Evolutionary Theory and Human Nature PDF
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EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND HUMAN NATURE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND HUMAN NATURE by Ron Vannelli University of Central England (Birmingham), UK SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, LLC Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data VanneIli, Ron, 1938- Evolutionary theory and human nature / by Ron VanneIli. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4613-5607-3 ISBN 978-1-4615-1545-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-4615-1545-6 1. Human evolution. 2. Human behavior. 3. Behavior evolution. 4. Social evolution. 5. Cognition and culture. 1. TitIe GN281 .V35 2001 599.93 '8-dc21 2001038303 Copyright © 2001 by Springer Science+Business Media New York Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2001 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 2001 AU rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photo copying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. Printed an acid-free paper. The Publisher offers discounts on this book for course use and bulk purchases. For further information, send email to<[email protected]> . CONTENTS PREFACE vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xi 1 IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: REASON AND RATIONALITY Reason As Rationality In Search of an Empirical Science of Human Behaviour Summary and Conclusions 2 BIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: 27 THE ISSUE OF MORALITY Darwin's Impact Biology and the Social Sciences; The Search for Morality Summary and Conclusions 3 BIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: 53 EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES The Problem of Causation Human Nature and the Problem of 'Pre-knowledge' The Problem of Classification: Significance and Unity In Search of Human Nature Summary and Conclusions 4 HUMAN NATURE: EMOTIONAL- 95 COGNITIVE PROCESSES Emotionality and Cognition: Meaning and Significance The Biology of Emotional-Cognitive Processing Summary and Conclusions vi 5 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN 121 EMOTIONAL-COGNITIVE PROCESSING Species Typical Emotional-Cognitive Motivators The Evolution of Human Desires The Evolution of Human Fears Summary and Conclusions 6 ADVANCED COGNITION 151 Evaluating Delineating, Deception and Self-deception Summary and Conclusions 7 HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIAL PROPENSITIES 179 Human Nature and the Processes of Political Society The Search for Vengeance and the Social Order Controlling Self and Others Summary and Conclusions 8 IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL SOCIETY 207 Social Boundaries Hierarchy, Politics and Spirituality In Search of Natural Kinds of Behaviour Conclusions: A Science of Behaviour NOTES 234 REFERENCES 235 INDEX 249 PREFACE So reason began to annihilate its enemies: God was dead; instincts were animal-like; emotions were condemned -they were enemies of reason, to be guarded against and strictly controlled. A strong will, strength of char acter, the pursuit of science - all children of reason - were to be admired, indeed worshipped. This was the gospel message of the Enlightenment; this was the road to modernity. But as reason began to worship itself, it began to deify itself. It became not enough in-itself; it 'needed' more; it became Rationality. And rationality cannot live with irrationality; it seeks to destroy it; but in doing so it kills the very essence of humanness. The argument of this work will be that we must bring humanness back into our explanations if we are to advance our understanding of human behaviour. It will start with reason already having become rationality, ex planations of human behaviour having desperately sought deterministic laws, social science having turned to teleology, social interactions having been formulated as systems/structures, and history having become progress; and while this was happening, emotions, self-interest, social ambiguity/disorgan izaion and power politics had become evil - treated as reminiscent of 'the beginning', of disorder and chaos, products of an age 'before reason'. This will be a story, however, which might have consoled Charles Darwin, who had come to fear that he was the 'Devil's Chaplain' for advoca ting the scientific importance of non-teleological explanations which in cluded elements of chance, conflict and non-progressive history. This is be cause the approach developed here will try to rehabilitate emotions, self interest, social ambiguity and power politics; it will, in a sense, argue the 'Devil's' case; or perhaps more accurately it will seek to reunite Enlighten ment gods with their demons. It will try to bring reason and emotion back to gether and it will attempt to put self-interest, social co-operation and person al and social politics into the same framework; it will seek to demonstrate the role of a human 'will to power' and the importance of practical politics in this process. The notion of a grand design will be conspicuous by its ab- sence. Human nature will loom large in this undertaking. It will not be a deterministic human nature, nor will it be a rational one capable of con tinually learning and perfecting itself. Rather, it will represent the dynamic proesses in which our species typical emotions and reason struggle with each other. It will not depict a human nature with a mission or known direction, but a set of mental processes which are the product of natural and sexual selection - with both their chance and 'order in process' elements. It will not be a search for 'Truth'; it will seek to understand and explain. The first major contention, as suggested, will be that we must take on board much of the 'Devil's' contribution to our view of humanness if we viii are to have a chance of understanding ourselves as we really are. There has been, and will be, resistance to such a view; after all it does not present an ideal view, it is not even (on the face of it at least) a very 'nice' picture of humankind. Unfortunately, ideal or nice pictures are not always the best representations of something, nor do such pictures necessarily cause their subjects to become so. If the Devil's view is less distorting than any alterna tive picture, and our goal is understanding, we have no choice but to embr ace the understanding it might offer. And a major assertion of this work will be that not only must we consider the Devil's view, but that it is, in fact, less distorting than the majority of favoured alternatives and is also quite an accurate representation of humanness (and, incidentally, not necessarily as negative an interpreta tion as so often imagined). I will start by looking at some of the specific distorting consequences of deifying reason - and very significantly, at