Failure to Protect Antiminority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004

2004·3 MB·English

by  Bouckaert, Peter

HumanRightsWatch July2004Vol.16No.6(D)
Failureto Protect:
Anti-MinorityViolenceinKosovo,March2004
SUMMARY
t
RECOMMENDATIONS 4
INTRODUCTION 7
BACKGROUND:KOSOVO’SUNRESOLVEDSTATUSANDTHEROLEOF
THEINTERNATIONALCOMMUNITYINKOSOVO 10
BACKGROUND:KOSOVO’SUNRESOLVEDSTATUSANDTHEROLEOF
THEINTERNATIONALCOMMUNITYINKOSOVO 10
TheEstablishmentandRoleofKFOR 11
TheEstablishmentandRoleofUNMIK 13
TheKosovoPoliceService 14
THESPARKSTHATCAUSEDAFIRE 15
TheShootingofJovicaIvicinCaglavica 16
TheRoleofthe“WarAssociations” 17
TheDrowningofThreeBoysintheIbarRiver 19
FAILURETOPROTECT:UNMIKANDKFOR’SINABILITYTOPROTECT
SERBSANDOTHERMINORITIES 20
THEVIOLENCE:ETHNICALBANIANATTACKSONSERBSANDROMA 26
WastheViolenceSpontaneousorOrganized? 26
TheMitrovicaandCaglavicaClashes 28
AttacksAgainstSerbsandRoma,andtheFailuretoProtect 30
Pristina/Prishtine 30
Lipljan/Lipjan 33
Svinjare/Frasher 34
Slatina/Sllatine 37
Vucitm/Vushtrii 38
KosovoPolje/FusheKosove 42
Obilic/Obiliq 47
BeloPolje/Bellopoje 50
Djakovica/Gjakove 52
Prizren 53
THERESPONSEOFTHEKOSOVARLEADERSHIPTOTHEVIOLENCE 57
THESITUATIONFORSERBS,ROMA,ANDOTHERNON-ALBANIAN
MINORITIESINKOSOVOAFTERTHEVIOLENCE 62
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 65
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SUMMARY
Forthelastfiveyears,somanyinternationalshavecometostudyourproblemsthatI
can’teven countthem anymore, andthey haveproducedtons ofreports and
recommendations.Intheend,theresultwasthatIlosteverythingIhavebuiltforforty
years,whiletheinternationalcommunitywatchedfromafewhundredmetersaway.I
don’tevenhaveasi—nglephotographleftfrommylife.Andnowtheytellmetogoback
andrebuildmylife howcanItrustthem?
DisplacedSerbresidentofSvinjare
WealwaysknewthatKosovowouldnotbeinvaded.KFORisinKosovotoprotect
againstcivilviolence,disturbances,andethnicviolence.Theydon’tneedtanksbutriot
gearandshields,andsoldierstrainedindealingwithpublicdisorder.IfKFORwas
notpreparedforsuchcivildisorder,thenwhythehecknot? Whatdidtheythinkthey
wereinKosovofor?
SeniorUNMIKofficial
OnMarch17and18,2004,violentriotingbyethnicAlbanianstookplacethroughout
Kosovo,spurredbysensationalandultimatelyinaccuratereportsthatSerbshadbeen
responsibleforthedrowningofthreeyo—ungAlbanianchildren.Fornearlyforty-eight
hours,thesecuritystructuresinKosovo theNATO-ledKosovoForce(KFOR),the
interna—tionalU.N. (UNMIK)police,andthelocallyrecruitedKosovoPoliceService
(KPS) almostcompletelylostcontrol, as atleastthirty-threemajorriotsbrokeout
acrossKosovo,involvinganestimated51,000participants.
