Examples of Negative and Positive Paradox

376 Pages·2012·2.34 MB·French

by  David Holford

HEC Montréal
Affilié à l’Université de Montréal

Knowledge Construction and Risk Induction within a Large High-Tech Firm

par
W. David Holford

Service de l’Enseignment du Management,
HEC Montréal

Thèse présentée à la Faculté de études supérieures
en vue de l’obtention du grade de Philosophiæ Doctor
en Administration

Décembre, 2008

©, W. David Holford, 2008
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HEC Montréal
Affilié à l’Université de Montréal
Faculté des études supérieures

Cette thése intitulée:

Knowledge Construction and Risk Induction within a Large High-Tech Firm

présentée par:

W. David Holford

a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes:

.....Professeur Alain Chanlat…..
président-rapporteur

.....Professeur Omar Aktouf…...
directeur de recherche

..Professeur Mehran Ebrahimi..
membre du jury

.....Professeur Olivier Boiral.....
examinateur externe

…Professeur Patrick Cohendet….
représentant du doyen de la FES
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RÉSUMÉ:

Cette étude cherchait à déterminer comment le savoir est construit et le risque est induit au
sein d’une grande firme de haute technologie en Amérique du Nord. En avançant qu’il y a
une relation étroite entre le savoir, le risque et la contradiction, un objectif principal de
notre recherche consistait à évaluer comment les individus et une organisation collective
incorporent les ambiguïtés ou les concepts antithétiques dans leurs activités quotidiennes.
Ceci impliquait la vérification empirique d’un cadre conceptuel préliminaire qui tente de
distinguer la construction du savoir de l’induction du risque, et ce, en fonction du sense-
making organisationnel face à l’ambiguïté. Les résultats de notre recherche confirment que
la contradiction, prenant la forme d’ambiguïtés ou de concepts antithétiques, joue un rôle
important dans la complexification et l’enrichissement du savoir.
Une étude de cas sur deux groupes de travail a démontré que la principale ambiguïté
menant à la construction d’un savoir enrichi implique la dyade ontologique de la
‘reconnaissance du désir individuel’ vs la ‘reconnaissance de l’identité envers l’Autre’.
L’intégration de cette ambiguïté primaire a aussi permis de faire émerger de façon originale
la notion de perspective-taking et perspective-making/giving dans la mesure où les
ambiguïtés secondaires et spécifiques aux groupes (dans la forme de connaissances
complémentaires) sont intégrées pour ainsi alimenter la construction du savoir complexifié.
Ceci forme la base d’un nouveau cadre émergent du processus dialogique de construction
du savoir qui démontre que les conditions clés pour maintenir cette dynamique implique la
confiance et le respect mutuel, le support mutuel et l’autonomie – et que lorsque réprimées,
elles mènent à un effondrement de sous-processus ou étapes dialogiques, et ultimement à
l’induction de risques transdisciplinaires. Un résultat additionnel de cette étude est le
concept de boundary construction résultant de l’interaction acteur/boundary object. Ceci
implique essentiellement les aspects visuels et autres aspects non-verbaux, tels que les
gestes corporels et les objets ‘énergisés’, qui sont dans un flux continuel de co-
construction/re-construction actuelle et potentielle par les acteurs interagissant.
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Cette étude de cas a aussi démontré que le sentiment de confiance en soi suscité par
les dirigeants à travers une approche de ‘filet de sécurité’ parentale (et non pas paternaliste)
était un facteur clé pour le fonctionnement du processus de construction du savoir. Une
telle approche impliquait non seulement le support direct ou indirect du management, mais
a aussi entraîné un support mutuel entre les membres du groupe, encourageant de concert
l’initiative individuelle – qui, finalement, fournit un environnement propice pour
l’apprentissage individuel et la progression du groupe. Placer l’humain à l’avant plan des
actions et pensées managériales nous mène, en fin de compte, vers un savoir enrichi et
complexifié, tout en minimisant une variété de catégories de risque.

Mots clés: Contradiction, ambiguïté, savoir, boundary object, boundary construction,
perspective-taking, perspective-making/giving, risque.
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ABSTRACT.

