Facts, Words and Beliefs

180 Pages·1970·17.823 MB·English

by  Timothy L. S. Sprigge

Each of us believes many things to be the
case. At any particular moment in our
lives only a fragment of all that we
believe to be the case can have any sort
of presence in our consciousness. How
can a few stray images or muttered words
running through our mind constitute our
envisagement of some situation perhaps
LIEFS
remote in time and place from our present
position? Facts, Words and Beliefs is
concerned primarily with formulating
this question more precisely and with
suggesting the right way of answering it.
From a practical point of view the
moments when we envisage the nature
of some situation which we believe to
exist may not be of any great importance.
It would seem that our belief in the
existence of these situations lies in some
sort of adjustment of our behaviour to
them which will be useful, if the situations
really exist, from the point of view
of survival and comfort. The author
suggests that these moments of conscious
envisagement of such absent situations
may be rather a sign of such successful
adjustment than a factor in bringing it
about, and hence of no practical value in
themselves. However, if knowledge has
any sort of intrinsic value, it must surely
lie in those moments when one does
consciously envisage some aspect of the
world more or less as it really is, and to
try to understand the nature of these
moments is to try to understand a~l that is
of intrinsic value in knowledge. This is
the main theme of the book. Dr Sprigge
also considers some issues in ontology and
semiotics, such as the status of sense
data, universals and facts, and the nature
of pragmatic and semantic meaning,
which supply an essential background to
his discussion of believing.
of
International Library Philosophy
FACTS, WORDS
and Scientific Method
AND BELIEFS
EDITOR: TED HONDERICH
C 1 of books already published in the
Int~na~1:,,~KI,7brary
of Philosophy and.Scien{ific Method
by
will be found at the end of this vo ume
Timothy L. S. Sprigge
LONDON
ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL
NEW YORK : HUMANITIES PRESS
CONTENTS
First published 19 7° . .
by Routledge & Kegan Paul L1m1ted
Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane
London, E.C.4
Printed in Great Britain
by W & J Mackay & Co Ltd, Chatham, Kent
©Timothy L. S. Sprigge 197°
No part of this book may b~ ~eproduced
in any form without permission fro'!' Preface page vii
the publisher, except f?r th.e .q'!otatzon
of brief passages 111 cr;tzczsm Ontological Background
ISBN o 7100 6823 9 I Sense-data 3
II Universals 52
l Introductory 52
2 Discussion of the Resemblance Theory 56
3 Properties 62
4 Fami!J Resemblance and Open Texture 66
5 Relations 68
6 Syncategorematic Properties 70
7 Relational Properties 72
8 Individ11al Properties 74
9 Complex and Simple Universals; Natural and
Artificial Universals 76
III Facts 82
l Facts and Universals 82
2 The Exemplification Regress 87
3 Properties of Universals and of Facts 8 8
4 Contingent, Essential and Quintessential Properties 90
IV The Experience of Noticing a Universal 93
V Groups 112
Semiotic Background
VI Pragmatic and Semantic Meaning
VII Types of Reference 145
Part Three Imaging and Believing
VIII Acts of Belief and the Intending Relation 171
l Belief as Disposition and Belief as Ocettrrence 171
v
coN'I'EN'I'S
Formulation of our .main pr?bl~m about believing:
2
What is th~ ~ntendzngd~at7~~lations: The
3 Ideal, Quasz-zde~l, an ea 180
PREFACE
Intending Relation
IX Simple. Im~gismN l View to Take of Believing
1 Imagzsm ts a atura 190
and Merits Discussion 191
~ij/e~:=b~1::}!;~f~:~~:and 201
2 Mere Imagining
202
3 Hume's Theory of Beltevzng . 204
4 Bertrand Russell's Versi~n of Imagzsm 206
~ Farewell to Simple Imagzsm
2.08
Each of us believes many things to be the case. At any particular
X Imagist-Activism
moment in our lives only a minute fragment of all that we believe
XI ImTagist:tJ':'lenfitraol;n;_maaist-Activism to Imagist- to be the case can have any sort of presence in our consciousness.
