Evolution of living standards and human capital in China in the 18–20th centuries

13 Pages·2010·0.43 MB·English

ExplorationsinEconomicHistory47(2010)347–359
ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect
Explorations in Economic History
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eeh
Evolution of living standards and human capital in China
in the 18–20th centuries: Evidences from real wages, age-heaping,
and anthropometrics
Joerg Batena, Debin Mab,*, Stephen Morganc,d, Qing Wanga
aDept.ofEconomics,UniversityofTuebingen,Mohlstr.36,72074,Tuebingen,Germany
bEconomicHistoryDept.,LondonSchoolofEconomics,HoughtonStreet,LondonWC2A2AE,UK
cSchoolofContemporaryChineseStudies,UniversityofNottingham,Nottingham,NG81BB,UK
dSchoolofHistoricalStudies,UniversityofMelbourne,Melbourne3010,Australia
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Articlehistory: Thisarticlemobilizesandintegratesbothexistingandnewtimeseriesdataonrealwages,
Received10November2008 physicalheightsandage-heapingtoexaminethelong-termtrendoflivingstandardsand
Availableonline19September2009 humancapitalforChinaduringtheeighteenthtotwentiethcenturies.Ourfindingsconfirm
theexistenceofasubstantialgapinlivingstandardsbetweenChinaandNorth-western
Keywords: Europeintheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies.Theyalsorevealasustaineddecline
China inlivingstandardsandhumancapitalatleastinSouthChinafromthemid-nineteenthcen-
Standardofliving
turyfollowedbyarecoveryintheearlytwentiethcentury.However,comparativeexami-
Humancapital
nationofage-heapingdatashowsthatthelevelofChinesehumancapitalwasrelatively
Realwages
highbyworldstandardduringthisperiod.Wemakeapreliminaryexplorationofthehis-
Height
Numeracy toricalimplicationofourfindings.
(cid:2)2009ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved.
1. Introduction
Oneprominentfeaturethatunderpinsthephenomenalcatch-upofEastAsiafromverylowlevelsofpercapitaincomes
afterWorldWarIIistherapidaccumulationofphysicalandhumancapital.GodoandHayami(2002)compileddataonaver-
ageyearsofschoolingtoshowthattheJapanesecatch-upinaverageyearsofschoolingprecededthatofpercapitaincome
relativetotheUSinthepre-Warperiod.Unfortunately,workswithsuchalong-termperspectivearerelativelyscarcegiven
thepaucityofsystematicandcomparabledata,especiallyforChina.1Similarly,despitethevoluminousliteratureonChina’s
longandtumultuousnineteenthcentury,whichsawsocialandeconomicdislocationfromtheonslaughtofWesternimperial-
ismandthedevastatingdomesticrebellions,quantitativeindicationsofasystematickindaresorelylackingforlong-termtrend
inwelfareandlivingstandards.
OurpaperrepresentsthefirstattempttoconstructamorecomprehensiveprofileoftheevolutionofChineselivingstan-
dardsandhumancapitalinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturiesbasedontheintegrationoflarge-samplebasedrealwage
andanthropometricevidences.Ourdataseriesconfirmageneraldeclineinlivingstandardsandhumancapitalafterthemid-
nineteenthcenturyfollowedbyarecoveryonlyattheturnofthecentury.OurrealwagedataalsorevealChineselivingstan-
* Correspondingauthor.Fax:[phone].
E-mailaddress:[email protected](D.Ma).
1 Godo(2006)extendedtheaverageyearsofschoolingdatatocolonialTaiwanandKorea.ForphysicalcapitalaccumulationinEastAsia,seethecontroversial
summaryarticlebyPaulKrugman(1994).ForasummaryoftheEastAsianpathoflabor-intensiveindustrialisationbasedonqualityhumancapitalformedin
thetraditionalsector,seeSugihara(2007),‘‘TheSecondNoelButlinLecture.”
0014-4983/$-seefrontmatter(cid:2)2009ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved.
doi:10.1016/j.eeh.2009.09.003
348 J.Batenetal./ExplorationsinEconomicHistory47(2010)347–359
dardswereprobablyclosertotherelativelybackwardpartsofEuropebutlowerthanNorth-westernEuropeintheeigh-
teenthandnineteenthcenturies.Socontrarytorecentrevisionism(Pomeranz,2000;LeeandWang,1999),ourstudiescon-
firmthetraditionalviewthatthedivergenceinlivingstandardsandpercapitaincomesbetweenEuropeandChinaalready
existedbeforetheindustrialrevolutionandonlywidenedfromthenineteenthcenturyandafterward.However,incontrast
tothefindingsbasedonrealwagesandheights,ourage-heapingindex–ameasureofChinesenumericalabilities–revealsa
relativelyhighlevelofChinesehumancapital,whichwasclosertothatofNorth-westernEuropeforeighteenthandnine-
teenthcenturiesthancountrieswithacomparablelowleveloflivingstandards.
