Farm Dweller Precarity in South Africa's Changing Agrarian Economy and Climate

25 Pages·2017·1.51 MB·English

land
Article
A Slipping Hold? Farm Dweller Precarity in South
Africa’s Changing Agrarian Economy and Climate
DonnaHornby1,*,AdrianNel2 ID,SamuelChademana3andNompiloKhanyile4
1 InstituteforPoverty,LandandAgrarianStudies,UniversityoftheWesternCape,
7535WesternCape,SouthAfrica
2 AdrianNel:UniversityofKwaZulu-Natal,Pietermaritzburg,3201KwaZulu-Natal,SouthAfrica;
[email protected]
3 SamuelChademana:Groundwork,3201Pietermaritzburg,SouthAfrica;[email protected]
4 NompiloKhanyile:AssociationforRuralAdvancement,3201Pietermaritzburg,SouthAfrica;
[email protected]
* Correspondence:[email protected];Tel.:[phone]
(cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:1)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:1)
(cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)
Received:7February2018;Accepted:12March2018;Published:23March2018
Abstract: ThepaperinvestigateswhetherfarmdwellersintheKwaZulu-Natal(KZN)provinceof
SouthAfricaaresubjecttoa“doubleexposure”: vulnerablebothtotheimpactsofpost-apartheid
agrariandynamicsandtotherisksofclimatechange. Theevidenceisdrawnfroma2017survey
that was undertaken by the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA), which is a land rights
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), of 843 farm dweller households. Data on the current
livingconditionsandlivelihoodswascollectedon15.3%ofthefarmdwellerpopulationinthearea.
Thepaperdemonstratesthatfarmdwellersareafragmented,agriculturalprecariatsubjecttopush
andpulldriversofmobilitythatleavethemwithaprecariousholdonruralfarmdwellings. Thekey
provocationisthatweneedtobeattentivetowhethertheholdfarmdwellershaveoverlandand
livelihoodsisslippingfurtherasaresultofinstabilityintheagrarianeconomy? Thisinstabilityarises
fromagriculture’sarguablymaladaptiveresponsetotheintersectionofstructuralagrarianchange
andclimateriskinpost-apartheidSouthAfrica. Whiletheoutcomeswillonlybeapparentintime,
therisksarereal,andthepaperconcludeswithacallforagrarianpolicypathwaysthatarebothmore
adaptiveandachievesocialjusticeobjectives.
Keywords: agrariandynamics;climatechange;farmdwellers;livelihoods;precariat;vulnerability;
SouthAfrica
1. Introduction
WhatplaceisthereforfarmdwellersinSouthAfrica’schangingagrarianandclimatecontext?
The uncertainty over this issue is what we intend to engage in this paper. Some things are more
certain, however. ThreekeyfeaturesofSouthAfrica’sagrarianeconomy24yearsintodemocracy
arethepersistenceofaraciallyskeweddistributionandstructureoflandownershipwithmostrural
peoplelivingonstatelandundertraditionalauthoritiesandaccessinglandthrough(neo-)customary
processes(Hornbyetal.,2017[1]);concentration,centralisation,andintegrationofagriculturalcapital
creatingagloballycompetitivebuthighlycapitalintensiveandlaboursheddingagro-foodregime
(Greenberg, 2015[2]); and, theongoingevictionsoffarmdwellersfromcommercialfarmsdespite
tenurereformlaws,withtotalsexceedingevictionsfromadecadepriorto1994andgreaterthanthe
numberofbeneficiariesoflandreformpolicies(Wegerifetal.,2005[3]).
Thepoliticsoflandreformremaincontestedwhileconsensusonagrariansolutionsiselusive.AgriSA,
thenationalagriculturalunionrepresentingcommercialfarmers,claimsthatthegovernment’stargetto
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redistribute30%ofwhiteownedfarmlandhasbeenachieved(AgriSA,2017[4]).However,methodological
critiques (Hall and Cousins 2017 [5]) show that the real figure is closer to 8% (Aliber and Cousins
2013[6])andgrowingpopulistdemandsforlandexpropriationwithoutcompensationindicatewidespread
discontentwiththelandownershipdistribution.Debatesonagrarianfuturesrevolvearoundthepossibility
ofexpandingruralhouseholduseofsmallplotstogeneratefoodandincome(AliberandCousins2013,
Hall,2009a[6,7]),whileothers(SenderandJohnstone2009,Hein,2011[8,9])suggestthatthedominanceof
largescalefarmersandagro-foodconglomerates(or‘BigFood’)(Igumboretal.,2012[10])evisceratethe
spaceforsmallfarmstrategies. O’Laughlinetal.[11]arguethat“Landreformcanthereforebeseenas
simultaneouslybothcentralandmarginal(or‘necessarybutnotsufficient’)tomeetingSouthAfrica’scrisis
ofemployment,livelihoodandsocialreproduction... ”
ThisposesseriouschallengesforSouthAfrica’sattempttouseagrarianreformtoconfrontrising
unemployment,persistentstructuralinequality,andgrowingpovertyandhunger1,particularlyfor
farm dwellers, the focus of this paper. Moreover these challenges are exacerbated in the context
ofemergingclimatechangerisks. Globalwarmingiswidelyacknowledgedasoneofthegreatest
environmental, social, andeconomicthreatstosustainabledevelopmentintheworldthiscentury
(AgrawalaandFrankhauser2008,Stern2008,UnitedNationsIntergovernmentalPanelonClimate
Change(IPCC)2014,ZiervogelandTaylor2008,Anbumozhi2009,Kaijage2011,TurpieandVisser
2012 [12–18]). In South Africa, the mean annual temperatures have increased by at least 1.5 times
theobservedglobalaverageof0.65◦Coverthepastfivedecadesandextremerainfalleventshave
increased in frequency (Ziervogel 2014 [19]). Both the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) and South Africa’s own localized and downscaled assessment models
projectwarmingofabout3–6◦Cby2081–2100(IPCC2014,DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsand
Tourism(DEAT)2004[14,20]). Despitetheparallels,thereisadisconnectintheliteraturewithagrarian
politicaleconomiststendingtoneglectclimateasafactorofchange,whiletheclimatechangeliterature
disregardshowthesechangeswillintersectwiththesocialdynamicsunderlyingagrarianchange. Yet,
climatechangecoulddeepenandexacerbatepre-existinghistoricalandcurrentvulnerabilitiesofthe
approximately2million(StatsSA2011[21])alreadyvulnerablefarmdwellersacrossthecountry.