This research sought to determine how knowledge is constructed and risk is induced within
a large North American high-tech firm. In arguing that there is an intimate relationship
between knowledge, risk and contradiction, a major objective included the study of how
individuals and the collective organisation integrate antithetical concepts or ambiguity
within their daily activities. This included the empirical verification of a preliminary
conceptual framework which attempted to distinguish knowledge construction from risk
generation, and this, as a function of organisational sense-making in regards to ambiguity.
The results of our study confirmed that contradiction, in the form of complementary
antithetical concepts or ambiguities, does in fact play an important role in achieving
complexified knowledge.
A case study examination of two workgroups showed that the primary ambiguity at
work leading towards enriched knowledge construction involves the ontological dyad of
‘recognition of individual desire’ vs ‘recognition of identity towards the Other’. Embracing
such an ambiguity also showed the notion of perspective-taking and perspective-
making/giving to emerge in a novel way, whereby secondary ambiguities specific to the
workgroup(s) in the form of knowledge complementarities are integrated so as to nourish
the construction of complexified knowledge. This formed the basis for a new emerging
dialogical knowledge construction framework showing that key conditions involved in
maintaining such dynamics involves mutual trust and respect, mutual support and
autonomy – which when repressed, lead to breakdowns in key dialogical sub-processes or
steps, and ultimately the induction of transdisciplinary risks. An additional outcome from
this study was the concept of boundary construction as a result of boundary object/actor
interactions. This essentially involves visual and other non-verbal aspects of dialogical
communication, such as body gestures and ‘energised’ artifacts, which are in a constant
flux of actual and potential co-construction and re-construction at the hands of interacting
actors.
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This case study also showed that managements’ instilment of self-confidence across a
parental (yet not paternalistic) ‘safety net’ approach was a key factor towards a achieving a
fully functioning knowledge construction process. Such an approach not only involved
direct or indirect support by management, but also entrained mutual support between the
group members themselves, all the while encouraging self-initiative – thus providing an
environment for both individual learning and group progression. Placing the full human at
the forefront of management thinking and actions, in the end, leads towards enriched or
complexified knowledge construction, all the while mitigating a variety of risk categories.

Key words: Contradiction, ambiguity, knowledge, boundary object, boundary construction,
perspective-taking, perspective-making/giving, risk.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Résumé.................................................................................................................................iii
Abstract.................................................................................................................................v

INTRODUCTION: RISK, KNOWLEDGE AND CONTRADICTION.......................1

CHAPTER I: CONTRADICTION AS EITHER VISIBLE PARADOX OR
UNDERLYING AMBIGUITY…………………………………………....4

1.1 Paradox as a Visible Outcome Caused or Driven by Underlying Ambiguity…....7
1.2 Western Society’s Struggle Towards Fully Accepting Both the Subject and
Object………………………………………………………………………………...11
1.3 A ‘Total’ Environment that is both Dialectical and ‘Teeming’ with Ambiguity..14

CHAPTER II: RISK CREATION AND KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION……….18

2.1 Knowledge as Synthesis of Emerging Polysemic Concepts of Ambiguity..............24
2.2 Risk Categories As Having the Potential For Being Inter-related..........................35
2.2.1 A Few General Words about the Honda Ridgeline Pick-up Truck..................................38
2.2.2 Honda as an Ambiguity-Recognizing Firm......................................................................39
2.2.2.1 A Predisposition Towards Creating Disruptive Innovations......................................44
2.2.2.2 Relative Risk: Recognizing Ambiguity vs ‘One-Sided’ Thought..............................46
2.3 Knowledge Construction and Risk Creation within the Group Environment…...48
2.3.1 ‘Massified’ Groups............................................................................................................49
2.3.2 ‘Differentiated’ Groups....................................................................................................52
2.3.3 The SECI Approach to Organizational Knowledge Creation..........................................53
2.3.3.1 Applicability of the SECI Approach within a North American Context............61
2.3.4 Preliminary Framework for Assessing Knowledge Construction and Risk
Creation within a Project Team or Group……………………………………………….62
2.3.4.1 Refining the Framework across Organisational Sense-Making.................................65
2.4. Principle Research Aim and Research Questions.....................................................75
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY..............................................................................................78

3.1 Choosing the Field……………………………………………………………….....................79
3.2 First Contacts with the Field – Constraints, Opportunities and Serendipity......................80
3.2.1 Shifting from the Original Intent of the ‘Project’ Team towards the Departmental
Workgroup……………………………………………………………………………………82
3.3 Ethnographic Case Study with Embedded Units of Analysis...............................................85
3.4 Objectivity vs Subjectivity........................................................................................................87
3.4.1 ‘Etic’ vs ‘Emic’………………………………………………………………………………..89
3.5 Criteria Used for Judging the Quality of the Research Design.............................................90
3.6 Data Collection..........................................................................................................................92
3.6.1 Informal Non-participatory Observations, Conversations and Ad hoc Interviews…………..95
3.6.2 In-depth Formal Semi-directed Interviews…………………………………………………..97
3.6.3 Company Documents and other ‘Static’ Artifacts…………………………………………...97
3.6.3.1 ‘Dynamic’ Artifacts: Short Film ‘Clips’…………………………………………...98
3.7 Methodological Limitations of the Study...............................................................................98
3.7.1 Particular Limitations and ‘Advantages’ in Regards to the Investigator’s Personal
Experience…………………………………………………………………………………...99
3.8 Data Analysis and Interpretation...........................................................................................100
3.8.1 A Few Words ‘After-the-Fact’……………………………………………………………….101
3.9 Main Research Steps...............................................................................................................101