Weexplorethehistoricalimplicationofthisintriguingcombinationofrelativelylowlivingstandardsbuthighhuman
capitalinChinaatthetime.Theconcludingsectionmakessomepreliminarydiscussionontheuniqueinstitutionalfeatures
intraditionalChina,suchastheCivil-ServiceExamination,aunifiedcharacter-basedlanguageandaprecociousgovernment
bureaucracy,asfactorsthatcontributedtorelativelyhigherlevelofliteracyandnumeracywithoutnecessarilygenerating
sustainedeconomicgrowthtosupportahigherlivingstandardintheearlymodernera.Wepositthatthislargereservoir
ofhumancapitalinearlymodernChinaandEastAsiaformedimportantstrategicfactorstounderpintheregion’srapideco-
nomiccatch-upinthemoderneraoncetheinstitutionalandideologicalchangeswereaccomplished.
Therestofthepaperisdividedintothreesectionstodiscussthefindingsderivedfromrealwage,heightsandage-heap-
ing,followedbyaconcludingsection.
2. Realwages
InthedebateonthecomparativestandardoflivingofAsiansandEuropeansontheeveoftheIndustrialRevolution,a
recentwaveofrevisionistscholarshiphasclaimedAsianlivingstandardswereonaparwiththoseofEuropeintheeigh-
teenthcentury.However,theevidencebroughttothisdebateisfragile,usingindirectcomparisonofscatteredoutput,con-
sumptionordemographicdata.ThiscontrastswithourknowledgeofrealincomesinEuropewherescholarssincethemid-
nineteenthcenturyhavebeencompilingdatabasesofwagesandpricesforEuropeancitiesfromthelateMiddleAgesintothe
nineteenthcenturywhenofficialstatisticsbegin.2
TheidealmeasureforcomparisonwouldbepercapitaGDP,whichhastheadvantageofbeingthemostacceptablemea-
sureoftheoveralleconomyandproductivecapacity,despitethelong-heldcaveatsthatitwasnotabletocapturenon-mar-
ketincomeoftencruciallyimportantfordevelopingeconomies,anddistributionaldimensions.Unfortunately,thereareno
meaningfulGDPseriesforChinabeforethetwentiethcentury.3TheinfluentialestimatesbyMaddisonarelargelyguess-work
basedonbackwardprojectionfromtwentiethcenturyestimates.Whilehighlyquestionable,theymightstillbeusefulasaguide
forroughcomparisonsacrossbenchmarkyears,buttheygivelittleindicationoffluctuationsbetweenthebenchmarks.
RecentstudiesbyAllenetal.(2007,2009)representthemostambitiousattempttouserealwagestofillthisgapforChina
intheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies.ThewageseriesinthesestudiesareconstructedfromdataobtainedfromChi-
neseimperialministryrecords,merchantaccountbooksandlocalgazetteers,whichhavebeendeflatedusingappropriate
cost of living indices reconstructed from consumption baskets. The Allen et al. paper concentrates on the wage histories
of Canton (south China), Beijing (north China), and Suzhou and Shanghai in the lower Yangzi (east China), because they
arecomparabletothelargecitiesinEuropeandJapanforwhichwehavesimilarinformation.
WhiletheAllenetal.studyisthemostcomprehensivesofarintermsofdatacoverageandmethodology,theircompar-
isonconcentratesonlyontherealwageofurbanunskilledworkersinmajorcitiesofEuropeandChina.Thisraisesquestions
oftherepresentativenessandcomparabilityoftheirfindings.4Despitethesequalifications,whichwereextensivelydiscussed
intheAllenetal.paper,wehavereasontobelievetheirfindingrepresentabetterapproximationoftherelativelevelsofreal
incomeatthetwoendsofEurasiafortheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturiesthananyavailablealternativeestimates.Clearly,
futureresearchisneededtoproducemoredefinitivefindingsinthisarea.Fig.1reproducesoneoftheirrealwagecomparisons,
whichpaintalessoptimisticpictureofChineseorAsianperformancethantherevisionistssuggest.
Fig.1confirmsthetraditionalviewthatthedivergenceinlivingstandardsbetweenmajorurbancentersofChinaand
thoseoftheNetherlandsandEnglandwasalreadypresentintheeighteenthcentury.Thestandardoflivingofworkersin
LondonandAmsterdamwasmuchhigherthanthatofworkersinBeijingorSuzhouintheeighteenthcentury.Butamajor
surpriseisthatunskilledlaborersinmajorcitiesofChina–poorastheymaybe–hadroughlythesamestandardoflivingas
theircounterpartsincentralandsouthernEurope,theOttomanEmpire,India,andJapanforthelargerpartoftheeighteenth
century.5
Secondly,fromthemid-nineteenthcentury,realwagesintheindustrialcoreofWesternEuropesuchasLeipzigbeganto
overtakethoseofChina.Incontrast,MilanremainedatasimilarlylowlevelasChinaduringthisperiod.Bythetwentieth
century,enoughprogresshadoccurredineventhebackwardpartsofEurope(asshowninMilan)andJapanthattheirstan-
2 SeeAllenetal.(2007)and(2009)forareviewofthedataissuesandMa(2004)forageneralreviewoftherevisionistscholarship.
3 SeeFukaoetal.(2007)forareviewofGDPdatainEastAsia.
4 OneobviousquestionistherepresentativenessofthelargestandfastestgrowingcitiesinEurope.Allen(2001)hasshownthatinsmallerEnglishcitiessuch
asOxford,realwagesweremuchlowerthanthoseinLondon,buttheywerestillhigherthaninChina(alsoseeBassinoandMa,2005).
