Fernando Martins Secco Luce Do Neighbors Vote Alike? Evidence from the Brazilian Congress

49 Pages·2017·0.64 MB·English

Fernando Martins Secco Luce
Do Neighbors Vote Alike? Evidence from the
Brazilian Congress
Dissertação de Mestrado
Dissertation presented to the Programa de Pós–graduação em
Economia of PUC-Rio in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Mestre em Economia .
Advisor: Prof. Claudio Abramovay Ferraz do Amaral
Rio de Janeiro
April 2018
Fernando Martins Secco Luce
Do Neighbors Vote Alike? Evidence from the
Brazilian Congress
Dissertation presented to the Programa de Pós–graduação em
EconomiaofPUC-Rioinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsfor
thedegreeofMestreemEconomia.Approvedbytheundersigned
Examination Committee.
Prof. Claudio Abramovay Ferraz do Amaral
Advisor
Departamento de Economia – PUC-Rio
Prof. Fabio Adriano Miessi Sanches
Departamento de Economia – PUC-Rio
Prof. Carlos Eduardo Ferreira Pereira Filho
Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas –
FGV/EBAPE
Prof. Augusto Cesar Pinheiro da Silva
Vice Dean of Graduate Studies
Centro de Ciências Sociais – PUC-Rio
Rio de Janeiro, April 4th, 2018
All rights reserved.
Fernando Martins Secco Luce
B.A., Economics, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de
Janeiro (PUC-Rio), 2014
Bibliographic data
Luce, Fernando Martins Secco
Do Neighbors Vote Alike? Evidence from the Brazilian
Congress / Fernando Martins Secco Luce; advisor: Claudio
Abramovay Ferraz do Amaral. – Rio de janeiro: PUC-Rio ,
Departamento de Economia , 2018.
v., 49 f: il. color. ; 30 cm
Dissertação (mestrado) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica
do Rio de Janeiro , Departamento de Economia .
Inclui bibliografia
1. Economia – Teses. 2. Efeito dos pares;. 3. Sorteio de
gabinetes;. 4. Votos de políticos;. 5. Congresso Brasileiro..
I. Ferraz, Claudio. II. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio
de Janeiro . Departamento de Economia . III. Título.
CDD: 620.11
Acknowledgments
Iwouldliketothankmyparentsandmysister,Fernanda,ClaudioandFabiola,
for all their love and help throughout all my life and for showing me that I was
able to accomplish all my dreams if I never gave up.
To my advisor Claudio Ferraz, thank you for your guidance and contri-
butions for the past two years.
I also want to thank my colleagues for making my days better than I
could have imagined for the past two and a half years. A special thank you to
Roberto Hsu, Rodolfo Rigato and Vitor Martello for being almost co-advisers
in this project.
To my oldest friends, Rodrigo Abrahão, Breno Gouvea, Lucas Ronchini
thank you for everything and for being by my side at every step of the way,
alongside with our bell.
Finally, I want to thank my wife, Anna Frangipani, for her unconditional
support, love and help. I was only able to overcome all the difficulties of this
project because you were by my side giving me the strength to go on.
Abstract
Luce, Fernando Martins Secco; Ferraz, Claudio (Advisor). Do
Neighbors Vote Alike? Evidence from the Brazilian Con-
gress. Rio de Janeiro, 2018. 49p. Dissertação de mestrado – De-
partamento de Economia , Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio
de Janeiro .
This work analyses the presence of peer effects in the Brazilian
Congress among federal deputy. I test if a deputy is influenced by its next-
door neighbor when casting a vote for a proposition. Since politicians can
select colleagues with similar political position to be their neighbors, I use
an office lottery that randomly allocates offices for newcomers and test if
office proximity increases the likelihood of agreement. I use data for all 1026
Brazilianfederaldeputiesfrom54thand55thlegislatureelectedin2010and
2014 and observe their votes in all propositions held between February 2011
and May 2017. I find that being next-door office neighbors does not increase
the probability of agreement. Similar findings are obtained when restricting
the sample for different types of proposition, for deputies from the same
party, as well as for congressmen from the same state.
Keywords
Peer effects; Office Lottery; Politicians’ votes; Brazilian Congress.
Resumo
Luce, Fernando Martins Secco; Ferraz, Claudio. Do Neighbors
Vote Alike? Evidence from the Brazilian Congress. Rio de
Janeiro, 2018. 49p. Dissertação de Mestrado – Departamento de
Economia , Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro .
Este trabalha analisa a presença de peer effects no Congresso Brasileiro
entre os seus deputados federais. Neste trabalho, eu testo se um deputado
é influenciado pelo seu vizinho de porta no momento de votar em uma
proposição. Dado que eles podem selecionar colegas com posições políticas
semelhantes para serem seus vizinhos, eu utilizo uma loteria de gabinetes
que aleatoriamente define os gabinetes dos novos deputados para observar
se a proximidade de gabinetes aumenta a probabilidade de concordância.