Thispaperthusinvestigatesthedegreetowhichfarmdwellers,theirlandtenureandlivelihoods
aresubjecttoa“doubleexposure”(O’BrienandLeichenko2000[22]);vulnerabletotheimpactsof
post-apartheidagrariandynamicsandchangewhiletheirland-basedlivelihoodsarevulnerableto
climatechangeasarethecommercialfarmenterprisesonwhichtheirwagelabourandresidential
rights depend. The study is innovative in providing extensive data on frequently neglected rural
dwellers,namelythosewholiveoncommercialfarmsthattheydonotown,andindrawingattentionto
theirdoubleexposuretoacombinationofagrarianandclimatechanges,thelivelihoodvulnerabilities
thatarecreated,andtheparticularpoliticsthatthisgeneratesonfarms.
The paper demonstrates that farm dwellers are a “fragmented” (Bernstein, 2010:110 [23])
agricultural “precariat” (Standing, 2011 [24]) that are subject to centrifugal (push) and centripetal
(pull)driversofmobilitythatleavethemwithaprecariousholdonruralfarmdwellings. Thekey
provocation of this paper is that we need to be attentive to whether the hold farm dwellers have
over land and livelihoods is slipping further as a result of instability in the agrarian economy2?
Thisinstability,wesuggest,arisesfromagriculture’sarguablymaladaptiveresponsetotheintersection
ofstructuralandclimatechangeinpost-apartheidSouthAfrica. Whileoutcomeswillonlybeapparent
intime,wesuggesttherisksarereal,andthepaperconcludeswithacallformoreresearch,andfor
agrarianpolicypathwaysthatarebothmoreadaptiveandachievesocialjusticeobjectives.
1 Foodpricesin2016recordedthehighestlevelofinflationat11.6%(ProvinceofKwaZulu-Natal,2017: 14[25])while
agriculturalproductionintheKwaZulu-Natalrecordedasixthconsecutivecontractionin2016duetoaseveremulti-year
drought(ibid,20).
2 StatsSA (2016 [26]) records a 25.2% decline in “agricultural households” in KwaZulu-Natal between 2011 and 2016,
thehighestrateofdeclinenationally,andfollowedbyNorthWestwith21.6%.
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2. Capital,ClimateandtheAgriculturalPrecariat
The contested discourse of a new geological era, in the form of the Anthropocene—in which
anthropogenicclimatechangeisacknowledgedtohavefundamentallyalteredourclimatesystem
(Clark2015,Morton2014[27,28])—providesanentrypointforanumberofissuesthatrepertinent
to this paper; namely the interconnections between climate, capital and socio-ecological change.
Moore 2017 [29] argues that there is a fundamental Human/Nature dualism at the centre of the
Anthropocenediscourse,which“obscuresourvistasofpower,productionandprofitinthewebof
life”. Instead of the Anthropocene discourse, which begins with Nature as analytically distinct to
ahomogenousandabstractednotionofSociety,Moore,amongstothers(Klein2014[30])proposesthe
Capitaloceneasawayforunderstandingtheconditionsforco-productionintheplanetary‘webof
life’,andhowcapitalismhasrevolutionisedthe“co-productionofhistoricalnatures”(ibid: 599).
Indirectlysubstantiatingthisargument,O’BrienandLeichenko2000[22]considerprocessesof
globalisationtogetherwithclimatechangearguingthat“on-goingprocessesofeconomicglobalization
aremodifyingorexacerbatingexistingvulnerabilitiestoclimatechange”(ibid,221).
Mostdirectly, theconnectionbetweenhighlycapitalised, commercialagricultureandclimate
changeisoneofcauseandeffect:ononeextremecommercialagriculturalsystemsareenergy-intensive
andfossil-fuelbased,andthuscontributetogreenhousegasemissions. Estimatespositthatagriculture
andthefoodsystemasawholeaccountsforbetween8.2%(TakleandHofstrand2008[31])to29%
(Vermeulinetal.,2012[32])ofglobalgreenhousegasemissions,thusfurtheracceleratingclimatechange
(Hewitsonetal.,2005[33]). Moreover,somescholars(Weiss2013,VanDerPloegetal.,2015McMichael
andSchneider2011andSchneiderandMcMichael2010[34–37])contendthattheshifttowardsahighly
capitalised, mono-culture form of agriculture has constituted a form of maladaptation to ongoing
climatechangeandassociatedshiftingagro-ecologicalconditions.Grainproduction(specificallymaize
in Southern Africa and rice in Asia) faces particular adaptation threats due to sensitivity to small
temperatureincreases(IAASTD,2009:287[38]),withsmallfarmersmostatrisk(ibid). Maladaptation,
accordingtotheIPCC(2014[14]),is‘anadaptationthatdoesnotsucceedinreducingvulnerabilitybut
increasesitinstead’.3
YetMoore’sargumentisfurthernuancedregardingaccumulationdynamics,wherehesituatesthe
capitalistrevolutionintheco-productionofhistoricalnaturesinthefour“cheaps”ofNature—labour4,
food,energy,andrawmaterials—thathavesustainedcapitalism’sexpansionandthatarenowdrawing
toanend. Thelaunchofthegreenrevolutioninthe1960s,alongwiththeintensiveinvestmentthat
accompaniedit,wasbasedontheextensivefarmingofmonoculturesandsupportedbyaboominthe
agrochemicalsectorandfossilfuelbasedmechanization(Capra,2015[39]).Whilethenewtechnologies
supportedanexponentialgrowthinagriculturalproductionandincreasedfoodsupplyforagrowing
worldpopulation(Bernstein2010[23]),theassumptionswerethattheclimatewouldremainstable
andbothfossilfuelsandwatersupplywouldalwaysbeabundantandaffordable(Capra2015[39]).