5 SeeAllenetal.(2009),Fig.6forotherAsiancities.AstheirpaperfindsnomajordifferencesinlevelsofrealwagesamongthethreecitiesofBeijing,Canton
andSuzhou/Shanghai,therealwageseriesforCantonisomittedinFig.1.
J.Batenetal./ExplorationsinEconomicHistory47(2010)347–359 349
9
London
8 Amsterdam
Leipzig
os 7 Milan
Rati 6 Beijing
are Suzhou/Shanghai
elf 5
W
n
e i 4
g
a
W
al 3
e
R
2
1
0
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fig.1. RealwagetrendsinChinaandEurope.Source:Allenetal.,2009.Notes:Allrealwagesareconvertedtowelfareratios.Awelfareratioofoneindicates
subsistence.Fordetailsonwelfareratios,seeAllenetal.,2009.
dardsoflivingwerebeginningtocreepabovethoseinChina,whileLondonincreasedtheleadoverBeijing.Thisiswhatwe
termastheseconddivergenceinthemodernera.
Thirdly,andmostrelevantforourperspective,isthetrendintherealwageseriesforBeijing(Fig.1).Thisseriesiscom-
posedofthreeserieslinkedtogether:thefirstonefortheeighteenthcenturybasedontheaverageoflargenumberofscat-
teredwageinformation;thesecondseriesbasedonSidneyGamble(1943),whichrunsfrom1807to1903,andthethird
series is for 1900–1925 from Meng and Gamble (1926). Among these series, the Gamble (1943) series most importantly
spanstheentirenineteenthcentury.AsseeninFig.1,itpointstoaclearandsharpdropinrealwagesduringthemid-nine-
teenth century, a period known for the severe economic dislocation caused by Taiping Rebellion that devastated large
swathesofsouthernandeasternChina.
3. Heights
Historicaldataonheightshavelongbeenanimportantcomplementarymeasureoflivingstandard(Fogel,1994;Komlos,
1994;Steckel,1995,2009;KomlosandBaten,1998;KomlosandCuff,1998).Whileheightsdonotmeasurethepurchasing
poweraspectoflivingstandard,theyarebetteratcapturingthe‘biological’componentofwelfaresuchashealth,lifeexpec-
tancyandthequalityofnutrition.ComparedwithGDP,heightisparticularlysensitivetotheeconomicinequalitiesandthe
welfaredevelopmentofthelowerincomestrata,whichcorrespondsmorecloselytothegroupsofunskilledworkersinthe
realwagestudy.6
Careneedstobetakenaboutinterpretationofheightsininternationalcomparisonduetodifferencesinintergenerational
heighttransmissionandnutritionalhabits,whichmightnotbedirectlyrelatedtoeconomicscarcities,atleastintheshort
run.Forexample,theDutchandScandinavianstodaystillconsumefarmoremilkthanSouthernItaliansandJapanese,pos-
siblyalegacyofeconomicscarcityofthepast.7EvenwithinChina,thereexistregionaldifferenceswithNorthernersfartaller
thanpeopleintheSouth.Nonetheless,withrapidlychangingnutritionalandeconomicconditions,therehasbeenanarrowing
ofregionaldifferencesinheightsaswellasaconvergenceofChineseheightstotheEuropeanandNorthAmericanlevelmore
recently.8
Forthisresearch,wemobilizeseverallargedatasetsofheightsofChinesewhomigratedfromSouthChinatotheUnited
States,AustraliaandIndonesiaduringthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies,orwhoworkedinmodernorganisationsin
6 Heightiscloselycorrelatedwithincome;thepoorerstrataofapopulationonaverageareshorterthanthoseinthebetteroffstrata.Inalowincome
economy,anincreaseinincomewillraiseaverageheight,otherthingsbeingequal.Averageheightwillalsoincreaseifincomedistributionimprovessuchthat
thelowerincomestrataarebetterabletoacquiretheinputsnecessaryforhumangrowth.Conversely,whereinequalityworsensaverageheightmightdecline
eveninthepresenceofincreasingGDP.SeeSteckel(1995).
7 Lactoseintolerance,theinabilitytodrinkmilkwithoutdiarrhoea,mayhaveplayedalimitedroleingeneticallypredisposingsomepopulationstoshorter
stature.EastAsians,NativeAmericansandsomeAfricanpeoplesufferfromlactoseintolerance(seeMaceetal.,2003).
8 IntheearlytwentiethcenturythedifferencebetweennorthandsouthChinawasintheorderof6cm,comparedwithabout3cmin2000forpopulationsof
roughlythesamesocioeconomicstatus(Morgan,2009,Table7).Also,contemporaryeducatedyoungmaleadultsinBeijingarenotmuchshorterthanwhite
Americanmales.Theaverageheightofthebirthcohortof1978–81inurbanNorthernChinawas173.0cm(rangedfrom171.2to175.8cm)forthepooledages
age19–22years,whichisonly2.2cmshorterthantheUnitedStatesaverageinthe1980s(175.8cm);Beijingurbanmaleswere175.5cmonaverage(China,
MinistryofEducation,2002).Large-scaleanthropometricsurveysofchildren7–22yearshavebeenconductedinChinasincethelate1970sabouteveryfive
years.Analysisofthe1979–1995surveysandsurveymethodologiesisreportedinMorgan(2000).
