Falling behind: explaining the development gap between Latin America and the United States

327 Pages·2008·2.661 MB·English

by  Fukuyama, Francis

falling behind
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edited by francis fukuyama
FALLING BEHIND
Explaining the Development Gap
Between Latin America
and the United States
1
2008
1
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Copyright © 2008 by Francis Fukuyama
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Brecha entre América Latina y Estados Unidos. English
Falling behind : explaining the development gap
between Latin America and the United States / edited by Francis Fukuyama.
p. cm.
Papers presented at an international seminar held in Buenos Aires, November 2005.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-536882-6
1. Latin America—Foreign economic relations—United States—Congresses.
2. United States—Foreign economic relations—Latin America—Congresses.
I. Fukuyama, Francis. II. Title.
HF1480.5.Z4U535 2008
338.98—dc22 2007050154
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
Preface
Literature tends to precede history and politics, to condense
them, reveal them. Zavalita’s phrase in Mario Vargas Llosa’s
famous novel, “At what precise moment had Peru fucked itself
up?” has become the painful epigraph of life in Latin America.1 By ask-
ing “when,” Vargas Llosa was also asking how much, how, for what pur-
pose, due to whom, and why. The question searched for an explanation
and, secretly, a light, an exit. The character lived in a feeble country,
one that does exist. He lived in a country that took the wrong path,
lost opportunities, lived on dreams, tolerated sharp inequalities, tore its
social fabric, and suffered many times under tyranny. However, he also
lived in a country that held then, and holds now, an invaluable histori-
cal, artistic, and cultural treasure: its indigenous roots, those “subter-
ranean rivers” to which José María Arguedas referred, and that miracle
of mestizo convergence (communion) between the indigenous and the
Spanish that is the unique essence of “The Inca,” Garcilaso de la Vega.
Then came the tumultuous but promising nineteenth century, with
its poorly digested if authentic liberalisms and positivisms, followed by
an inexhaustible fl ow of isms in the twentieth century, some noble (like
those of José Carlos Mariátegui) and some abominable (like Sendero
Luminoso’s Maoism). Peru was and is a land emblematic of an unre-
solved and perhaps insoluble tension between the deep presence of the
past and the urgency of the inevitable future, a mythical paradise yet
also an inferno for the conquistadores, a crucible and Babel of ethnicities
and religions.
Zavalita’s celebrated phrase reached far and wide, as Vargas Llosa’s
mention of Peru referred not only to Peru; his readers in every corner
of the complex and plural subcontinent called Latin America under-
stood immediately that, when speaking of Peru, the narrator referred
to all of them. When, exactly, had this region—joined together by a
shared language, history, set of traditions, and culture, yet separated
by political boundaries, countless disputes, geographical barriers, and
random events—gone astray in its development path?
Zavalita’s lament about Peru and Latin America implied a broader
context. At the core of his question lay the shadow of another: why had
this America (the one that José Martí proudly called “our A merica”)
turned out so differently from the other America? After all, European
presence in Latin America began a century earlier, allowing for the
establishment of universities and printing presses, along with the
emergence of rich cultural activity, as early as the sixteenth century.
Furthermore, Latin America was—and is still today—endowed with
seemingly inexhaustible natural resources. A region never lacking in
illustrious and patriotic citizens, it achieved independence from Spain
and Portugal nearly two centuries ago. Why then did this America fall
into a premature decline while the other America fl ourished?
This question, which also echoes the issue of destiny, has for
more than a century perplexed those interested in the region, and
will likely continue to bewilder others for generations to come.
Intellectuals from both the Right and the Left have formulated this
question through many different lenses, generally expressing the
lowest of passions: rancor, resentment, envy. We are less fortunate
because they have made us so: their success is rooted in our failure.
They—the plunderers, the exploiters, the victimizers—are, in the
eyes of many, the United States. And when blame is not squarely
placed on the United States, usually a more devious interpretation
is offered: rather than outright denial of the development gap, a
complete reversal, substituting failure with success, is declared. The
latter argument is in line with Rodó, Vasconcelos, and several armed
and disarmed prophets of the dogmatic Left who have argued that
they are not the victors, but rather we—the repositories of spiritual
truths, which are “superior” to the rude desires that poison the
“empire”—are the victors.
But reality speaks for itself. This America, Latin America, can be
immensely rich culturally, spiritually, and artistically, but it is plagued
by economic and social problems. The other America, the United
States, is the leading world power. Thus, the long-used, irrefutable
term that characterizes the condition separating these two Americas, is
one simple word: gap.
vi Preface
The trajectory that brought the United States to its privileged
position in the world in the twenty-fi rst century is well known, yet
it is impressive and worth outlining nonetheless. The United States
contributes one-fi fth of the gross global product, and it generates 25
percent of the world’s industrial production. It is the largest food pro-
ducer, and 5 of the top 12 industrial fi rms in the world are from the
United States. The country’s petroleum-refi ning capacity is about 15
million barrels per day, and its coal reserves are practically inexhaust-
ible. Other factors that help to make the United States the fi rst eco-
nomic power of the planet include a multitude of large ports, an active
railroad network spanning more than 172,000 miles, and a highway