1 ransz zon o Still, such fragments as are present pose us this problem. How can
Mentalism b . . . the existence of an F and
2 Relation betiveen e1 z~vzn[c. zn a few stray images, muttered words or whatever, which run
noticing that something is ~ . through our minds somehow constitute (as surely they can do)
3 Believing in Relati~na! Ob;ectzves. d l!J the our envisagement of some situation perhaps remote in time and
4 Illustrations of ~elzevzng as conceive 234 place from our present position? Most of this book is devoted to
imagist-mentalzst .
an attempt to formulate this question rather more precisely than
. . f Imagist-Mentahsm
XII Difficulties and Apphca~1ons o has been done in these few words and to make some suggestions
1 Belief in Logical Necessz~. regarding the right way of answering it. From a practical point
Imagist-Mentalism and Time. l Ob. t
234 ANl toenr-neax:zzs.vt een t-tV.a :11 'e iBvse 1 oz.ei fv zM. nga~t. .e .r( z1a) Tru1.JtChCj usn ctions oi f soofm veie swit uthaeti omno wmheincths wweh benel iwevee s toom eexhisotw m eanyv nisoatg be et hoef annaytu grer eoatf
simple existential propositions -,+ . importance. Our belief in the existence of these situations may
Non-existential Belie~i~gs (2) Belie; zn 274 be largely regarded as lying in some sort of adjustment of our
5
DCou~terfadctSuaulbi~~::::o~~~ditionals: The Feeling behaviour to them which will be useful, if the situations really exist,
6 eszre an J • from the point of view of survival and comfort. These moments of
that a thing is impossible .
conscious envisagement of such absent situations may be rather
7 Difficulties of Ph~ndomenaltsm. d by imagist-mentalism
8 Belief in other vnn s as conceive a sign of such successful adjustment than a factor in bringing it
319
. d Demerits of Imagism d about, and hence of no practical value in themselves. From what
XIII Merits .anM 1· Substitute-Mentalism, an might be called a spiritual point of view, however, they are all
1 Imagzst- enta ism, . 319
Just-as-though-l14entaltsm . d b11 Imagist-Mentalism important. If knowledge has any sort of intrinsic value apart from
2 Linguistic Meaning as conceive '-'. 323 its utility from the point of view of survival and comfort, it must
and Subst~tu~e-l14en~lism reJf::;~~:':1.entalisn1 and surely lie in those moments when one does consciously envisage
3 Final Ai!;udzcatzo~ etween 326
1t;;; some aspect of the world more or less as it really is. 'To try to
Substitute-Menta l°'+' considered as a disposition 331
4 Different senses~1 e ze;. 338 understand the nature of those moments is to try to understand all
5 'Imageless' Belief E:;cf?ertences 345 that is of spiritual value in knowledge.
6 Believing and Conceiving Though this is the main theme of this book, it will not be
349
Index vii
vi
broached for many chapters. For it will be better approached
after we have sought clarity on certain matters to do with ontology
and theory of meaning. The first two parts of this book, entitled
'Ontological background' and 'Semiotic background' respectively
are not, however, put forward solely to serve as backgrounds for Part One
what I have called the main theme. They are also intended as
contributions to ontology and semiotics in their own right. It
seems suitable to present these contributions, such as they are, to
those subjects in association with my discussion of believing, as
ONTOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
my discussion of believing will to quite an extent presuppose, or
otherwise link up with, my ontological and semiotic opinions.
It is to be hoped that this is not a very original work, for on the
whole the more original a philosophical theory is the less likely it
is to be true. It seems to me that the philosophers who have
influenced me most (other than solely by way of negative reaction)
are: William James, George Santayana, G. E. Moore, Bertrand
Russell, H. H. Price, 1 and A. J. Ayer, not to mention the tradi
tional British empiricists. To have pointed out in many cases
where an idea derives from one of these would have been to have
offered the reader a somewhat impertinent lesson in the history of
philosophy in English, of which he probably stands in no need.
I should like to dedicate, and hereby do dedicate, this work to
my wife Giglia, who has been intended by so many of my more
delightful mental acts.
T.L.s.s.
1 Since completion of my work on this book, a masterly new book (Belief,
Allen & Unwin, 1969) by H. H. Price has been published dealing with many
of the same themes as are discussed here. I much regret that I did not have the
benefit of familiarity with this work in composing my own, which, however,
is somewhat different in approach and aim. In Price's terminology, the main
theme of Part Three of my book is an analysis of assenting to a proposition.
This phrase, however, does to my mind rather carry the suggestion with it
that a proposition is first presented to one as a mere 'idea' and that after
consideration one gives one's assent to it, whereas in the cases I am parti
cularly thinking of, some state of affairs is envisaged as really existing from the
start. Price's phrase also has the disadvantage from my point of view that it
includes the word 'proposition'. On the whole, then, I still feel justified in
my use of the word 'belief' after suitable explanations have been offered.