350 J.Batenetal./ExplorationsinEconomicHistory47(2010)347–359
China.Webelievethatthereportedheighttrendand–withcertainqualifications–theirlevelsduringthenineteenth–twen-
tiethcenturyislikelytobearobustlong-termindicatorfornutritionalqualityandceterisparibusthelivingstandardsatleast
fortheSouthernChinese.Belowweexplainourdatasetsinsixdifferentcategories.
(1) ImmigrantstoIndonesia:BatenandHira(2008)madeuseofalargedatasetofChinesemigrantstoIndonesiaoriginally
measuredbytheanthropologistBernhardHageninthe1880s.Mostoftheobservationsweremadein1885and1886,
withsomeperhapsin1887.9TheoccupationsoftheChineseweredescribedas‘‘mainlyagricultural.”Fortunately,Hagen
reportedtheagessothattheapproximatebirthyearscanbecalculated.Overall,Hagenmeasurednolessthan15,722
Chinese males who had migrated to Indonesia. Our data set made use of 12,678 subjects, aged from 23 to 50years.
We discarded all those above 50 and below 23years of age to exclude the effects of residual growth in our data set.
We also collected a much smaller data set of migrants to Suriname (159 cases) for the birth cohort of 1830–1834to
1845–1849.Asexplainedlater,theyrevealsimilarheightfeaturestomigrantstoIndonesia.
(2) PrisonersintheUnitedStates:Carson(2006)collectedasampleof1472Chinesemaleimmigrantworkerswhowere
incarceratedintheUnitedStatesmostlyforpettycrimes.
(3) PrisonersinAustralia:Morgan(2009)compiledadatasetof1492ChineseimprisonedinAustraliabetweenthe1850s
and1920s,whowerefromSouthChinaandwhoweremostlybornbetweenthe1810sand1880s.Manyarriveddur-
ingthe‘‘GoldRush”periodofthe1850s.Whenthealluvialgoldpeteredout,thosewhoremainedinAustraliamostly
turnedtoruraloccupationsandweregenerallyinalowersocioeconomicgroupthanChinesemigrantswhoarrived
fromthe1880s.
(4) MigrantstoAustralia:InthelaterdecadesofthenineteenthcenturyanotherwaveofChinesemigrants,alsomainly
fromSouthChina,arrivedinAustralia.Somewhatdifferentfromtheprisoners’sample,theyincludedmanysmallmer-
chants,marketgardenersandtradesmenwhowenttodestinationssuchasMelbourneandSydney(Morgan,2006a).
ThosewhosettledinnorthernAustralia,suchasQueenslandortheNorthernTerritory,wereengagedinminingand
agricultureandtheyweremoretypicaloftheearliergold-rushperiodmigrants;theywerealsoshorterthanthose
residinginMelbourneorSydney.Thecurrentdatasetnumbers3692subjects.10
(5) Migrants to the US: From the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) archive of the Pacific Region, we
obtainedasmalldatasetofheights(N=360)fromtheshiplistsofChinesemigrantstotheUSorreturningtoChina.
Moreover,thisarchivealsoholdstheNationalArchivesmicrofilmpublicationsofpassengermanifestsforshipsarriv-
ingatSanFrancisco,1893–1957.Themanifestslisttheheightandageofeachpassengerfrom1907to1948,andthe
sameistrueformostoftheimmigrationfiles.
(6) EmployeesofGovernmentOrganisationsinChina:Thelastdatasetdiscussedcomesfromgovernmententerprisesand
agencies,whomeasuredtheiremployeesinthe1930sand1940saspartofamedicalexaminationsystem.Mostof
themwerebornbetweenthe1890sandthe1920s,withsometeenagersfromtheearly1930s(Morgan,2004).The
largestgroupwasrailwayworkers,buttherewerealsoemployeesofgovernment,financialorotherinstitutions.
Theregionofbirthisrelativelyhomogenous:thesouth,andtheprovinceGuangdonginparticular.11Onlyinthecaseof
thegovernmentemployees(sample6)wastheregionalspreadlarger,butwetookcaretoextractaregionallyhomogenousser-
ies–unskilledrailwayworkersfromSouthChina.WecanthereforeassumethattheestimatesapproximatetrendsinSouthern
China.
Fig.2givesaplotofthetrendlevelofdifferenttimeseriesofChineseheightsasdescribedinthesample.Twofeatures
standout.Firstly,theshortestChinesewerethosewhowenttoIndonesiaascontractworkeraswellasthosethatwentto
Suriname.12TheheightsofprisonersinbothAustraliaandtheUnitedStateswerethesecondshortest.Clearly,amongthetallest
arethemigrantstotheUSandAustralia.Interestingly,migrantstotheAustralianNorthernterritorywereshorterthanthose
thatresidedinMelbourneandQueensland.Finally,therailroademployeedatasetforSouthChinahadrelativelyhighvalues.
