Extremism – Recognizing a Social Evil

148 Pages·2015·1.26 MB·English

HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA
Helsinki Files Vol. 34
E X T R E M I S M
recognizing a social evil
Helsinki Committee
for Human Rights
in Serbia 34
helsinki fles
EXTREMISM
RECOGNIZING
A SOCIAL EVIL
Belgrade, 2014
EXTREMISM: RECOGNIZING A SOCIAL EVIL
Helsinki Files, Vol. 34
Publisher:
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
www.helsinki.org.rs
For the publisher:
Sonja Biserko
Design and typesetting: Ivan Hrašovec
Printed by: Diginet, Zrenjanin
100 copies
Belgrade, 2014.
ISBN 978-86-7208-200-5
COBISS.SR-ID 213742092
This publication is made possible by the support of the of the American people through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) under the “Civil Society Forward” program, implemented by the Institute for Sus-
tainable Communities (ISC). The contents of this publication are the responsibility of the Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights in Serbia and do not necessarily refect the views of USAID, the United States Government or ISC.
Contents
I ~ EXTREMISM IN SERBIA
Sonja Biserko
Extremism: A Follow-up to the Greater Serbia Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Srđan Milošević
“Anti-fascism” According to Serbia’s Right Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Srđan Barišić
Legitimization of the Extreme Right-wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Pavel Domonji
Autonomists, “The Red Flag Of Communism” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Jelena Višnjić
The Right-Wing on Women, The Women of the Rigth Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Ivana Stjelja
Hate Crime and Hate Motivated Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
II – HELSINKI BULLETINS ON EXTREMISM
Helsinki bulletin No.38/Sept. 2009
Ethnic Minorities in Serbia:
A State Of Permanent Tension. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Helsinki bulletin No.44/Oct. 2009.
Radicalization: A Constant Threat to Democratic Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
Helsinki bulletin No.52/Dec. 2009.
Hooliganism Spills from Political onto Sports Terrains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109
Helsinki bulletin No.69/Oct. 2010.
National Bosniak Council Election: Test for Serbian Government . . . . . . . . . .119
Helsinki bulletin No.92/March 2013.
Temerin: Administration of Justice Novi Sad Courts – double standards . . .141
I
EXTREMISM
IN SERBIA
9
Sonja Biserko
Extremism: A Follow-up to
the Greater Serbia Project
From a historical perspective the extreme right-wing and Serbia’s right-wing
ideology in general are outcomes of the structural changes taking place in the
aftermath of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. The 1990s wars wagged for rear-
rangement of the Balkans – and motivated by the Greater Serbia concept –
as documented in the infamous Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Arts
and Sciences, are parts of the body of ideology the right-wing thinking has
been living on since. Characteristic of this ideology (considering the histori-
cal background of the post-socialist era, Europe’s mushrooming anti-com-
munism, and chaotic changes marking Serbia’s failed transition) are: the
idea of ethnic homogenization (Milosavljević: 2001), the plan for blending
ethnic and state borders (Gellner: 1987), anti-communism, denial of anti-
fascism, growing traditionalism and authoritarianism, Eastern Orthodoxy
as superior to other religions and religious communities (especially those of
Croats, Muslims and Albanians), resistance to the ideas of multiculturalism
and cosmopolitarianism, open chauvinism and animosity for “new” (LGBT
population) and traditional minority groups (Roma).1
What all right-wing movement invoking extreme Serb nationalism and
leaning on fundamentalist interpretation of Eastern Orthodoxy have in com-
mon are unconcealed Islamophobia and hostile attitude towards anything
Islamic.
There are several currents of ultra-right wing options and organizations
in Serbia. Often their activism is described as „hooliganism” or „extremism,”
1 The so-called new minorities are also characteristic of Europe’s right-wing: hostil-
ity towards them grows in parallel with public visibility of these vulnerable minority
groups. This perfectly suits the idea about “the purity of nation” advocated in Serbia
by National Front /”Nacionalni stroj”/, a branch of the international neo-Nazi organi-
zation, Stormfornt. The Constitutional Court banned the National Front in October
2008. See more, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/serbian/saopstenja.html.
10 CHAPTER I
the terms that by themselves sweep the actual state of affairs under the car-
pet: and that is ideologically founded violence.2 The hookup between right-
wing political parties and these organizations is evident in the former’s
assistance to the latter, and in their „ideological” intimacy (e.g. the Kosovo
issue, advocacy for secession of Republika Srpska, close relations with the
Serb Orthodox Church, etc.). As for political parties this includes the Serb
Radical Party or the „ex-radical” Serb Progressive Party, the New Serbia and
the Democractic Party of Serbia. Their ideological closeness rests on the
structures that survived the 1990s and are either incorporated in today’s
administration or in the opposition, as well as on the new right-wing strata
that blends the logic of free market capital and nationalism (under the „both
Europe and Kosovo” slogan).
For over a decade Serbia has not managed to distance itself from its
nationalistic past. Nationalism still prevails in all spheres, true, having taken
a different, non-violent form: from foreign policy (statements such as “Some
have seas, but we have history”), through the media to education system
and culture. All key institutions are still promoting nationalism as the only
ideology. This is the sociopolitical climate that gave birth to extreme right-
wing organizations among other things. Wherever politics had to step down
under the pressure – from the EU in the frst place – right-wing organizations
continued implementing the Greater Serbia project by other means and by
fueling the delusion about its sustainability. Formally, the government gave
up the plan for territorial expansion and establishment of an ethnically pure
state; but this is what these organizations are doing instead with reliance
on the Serb Orthodox Church /SPC/: through their programs and activities
they advocate unifcation of all Serb territories and Serbia as a state of Serb
people solely.
Instead being a religious institution, SPC has positioned itself as a polit-
ical one, wholeheartedly supporting the Serb leadership (Milošević) and
2 The Pride Parade 2010 was in the sign of such discourse. The names of the groups
threatening to lynch the participants in the Parade have never been revealed. How-
ever, the common knowledge is that this refers to „Obraz” (Honor), Serb Movement
1389 and „Naši” (Ours) that have not been banned yet. Some of them have become
political parties in the meantime (“Srpski sabor Dveri”) thus securing legitimacy for
their actions. Institutions’ failure to react against thier activism testifes of the state’s
inability to confront the extreme right-wing (including the right-wing protagonists in
the adminsitration itself).