Theviolence across Kosovo represents the most serious setbacksince 1999 inthe
internationalcommunity’seffortstocreate amulti-ethnicKosovoinwhichboththe
governmentandcivilsocietyrespecthumanrights.FromthecapitalPristina/Prishtine,1
tocitieslikePrizrenandDjakovica/Gjakove,tosmallvillageslikeSlatina/Sllatineand
BeloPolje/Bellopoje,largeethnicAlbaniancrowdsactedwithferociousefficiencytorid
theirareasofallremainingvestigesofaSerbpresence,andalsotargetedotherminorities
suchas Roma,includingAshkaliwho areAlbanian-speakingRoma. Inmanyofthe
communitiesaffectedbyviolence,inattacksbothspontaneousandorganized,everysingle
Serb,Roma,orAskaelihomewasburned.InthevillageofSvinjare/Frasher,all137Serb
homes were burned, but ethnic Albanian homes were left untouched. In nearby
1Forthesakeofclarityandconsistency,HumanRightsWatchprovidesboththeSerbianandAlbaniannameat
firstmentionoflocation.SubsequentreferencesareintheSerbianlanguageonly,sincethisistheEnglish
languagepractice(forexample,PristinaandnotPrishtine).
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—
Vucitrn/Vushtrii,theethnicAlbaniancrowdattackedtheAshkalicommunity,burning
sixty-nineAshkalihomes.In KosovoPolje/Fushe Kosove,oneSerbwasbeatento
death,andoveronehundredSerbandRomahomeswereburned,aswellasthepost
office,theSerbianOrthodoxChurch,theSerbianschool,andtheSerbianhospital.Even
thetiniestSerbpresenceswereatargetforthehostilecrowds: ethnicAlbaniancrowds
attackedtheSerbianOrthodoxChurchinDjakovicaforhours,ultimatelydrivingout
fiveelderlySerbwomenwhowerethelastremainingSerbsinDjakovica,fromapre-war
populationofmorethan3,000.
TheMarchviolenceforcedou—ttheentireSerbpopulationfromdozensoflocations
includingthe capital Pristina andequally affectedRomaandAshkali communities.
Aftertwodaysofrioting,atleast550homesandtwenty-sevenOrthodoxchurchesand
monasterieswereburned,leavingapproximately4,100Serbs,Roma,Ashkali,andother
non-Albanianminoritiesdisplaced.Some2,000—personsstillremaindisplacedmonths
later,livingincrowdedandunsanitaryconditions includinginunheatedandunfinished
apartments,crowded schools, tentcamps on KFORmilitarybases, andevenmetal
truckingcontainers.ThefutureofminoritiesinKosovohasneverlookedbleaker.
The—securityorganizationsinKosovo—KFOR,UNMIKinternationalpolice,andthe
KPS failedcatastrophicallyintheirmandatetoprotectminoritycommunitiesduring
theMarch2004violence.Innumerouscases,minoritiesunderattackwereleftentirely
unprotectedandatthemercyoftherioters.InSvinjare,FrenchKFORtroopsfailedto
cometotheassistanc—eofthebesiegedSerbs,eventhoughtheirmainbasewasjustafew
hundredmetersaway infact,theethnicAlbaniancrowdhadwalkedrightpastthebase
onitswaytoburningdownthevillage.FrenchKFORtroopssimilarlyfailedtorespond
tothe riotinginVucitrn,which is locatedinbetweentwo major Frenchbases. In
Prizren,GermanKFORtroopsfailedtodeploytoprotecttheSerbpopulationandthe
many historic Serbian Orthodox churches, despite calls for assistance from their
UNMIK international police counterparts, who later accused German KFOR
commandersofcowardice.InKosovoPolje,UNMIKandKFORwerenowheretobe
seenasAlbaniancrowdsmethodicallyburnedSerbhomes.ThevillageofBeloPolje,
rebuiltontheoutskirtsofPectohousereturningSerbs,wasburnedtothegroundeven
thoughitwasalmostadjacenttothemainItalianKFORbase.ItalianKFORsoldiers
refusedtoapproachthebesiegedSerbs,forcingtheSerbstorunforseveralhundred
metersthroughahostileAlbaniancrowd,beforeKFORevacuatedthem.SeveralSerbs
were wounded in the process. Even in the capital Pristina, Serbs were forced to
barricadethemselvesintotheirapartments,whileAlbanianrioters shotatthem and
lootedandburnedtheapartmentsbelowandaroundthem,foruptosixhoursbefore
KFORandUNMIKcametotheirassistance.