Webelievetheobserveddifferencesinoursamplesseemareasonablereflectionoftheselectivitybiasesamongthemi-
grantswhocomprisethesamplesusedhere.Itislikelythatthosewhowenttomoreattractivelocationshadtoincurhigher
costsofmigrationandthusmighthavebeenslightlypositivelyselected.ThismighthavebeenthecaseforChinesemigrants
totheUnitedStatesandAustralia,manyofwhomfundedtheirpassagethroughdebtssecuritisedagainstpropertyorother
familyassets(summarizedinMorgan,2009).ThoseinNorthernTerritory,whoweretheshortestofthelatermigrantsto
Australia, are a case in point: they could reach Port Darwin more cheaply via Singapore than the eastern seaboard cities
ofMelbourneorSydney,andtheyweremostlyengagedinminingorremoteareaagricultureratherthaninurbancommer-
9 Murray(1994)foundacitationtothestudyinanotheranthropologicalstudyofthe1920s,andwewereabletolocatetheoriginaltext(inGerman)atthe
UniversityLibraryHamburg.
10 ThedataarefromtheNationalArchivesofAustralia(NAA)seriesB13/0,B78/1,J2482,andE752/0,whichcomprise‘CertificateExemptingfromDictation
Test’(CEDT)anda‘StatutoryDeclaration’forChineseresidentinAustraliaafter1901whowishtoleaveAustraliaandreturn.Detaileddescriptionoftheseseries
canbeobtainedfromtheNAAonlinesearchfacilityatwww.naa.gov.auandtheuseoftheAustralianimmigrationrecordsforanthropometricresearchis
discussedinMorgan(2006b).
11 AllmeasuredChineseimmigrantswerereportedtohavecomefromtheSouth(usuallyCanton)orsimply‘‘China”.Ourstatisticalt-testrevealsthatthe
differencesinmeanheightsformigrantsidentifiedasCantonoranotherplaceinSouthChinaand‘‘China”groupsasindistinguishableatthe1percentlevel.For
thepredominanceofGuangdongandFujianoriginofoverseasChinesemigrantsinthenineteenthcentury,seeGeetal.(1999),pp.191–201.
12 TheSurinamsamplenotshowninthefigureconfirmsasimilarheightlevelswithacleardownwardtrendfromthe1840s,seeBatenandHira(2008).
J.Batenetal./ExplorationsinEconomicHistory47(2010)347–359 351
168
167
166
165
m164
c
ht in 163
g162
ei
H161
160
159
158
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mig to ID Pris US Pris AU Mig AU-Nth Terr.
Mig US Mig AU-Qld Sth unskilled rlwy Mig AU-Melb./Vic.
Fig.2. TrendsofChineseheightsamplesbyBirthCohort.Source:Seetext.Notes:MigtoID,MigrantstoIndonesia;PrisUS,ChineseprisonersintheUnited
States;PrisAU,ChinesePrisonersinAustralia;MigUS,MigrantstotheUnitedStates;Sthunskilledrlwy,unskilledrailwayworkersfromsouthChina;Mig
AU-NthTerr,MigrantstoAustralia’sNorthernTerritory;MigAU-Melb./Vic.,MigrantstoMelbourne/Victoria;MigAU-Qld,MigrantstoQueensland;The
reportedheightoftheChinesetoAustraliaforbothprisonersandmigrantswereadjustedforage-relatedshrinkageasexplainedinMorgan(2009).
cialactivities.Finally,therelativelyhighvalueoftheunskilledrailroadworkersinSouthChinacanbeexplainedbythefact
thatthesegovernmentemployeeswereoftenregardedasakindofeliteworkerswithliteracylevelhigherthantheaverage
workingpopulation(Morgan,2004).
Secondly,despitethisheterogeneity,wecandiscernclearlyabroadcommontrendamongthesedifferentseries.While
theheighttrendseemstohavebeenstableupuntilthe1830–1840s,allseriesstartedtodeclinefromthemid-nineteenth
century,whichcoincidedwiththedevastatingTaipingrebellion.Moreover,anunexpectedfindingisthatmostoftheseries,
followingwhatseemslikeastagnation–atbestamildrecovery–inheightsduringthe1860sand1870s,revertbackintoa
fairlysubstantialandsustaineddeclineallthewayintothe1880sandeven1890s.Thisdeclineseemstohavebottomedout
towardstheturnofthelastcenturywithareboundandrecoveryinthefirsttwodecadesofthetwentiethcentury.Theco-
movementoftheseseriesisremarkablyconsistent.