However,themountingevidenceofclimatechangeandfoodpricevolatility(Holt-Giméneza&Altieri
2013,VanDerPloeg2013[40,41])haveshownthelimitsoftheseassumptions. Commercialagriculture
isnowincreasinglyfacedwithprospectsofpeakfossilfuels,peakfertilizers(Pinock2010[42]),falling
water tables in some regions, with risks of food shortages, increasing food prices, and increased
socialinstability(Raleighetal.,2015[43]),aswellasglobalpoliticalpressurestocurbagriculture’s
contributionstogreenhousegasemissions. Thespatiallyunevendistributionofclimatechangeeffects
(O’BrienandandLeichenko2000[22])hasalreadyresultedinperiodicdeclinesincropsyieldsand
failuresinsomeregions.
3 Thereisdebateaboutadaptationasausefulconcept,however.See,forinstance,AtteridgeandRemling(2018[44])who
suggestthatadaptationisredistributingvulnerabilityratherthanreducingit.
4 Cheaplabour,accordingtoMoore2017[29],wasbasedonthedisconnectionofindigenouspopulationsfromthefoldof
‘civilized’people:whatEnglishcolonialadministratorsreferredtoasthe‘wild’IrishandtheCastilianscalledthe‘Naturales’
inreferencetoindigenousPeruvians.
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Of interest with regards to ‘cheap’ labour in South Africa, the dynamics run somewhat
contrarytoMoore’sassertionofscarcity,withincreasingprecarityforanoversuppliedlabourbase.
O’Laughlin et al., 2013:6 [11]) argue that it was apparent in the 1970s “that the system of migrant
labour[inSouthAfrica]haderodeditsownconditionsofexistence”. Thesubsistence‘subsidy’that
householdfarmingintheapartheid‘Bantustans’hadprovidedtoagriculturalandminingwagelabour
hadbeenundercutbyovercrowdingasaresultofforcedremovalsandconsequentdecliningfarm
production. However,thisparticularcontradictioncreatedthebasisforthesubsequentemergenceof
‘surpluslabour’aspeoplecontinuedtomigrateoutofruralareasandtheneedforlabourinmining
andmanufacturingdeclined. Asaresult,“cheaplabourwasnolongerscarceandsecuringitnolonger
requiredsystematicstateintervention”(ibid). Furthermore,thegrowingsurplusoflabouroverthe
past40yearshave“narrowedtherangeofemployment-basedentitlements,cutflowsofremittances
betweenruralandurbanareas,andheightenedcompetitionforjobsandaccesstoservices”(ibid).
Theeffectofthissurpluslabourboomalongsidethecapitalistrestructuringofagrariansocial
relationshavebeenfarreachingforruralfarmdwellersandlabourers.EwertandDuToit2005:[45]use
theideaofa“doubledivide”tocharacterisethechangesintheagrarianstructurethathavetakeplace
overthepastfourdecades. Onthesideofcapitalarefarmers“abletoprofitfromtheopportunities
offeredbyinternationalexpansionandthosewhoarenot”;and,onthesideoflabourisagrowinggap
“between‘core’workersandthosethrownoutbycasualizationandexternalization”. Whilethereis
noreferencetowhathappenstothedynamicsinternaltothedoubledivideinthecontextofclimate
change,aneffectofthedoubledividehasbeenthegrowthofa“rurallumpenproleteriat,oftenresiding
inrural,peri-urbanormetropolitanshantytowns”(ibid: 317).
Perhaps more accurately, the position of farm dwellers in the face of these trajectories can
be described as something of a rural agricultural precariat. Standing 2011 [24] argues that the
fragmentationofthelabourmarketaccompanyingglobalisationhascreatedanewsocialclassofpeople
whoare‘habituated’toprecariousnesscharacterisedasflexible,insecureandintermittentemployment
as well as “uncertain access to housing and public resources”. While the idea that the ‘precariat’
constitutesaspecificsocialclasshasbeenthoroughlycritiquedfordisregardingthe(geographically
varied)logicofclassdominationundercapitalism(seeBreman2013,Bernado2016,Munk2013[46–48]),
further theorisation has linked employment precariousness (or ”wageless existence” for Denning,
2010 [49]; ‘footloose labour’ for Breman, 1996 [50]) to eroded conditions of social reproduction
(Hart 2014, Bernstein 2004: 205–6, Bernstein 2003: 210 [51–53]). Tania Li (2010: 67 [54]), in her
essay‘ToMakeLiveorLetDie’,arguesthatthedeepeningconditionofprecariousnessistheresult
of a new round of enclosures, leading to the dispossession of large numbers of rural people from
landcombinedwith“thelowabsorptionoftheirlabour, whichis‘surplus’totherequirementsof
capital accumulation”. It is in this sense that we find the term ‘precariat’ a useful conceptual lens
toengagewithchangingsocialrelationsonfarmsintheruralmidlandsofKwaZulu-Natal(KZN)
province, to which we presently turn. Firstly, however, we set out the KZN context of capitalist
agrariantransformationinSouthAfricaoverthepastdecades.
3. StudyMethod
The evidence is drawn from a 2017 survey that was undertaken by the Association for Rural
Advancement(AFRA),alandrightsNGOthatworkswithfarmdwellersintheUmgungundlovu
DistrictoftheKwaZulu-Natal(KZN)province. TheUmgungundlovuDistrict,whichislocatedinthe
midlandsareaofKwaZulu-Natal(thecountry’ssecondmostdenselypopulatedprovince),isoneof
11municipaldistrictsthatarelocatedontheeastcoastofSouthAfrica,inlandfromtheportcityof
Durban. TheDistricthasapopulationofjustoveramillioninhabitants,61%ofwhomarelocatedin
theMsunduziLocalMunicipalityinthevicinityofthecityofPietermaritzburg(StatsSA,2017[55]).