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ThefailureofUNMIKinternationalpoliceandKFORtoeffectivelyrespondtothe
violenceleftmuchofthesecurityinthehandsoftheKosovoPoliceService(KPS).The
locallyrecruitedKPS,manyofthemonlyrecentlytrained,werepoorlyequippedtodeal
withtheviolence.SomeKPSofficersactedprofessionallyandcourageously,riskingtheir
ownlivestorescuebesiegedSerbs andotherminoritiesinmanytownsandvillages.
However,manyotherKPSofficersstoodbypassivelyastheethnicAlbaniancrowds
burnedhomesandattackedSerbsandotherminorities,evenwhenthoseattackstook
placejustmetersaway.SomeKPSofficersshowedaclearbiasbyarrestingonlySerbs
and otherminoritieswhowere defendingtheirhomes,while ignoringthe criminal
behaviorofethnicAlbanians occurringin frontoftheireyes. Inafewcases, KPS
officerswereaccusedoftakinganactivepartintheburningofminorityhomes.
Theinternationalcommunityappearstobeinabsoluteden—ialaboutitsow—nfailuresin
Kosovo.Whileinternationalactorshavebeenuniversally andaccurately criticalof
thefailuresoftheKosovoAlbanianleadershipduringandafterthecrisis,thedismal
performance of the international community has escaped similar critical scmtiny.
Instead,theleadershipofKFORandUNMIKseemhappytocontinuewith“business
asusual,”rath—erthanputtinginplacethereformsneededtopreventarecurrenceof
massviolence andarenewedcollapseofthesecurityinstitutionsinthefuture.
AnexhaustiveandtransparentreviewofKosovo’ssecurityinstitutions,resultingina
drastic overhaul ofits inefficient structures, is urgently needed. Kosovo’s security
institutions needtobe adequately staffedwithpersonnelwho arewell trained and
adequatelyequippedtorespondtoriotsituations.Acoordinatedsecuritysystemmustbe
developedbetweenKFOR,UNMIK,andtheKPS,puttinganendtointer-institutional
tensionsandrivalries.KFORinparticularmustdevelopaunifiedcommandstructure
andacommonresponsesystemtoviolenceinKosovo,abandoningthedecentralized
structuresandwidelydisparatenationaldoctrinesthatcontributedtothechaosofMarch
17and18. Ultimatelythesecurityofminoritycommunitieswillrestinthehandsof
locallycreatedinstitutionssuch astheKPS—justasitdidinmanylocationsduring
March.ItisessentialtothefutureofminoritiesinKosovothereforethattheKPSis
developed into a tmly professional, impartial, well-trained police service that sees
protectionofminoritiesasoneofitscoremandates.
TheinternationalcommunityhaslosttremendousgroundinKosovoasaresultofthe
Alarchviolence:ethnicAlbanianextremistsnowknowthattheycaneffectivelychallenge
the international security structures, having demolished the notion ofKFOR and
UNMIKinvincibility;andethnicminoritieshavelostalmostalloftheremainingtrust
they had left in the international community. Time is running out for both the
internationalcommunityandminoritiesinKosovo,andnowisthetimeforresoluteand
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transparent action to rectify the all-too obvious shortcomings ofthe international
community’ssecuritystructuresinKosovo.
