Exact Philosophy: Problems, Tools, and Goals PDF
Preview Exact Philosophy: Problems, Tools, and Goals
EXACT PHILOSOPHY SYNTHESE LIBRARY MONOGRAPHS ON EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND OF KNOWLEDGE, AND ON THE MATHEMATICAL METHODS OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES Editors: DONALD DAVIDSON, The Rockefeller University and Princeton University J AAKKO HINTIKKA, Academy of Finland and Stanford University GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden WESLEY C. SALMON, Indiana University EXACT PHILOSOPHY Problenls, Tools, and Goals Edited by MARIO BUNGE Foundations and Philosophy of Science Unit, McGill University, Montreal D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY I DORDRECHT-HOLLAND BOSTON-U.S.A. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-77872 ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2518-8 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2516-4 001: 10.1007/978-94-010-2516-4 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland Sold and distributed in the U.S.A., Canada and Mexico by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Inc. 306 Dartmouth Street, Boston, Mass. 02116, U.S.A. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1973 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1973 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint. microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher FOREWORD The papers that follow were read and discussed at the first Symposium on Exact Philosophy. This conference was held at Montreal on November 4th and 5th, 1971, to celebrate the sesquicentennial of McGill University and establish the Society for Exact Philosophy. The expression 'exact philosophy' is taken to signify mathematical phi losophy, i.e., philosophy done with the explicit help of mathematical logic and mathematics. So far the expression denotes an attitude rather than a fully blown discipline: it intends to convey the intention to try and pro ceed in as exact a manner as we can in formulating and discussing phi losophical problems and theories. The kind of philosophy we wish to practice and promote is disciplined rather than wild, systematic rather than disconnected, and capable of being argued over rather than oracular. We believe that even metaphysics, notoriously riotous, can be subjected to the control of logic and mathematics. Even the history of philosophy, notoriously unsystematic, can benefit from an exact reconstruction of some classical ideas. Exactness, though desirable, should not be taken for an end: it is a means for enhancing clarity and systemicity, hence control. Exactness, whether in philosophy or in science, does not guarantee certainty: it eases the discovery of error and its correction. Nor does exactness ensure depth, hence interest: it warrants the possibility of rational scrutiny. The ideal is, of course, to tackle genuine and deep problems in an exact manner. But before we can solve any deep problems in exact philosophy we must accumulate a stock of modest yet exact theories. I submit then that our immediate task is to build well circumscribed theories in exact philosophy: in semantics, epistemology, metaphysics, value theory, ethics, legal logic, etc. The big systems will emerge, if at all, from the fusion of such modest but exact theories. The style of research in exact philosophy is the one familiar from ma thematics and theoretical science: Finding or inventing a problem / For mulating the problem in a reasonably precise way / Trying possible solu- VI FOREWORD tions within available theories or in theories built ad hoc I Checking the possible solutions against the body of relevant knowledge / Choosing and weighing a solution / Revising the rest of the relevant knowledge in the light of the previous result. The initial problem may be internal to an existing theory or it may consist in building a new theory. While the form er situation is common in the advanced area of exact philosophy, namely logic (whether ordinary or not, truth functional or not), in other areas we are usually faced with the much harder task of building new theories. Some of these theories will formalize (perhaps in alternative ways) phi losophical insights inherited from inexact philosophy, while others may have no roots in the past although they may settle questions handed down by traditional philosophy. In either case we should not regard our solu tions as perfect: it will be enough if they are perfectible. The name 'exact philosophy' seems to be new. It was born, or at least revived, in typical Viennese fashion, namely at a restaurant table. To be exact, the birth took place at the Vienna Rathauskeller on the evening of September 6th, 1968, during the XIVth International Congress of Philoso phy. The name was proposed by the late mathematician and philosopher Richard Montague (1930-1971), whose untimely death prevented him from reading a paper at our Symposium. However, the denotatum of 'exact philosophy' is not new: it has been going on for quite a while, so that we can now exhibit a number of results in exact philosophy. To be gin with there are both the standard and the noncanonical systems of mathematical logic, as well as the semantics of logics and of mathematics, which belong to both mathematics and philosophy. We also have a sprin kling of results in the philosophy of science, in metaphysics, in ethics, and in legal logic, that qualify as members of exact philosophy. But we should acknowledge that most of the exact work in semantics, epistemology, metaphysics, value theory, and ethics, remains to be done. We should take some of the problems inherited from traditional philosophy, as well as the totality of philosophical problems posed by mathematics and sci ence, and should approach them in an exact fashion. Ifwe succeed in handl ing in an exact way some of the deep problems in these areas we shall be entitled to talk of a new revolution in philosophy. This Symposium marks the coming of age of the Bertrand Russell Col loquium in Exact Philosophy, launched in February 1970 by our Foun dations and Philosophy of Science Unit. I take this opportunity to thank FOREWORD VII the Canada Council for a generous Killam award that has kept this Unit alive, as well as for funding this Symposium. We are also indebted to the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science (Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science) for another generous grant in support of our conference. MARIO BUNGE Foundations and Philosophy of Science Unit, McGill University, Montreal CONTENTS FOREWORD v PART I: LOGIC HUGUES LEBLANC I Matters of Relevance 3 BRIAN F. CHELLAS I Notions of Relevance. Comments on Leblanc's Paper 21 PART II: SEMANTICS LARS SVENONIUS I Translation and Reduction 31 MARIO BUNGE I A Program for the Semantics of Science 51 PART Ill: EROTETICS NUEL D. BELNAP, Jr. I S-P Interrogatives 65 PART IV; PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS WILLIAM S. HATCHER I Foundations as a Branch of Mathematics 83 CHARLES CASTONGUAY I Naturalism in Mathematics. Comments on Hatcher's Paper 93 PART V: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE RAIMO TUOMELA I Deductive Explanation of Scientific Laws 103 PART VI: METAPHYSICS PETER KIRSCHENMANN I Concepts of Randomness 129 PART VII: ETHICS BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN I The Logic of Conditional Obligation 151 x CONTENTS HARRY BEATTY / On Evaluating Deontic Logics. Comments on van Fraassen's Paper 173 PART VIII: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY CARLOS E. ALCHOURR6N / The Intuitive Background of Norma- tive Legal Discourse and Its Formalization 181 PART IX: HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY HECTOR-NERI CASTANEDA / Plato's Phaedo Theory of Relations 201 PARTI LOGIC
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