The commercial farm areas are dominantly sugar, forestry and beef with some poultry and diary.
Thefarmdwellerpopulationisestimatedtobejustunder41,000people.
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The survey was undertaken as part of AFRA’s Pathways Project, whose objective is to find
pathwaysforfarmdwellersoutofpoverty.5 Thepurposeofthesurveywasthree-fold: firstly,tocollect
base-linedataonfarmdwellerhouseholdsinthedistrictinordertoupdateinformationontheliving
andlivelihoodconditionsoffarmdwellersacrossthedistrict;secondly,toprovidedatathatcouldbe
usedinlongitudinalstudiestoassesschangestothelivingandlivelihoodconditionsoffarmdwellers;
and thirdly, to provide a GPS location of the interviewed farm dweller households and summary
dataonrightstolandandservicesasarecordofevidencetobeusedtoadjudicateanyarisingfuture
disputesoverrights.
Surveys on farms in South Africa are not politically neutral processes of data collection.
Theresearchwasplannedtobeundertakentogetherwithlandownersinasinglemunicipalarea,
butafterlandownerstructuressubsequentlywithdrewtheirco-operation,AFRAchangedthescopeto
asampleoffarmdwellerhouseholdsacrosstheDistrictinordertoensureaccesstoarepresentative
sample.Theaccesstofarmdwellersthenhadtobenegotiatedthroughotherstructures,whichincluded
electedcouncilors,communitydevelopmentworkers,andfarmdwellerstructures. Thismayhave
createdsomebiasinthesampleinthatthefarmsmorelikelytobeknowntothesestructuresarethose
wherefarmdwellershavereportedproblemsofsomekind,buttheseproblemsalsoconstitutethe
rationaleforresearchingfarmdwellersinthefirstplace. Afurtherdimensionshapingthesamplewas
thatsomelandownerspreventedtheresearchersfromaccessingfarmsandinonecasethreatenedto
bringtrespassingcharges.
Thesamplingmethodundertheseconditionswasessentiallyopportunisticandtherobustness
of the data depended on the percentage of farm dweller households sampled.6 The survey was
conductedwith843farmdwellerhouseholds,whichcollecteddataon6478individualmen,women,
andchildren,livingon83farms,andthuscomprisesanestimated15.8%ofthefarmdwellerpopulation
intheDistrict. Datawascollectedonbothindividuals7andhouseholds8,andanalysedaccordingly.
Theinstrumentwaspilotedrepeatedlyandamendmentstotheinstrumentweremadeonthebasisof
researchassistants’experienceofadministeringthesurvey.
Thesurveywasloadedontoatablet,andinterviewswereundertakenbysixresearchassistants
over a six month period, with a subsequent two months for checking and correcting errors.9
Dataanalysiswasundertakeninexcelandmadeavailableonalimitedaccesswebsiteasinformation
wasbeingupdated. Cross-tabulationswererunacrossvariableswherepossiblerelationshipshad
been identified through literature or through focus sessions with farm dwellers and AFRA field
staff. Intermsofethics,AFRAwasconcernedthatthecollecteddatanotbeusedbylandownersor
governmenttofurthererodelandandservicerightsoffarmdwellers. Thepermissionofrespondents
tobeinterviewedwasthusobtainedineverycase,andtherespondentsassuredthatthedatalinked
explicitlytotheirnameswouldnotbereleasedwithouttheirconsent.
5 Thepathwaysincludeanumberofstrategiesforsettlinglandrightsandtheprovidingmunicipalservicesandstate
housingthroughmulti-stakeholderprocesses,includingwithlandowners,anddifferentspheresofmunicipal,provincial,
andnationalgovernment(seehttps://afra.co.za/current-focus-areas/).
6 ThetotalnumberoffarmdwellerhouseholdsintheDistrictwascalculatedfromStatsSA(2013[56])datawhichshowed
thatin20115.28%ofSouthAfrica’spopulationlivedindesignated“FarmAreas”,andofthispopulation,76.1%livedon
commercialfarms(seeVisserandFerrer,2015:8[57]).Althoughthecensusdataisold,thereisnouptodatedatathatcan
beusedtocalculatethefarmdwellerpopulation.AFRAthususedthesepercentagestocalculatethepopulationoffarm
dwellerslivingoncommercialfarmsas:5.28/100×76.1/100×1,017,763,whichamountedto40,895individuals.
7 Datacollectedonindividualmembersofhouseholdincludededucationallevels,genderandage,permissiontobeonthe
farm,residenceonthefarm,incomelevelsandsourcesofincome.
8 Thedatacollectedonhouseholdsincludedhouseholdcomposition,ageandgendercharacteristics,lengthoftimeresident
onfarms,useoflandforlivestockproductionandcultivation,accesstobasicneedsandservices(specificallywater,energy,
andhousing),successioninrelationtohousingandperceptionofrelationshiptofarmer,andwhetherthemunicipality
providedservicestofarmdwellers.
9 Thecaptureddatawasuploadeddailyandverifiedandacceptedbytheresearchteamleadertwiceaweek. Errorsor
missingdataweresentbacktoresearchassistantsonaweeklybasisduringdatacollection,andthenagainintheseventh
andeighthmonthswhenpreliminaryanalysisanddatacleaningwerebeingundertaken.