RECOMMENDATIONS
TotheContactGroupgovernments:
TheContactGroupcountries(France,Germany,Italy,Russia,U.S.andU.K),alongwith
NATO,andtheU.N.SecurityCouncil,shouldincreasetheirengagementwithKosovo
toimprovethesecurityofminorities. AthoroughreviewandreformoftheNATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR) andthe UnitedNationsInterimAdministrationin Kosovo
(UNMIK)structuresisurgentlyneeded,andwillrequireattentionandsupportatthe
highestlevelstobeeffective.Theoverlapping,andattimescompeting,rolesofvarious
internationalinstitutionsarehamperingKosovo’srecovery,anditisimportantthatthe
ContactGroupactsinunitytocarryoutthenecessaryreformsinKosovo.Therefore,
HumanRightsWatchismakingrecommendationstotheContactGroup asawhole,
ratherthantheindividualinstitutionsinchargeofcomponentelementsofKosovo’s
governanceandsecurity.
• Carryoutathorough,independent,andimpartialreviewoftheresponseof
KFOR,internationalUNMIKpolice,andtheKosovoPoliceService(KPS)
to the March violence, focusingparticularlyon the failure ofKosovo’s
security organizations to protect minorities from ethnically motivated
violenceandtheshortcomingsofcoordinationbetweenthevarioussecurity
organizationsinKosovo.
• Reviewthecommandstructure andmake-up ofKFOR,withaviewto
creatingaKFORwithaunifiedcommandstructureabletorespondquickly
anduniformlytoKosovo-wideviolence,byensuringuniformityofresponse
tosecurityincidents,andbe—ingfreeofrestrictionsbynationalcon—tingentsof
their“rulesofengagement commonlyreferredtoas“caveats” ontroop
deploymentthathamperedtheKFORresponsetotheMarch2004violence.
• ExpandthesizeofKFORandinternationalUNMIKpolicetoensurean
adequatenumberofsecurityofficersto address the securitysituationin
Kosovo.
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EnsurethatKFORtroopsandUNMIKcivilianpolicedeployedtoKosovo
areexperiencedinriot-controlsituations,includinggraduateduse-of-force
responsetoriotsituations,andhavethenecessaryequipmenttorespondto
riotsituationsandothermassdisturbances.
Together with Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
(PISG),takeimmediatestepstoimprovethelivingconditionsofthosestill
displacedfromtheMarch2004violence.Addressthecontinuingsecurity
concernsoftheminoritiesdisplacedbytheMarch2004violenceinfull
conformitywiththeU.N.GuidingPrinciplesontheInternallyDisplaced;
ensure adequate consultationwiththe displaced andprovide themwith
options,includingreconstructionoftheirhomesorrelocationifthesecurity
situationsorequires.
Take the lead ininitiatingandinstitutionalizing a dialogue between the
PISG,KosovoSerbleaders,andthegovernmentofSerbiatoimprovethe
securityofminoritiesin Kosovo,enddiscriminationintheprovisionof
publicservices,andresolvetheissueofparallelinstitutions.
Seek accountability for ethnically motivated crimes in Kosovo, by
prioritizing the strengthening of impartial investigative and judicial
mechanismsinKosovo.
AsrequestedbyUNMIK,increasethenumberofUNMIKinvestigators,
prosecutors,andjudgestogiveUNMIKadequatecapacitytoinvestigateand
prosecutecriminalactscommittedduringtheMarchviolence,inaccordance
withinternationalstandards.
Continuetomakeclearandforcefulpublicstatementsthatamultiethnic
Kosovoinwhichtherightsofallinhabitantsarerespectedisoneofthe
principalobjectivesoftheinternationalcommunity.
ProvideinternationalprotectiontoethnicminoritiesforcedtofleeKosovo
forfearofpersecution.Ensurethatthosefleeingtoneighboringcountriesor
elsewhere in Western Europe have access to full and fair asylum
determinationprocedures andaretreatedhumanelywith fullrespectfor
theirhumanrights.AsylumseekersfromKosovowhohadtheirapplications
rejectedpriortotheMarchviolence,orthosewho soughttovoluntarily
5 HUMANRIGHTSWATCHVOL.16,NO.6(D)
returntoKosovo,shouldhavetheirapplicationsreconsideredinlightofthe
March2004violenceandthechangedsecurityconditionsinKosovo.