Os dados foram coletados para todos os 1026 deputados federal brasileiros
da 54a e 55a legislatura, eleitas em 2010 e 2014, e observa os seus deputados
em todas as proposições votadas entre Feveireiro de 2011 e Maio de 2017.
Os results indicam que ser "vizinho de porta" nos gabinetes não aumentam a
probabilidadedeconcordânciaemumavotação.Resultadossemelhantessão
obtidos quando a amostra foi restrita para diferentes tipos de proposição,
para deputados do mesmo partido, assim como para deputados do mesmo
estado.
Palavras-chave
Efeito dos pares; Sorteio de gabinetes; Votos de políticos; Con-
gresso Brasileiro.
Table of contents
1 Introduction 11
2 Political Networks 14
3 Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies 16
3.1 Background 16
3.2 Congressional Voting 17
3.3 Office Lottery 17
4 Data and Empirical Strategy 19
5 Results 22
6 Conclusion 31
Bibliography 32
A Figures 36
B Additional Tables 38
C Different Clustering Specifications: Dyadic and Two-Way 47
C.1 Sub sample 1 47
C.2 Sub sample 2 48
List of figures
Figure A.1 Aerial photo of the Chamber’s Main Complex 36
Figure A.2 Plan for Anexo III only floor 37
Figure A.3 Plan for Anexo IV 2nd floor 37
List of tables
Table 4.1 Agreement Measures 19
Table 4.2 Summary of Agreement Measures 20
Table 5.1 Baseline Results 22
Table 5.2 Sub Sample: Pairs from the Same Party 23
Table 5.3 Sub Sample: Pairs from the Same State 24
Table 5.4 Sub Sample based on Political Ideology. Dependent vari-
able: Agree1 25
ijt
Table 5.5 Sub Sample based on Political Ideology. Dependent vari-
able: Agree1 25
ijt
Table 5.6 Sub Sample based on Political Alignment. Dependent
variable: Agree1 26
ijt
Table 5.7 Heterogeneous effect based on election criterion 27
Table 5.8 Analysis by Absence Rate. Dependent Variable: Agree1 28
ijt
Table5.9 AnalysisbyAgreementRate.DependentVariable:Agree1 28
ijt
Table 5.10 Analysis by Type of Proposition. Dependent Variable:
Agree1 29
ijt
Table 5.11 Analysis by Type of Proposition. Dependent Variable:
Agree1 29
ijt
Table 5.12 Analysis by proportion of time away from position. De-
pendent Variable: Agree1 30
ijt
Table B.1 Number of Federal Deputies elected by Political Party 38
Table B.2 Number of Federal Deputies elected by Political Ideology 39
Table B.3 Number of Federal Deputies elected by Political Coalition 39
Table B.4 Sub Sample based on Political Ideology. Dependent vari-
able: Agree2 39
ijt
Table B.5 Sub Sample based on Political Ideology. Dependent vari-
able: Agree2 40
ijt
Table B.6 Sub Sample based on Political Ideology. Dependent vari-
able: Agree3 40
ijt
Table B.7 Sub Sample based on Political Ideology. Dependent vari-
able: Agree3 41
ijt
Table B.8 Sub Sample based on Political Alignment. Dependent
variable: Agree2 41
ijt
Table B.9 Sub Sample based on Political Alignment. Dependent
variable: Agree3 42
ijt
Table B.10 Heterogeneous effect based on election criterion 42
Table B.11 Neighbor’s Impact for Different absence rates. Dependent
Variable: Agree2 43
ijt
Table B.12 Neighbor’s Impact for Different absence rates. Dependent
Variable: Agree3 43
ijt
TableB.13 AnalysisbyAgreementRate.DependentVariable:Agree2 43
ijt
TableB.14 AnalysisbyAgreementRate.DependentVariable:Agree3 44
ijt
List of tables 10
Table B.15 Analysis by Type of Proposition. Dependent Variable:
Agree2 44
ijt
Table B.16 Analysis by Type of Proposition. Dependent Variable:
Agree2 44
ijt
Table B.17 Analysis by Type of Proposition. Dependent Variable:
Agree3 45
ijt
Table B.18 Analysis by Type of Proposition. Dependent Variable:
Agree3 45
ijt
Table B.19 Analysis by proportion of time away from position. De-
pendent Variable: Agree2 45
ijt
Table B.20 Analysis by proportion of time away from position. De-
pendent Variable: Agree3 46
ijt
Table C.1 Agree1 - Sample 1 47
Table C.2 Agree2 - Sample 1 47
Table C.3 Agree3 - Sample 1 48
Table C.4 Agree1 - Sample 2 48
Table C.5 Agree2 - Sample 2 49
Table C.6 Agree3 - Sample 2 49