I
viii
I
SENSE-DATA
-
I
A treatment of the philosophy of perception is not among the
main purposes of this work, yet my views on this subject do much
to set the terms in which my discussion of other issues is couched.
It is unfortunate that my views, though in conformity with those
of many wise philosophers, some of them still living and philo
sophically active, are of a kind rather often condemned as out
moded and disproven. What is objected to is not so much any
solution I might offer to what seems to me to be the problem of
perception, as the very terms in which I set it. For me the problem
of perception concerns the answer to these two questions. First,
what view is implicit in the thought of the ordinary man as to the
relation between the material things he perceives and the sense
data immediately present to him when he does so? Second, is this
view correct, and if not, what alternative view may be substituted
for it? My answer to the first question is given in the main text,
and some hint of my answer to the second. (See the later part of
this chapter and Chapter XII, sections and 7.)
2
These questions can only properly be posed if it is proper to
distinguish two factors in each case of perception, first, the sensing
of a certain sense-datum, second, the putting some interpretation
upon this sense-datum of a kind such that, if it is correct, or at
least correct enough, the two factors together will constitute
perception of some material thing.
There are many different ways of exhibiting the propriety of
this distinction. The essential thing is to show that it is proper to
draw a contrast between the sense-datum experienced and the
material thing perceived, for if this distinction is granted there
3
ON'tOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
SENSE-DA'tA
will not probably be much quarrel ov~r _the asserti?n that per
here used u~iv?cally, for good reasoi:-s can be given for denying
ception is a matter of the putting a certain interpretation up?n the
this. !here is, indeed, no way of saying what the change in the
sense-datum which connects it in some way - to be elucidated
appearance ~s which cannot ?e .objected to by philosophers with
when the problem of perception proper is discussed - with a
an axe to grind, for the description of appearances is usually done
material thing.
in an ad hoc and unmethodical manner. I content myself therefore
!here is often talk of arguments for the existence of sense-data,
with simply insisting that the appearance has changed, and that
but as I see the matter this is really somewhat misleading. Argu
the wall has not, at least not in any way relevant to the perceptual
ments for the existence of things of a certain kind must start from
situation. If one thing has changed in a thus relevant way and
premisses which assert the existence of things already admitted to
another thing has not changed, it is a logical inference that the
exist. One who grasps the concept of a sense-datum will not accept
two are not identical. We may point out, that for our purposes it
that it is instantiated, on the basis of argument. Moreover the presen
does not matter if in saying that the appearance has changed what
tation of arguments for the existence of sense-dat~ ha~ often I mean is that one appearance has given way to another or if I
suggested that some hitherto unacknowledg~d fact is bei_ng _es
mean that so.me one thing called the appearance has changed its
tablished, and that the philosopher has something to say which is a
character. Either case equally suffices to establish a contrast
novelty to common sense. Such is not my view of sense-?ata. !he
betw~en the wall and the appearance it presents to me at any time,
contrast I wish to draw between sense-data and material things
provided no one attempts to say that one of these appearances is the
aims simply to make more precise and explicit a contrast which in
wall itself and the other is not. I think it would be rather absurd
effect we all implicitly recognize anyway. We can make the contrast
to say that the appearance the wall presents when looked at with
in such particular everyday cases a~ demand it in ai: ad hoc .ter out sunglasses really is the wall, but that the appearance it presents
minology which is adequate for ordinary cases; but fails to brings
when looked at with sunglasses is not the wall, though doubtless
out the generality of the contrast involved. . .
if one had to be picked out as really being the wall, that would be
1rying to point out to someon~ the propriety of a ?ertain the one. It would be absurd because all that happens is that the
distinction is quite different from trying to prove a conclusion on
medium through which the light waves travel is somewhat
the basis of certain premisses, and there is no question of argu
different in each case, and it is hard to see how this can make such
ment in any proper sense. 1he phrase 'argument from :ariation'
a vast difference to the intimacy of my relation to the wall. The
may be used for certain considerations I shall now mention as apt
question is not, of course, which appearance is a better guide to
for bringing home the distinction between sense-data and material
the character of the wall, but whether it is possible in certain cases
objects. This 'argument' appeals to much the same. facts ;nd
to elude the ontological distinction between appearance and thing.