CHAPTER IV: DESCRIPTIVE DATA FROM THE FIELD...................................................104

4.0 Foreword..................................................................................................................................105
4.1 My Return to NorAm and First Re-Contacts with Management.......................................106
4.1.1 A Phone conversation with Brad……………………………………………………………110
4.1.2 Follow-up Meeting with the “Director’s Deputy”…………………………………………..112
4.2 First Meeting with the Manager of the Operability Development Department ………...114
4.3 First Meeting with the Manager of the Special Test Department………………………...115
4.4 Meeting Old Colleagues……………………………………………………………………..117
4.5 First Contact with the two Workgroups – My First Intergroup Meeting ……………….118
4.5.1 Presentation to the Special Test Workgroup………………………………………………..122
4.5.2 Presentation to the Operability Development Workgroup………………………………….124
4.6 A Visit for ‘Old-Times’ Sake........ …………………………………………………………..124
4.7 The Morning Intergroup Meetings…………………………………………………………126
4.7.1 Initial ‘Ethnographic’ Observations and Difficulties……………………………………….126
4.7.2 More ‘Thorough’ Observations……………………………………………………………..130
4.7.2.1 The Pre-Agenda Period……………………………………………………………131
4.7.2.2 The ‘Formal’ Agenda Period……………………………………………………...134
4.7.2.3 The Post-Agenda Period…………………………………………………………..143
4.8 The Special Test Workgroup………………………………………………………………..146
4.8.1 First Ethnographic Observations…………………………………………………………….146
4.8.2 Subsequent Days Within the Special Test Workgroup Environment……………………….153
4.9 The Operability Development Workgroup………………………………………………...160
4.9.1 First Ethnographic Impressions…………………………………………………………….160
4.9.2 Subsequent Days Within the Operability Development Workgroup Environment..............161
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CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE DATA…………….............170

5.1 Categories and Patterns Discerned Within the Intergroup Meeting Environment……..171
5.1.1 Storytelling and Narrations…………………………………………………………………171
5.1.1.1 Perspective-Giving…………………………………………………………………178
5.1.2 Perspective-Taking…………………………………………………………………………180
5.1.3 Perspective Adjustments vs Binary-type Creditation/Discreditation……………………….184
5.1.4 Dynamic/Static Boundary Objects and Other Non-Verbal Dynamic Boundary
Representations……………………………………………………………………………..189
5.2 Re-Visiting the Knowledge Construction Process…………………………………………196
5.2.1 Integrating Other Observed Categories……………………………………………………..200
5.2.1.1 Introducing and Incorporating the Concept of Boundary Constructions…………..201
5.2.1.1.1 Literature and Epistemological Review of Boundary Objects…………202
5.2.1.1.2 Hybridization and Inter-Reciprocal Relationship of the Subject and
Object…………………………………………………………………...204
5.2.1.1.3 ‘Dynamic Non-Verbal Representations’ and ‘Dynamic/Static Boundary
Objects’ as Boundary Constructions……………………………………205
5.2.1.2 Integrating Tacit and Explicit Knowledge and its Conversions……………………208
5.2.1.2.1 A So-Called Epistemological Dilemma as Reflection of the
Researchers own Erroneous Assumptions……………………………...211
5.2.1.3 Knowledge Complexification as Openness to Ambiguity………………………….212
5.2.1.3.1 Recognition of Desire vs Recognition of Group Identity: Enter
Differentiated Intergroup Dynamics……………………………………217
5.3 ‘Testing’ the Framework Outside of the Intergroup Meeting Context…………………..223
5.3.1 Examples Highlighting the Notion of Risk Induction as a Result of Coercive
Sense-Giving………………………………………………………………………………..230
5.4 Differentiated Group Dynamics Within the Special Test Workgroup Environment…...242
5.4.1 ‘Recognition of Desire’ vs ‘Recognition of Identification to the Group’..............................242
5.4.2 Management: Instilling a Sense of Self-Confidence and Sense of Identity to the
Group Amongst the Group Members and Instilling a ‘Likeable Mission’............................248
5.4.3 Secondary Antithetical Elements Embraced Within the Special Test Workgroup................254
5.4.4 A Schematic Summary of the Special Test Workgroup Dynamics.......................................256
5.5 Quasi-Differentiated Group Dynamics Within the Operability Development
Workgroup Environment …………………………………………………………………..259
5.5.1 ‘Recognition of Desire’ vs ‘Recognition of Identification to the Group’ with a Caveat;
and an Approachable/Supportive Management....................................................................259
5.5.2 Secondary Antithetical Elements Embraced Within the Operability Development
Workgroup............................................................................................................................270
5.5.3 A Schematic Summary of the Operability Development Workgroup Dynamics.................274