some of the less than desirable consequences for humanity of having done so. Possible alternative conceptual, theoretical and empirical approaches to those which have deified reason and embraced teleology will be examined, as will some of the 'moral', conceptual and theoretical issues raised when we set out to link biology and the social sciences using a Darwinian perspective (Chapters 1-3) . This will be followed by a look at a wide body of evidence from the neural sciences and various branches of psychology in order to suggest an evolutionary based, non-teleological model of human nature (Chapters 4-6). This model is to be made up of potential bioelectric!chemical, emotional/ psychological and cognitive elements. In the Devil's dynamic - but often un settling - picture of human nature, emotions, desires and fears playas im portant a role as human reason; love and hate have their place, the 'will to power' is ever-present. Cognition is not only about solving complex prob ems but also about evaluating, stereotyping, distancing and deceiving (both self and others). Based on the theoretical argument and model of human nature de veloped, it is then suggested that human behaviour can be classified into 'natural patterns', or 'natural kinds' based on 1) a high degree of coherence derived from identifiable human nature propensities, and 2) on their empi rically discovered anthropological and historical universality (Chapters 7-8). It is for these reasons that a non-teleological social science is possible; one clearly dependent upon a full understanding of the working of human nature and on a study of history. As noted, any notion of a grand design (God or Nature, no matter) as a driving force in human history will have to be abandoned. Banished also from our theorizing must be the common human bias that human nature was necessarily made for being perfected (or for perfecting its environment), that it is characterized by a super-rationality which lifts humans above any rem- ix nants of an animal nature, and, above all, that humans have a larger, univer sal purpose - such as to take us to utopia, for example. This development will not be easy. Humans are not quick to give up the notion of a higher purpose, even for the prospect of a science of humans; indeed, especially not for the prospect of a science of humans. Nevertheless, even though the search for knowledge is often uncomfortable, human curiosity is such that, in the end, it cannot be denied. Acknowledgments This work has had a long gestation. Many of the people who should be thanked are not easily identifiable. Students, colleagues, friends, relatives and some complete strangers said things which ignited something, which up on reflection (often no doubt unconscious reflection), was used. Numerous scholars and teachers, whose work has been very influential but, perhaps because of the long time since their ideas were absorbed (and likely not always correctly), have not in every case been properly recognized in the referencing. So if it were possible I would thank them now, and apologize for my forgetfulness or misconstruction of their ideas. In terms of names, however, I will have to confine recognition to those who did something memorable (and for me, special) to help this project along. Vic Heatherington read an early version and made many useful ob servations, not the least of which was to point out that my (at that time) somewhat fear/danger oriented look into the nature of humankind could benefit from an equal emphasis on a search for human desires. Harry Bauer saw the challenge that this same early version represented and encouraged me to keep on with it; Fred Willhoite, too, was concerned that it would rankle, but encouraged its continued development. As the work progressed, and was revised, Alan Rowan and Judy Tweddle spent long hours discussing what is now Chapters Four, Five and Six and how we might 'draw' them. Although the resultant diagrams are no fault of their's, their thinking was very much part of the process of getting to what is there now. Pat Needle read various versions of the manuscript in order to try to make sure the grammar, syntax and general presentation was not too far out; she also made many valuable academic points. Later on, Malcolm Hughes and Brenda Shute read what are now Chapters Four, Five and Six and made helpful comments. Bill Roper read a number of sections concerning the impact of Darwin and raised a number of points I had to take on board. Kate O'Shea saw great value in an interdisciplinary approach to scholarship and teaching which went back to the question - 'what is it to be human?', and encouraged me in a number of directions; and her students contributed much, unknowingly, to the final product. Robert Kornreich, too, engaged with many of the ideas put forward here during episodes of team teaching, discussion and seminars; although he did not always agree with various notions, he understood their intent and reasons and was always ready to engage in scholarly conversations or debates, as the circumstances dictated. And he sincerely enjoyed seeking answers to the puzzling ques tions which have engaged theologians, philosophers and scientists for a very longtime. Paul Waddington had a great deal of faith, and understood the aims, and also looked for answers to big questions, and never seemed to doubt that xu the project was worthwhile and that the questions being asked should be asked; although not always in agreement with my views, his encouragement was often just what was needed when things were not going well. He also read various versions of possible 'starts' of the book, making important stylistic and academic points. As the project neared its end, Malcolm Hamilton and John Richardson read the entire manuscript, gave encourage ment, made suggestions and consulted over the exact form it should take. None of the above, of course, would agree with me on everything but from my point of view this makes their contribution all the more valuable because I had to decide why I would stay with my interpretations on those occasions where I did not follow their advice (although often I did follow their advice). Near the end, Linda Harland took a final look and made some important proofing corrections. Most of all, I must thank my wife, Susan Vannelli, who struggled with a number of rewrites; always sharpening up the presentation, teaching me commas, questioning the validity of many points, suggesting new and better ways of expressing certain things; postulating ideas; but above all, believing in the scholarship it represented, and in my determination to com plete it, even when I seemed to always be changing things; so, despite often despairing at what seemed to be yet another re-write, she stuck with it, and me. By the end she knew its argument as well as I do. This book is dedicated to her.
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