possibilities as are sometimes marshalled under the hea?ing of the
Anyway, ;ver~ anyone to take this eccentric step of saying that one
argument from illusion', but it differs fro_m the latter in t~e form of these differing appearances really is the wall one would have to
which has been under so much attack in recent years in ways
ask him _to consider cases where the appearance an object (itself
which make most of those attacks quite irrelevant.
unchanging) presents, varies very slightly from one case to another
What then do I mean by the argument from variation? 1his
in a. ~ertain series, as where one views it from gradually changin~
argument sets out from such familiar facts as that i~ I lc~ok at a positions, and ask him whether he can really suppose that any of
white wall without sunglasses on, and then look agam with sun th~se appear.ances has such a special status as to be picked out as
glasses on, while all will admit that there has been no change in being the ob1ect itself.
the character of the wall, there has been a change in the appearance I s~y th~t this argument starts out from familiar facts and it may
of the wall. It is quite natural to elaborate on this by saying that
be said quite correctly that it hardly moves away from them. This
though the wall has not changed colour, the appearance has done
does not represent a deviation from my intention, for all I am
so, but one should be careful not to assume that 'colour' is
really concerned to do is to remind people of the contrast we all
4
5
ONTOLOGICAL BACKGROUND SENSE-DATA
quite naturally make between changes in the appearance a thing First, it is by no means the case that the plain man is particu
presents us with and changes in the thing itself, and that th~ first larly averse to nouns which, if interpreted as having a reference at
by no means always requires that there has been a change m the all, must presumably refer to such things as I call appearances or
second. No one doubts that a thing may present us with a different sense-data. I am not at all clear what a beautiful view is if it is not
appearance according to our position or state, or in virtue of what the joint appearance of a certain set of objects from a certain place.
lies between us, and none of these differing appearances are Use of the noun 'appearance' in the sense adopted here is not
naturally or reasonably thought of as the object itself. These uncommon either.
appearances are what a philosopher such as myself.refers to un~er Second, the fact that one could 'get by' without a certain noun
the heading of sense-data. That there are no precise rules which qualified by such words as 'the' and 'an' and occurring when thus
determine whether in various circumstances we should say that qualified as the subject of sentences, is no good reason for saying
one and the same appearance or sense-datum has changed or that that there is nothing such as it seems to designate. One could
we are now concerned with a numerically different one, does not perhaps have a language geared to absolute idealism in which
affect the fact that on any of the usages left open by what we have 'Reality' is the only proper subject of a sentence and in which all
said and by ordinary language the contrast between a change in the information we provide by talking of material things and
the appearance of a certain object with which one is presented and persons is conveyed by an enrichment of our adjectives, adverbs,
and verbs. I am not in a position to say that this would be possible,
a change in the object itself is absolute.
If it is granted that there is this contrast between the ~ppearance but my point is that if it is so, it seems to count not at all against
presented and the object perceived, it can hardly b.e demed t~at the the assertion that there are persons and material things. If I am to
question as to how these two contrasted elements m ~ercept~on are be shown that there are no such things as sense-data, I need to be
related is a proper one for the philosopher. Nor can 1t be said that shown positively what is wrong in saying that there are, not just
objects only present appearances in exceptional cases of percep to be shown that I could convey information about them without
tion, for one can always consider contrasts between t~e appeai: nouns which refer to them. I would not say that the truth about
ances it presents one with from where one is now, with that 1t the world could not be told without that sort of reference to them
'
only that it can appropriately be told with such reference.
would present one from another position.
I am not unaware that many philosophers would say that there More positively my reason for saying that what changes when I
is a play upon words in moving from t~e fact tha.t th~ngs appear, put on my sunglasses is the character of the appearance presented,
for instance look and feel, somewhat differently m different per and that the appearances are real somethings, lies in the fact that if
ceptual circumstances, to saying that there are looks, feels, .or, I interest myself in how some change in position, or some change
more generally, appearances, which they present. Other philo in myself, such as squinting, putting on sunglasses, being very
sophers may even spend a long time refusing to see which among tired, taking too much alcohol, alters the appearance of things for
various possible senses of 'appear', 'look', etc, is in question, but me, I do seem to attend to a real something, my visual field and its
I think that the kind of phenomenal differences intended should various elements, which I seek to characterize or to compare with
be clear to someone not being merely captious. other somethings of the same status. To attend in this way to that
Where one philosopher says that a thing presents a different large sense-datum called the visual field and its various parts is
appearance in different cases and another philosopher says that quite different from examining a material thing, for in the latter
there is no such thing as the appearance it presents, but that it may case one must continually peer about one in a way which constantly
certainly appear somewhat differently in different cases, it is i:ot alters what one endeavours to preserve as the same in the former
easy to know how the dispute is to be settled. Before pressmg c~se, while the predicates one can use to present one's results are
more forcefully for my own position there are some preliminary different, or different in sense, in each case. Sometimes when I am
tired something happens which I am hard put to describe if I do
points I have to make.