• Prioritizethestrengtheningofacredible,professional,andimpartialKosovo
Police Service by improving training programs and ensuring adequate
equipment for KPS officers (including riot-control equipment). Salary
packages forKPS officers shouldbe increasedtoprofessionallevels to
ensuretherecruitmentandretentionofqualitypersonnel.
ToKosovo’sProvisionalInstitutionsofSelf-Government:
• CommitKosovotoamultiethnicfuture,andmakeclearthatattacksagainst
minoritieswillbevigorouslyprosecuted.
• TakeresponsibilityforthesecurityofminoritiesinKosovo,andmakethe
securityofminoritiesinKosovoastrategicpriorityforthePISG.Carryout
thenecessaryreformswithinthe PISG andKPS to ensure security for
minoritiesinKosovo.
• Acknowle—dgethatKosovo’sinstitutions—politicalleaders,themedia,and
thePISG werepartlytoblamefortheoutbreakofviolenceinMarch2004
byinitiallymakinginflammatorystatements,andinstitutereformstoprevent
futureanti-minorityviolenceinKosovo.
• SeekdialoguewithKosovo’sSerbleadershipandthegovernmentofSerbia
andMontenegro to improve the security ofminorities in Kosovo, end
discriminationintheprovisionofpublicservices,andresolvetheissueof
parallelinstitutions.
• Seekto increase the multiethnic nature ofinstitutions ofgovernance in
Kosovo,andactdeterminedlyagainstdiscriminationintheprovision of
publicservices.
TotheGovernmentofSerbiaandMontenegro:
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• Seek dialogue withboth the PISG and the international institutions in
KosovotoimprovethesecurityofminoritiesinKosovo,enddiscrimination
in the provision ofpublic services, and resolve the issue ofparallel
institutions.
INTRODUCTION
OnMarch17,2004,violentriotingbyethnicAlbaniancrowdsbrokeoutinKosovo,a
dayafterethnicAlbaniannewsagenciesinKosovoreportedsensationalandultimately
inaccuratereportsthatthreeyoungchildrenhaddrownedafterbeingchasedintothe
riverbySerbs.2 Withlightingspeed,thecrowdviolencespreadalloverKosovo,with
theKosovoauthoritiescountingthirty-threemajorriotsinvolvinganestimated51,000
participantsoverthenexttwodays.3 LargeethnicAlbaniancrowdstargetedSerb4and
othernon-Albaniancommunities,burningatleast550homesandtwenty-sevenSerbian
Orthodoxchurches andmonasteries, andleavingapproximately4,100 Serbs,Roma,
Ashkali (Albani—an-speaking Roma), and other non-Albanian mino—rities5 displaced.6
NoivenreteaenthpoeuospalnedweoiughntdKeods—ovionclSuedribnsgamndoreelevtehnanKo1s2o0voKAFlObaRniasonlsdierwseraendkiUlleNd,MaInKd
policeofficers,andfifty-eightKosovoPoliceService(KPS)officers.
TheviolenceofAlarch2004wasnotthefirsttimenon-Albanianscameunderattackin
Kosovo. During the 1999 conflict between NATO and Yugoslavia over Kosovo,
KosovarAlbanianswere subjectedto asystematiccampaignofmass murder, rape,
forcedexpulsions, andotherwar crimes committedby Serb andYugoslav forces.7
WhenethnicAlbaniansreturnedtoKosovowiththeentryofNATO,Kosovo’sSerb,
Roma,andotherminoritieswereimmediatelysubjectedtoviolence,causingamassive
2Seebelow,ChapterV,SectionC,“TheDrowningofThreeBoysintheIbarRiver,”foradetaileddiscussion.
3“U.N.DetailsWideScaleofKosovoViolence,”Reuters,March22,2004.
4Theterm“Serb”isusedinthisreporttorefertopersonsofethnicSerboriginlivinginKosovo.Theterm
“Serbian”wouldapplytocitizensofthestateofSerbiaandMontenegroorformalentities,suchastheSerbian
OrthodoxChurchortheSerbianlanguage.Theterm“ethnicAlbanian”referstoethnicAlbanianslivingin
Kosovo.
