlights
the summer a number of trials were conducted. Tracking ranges of 40 miles were
and guns around London.The Aircraft Zone
soon beingachieved, and it was obvious that here was the solution to the problem; all
was positioned 35 miles from the coast, a
that was needed wastime to develop and introducetheequipment, and integrateitinto
distancebased upon thetimeitwould takethe
the Fighter Command system. In September 1935 the Air Defence Sub-Committee
fighter to climb to 14,000ft. Initial detection
acquired Treasury funding for a chain of RDF stations along the east coast; a
of raiders depended upon visual sighting by
remarkable achievement so early in the development of the technique. The next three
the Observer Corps, plusa limited number of years saw a number of technical developments of the equipment, many individuals
'acoustic mirror devices'. Each HQ received makinginvaluablecontributionsto thework,sothat bymid-1938thecompletedstations
information from the observation units and were functioning reasonablywell
displayed raidsona plottingtable,thusallow Since the initial proving of the RDF principle in 1936, progress had been fairly
ing the overall picture of the air situation to rapid, although many problems still remained. By mid-1937 three stations were in
be seen by the controller. However, it was operation, at Bawdsey, Canewdon and Dover,along with an experimentalfilter station
not until new radios, such as the TR.9, were at Bawdsey.Thedevelopment ofthelast oftheseadded a newdimension to thesystem
introducedin 1932that reasonableground-to byproviding,astheterm implied,afilteringofthemassofinformation from thevarious
air radiocommunication, as opposed to wrr, sources so that the controllers could be provided with a simpler, more accurate air
waspossible;eventhentheeffectiverangewas picture on which to base their operations.The earlier problem oftrack discrimination
I
only 35miles. had virtually been solved, but height prediction remained a significant problem. The
Theweak link remained that ofdetection system's first major test came in the 1938 Home Defence exercises, and in general
- it was a big sky so how did you find the terms it appeared to work well, some 75% of attempted interceptions (day and night)
enemy? If the enemy could not be accurately provingsuccessful.NewRDFstations(codenamedChainHome- CH,andChainHome
located, it was almost impossible to effect an Low - CHL) were constructed in a plan to create unbroken coverage around the east
interception. This was borne out in the July and southern coasts of Britain. At the same time an extensive programme for the
1934 annual air exercise, when at least half construction of Command, Group and Sector operations rooms was under way.
of the day bomber formations reached their The enemy could now be located by day or night; radar made no real distinction
targetswithout beinginterceptedbyfighters.If between the two. Defending fighters could be positioned so that by day they could
thefighters could not find bomber formations acquire the bombers visually, but what about the night situation? Would the fighter be
in good weather by day, what chance would able to pick up its targets? Among his early proposals, Watson-Watt had included
they have at night? ot that this was ofany thoughts on an airborne version of RDF to prevent reliance on searchlights or good
concern at the time. visibility. However, because priority was given to the ground stations, little work was
carried out on developingequipment smallenough to becarried byaircraft. June 1937
The radarstationsaroundThecoast werea vita! saw an experiment whereby the 'fighter' had a receiver that could pick up the trans
elementin Fighter Command's COII/ro!and missions (and echoes) ofthe CH stations. The principle appeared to work, but it was
Reportingnetwork. not a satisfactory solution and was abandoned. Not until late that year was Airborne