Webelievethatsystematicselectionbiasesinanyonedirectionarelesslikelyasourdatasetsconsistoflargenumbersof
SouthChinesemigrantswhowenttodifferentlocationsinbothdevelopedanddevelopingregionswithvaryingentrydates
andmeasuredbydifferentauthorities.13Wealsomakeacross-checkagainsttheonlyindependentheightseriesfornon-over-
seasmigrantavailableduringthenineteenthcentury:Chineseresidents(largelyofCantoneseandFujianeseorigin)inTaiwan
stillunderQingrule(Olds,2003).MeasuredbyJapanesecolonialauthorityintheearlytwentiethcentury,theheighttrendfor
maleandfemalerevealnearlyidenticalpatternsofdeclinefromthemid-nineteenthcentury,followedbystagnationduringthe
1860sand1870s,andarenewedandsustaineddeclineinthe1880sand1890s.14
InFig.3,wesummarizethesedisparatesampleseriesintoasinglecontinuousbutnotionalseriesthatwebelieveisrep-
resentativeoftheheighttrendofthelowerandworkingclassSouthernChinesemalein1810–1920,butwithsufficienthu-
mancapitalandwealthtomovetoAustralia.TheseriessplicestogethertheAustraliaprisonerseriesfor1810–1840withthe
migrantseriesestimatedformigrantsintheNorthernTerritory,whoseoccupationbackgroundsissimilartotheprisoners,
andthegap1840–1850isfilledbysimplelinearinterpolation.15Wealsoplotthistrendlineagainstotherheightseriesfor
international comparison. These series were adult males of broadly comparable social class to our Southern Chinese series
andregionallyrepresentativefortheircountrypopulationasawhole(seeBaten,2006).
Fig.3clearlyindicatesthatthenorthernEuropeans(Netherlands)weretallerandbecameeventallerafterthemid-cen-
tury.ThesouthernEuropeans(Italy)wereshorterthantheChinesewithlittleupwardmovementinstatureuntilthe1860s,
after whichtheir heights began torise above the SouthernChinese.Fig. 3 thusconfirmsthe so-calledsecond divergence
wherebothDutchandItalianheightsstartinganupwardtrendfromthemid-nineteenthcenturyfollowingrapidindustri-
alization,whileChineseheightstagnatedordeclinedthereafter.16
13 SeeFig.8inMorgan,2006afortheyearofarrivalforsomeofChineseimmigrantsinAustralia.
14 SeeOlds(2003),Figs.2and3,whicharepartlyreproducedinFig.3inthisarticle.
15 Theoriginalserieswereestimatedindecadalunits.Linearinterpolationbetweenthedecalmid-pointshavebeenusedtocreateafive-yearseries.
16 WecanplaceourSouthernChineseheightdatainalargersampleoftheheightsinallEuropeancountries.AnappendixtoBaten(2006)presentstheheight
estimatesforallEuropeancountrieswith500,000andmoreinhabitantsforthebirthcohorts1850,1890,and1920(availablefrom:http://www.wiwi.uni-
tuebingen.de/cms/fileadmin/Uploads/Schulung/Schulung5/Paper/eurohgt.pdfaccessedMay7th,2009).In1850,theSouthernChineseheightofaround164cm,
isshorterthantheaverageheightof168–169cminthoseEuropeancountrieswithtallinhabitants(Scandinavia,Ireland,somepartsoflaterYugoslavia)but
surpassesthe160–162cmaverageattainedinthosecountrieswithshortpopulations(Portugal,Spain,Italy).Overall,sevenoutof36countriesoraboutone
fifthofEuropeancountrieshadlowerheightsthanthoseofSouthernChina.By1890,however,allEuropeanpopulationsexceptPortugalweretallerthan
SouthernChina,andby1920,SouthernChinastoodatthebottomoftheEuropeanheightdistribution.
352 J.Batenetal./ExplorationsinEconomicHistory47(2010)347–359
180
Netherlands Italy
175 Taiwan South China
Japan
m 170
c
n
ht i
g
Hei 165
160
155
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fig.3. AnotionaltrendofsecularheightofSouthernChinesein1810s–1920sincomparativeperspective.Notes:Italy–calculatedfromA’Hearn(2003),
Netherlands–calculatedfromDrukkerandTassenaar(1997),ForTaiwan,1845–1900fromOlds(2007Model2forMaleinTable3.1900–1930from
MorganandLiu(2007);SouthChinaseetextandFig2;JapaniscalculatedfromBassino(2006)andShay(1994).
PerhapsmoreinterestingisthattheSouthernChineseseemedtoperformpoorlyintheEastAsiancontext.Asshownin
thedata,althoughtheJapanesestartedasunusuallyshort,theymanagedtogrowatarateofabout1.0cmadecadefromthe
latenineteenthcentury.Morestrikingly,heightsofChineseinTaiwan(largelyofSouthChinaorigin)arealmostnon-distin-
guishablebothintrendandlevelduringthenineteenthcenturybutgrewrapidlyfromtheearlydecadesofJapanesecolo-
nialismfromthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury(Olds,2003;MorganandLiu,2007).Overall,weseeacaseofChina
laggingbehindthebetterperformersduringthenineteenth–twentiethcenturies.17
4. Age-Heaping
Recently,newresearchbasedontheuseofage-heapingmeasurementhasmadeitpossibletoquantifynumeracyincom-
parativeandlong-termperspectives.ThislineofresearchwaspioneeredbyMokyr(1983)inthemoderneconomichistory
context,andbyDuncan-Jones(1990)forthestudyofancienteconomies(aftersomeearlierdemographicstudies,seeBachi,
1951).Butrecently,CrayenandBaten(forthcoming-a,b)havecompiledlargeinternationaldatasetsthatallowglobalcom-
parisons.Theage-heapingstrategyisbasedonthetendencyofpoorlyeducatedpeopleinthepasttoroundtheirage.For
example,whenaskedtheiragetheyanswermoreoften‘‘40”,whentheiractualagemayinfactbe39or41years.Conversely,
bettereducatedpeoplearemorelikelytoreporttheirexactage.Theage-heapingindex(alsocalledaWhippleindex)isa
measureoftheconcentrationordegreeofage-heapingbetween23and62yearsinclusiveandisrepresentedasfollows:
5(cid:2)numberof agesendingina0ora5
WI¼ (cid:2)100 ð1Þ
numberof allages
Therefore,anindexequalto100indicatestheabsenceofage-heapingandmagnitudeoftheindexbeingabove100indi-
catesthedegreeofage-heaping.