6 7
ONTOLOGICAL BACKGROUND SENSE-DATA
not say that the visual sense-data with which I am presented begin be called images, neither of which is the candle, yet which may
to move up and down. I could perhaps say that things seem to play an important part in my present seeing of the candle, for I
move up and down, but apart from the fact that that suggests suppose no-one will deny that I am seeing the candle.
perhaps a tendency to make a judgment which I. have no ~endency The next stage in the argument is to point out that, if when I see
to make, this ignores the fact that there really 1s somethmg I am a candle double, it presents two images to me, then presumably
attending to and characterizing in this way. As for the fact tha~ my when I see it singly, it presents one image to me. This is not a
language here and elsewhere is largely borrowed from express10ns merely verbal point about what we must say. Doubtless we can
which characterize material situations, that does not mean that avoid saying any such thing if we want to. I am attempting rather
when borrowed they do not take on a new sense. The characteristic to get the reader to dwell on a certain fact, namely that in such a
of my sense-data which I call their moving up and. dow.n is indee.d a case as this, there is just one of that very sort of thing, which we
characteristic which my sense-data would have 1f, without bemg have called candle images, of which there were previously two.
tired, I looked at things which really were moving up and down, First there were two at a certain distance from one another, then
but it is a definite characteristic which would be shared by my sense they coalesced into one.
data in each case and which can be considered for its own sake. Even if neither of the double images was identical with the
Let us now turn to another argument which seems to me very candle, could it still be the case that when I see the candle singly,
compelling, the argument from double imagery. If ~ look at. a what we have just called the single candle image really is identical
candle for a while and then press one of my eyeballs 111 a certam with the candle ? The idea seems rather absurd. How can the mere
way, something happens which I find it natural to describe by fact of a slight push on the eyeball produce such a different situa
saying that there come to be two of something of which pre tion as it would be doing, if neither of those two images are the
viously there was only one. If it is said that this phenomenon of the candle, while what I just called the single image really is the candle?
double image does not involve anything which can be properly After all, men might have had permanent double vision, as a
called the occurrence of two images of the candle, I confess myself friend of mine did for some weeks after a motoring accident, and
baffled. There they are, I can only say, side by side. I can turn my as perhaps some insects have multiple vision. Would such men
thought to the left one or the right one, and note that one is really be denied some sort of direct access to physical reality open
higher than the other, fainter than the other and so on. I can alter to those of single vision? The idea is rather implausible, surely.
the situation so that the two images get further apart or closer No, I do not think we can give such a radically different account
and let them finally coalesce. Perhaps the fact in question can be of what goes on in double vision from what goe3 on in single
described without implying that these candle images are countable vision. That being so, we must either acknowledge that the images,
things in relation to one another, but I confess that such other of which there are two in the one case and one in the other are all
'
descriptions seem to me far less appropriate. If there is anything of them to be distinguished from the candle itself, or we must
in the world which seems clear to me it is that there really are those decide somehow that either one or both of the candle images
two candle images. Can either of these images be supposed to in the double vision case is the candle. It cannot be that both
be the candle itself? It would seem absurd to pick out one of them of them are, for they are clearly not identical with one another
rather than the other for this role. Admittedly one is usually in being at a certain distance, perhaps of different intensities, etc. T~
customary relations to more of the remaining visual field than is choose one of them as actually being the candle is absurdly arbitrary.
the other, but they seem none the less to be too much of a type for I realize that some philosophers will say that one cannot draw
one of them to be picked out for such a striking ontological consequences about the normal case from the abnormal case of
privilege. Can both of them be the candle? I do not see how this double vision. This is a most peculiar claim. More than one
could really be maintained, for they are different things from one psychologist (e.g., William James and Sigmund Freud) has thought
another. I conclude then that we have here two entities which can much could be learnt about the normal mind by the study of the
8 9
ONTOLOGICAL BACKGROUND SENSE-DATA
abnormal, indeed one might say that taking the so called abnormal something so obvious, so that one tends to think that they must
seriously and looking for explanatory concepts which will apply have some purport more 'surprising than the one intended.