network of over 3.7 million miles. Its more than 14,000 commercial
banks constitute the world’s most extensive and complex fi nancial sys-
tem. Due to its impressively large internal market, U.S. exports, which
represent 7 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, are less
relevant to its economy than those of other developed countries, such
as Japan or Germany, and the United States has maintained a trade
defi cit of variable magnitude since 1976.
The United States is also home to some of the most infl uential uni-
versities and research centers in the world. With no close rival in sci-
ence and technology research and development, it is the world’s leader
in virtually all scientifi c fi elds. The United States is also the world’s
hegemonic military power. Politically, the United States stands out as
a federal republic with an effective system of separation of powers and
the most overarching and deep-rooted system of civil liberties. In its
more than 200 years of history as an independent country, the United
States suffered, it is true, a bloody civil war (1861–1865), but from it
arose a sustained basic harmony that has allowed the country to avoid
any violent change of political regime and institutional framework.
The contrast between the U.S. reality and that of Latin America is
painfully palpable. With some exceptions and taking into account that
clear differences exist among the different countries, the overall living
conditions of most Latin Americans are exceedingly poor. Some parts
of the region are stricken by acute poverty, while the subcontinent’s
levels of economic inequality are among the most extreme in the
world. Both unemployment and underemployment are markedly high
and chronic. Latin America could effectively compete in the global
economy by mobilizing its human resources, but the quality of public
education is defi cient, and the public and private sectors contribute
little to scientifi c and technological development. Malnutrition is as
much a problem as the region’s weak public health services. To make
Preface vii
matters worse, since the mid-1980s, Latin American countries have
witnessed a terrible criminal pandemic led by drug lords and gang-
sters. The threat to personal safety in Rio de Janeiro, Medellín, San
Salvador, and Mexico City drives away investment and discourages
social, economic, and political participation. And to top it all, our
political institutions, our laws, our civic practices, and our democra-
cies are fragile.
These facts raise several key questions. For example, is Latin
America incapable of competing in the current international land-
scape? Or, why is it that Latin America remains underdeveloped, while
countries in other regions that were poor just a few decades ago have
managed to emerge from poverty and continue to develop? At the
core of these questions lies a deeper one regarding Latin America’s
place in history: what, really, is Latin America? Making reference to
Mexico, Octavio Paz answered that question with poetic precision:
Latin America is “an eccentric outpost of the West.” Latin America
is the West, but it remains at its margin. There are times when the
region appears to wish not to be part of the West and to turn its back on
the cardinal objectives of Western civilization: individual liberties and
material well-being. What, then, are the region’s aims? At times, they
seem to be elusive utopias, other times bloody revolutions; but they
are mostly futile efforts to jump-start history. Meanwhile, the region’s
eccentricity continues to be a source of confusion. But the facts are
there. Both Americas exist and coexist with diffi culty: there is no real
bridge between them but, instead, a gap.
This volume seeks to explain the development gap between Latin
America and the United States, both from a historical viewpoint and
from a political/institutional perspective. The implications for Latin
America’s future are important. Although today most countries in the
region embrace liberal democratic values and institutions, a number
of past and current leaders have advocated an alternative, less demo-
cratic course. What will be the impact on the gap between the two
Americas should such leaders prevail? Today’s defenders of an alterna-
tive course argue that the gap will narrow: high oil and gas prices will
better enable them to implement government programs geared toward
improving income distribution and social justice. But they are mis-
taken. Once again, as in the times of Aristotle, the demagogues mislead
their people and, while precipitating revolutionary movements, they
will quietly kill democracy. Oil, even more so than the ozone layer or
the Arctic glaciers, has an expiration date. The West will not sit idle in
the face of its own destruction; eventually, new sources of energy will
viii Preface
be devised. And what will the oil market–dependent countries do then?
The gap will no doubt become an abyss.
The success of an authentically democratic system depends on the
support of a virtuous citizenry, which in turn can only exist within
the framework of free and transparent law-abiding institutions. At the
beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, a majority of the countries in
Latin America are fi rmly set on a democratic course, the true republi-
can course embraced at the time of independence from Europe, not its
dictatorial caricature.
The development gap between Latin America and the United
States is not a fatal condition. The latter was able to build an admirable
political system that runs like clockwork, even if tainted by vestiges of
racism and by an often myopic foreign policy. Latin America, on the
other hand, inherited an admirable cultural tradition, but proceeded
to squander it in a succession of civil wars, military uprisings, atrocious
tyrannical episodes, and revolutionary delusions. Fortunately, most of
the countries in the region have become aware of their historical fail-
ures and of their Western identity. They are no longer frivolous about
it, but have instead become serious players who follow clear rules in
the most serious of games: building for future generations a social
atmosphere in which basic human decency is able to fl ourish.
Enrique Krauze
Note
1. Mario Vargas Llosa, Conversation in the Cathedral (New York: Harper & Row,
1974), p. 3.
Preface ix