5SomeethnicminoritiesinKosovo,suchasethnicTurks,werenottargetedbytheviolence.
6OrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(OSCE)MissioninKosovo,DepartmentofHuman
RightsandRuleofLaw,“HumanRightsChallengesFollowingtheMarchRiots,”p.4.
7ForadetailedhistoryofthewarcrimescommittedbySerbandYugoslavforcesduringtheKosovoconflict,
seeHumanRightsWatch,UnderOrders:WarCrimesinKosovo(NewYork:HumanRightsWatch,2001).
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outflowofno—n-AlbaniansfromKosovo.8Highlevelsofviole—nceagainstnon-Albanian
communities muchofitpolitically-motivatedandorganized continuedformonths,
withthe international trooppresence andU.N. administration largely ineffective in
stoppingtheviolence.
Whiletheintensityoftheviolenceintheimmediatepost-warperiodsubsided,Serbsand
otherminoritiescontinuedtoberegularlyattackedinKosovo.Forexample,onAugust
31, 2003, a grenade was thrown at a group of Serbs in the mixed village of
Cernica/Cernice, near Gnjilane/Gjilan, killing a thirty-five-year-old schoolteacher,
MiomarSavic,andwoundingfourotherSerbs.OnAugust13,2003,twoSerbyouth
agedelevenandtwentywerekilledwithautomaticweaponswhileswimminginariver
neartheSerbianenclaveofGorazdevac/Gorazhdec.9OnJune3,2003,eighty-year-old
SlobodanStolic,hisseventy-eight-year-oldwifeRadmila,andtheirfifty-three-year-old
sonLjubmkowere axedtodeathintheirObilic/Obiliqhome,whichwas then set
alight.10 InApril 2003, Amnesty International released a detailedreport on attacks
againstminoritiesinKosovo,concludingthat
[ajlmost four years after the end ofthe war in Kosovo, minority
communitiesarestillatriskofkillingsandassaults,mostlyatthehands
ofthemajoritycommunityintheirarea.Onadailybasis,theyaredenied
effectiveredressforactsofviolenceandotherthreatstotheirphysical
andmentalintegrity.11
TheinsecureenvironmentinwhichSerbsfoundthemselvesinKosovoledtotheflight
ofalmosttheentireSerbpopulationinmanyurbancenters. Forexample,theSerb
populationofthetownofDjakovicadroppedfromanestimated3,000in1999,tojust
fiveelderlySerbwomenpriortotheMarchevents.12TheremainingelderlySerbwomen.
HumanRightsWatch,“AbusesAgainstSerbsandRomaintheNewKosovo,"August1999.Notalldepartures
ofSerbsandothernon-AlbaniansfromKosovowereadirectresultofanti-minorityviolence.SomeSerbsand
othernon-AlbaniansdepartedfromKosovoorresettledinmajoritySerbareasimmediatelyafterthe1999
conflict,eitherbecausetheyfearedfuturemistreatment,orbecausetheymadeaconsciousdecisiontheydid
notwanttoliveinanethnic-Albaniandominatedstate,or,foraminorityofthoseleaving,becausetheyfeared
futureprosecutionforcrimescommittedbythemselvesduringtheconflict.
9BBCNews,“UNactsoverKosovokillings,"August14,2003[online],
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/1/hi/world/europe/3150775.stm(retrievedJuly6,2004).Beta,“GorazdevacVictimsLaid
toRest,”August13,2003.
10“ThreeSerbsMurderedinKosovo:UN,”AgenceFrancePresse,June4,2003.
11AmnestyInternational,“SerbiaandMontenegro(Kosovo/Kosova):MinorityCommunities:Fundamental
RightsDenied,”AlIndexEUR70/011/2003,April1,2003[online],
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGEUR700112003.
12OSCE,Gjakove/Djakovica:MunicipalProfile,October2003.
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