equally to it and to the normal is one of the main lines of advance Nonetheless, though in a way the truths in question are obvious,
in knowledge. Not that what we are seeking here is scientific it is easy to become confused about them in philosophizing.1
knowledge, but I think the same point applies to the pursuit of Another 'argument' we may touch on may be called the 'argu
ontological clarity. Moreover, as I have urged, it would not have ment from hallucination'. Consider, as many philosophers have
been impossible for double vision to have been the normal case.1 done, Macbeth and his hallucination of a dagger before him. Does
The main thing we insist on, in any case, is that some flaw be one not have to be very over-sophisticated, however much one
found in the specific argument offered. may pose as the champion of the plain man, to fail to recognize
The step most likely to be challenged is that whereby I move that in such a hallucination something is before or in Macbeth's
from the assertion that in double vision there are two images, to consciousness, just such as would be if he were really perceiving
the assertion that in single vision there is one image. I can only a dagger before him in mid-air, or, if you prefer, were perceiving
repeat that this is not a question of verbal propriety, but of noting a dagger before him in mid-air which really existed? That the
that the sort of thing one is counting when one says that there are presence of such a something before or in his consciousness is not
two candle images, is still there to be counted in the normal case, enough to constitute its being true that there was a dagger there
only now the count ends at one. (Of course, mere images are not follows from the fact that there was not a dagger there. That some
countable - what is counted are images of specific types.) thing is a perfectly definite and far from non-existent something
The reader might do well to be suspicious if he thinks that I am and needs to be distinguished from the dagger, which in fact did
trying to upset some commonsense belief. Double imagery is not not exist. We are not suggesting that Macbeth perceived this some
such an unusual thing, after all, and people don't seem to find it a thing which we, of course, call a sense-datum. One can say either
challenge to their ordinary opinions. However, I am only em that he perceived a dagger which did not exist, or that he seemed to
phasizing a distinction which we all tacitly make anyway, and which
is to some extent reflected in ordinary language. I do not think that 1 On pp. 90-2 of Sense and Sensibilia J. L. Austin discusses some use Ayer
makes of the phenomenon of double imagery. There is little connection
the ordinary man really supposes that his single image of the candle
between our discussion and the issue there as to whether there is a sense of
is the candle itself. He is far too familiar with the fact that the 'perceive', and perceptual verbs in general, in which what I perceive need not
images, or sense-data, which things present may change with exist. A. J. Ayer says that 'if I say that I am perceiving two pieces of paper I
out the thing changing, to have made any such identification. need not be implying that there really are two pieces of paper there', having
the double vision case in mind. Austin objects to what Ayer says on various
These arguments sound odd only because they really labour
grounds. So far as our concern goes it is irrelevant whether when I see a
1 It is really rather bizarre that in Sense and Sensibilia (p. 91) J. L. Austin candle double I may or may not say that I perceive two candles, though
speaks of the double image phenomenon as 'a baffling abnormality'. I doubt myself I think it would be an inappropriate thing to say. The proper thing
whether it is baffling to physiologists, and ontologically it is only baffling if to say is 'I am seeing the candle double' or 'I am getting two images of the
one has some deep reluctance to talk of images or sense-data being involved candle'. Whether I say the former or the latter, the two images are clearly
in perception, the number of which may differ from that of the object there, two definite individuals in relation to each other and perhaps of
perceived. If the plain man using his plain language does not find it baffling, contrasting characters, for instance one may be more clearly defined than the
as indeed Austin in a somewhat uncharacteristic way, but surely wrongly, other. Austin insists that the fact that one might, in such an exceptional case
seems to think that he does, that is because though he may not articulate it, as this, say 'I see two candles' (or pieces of paper in his discussion) without
his ontology is in effect more sophisticated than Austin's. As an after-thought implying that there are two candles, does not exclude its normally being true
Austin says that the plain man can deal with things by saying 'I see it double' that 'I perceive X' implies 'X exists'. I don't see that there can be any compar
or 'I see it as two', but the fact remains that Austin's direct realist outlook (to able objection to my pointing out that a clear recognition of the contrast
characterize him, as it seems to me aptly, with a phrase he might reject as too between the abnormal case of double vision and single vision involves us in
theoretical) makes him inclined to regard the really quite usual phenomenon acknowledging that in the normal case there is one thing of which in the
of double imagery as 'baffling'. See also my next footnote. abnormal case there is two.
IO II