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4. StructuralChangeandLabourVulnerabilityinSouthAfrica’sAgrarianEconomy
ThestructureofSouthAfrica’sagriculturaleconomyistheoutcomeofhistory,itspersistenteffectsinto
thepresent,andofchangesoccuringinthedemocraticperiod(Ledger,2016[58]).Bernstein(1998:1[59])
statesthat“landandproduction,povertyandpower,arekeycoordinatesoftheterrainoftheagrarian
questionandofprospectsofagrarianreform”inSouthAfrica.These“coordinates”areoftencharacterised
asadualism10, withpoverty, overcrowding, andsubsistenceagricultureintheapartheid-constructed
former‘Bantustans’existingalongsidethevast,highlycapitalised,mainlywhite-ownedcommercialfarms.
Anoften-neglecteddualismisthepersistenceof“divisionsandstarkcontrastswithincommercialfarms...
[which]exemplifythetwinprocessesofaccumulationandunderdevelopment,featuringextremepoverty
(amongfarmworkersanddwellers)inthemidstofsubstantialagrarianwealthinlarge-scalecapitalist
agriculture”(Halletal.,2013:48[60]).
Beyonditsapartheidhistory,whataccountsforthesechanges? Answersarecomplex,andinclude
policychangesintheearly1990sresultinginde-regulation(Marais2011: 124[9]),thedismantling
of apartheid agricultural marketing boards and monopolies and the withdrawal of government
subsidies(Hall2009b[61]),andthereductionoftariffsonagriculturalimportsthatexceededwith
therequirementsin1994oftheGeneralAgreementonTradeandTariffs(GATT)(Ledger2016[58]).
Nicholson(2001[62])showsthattariffsonagricultural,forestry,andfishingimportsweresetat41.2%
buthadbeenreducedto2.2%by1998.ThechangesmeantthatSouthAfricanfarmerswere,overavery
shortperiod,expectedtocompeteonglobalmarkets,andinthis“momentofglobalisation”(Bernstein
2003:203[53])weresubjectedtoconditionsofextremecompetitionandan“exportordie”(Andrade
2017[63])dynamic. Therewasaneedtoadheretoandpaythecostsforstringentqualityrequirements
imposedbythesemarkets(Reardonetal.,2003[64]),withlittlesupportfromtheSouthAfricanstate
anddespitecontinuedsubsidiesprovidedtofarmersinEuropeandtheUnitedStates(Visser,2016[65]).
Thesenewconditionsanddisciplineshavemadeitdifficultforemergingsmallfarmerstogainasecure
foothold(Ledger2016[58]).
Capitalistagriculture’sresponsetothechangeshasvaried. Sectionsofagrariancapitalsupported
and lobbied for the changes in the early 1990s in order to open up their access to global markets
(Bernstein1996[66])resulting,amongstothers,inexpansionsofsugarmillingcorporatesandtheir
commercialmodelsintoAfrica(Dubb2016[67])andforestrycorporatesintoEuropeandtheUnited
States. Othersusedtheopportunitiestoassertlocalmarketdominance,withtherisein‘BigFood’
dominating the food and beverage sectors (Igumbor et al, 2012 [10]), the emerging dominance of
asmallnumberofretailersandsupermarkets(Reardonetal.,2003[64]),thesqueezingoutofsmall
growersfromtheagro-foodsystem(WeatherspoonandReardon2003[71],andincreasedexpenditure
ofruralhouseholdsonfoodpurchases(D’HaeseandVanHuylenbroeck2005[72]). However,many
agro-corporatesandcommercialfarmershavenotsurvivedthenew‘disciplines’ofcompetitionand
havegoneoutofbusiness(Visser2016[65]),asisevidencedinthedecliningnumberoffarmingunits;
inKZNthenumberofcommercialfarmunitsdeclinedrapidlyfrom6080in1993to3574unitsin2007.
Accompanyingthisdeclineisthegrowthinthemeansizeoffarmsfrom668hain2003to808hain
2006(StatsSA2013: 6[56]).
Genis(2015[73])summarisesresponsestochangesinconditionsforagriculturalproductionas
follows. Firstly, an expansion and consolidation of production and landholdings, which resulted
in increased concentration in agriculture. Secondly a large degree of centralisation, with vertical
integration into up and downstream value chains. This is less apparent at farm level and most
apparent in the agrochemical and seed sector (e.g., Monsanto, Bayer) although the concentration
10 Thenotionofadualismintheagriculturaleconomyishighlycontested,withsometheoristsarguingthattheunderdevelopment
oftheperipheralformerTBVCstatesistheresultofcapitalistdevelopmentinthecentre(see,forinstance,DuToit2004[68];
Cousins2005[69];LegassickandWolpe,1976[70]).AsO’Laughlinetal(2010:5[11])putit:“thehighly‘dualistic’butunified
economicstructurewasarticulatedwithanddependentonthebifurcatedcolonialpolity”.
Land2018,7,40 7of25
at farm level is probably a response to centralisation beyond the farm-gate. Thirdly, increased
labour productivity, through the systematic application of labour technologies in work processes
andmechanization. Thesechangeshaveenabledshiftstosmaller,moreskilledfarmlabour,withlow
skill or seasonal work being undertaken by contracted labour. This reorganisation of labour has
particularpertinenceforthispaperbecauseitalsothreatenstosnaptheconnectionbetweenfarm
labourandaccesstoland(Halletal.,2013[60]). Finally,increasedproductionefficiencythroughthe
useofhigh-yieldingplantvarietiesandproductionpractices,e.g.,conservationagriculture,moisture
conservation,andpruningpractices.
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal’sagriculturalstructurereflectskeyfeaturesofthenationalstructures,specifically,
raciallyskewedlandownership, adeclineincontributiontoGDP,andadeclineinthenumberof
farmingunitswithanassociatedincreaseinthesizeoffarms;togetherwitharestructuringoflabour,
whichhasincludedanoveralldeclineinjobsandashifttocontractandseasonalwork.