A wide range of research has confirmed a strong relationship between illiteracy and age-heaping especially for Less
DevelopedCountries(LDCs)after1950.Forexample,acorrelationcoefficientof0.63hasbeenfoundforasampleofabout
270,000individuals,organizedby416regions,rangingfromLatinAmericatoOceania.ThedatafromthePISA(Programme
for International Student Assessment) results for numerical skills yielded an even higher correlation coefficient (A’Hearn
etal.,2009,Appendix).Thiscorrelationhasalsobeenconfirmedforthenineteenthcenturydata(A’Hearnetal.,2009;Crayen
andBaten,forthcoming-b).Age-heapingindexreflectsnumericalskillsevenmorethanliteracyskills,whichcouldbemore
importantfortechnical,commercialandcraftsmenactivitiesthanliteracy.
Theappealofage-heapingmethodsisthereadyavailabilityofage-informationforcountriessuchasChinawheresystem-
aticsourcesofhistoricalnumeracyorliteracyinformationarelargelyabsent.Beforewepresentourfindings,itisimportant
toclarifysomespecificissuesrelatedtotheuseofage-heapingmeasuresinthecontextoftraditionalChina.Weperforma
test to examine the linkage between literacy and numeracy using an exceptional sample of Chinese migrants in the US,
17 TheunusuallyshortlevelofJapaneseheightsinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturieshasbeenmuchnotedandmaybeassociatedwithalackofprotein
inalargelyvegetariandietuntilquiterecently.Hereourcomparativeanalysisfocusesonitstrend,whichisunequivocallyfromthe1880s.
J.Batenetal./ExplorationsinEconomicHistory47(2010)347–359 353
180
1
175
4
170
x 8
e
nd 165
ple I 3 5 6 2
p 160
hi
W
155
9 7
150
145
55 65 75 85 95
Literacy in %
Fig.4. LiteracyandAge-heaping(WhippleIndex)byninedifferentoccupationalclassesamongChineseimmigrantstotheU.S.Notes:Seethetext.The
samplesizeforthenineoccupationalcategories(fromonetonine)is:178,153,239,268,202,415,158,627,and195.Thenineoccupationalcategories
containalltogether150differentspecificcategorieswithcategory1havingthelowestaverageincomeandgroup9thehighest.
whichprovidenotonlyage-informationbutalsoliteracy(whichincludesbothChineseaswellasEnglishreadingandwriting
skills)andoccupationalcategories.Thisisadatasetof2435ChinesemalesintheUnitedStates,220ofwhomwereUSborn.
Thedata,extractedfromtheIndividualPublicUseMicrodataSet(IPUMS)datasetof1850–1910,arearepresentativesample
basedontheUScensuses(Rugglesetal.,2004).Weexcludethefemales(theirnumberwastoosmallforreliableanalysis)
beforecalculatingage-heapingforthoseofthebirthdecadesofthe1830s–1880s.
Forourpurpose,weusethestandardoccupationalclassificationusedbytheUSCensustocreateninecategoriesforthe
2435Chinesemalesbetween23and72.Theoccupationsrangedfromincomelevelof600dollarsperyearin1950prices
(group1)tobetween1500and2000(group5),andtomorethan2500(group9).Thedistributionofincomeswasnotlinear,
and some occupations accounted for a large share of the Chinese population, so we took care that sufficient numbers of
observationsfellineachgroup.
Fig.4revealsahighnegativerelationship(withacorrelationcoefficientof(cid:3)0.8)betweenliteracyratesandWhippleIn-
dexforthesenineoccupationcategories.18Moreinterestingly,thiscorrelationseemsactuallytighterthanthecorrespondence
betweenincomecategoriesandliteracyrates.Whilethehigherincomegroups7and9hadthehighestliteracyrates,andthe
poorestgroup1hasthelowestrate,occupationcategories4(mainlylaunderers)and8(mainlyminers)orgroup2(domestic
servants)infacthavesimilarlevelsofliteracyrates.Thus,wearereasonablyassuredthatage-heapingindexisgoodpredicator
forliteracyratesandhumancapitalinChina.19
Belowwedescribesixdifferentdatasetsforourage-heapingseries:
(1) TheQingarchivesoftheImperialBoardofPunishmentcontainarecordofcriminalcasesofChinesefarmersandpeas-
antsinvolvedinvariouspropertycrimes,rentalconflicts,usuryordomesticconflictsduringthelateseventeenthand
eighteenthcenturies.ThecourtfilesaspublishedcoveredalargenumberofChineseregions.Overall,wehave602
reportedagesbetween23and72,whichallowssomepointestimatesforthelateseventeenthandearlyeighteenth
century.20
(2) ThedatafileforimmigrantstoIndonesiaisthesameasthosefortheheightseries.
