Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives

249 Pages·2006·2.09 MB·English

by  P. Kyle Stanford

Exceeding Our Grasp
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Exceeding Our Grasp
Science, History, and the Problem
of Unconceived Alternatives
P. KYLE STANFORD
1
1
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Exceedingourgrasp:science,history,andtheproblemofunconceived
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Preface
Though I didn’t know it at the time, I began writing this book during a
conversation with Jessica Pfeifer that she probably does not remember,
soon after we had both entered graduate school in the Philosophy De-
partmentandScienceStudiesProgramattheUniversityofCalifornia,San
Diego. After I grandly and self-importantly explained the problem of
underdetermination, Jessica replied in her characteristically self-effacing
and commonsensical way that she could understand how the available
evidencemightsupporttwoalternativetheoriesequallywellinprinciple,
butsheaskedwhysheshouldbelievethattherereallyarealways(orever)
suchequallywell-supportedalternativestoourownscientifictheoriesout
there to be found. She hastened to add, as she invariably does, that her
confusion was almost certainly caused by her inability to understand
whatIwassayingratherthanthefaultofanyinfelicityinmyexpression
or any underlying problem with the view I was espousing. But this was
simply not so. I did not have a good answer to Jessica’s question at the
time, andin tryingto figure outthe rightanswerto it Ihave beenled to
reconceive not only what I think the most serious problem about un-
derdetermination really is but also virtually everything else I think is at
theheartoftheissueofscientificrealism.IhavenoreasontothinkJessica
will be any more impressed with the answer I have now than the slack-
jawedblankstareIgaveherin1991,butIamverygladthatsheaskedme
the question.
While there are a very large number of others to whom I owe in-
tellectual debts both in connection with this book and more generally,
there are a small handful to whom I must express my deepest gratitude
viii Preface
for what I regard as their incredible generosity and apparently endless
willingness to devote time and energy to talking to me both about the
argumentsIdevelopbelowandaboutrelatedphilosophicalsubjects.My
friendandformergraduateadvisorPhilipKitcheraswellasthreeofmy
colleagues here at the University of California, Irvine (UCI)—Jeff Bar-
rett, Pen Maddy, and David Malament—have quite literally been with
theprojectofthisbookeverystepoftheway.Eachhasdemonstratedan
astonishing willingness to thoughtfully read, and reread, and talk to me
about every chapter and virtually every issue discussed in the pages that
follow.Theyhavehelpedinwayslargeandsmall—frommakingsensible
suggestions aboutstrategy and proposing useful examples to refusingto
acceptmyunconvincinganswerstotheirskepticalquestions,andIquite
literally cannot imagine what this book would now say were it not for
their uniformly constructive and generous input. Each of these friends
andcolleagueshasbeenwillingtodivertsignificantamountsoftimeand
effort from their own projects, interests, and professional careers in or-
dertoadvancemyown.Idonotholdoutanyhopeofevermanagingto
repay their kindness.
Other colleagues have also been willing to read and discuss sub-
stantial parts of the manuscript, and I am extremely grateful for their
useful feedback and thoughtful discussions. Peter Godfrey-Smith and
StathisPsilloseachreviewedtheentireprojectinanembryonicformand
provided invaluable advice. I am deeply grateful as well to others for
constructivecommentsandproductivediscussionsconcerningparticular
arguments and specific parts of the manuscript in earlier forms, espe-
cially Arthur Fine, Jarrett Leplin, John Norton, Bob Batterman, Hasok
Chang, Anjan Chakravartty, Greg Radick, Peter Lipton, Ludwig Feur-
bach, Alan Nelson, Larry Laudan, Alexander Rosenberg, Brian Skyrms,
CraigCallender,BillDemopoulos,ElliottSober,SandyMitchell,BasVan
Fraassen,AldoAntonelli,SherriRoush(didIspellitright,Sherri?),Kim
Sterelny, Noretta Koertge, Baron Reed, Larry Sklar, Andre Kukla, P. D.
Magnus, James Ladyman, Jonathan Hodge, John Worrall, Tim Lyons,
Kent Staley, Jim Lennox, Paul Griffiths, Otavio Bueno, Jessica Poulin,
FranciscoAyala,RobertOlby,andJohnEarman.Iamgratefulaswellto
themanypeopleonthislistwhowerewillingtodiscusstheirworkwith
me in private correspondence, sometimes at considerable length. And a
special debt of thanks is owed to Anjan Charkravartty, who was also
kindenoughnotonlytostandinformetopresentsomeofthisworkata
meetingoftheBritishSocietyforthePhilosophyofSciencewhenmyson
Casey was born rather suddenly and unexpectedly, but also to try to
suggest the responses to objections that he supposed I might give—a
service that was surely above and beyond the call of duty.
Iamdeeplygratefulaswelltoanumberofhistoriansofsciencewith
whom I have consulted in one way or another about the historical evi-
dence I present in this work, including Jane Maienschein, Peter Bowler,
Preface ix
Mary Terrall, Rasmus Winther, Martin Rudwick, and especially Keith
Benson. Here it is especially important to be clear, however, that the
willingness of these scholars to provide helpful suggestions and com-
ments should not be confused in any way with sympathy for even my
most basic contentions. My thanks also go to Nick Jolley, Alan Nelson,
andespeciallyDavidLemoineforconstructiveadviceonmytranslations
ofscientificwritingsfromtheiroriginalsources.Iamalsogratefultothe
Cambridge University Library and to the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin—
Preußischer Kulturbesitz for providing me with copies of unpublished
letters from Charles Darwin to various correspondents (see chapter 3).
Earlier versions of the arguments presented here also benefited
considerably from suggestions by anonymous reviewers for Philosophy
of Science, The Journal of Philosophy, Biology and Philosophy, Oxford
University Press, and for my grant proposal to the National Science
Foundation (thanks are also due to a series of extremely helpful and
encouraging program officers at the Science and Technology Studies
ProgramoftheNSF).Ihavealsobenefitedfromdiscussingthismaterial
with audiences at various conferences, including meetings of both the
Philosophy of Science Association and the British Society for the Phi-
losophy of Science (on multiple occasions each), the Canadian Society
for the History and Philosophy of Science, the British Society for the
History of Science, and the Southern California Philosophy Conference,
aswellaswithaudiencesatStanfordUniversity,theClaremontColleges
Colloquium(PomonaCollege),theUniversityofMissouri,andUCSanta
Cruz.
I have had the good fortune to be in constant contact with bright,
enthusiastic, articulate, and insightful graduate students both here at
UCI and elsewhere throughout the time that I developed the arguments
presented in this book: they have made me think harder, longer, and
betterabout thecentralissues. I amespecially indebted in this regard to
KevinZollman,CarolSkrenes,BrianWoodcock,PatrickForber,Patricia
Marino, Arash Pessian, Christina McLeish, Teri Merrick, Will Rowley,
WaldemarRohloff,JasonAlexander,JasonFord,andDougHill,aswell
asanumberofotherswhoattendedavarietyofgraduateseminarsIhave
offered in recent years concerning the subjects addressed in the pages
that follow.
Iwould alsolikethankPeter Ohlin, myeditoratOxfordUniversity
Press, for his unfailing encouragement, patience, and good sense, and
OUP itself for its willingness to be flexible with me about contracts and
deadlines. I also owe my thanks and formal acknowledgment to several
otherpublishersforgrantingmepermissiontoreviseandrepublishparts
of my own previously published work as follows:
Chapter 1 incorporates material from two previously published
papers. First, “An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science,”
Philosophy of Science 67: 266–284. 2000 by the Philosophy of Science