In terms of its contemporary land dispensation and agrarian patterns, the KwaZulu-Natal
AgriculturalUnion(KwaNalu)claimsthat46.29%oflandintheprovinceisblackowned,whileonly
15.6%iswhiteowned(withabout35.8%oftheprovince’slandownershipunknown)(DeLange2017;
Groenewald2015[74,75]). Thesestatisticsincludenearlyhalfoftheprovince’slandthatisownedby
theIngonyamaTrustBoard,whichisapublicentity. Todescribethetenureintheseareasasblack
ownershipismisleadingandinaccurate. Bycontrast,theauditofstateownedlandundertakenbythe
DepartmentofRuralDevelopmentandLandreform(2013: 9[76])suggeststhat50%oftheprovinceis
stateowned,while46%isprivatelyowned,withonly4%unaccountedfor.Thereportdoesnotprovide
a racial orurban/rural breakdown but does indicatea shift from individual privateownership to
corporateownershipofruralland,andreflectssomeownershipchangesasaresultoftransferthrough
landreform. However,accuratedataontheexactracialandclasscompositionoflandownershipin
theprovinceandthemechanismsaccountingforchangesdonotexist.
ThecontributionofagriculturetoKZN’sGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)hasdeclinedfrom4.4%
in2004to2.1%in2014(TIPS2016:3[77]),thoughwithaslightincreaseto2.3%by2017(TIPS2017[78]).
Despite this decline, agriculture is nevertheless more important to the provincial economy than
agriculturegenerallyistothenationalGDP.Employmentinagricultureintheprovincehasfluctuated:
150,000jobsin2008,downtoa100,000in2011,andupto148,000in2015(ibid).
The dominant agricultural commodities in KwaZulu-Natal are forestry, sugar, poultry and beef
production. Forestryuses5.5%ofKZN’stotalland(exceededonlybyMpumalangaProvinceat6.3%).
Althougharelativelylowuserrelativeto12.7%usedforarableproduction,58.3%forgrazing,and15.1%
usedfornatureconservation(Godsmark2013[79]),forestryinKwaZulu-Natalmakesupasignificant
proportion of the national forestry hectorage, expanding from 36.8% in 1979/80 to 39.9% in 2015/6.
Whileforestry’scontributiontonationalagriculturalGDPhasrisenfromabout4to10%(althoughdeclining
fromjustabovetobelow1%ofnationalGDP),itscontributiontomanufacturingGDPthroughprocessing
hasdeclinedfromapproximately6to5%.Thisdrophasbeenassociatedwiththehalvingofemployment
in the KZN wood and paper industry from approximately 34,000 jobs to 15,000 between 2010 and
2015,themostrapiddeclineinprovincialmanufacturingindustriesoverthisperiod(TIPS2016:4[77]).
Thedrop-offinmanufacturingemploymentcouldbeexplainedbythediversificationandglobalisation
strategiesoftheSAPPIandMONDIforestrycorporates,whileMondihasalsoshiftedtoalongerterm
strategyofleasingratherthanowninglandsubjecttolandreform(SAPPI2016[80]).
Sugaristheprovincessecondmostimportantagriculturalrevenueearnerafterforestry,generating
R2,3blnin2007,followedbybroilers(R1,7bln)andbeeffarming(R1,4bln)(StatsSA2007: 11[81]).
KwaZulu-Natal accounts for 90% of the country’s sugar production (Thornhill et al., 2009 [82]).
TheDepartmentofAgriculture,ForestandFisheries(DAFF)(2016[83])reportsthat318,865ha(4.8%)
ofagriculturallandintheprovinceisundersugarcaneplantations,adecreaseofabout24%fromthe
2006/07season,whichstoodat419,465ha(6.3%). Mostsugarintheprovinceisgrownunderdryland
Land2018,7,40 8of25
conditions(SASA2017[84]),andhenceisvulnerabletoclimatevariability. Thesectorexperienced
a decline in employment that was associated with a decline in output per hectare over the last
twodecadesduetoacombinationoffactors,includingrisinginputprices,volatileglobalsugarprices,
drought,anditsimpactonyieldsandqualityofproduction,thewithdrawalofstatesubsidiessince
the1990s(EDTEA2017[85]),theperceivedrisksoflandreform(Cronje2015[86])andrisinglabour
costs(Visser2016[65]).
The poultry industry (which has a high concentration of broiler chicken production in the
UmgungundlovuDistrictbetweenCatoRidgeandPietermaritzburg)tookalargeknockafteratrade
disputesawEuropeangoodsfloodthemarket(MeyerandDavids2017[87]).Asthelargestagricultural
sub-sectorinthecountry,poultrycontributes16.5%ofthegrossvalueofagriculturalproduction,andis
thecheapestandmostconsumedanimalproteinsource(DAFF,2016[83];DavidsandMeyer2017[88]),
whereasbeefcontributed11.9%andsugar3.2%ofthetotalvalueofagriculturalrevenuenationallyin
2015.KwaZulu-Natalhasthehighestpercentageofagriculturalhouseholdsthatwereengagedinpoultry
production(27.5%)11andvegetableproduction(30.3%),whilethepercentageofagriculturalhouseholds
thatwereengagedincattleproduction(24.5%)issecondtotheEasternCape(StatsSA,2013[56]).
Intermsofclimaterisk,Thornhilletal.,(2009[82])notethatKwaZulu-Natalhasbeensubjectto
extremeweatherepisodesatregularintervalsoverthelast100to150years,andwhiletherearedata
gapsthatmakeitdifficulttoidentifytrendswithsurety,theseeventsarelikelyapartofacontinuum
ofeventswhosefrequencyandseveritywillincreaseinthefuture. Theimpactsoftheseeventswillbe
mademoreseverebythedegradationofnaturalabatementsystems,suchasfloodplains,wetlands,
forested valleys, and coastal dunes. Discussion of further climate impacts are the subject for the
penultimatesection,andwenowproceedtodiscussthesurveydataonfarmdwellersinKZN.
5. FarmDwellersinKZNasaRuralPrecariat
Accordingtothe2011Census[21],3.7%ofSouthAfrica’spopulationlivesoncommercialfarmsthat
theydonotown,andyetlittleisknownaboutthelivingconditionsoffarmdwellers.Farmdwellersare
adistinctcategoryofruraldweller,andwhilethereareoverlapswithfarmworkers,tocollapsethem
intoasinglesociologicalcategoryblursimportantdifferencesbetweenthem.Farmdwellersinthisstudy,
followingAFRA’sdefinition(2017[89]),includefourcategories: wagedfarmworkerswhohavelong
historiesoflivingonthefarmtogetherwiththeirfamilies;wagedfarmworkerswhohaverecentlycome
toliveonthefarmwiththeirfamiliesandhavenohomeselsewhere;migrantfarmworkerswhohave
homeselsewhere(ofteninothercountries)butvisittheminfrequently;andfinally,familieswithnobody
workingonthefarm,butwhohavelivedmanygenerationsonthefarmandhavenohomeselsewhere.12
The 2017 AFRA survey of 838 farm dweller households13 living on 83 farms across the
UmgungundlovuDistrictinKwaZulu-Natalfoundthatthemeansizeoffarmdwellerhouseholdsis
7.2members,with55.8%withsixormoremembers,asignificantlyhighernumberthanthe3.5members
per household national mean (Wittenberg et al, 2017: 1299 [90]). 35% of household members are
11 Despitetheimportanceofpoultryproductiontotheprovince,noneofthefarmssurveyedintheAFRAdataproducedpoultry.
Themajorityofinterviewstookplaceonfarmsproducingsugarcane(39%)followedbybeefcattle(23%)andforestryplantations
(22%).
12 Thesecategoriesaredifferentfromlegalcategoriesthatincludefarmoccupiers(intermsoftheExtensionofSecurityofTenure
Act62of1997)whohaverightsofoccupationlinkedtoemployment,farmworkers(intermsoftheAgriculturalSector,farm
workers(BasicConditionsofEmploymentAct,75of1997andAgriculturalLabourAct66of1995)whomaynotberesidenton
thefarm,andlabourtenants(LandReformLabourTenantsAct1996)whohaveaccesstolandforresidenceandfarmingin
returnfortheprovisionoflabour.
13 Thedefinitionofhouseholdisanimportantsociologicalconceptasitiskeytomuchdemographicresearch. Thereare,
however,anumberofdebateddefinitions(see,forinstance,Amoateng2007[91]).Inthispaper,wefollowthedefinition
usedbyWittenbergetal.,(2017[90]),ofthehouseholdasbothasocialentity(asinfamily)andresidentialunit.Thesocial
entityallowsinvestigationoffamilymemberswhoareabsentbutwhoconsidertheresidentialspacetobe‘home’,whilethe
physicalresidenceisthesiteforservicedelivery,includinghousing,electricity,water,andsanitation.Theseaspectsoffarm
dwellerexistenceareallcoveredintheAFRAsurvey.
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youngerthan18years,52.1%arefemaleandtheremaindermale,withslightlymoremenbetweenthe
agesof18–35(50.9%)thanwomenofthesameage.
Farm dwellers secure incomes from multiple sources, including wage work on farms and off
farms,socialgrants,remittancesandownenterprises. However,risingunemploymentandlabour
casualisationonfarms(identifiedabove)combinedwithdecliningworkopportunitiesinruraland
urbansecondaryandtertiarysectors,decliningaccesstolandforfarmingandhighnumberswithout
accesstosocialgrantsmeansthatfarmdwellers,andparticularlyyoungmen,struggletosecurethe
conditionsfortheirsocialreproduction. Thecombinationofthesefactorscreatetheconditionsforthe
identifiedpolitics. Drawingfromthedataandsupportingliterature,thefollowingsub-sectionscover
theprecarity,mobility,andpoliticsofholdingonrelatedtofarmdwellers.
5.1. Precarity
Two-thirdsoffarmdwellers(66.5%)overtheageof18havenoincomeatall. Thismeansthatthey
areunemployed,receivenosocialgrants,andareinvolvedinnoenterprisesoractivitiesthatgenerate
income. Ofthosefarmdwellerhouseholdsinoursamplethatdohaveanincomefromwork,social
grantsorownenterprisesorcombinationsthereof,therearesignificantdifferencesinmeanamounts,
withaminimumofR014,amaximumofR95,840,themeaninthefirstquartileR2600,inthesecond
quartileR4000,andinthethirdquartileR6600. Ashouseholdsizesaverage7.2members,thismeans
thatmembersofhouseholdsinthefirstquartilehaveameanallocationofR361permemberpermonth,
thoseinthesecondquartileameanallocationofR555permemberpermonthandthoseinthethird
quartileR917permemberpermonth.
Our data thus suggests that farm dwellers may be worse off than previously indicated.15
Furthermore, 75% of members in farm dweller households in our sample receive less than the
upper-bound poverty line (of R992 per person per month) in 2015 prices (Stats SA, 2017 [55]).
StatsSA(2017)reportsthat55.5%ofSouthAfricanswerepoorin2015,andthatthisrisingpovertyis
concentratedamongchildren,blackAfricans,females,peoplelivingintheEasternCapeandLimpopo,
andthosewithloweducationallevels. Ourdatashowsthat,byStatsSA’sdefinition,farmdwellersare
oneofthepoorest,albeitsociallydifferentiated,socialcategoriesinthecountry,andthattheirpoverty
levelsandtheinequalitiesmaybeobscuredinnationaldatasets. Thereasonforthispossiblyliesin
nuancesrevealedbydistinctionsinthedatabetweenindividualandhouseholdincomes, primary
incomesourcesandcombinedincomesourcesandtemporary,seasonal,andcontractemployment
alongwithunemployment.
Farmlabour(combiningpermanent,temporary,andseasonallabour)16constituteshalf(49.9%)of
theprimaryincomesourcesofindividualfarmdwellersthathaveanincomewhenthosewhohaveno
incomeareexcludedfromtheanalysis. Wagelabouristhusaveryimportantsourceofincome. Thisis
notsignificantlydifferentfrom51.1%ofpermanentfarmlabourreportedinVisserandFerrer(2015:
ii). However,thefiguredropsto38.9%whenlabour(ofunspecifiedduration)onlyonthefarmon
whichthefarmdwellerisresidentistakenintoaccount,asopposedtoworkonanotherfarminthe
14 Thiswasfoundinthecaseoftwoelderlymenlivingalone,andwhoweresupportedwithfoodbyotherfarmdwellers.
Theybothdiedduringthedatacollectionprocess.
15 AccordingtoVisserandFerrerdrawingmainlyonnationaldatabases(2015:10[57]), the2013workstatusofpeople
living on farms showed 4.8% unemployed, 2.5% discouraged work seekers and 19.9% not economically active.
Nationalunemploymentfigurescurrentlystandat27%whenonlyactivejobseekersarecountedandaround37%when
discouragedworkseekersareincluded(StatsSA2017[55]).
16 Thesedistinctionsfluctuateovertime(Bhoratetal.,2014[92])whiletheextentofcasualisationisdifficulttogaugebecause
researchersusedifferentdefinitionsoftemporary,includingblurringdifferencesbetweenseasonal,contractandregular
work(Visser2016[65]).Ourdatacombinestemporaryandcontractworkunderstoodasintermittentworkwithshort-term
contractsforspecificemployers.Seasonalandpermanentworkareseparatecategories,withseasonalimplyingshort-term
butseasonallyregularworkoftenforaspecifictask(e.g., canecutting, planting, fellingandtransportationinforest
plantations)andpermanentmeaningon-goingworkforthesameemployer,oneitherafulldaybasisorpartofaday.
Land2018,7,40 10of25
area. Furthermore,ofthoseindividualfarmdwellerswhoseprimary17 incomeisfromfarmlabour,
ourdatashows79.5%arepermanentworkers,followedbytemporaryorcontractworkers(18.9%)
withveryfewpeoplestatingseasonalwork(1.6%)astheirprimaryincomesource18. Notwithstanding
methodological and analytical differences in the studies, this is significantly less than the work of
limitedorunspecifieddurationof48.9%,asreportedbyVisserandFerrer(2015:21[57])andHalletal.,
(2013:53[60]),andwhenfactoringinthosefarmdwellersovertheageof18whohavenoincomesat
all,thenfull-timepermanentemploymentonthefarmonwhichtheyresideistheprimaryincome
sourceforjustover10%offarmdwellers.
Relatedly,incomesandtheirdifferentialsalsoappeartohaveabearingonhowfarmdwellers
view their relationship with farmers (something that has a bearing on the ‘politics of holding on’
sectiontofollow). Wherethedistributionofthetotalprimaryincomeofhouseholdsisrelativelyequal,
householdsaremorelikelytoranktherelationshipwiththefarmerasgood(seeTable1). Indeed,
evenwhereahighpercentageofhouseholdincomesfallintothefourthquartileofhighestincomes,
thisdistributiondoesnotimprovetherankingofrelationshipwiththefarmer.
Table1.HouseholdPrimaryIncomeDistributionVRelationshiptoFarmer.
Good Average Poor
Quartile4 24.3% 32.6% 19.8%
Quartile3 22.8% 20.1% 29.5%
Quartile2 25.9% 26.4% 19.8%
Quartile1 26.9% 20.8% 30.9%
TotalnoHH 193 288 288
The worst relationship ranking is where most of the households fall into the first income
quartile,andthisindicatesasignificant,simmeringpoliticsofdiscontentsurroundingfarmdweller
precariousnessandfragmentation.
Otherprimarysourcesofincomeforindividualfarmdwellers(excludingthoseinthesamplewho
havenoincome)arechildgrantsandgovernmentoldagepensions(15.9%and13.4%respectively)
andofffarmincome(13.8%). Whileprimaryincomesourcesrevealanimportantcomponentoffarm
dwellerincomes,thediversificationandcombinationofincomesshowstheincreasingimportanceof
multipleincomesourcestofarmdwellerlivelihoodstrategies(seealsoCousins(2013[94]). Morethan
half of farm dweller households (60.6%) have more than one income source, in a range of 0 to 12,
whileonly38.1%ofhouseholdshaveasingleincome. Themostfrequentlystatedsecondaryincome
sourceischildgrants(15.3%),andthemostfrequentcombinationismainlypermanentfull-timefarm
work as the primary income supported by child grants. Reversals are also apparent, for example,
governmentoldagepensionstheprimaryincomesourcesupportedbypart-timeworkonthefarm.
Othersecondaryincomesourcesincludeothersocialgrants(childfostergrants,disabilitygrants),own
businesses,secondpart-timejobsinadditiontoaprimaryjob,andremittances. Whilework-social
grantlivelihoodcombinationsmayavoidtheprecariousnessofintermittentcontractedwork,veryfew
farmdwellerssecurethiscombinationoflivelihoodstrategyorthealternativeincomesourcefrom
contractedandseasonalworkopportunities19.
Wethussuggestthatdecliningpermanentemployment(inagricultureandindustry)andmodes
oflabourcasualisationoffarmlabourthatexcludefarmdwellers,togetherwithunevenaccesstosocial
17 Primaryincomereferstotheincomethatgeneratesthehighestamountofcashinamonth.
18 Thisispossiblybecauselabourcontractors,whoincreasinglysupplyseasonalworkerstoforestryplantations(seeKhosa,
2000[93])andsugarcanefarms,donotemployfarmdwellersbutsecurelabourfromoff-farmlocations.
19 Withtheincreaseinlabourbrokers,labourcontractorsandsub-contractors(seeKhosa2000[93]fortheforestrysector),itis
possiblethatfarmdwellersaresidelinedasasourceoflabourinpreferencetoothersourcesoflabour.However,thiswould
requireinvestigation.