(3) Wecollectedasmallerdatasetof193BeijingChinesesoldiersborninmid-nineteenthcentury.Althoughasmallsam-
ple,thesedataareparticularlyvaluableasothernineteenthcenturydataconsistedmostlyofoverseasmigrants.The
sourcesarefromtheQingarchiveandconsistedofsoldierlistsfromtheChinesearmy(partiallyManchu),whichwere
takenbyChineseofficersbetween1902and1911.21
18 Withoutusingtheclassificationofoccupationalcategories,wecanalsoconfirmthisnegativerelationshipwithalogitregression,whichregressesadummy
variableofpeoplewhoreportedtheiragesinthemultiplesof0sand5sonadummyvariableofliteracy.Ourresultshowsthatpeoplewhoreportedagesin0s
and5sare3%lesslikelytobeliteratethanthosewhodidnot,whichisstatisticallysignificantat10%level.Thesmallmarginaleffects(3%)areexpectedgiven
thatthisisafairlyliteratesampleandthatnotallpeoplewhoreportedtheiragesinroundnumbersareilliterate.
19 WealsocheckedwhethertheChineseuseofanimalcyclesfortheirbirthyearsmayleadtoage-heapingofadifferentsortratherthanonmultiplesof5sor
0s.Wecheckedtheage-heapingaroundthedragonyearofbirth–themostpopularandauspiciousanimalsignforabirthyear–forChinesemigrantstotheUS
andfoundtheywerefarlessmarkedthanheapingonmultiplesof5s.
20 Thecensorialsectionoftheboardofpunishment(Xingketiben)isanimportantarchivalsourceforanumberofreasons,notonlytheagestatements.The
memorialdocumentscontaininformationonlandprices,landrents,interestrates(‘usury’),amongotherpersonalandhouseholddata,coveringallChinese
administrativeregions.Asmallpartofthesememorials,especiallyfromtheQianlongperiod(1735–95)havebeenpublished(HistoricalArchiveNo.11981).
Allenetal.2007alsomadeuseofwageinformationfromthesesources.Agesweusedinthosesourcesonlyincludeself-reportedonesby‘‘criminals”stillliving
atthetime.
21 TheNo.1HistoricalArchive,Beijing,ShuntianFuarchive,microfilmreelNo.254.WethankHans-UlrichVogelforhelpingwiththeaccesstothisvaluable
source.
354 J.Batenetal./ExplorationsinEconomicHistory47(2010)347–359
200
190
x)180
e
d
e In170
ppl160
hi
W150
g (
n140
pi
a
e130
H
ge-120
A
110
100
h century 0 to 1700 0 to 1740 0 to 1750 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950
17t 166 171 175
Court/Census Beij. Milit. Pris. AU Mig. AU-Melb./B/D
Mig. AU-Sydney Migr. to US Migr. to Indon. National Census
Fig.5. Trendsofage-heapingamongavarietyofChinesesamplesbyBirthCohort.Note:seethetext.‘‘Mig.AU-Melb./B/D”weretheremigrantsrecordedin
thearchivesofMelbourne,Brisbane,andDarwin.Age-heapingsamplesbelow50werediscarded.
(4) Twodata series for Chinese immigrants toAustraliaare used to estimateage-heaping.Thefirst isthe sameas the
heightseriesdiscussedaboveformigrantstoMelbourne,BrisbaneandDarwin.Thesecondseriesisarecentlycom-
pileddatasetof8209SouthernChineseimmigrantswholivedinSydney,orelsewhereinthestateofNewSouthWales
inAustralia,fromtheST84/1seriesattheNAA,SydneyOffice.Thisserieshasonlybeenusedtoestimateage-heaping
andisindependentofthefirstseriesusedtoreportheights.22
(5) Thedatasetof2435ChinesemalesintheUnitedStatesasdescribedearlier.
(6) WeusethefirstChinesenationwidecensusundertakenin1953tocalculateWhippleIndexforthoseborninthe1900s
and1910s,inordertocomplementtheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturydatawithanendpointintheearlytwen-
tiethcentury.
Fig.5plotstheWhippleindicesofthedifferentdataseries.23Thelateseventeenthandearlyeighteenthcenturydatafrom
theBoardofPunishmentfilesrevealarathermodestlevelofage-heapingofabout110.ItisimportanttonotethatmostEuro-
peancountriesreachedsuchalowlevelnotbeforethelateeighteenthcentury,whereastheearlyeighteenthcenturylevelsof
FranceandGermanyweremuchhigher(intherangeof160–220).24Wedonothavedatafortheperiodbetweentheearlyeigh-
teenthcenturyandthe1820s.Butforseriesstartingfromthe1820s,thepicturethatemergedinFig.5isthatforalmostall
seriesofage-heapingindicesasorganizedbybirth-decadesroseandpeakedaroundthe1840s,withthatoftheUSmigrants
risingtoas highas170–190.25 Asimilarspikeinage-heapingis alsoconfirmedfor theBeijingsoldiersinthe period1840–
60,withavalueat150.Butfromthe1860s(birthcohorts)onward,Fig.5revealsahugeimprovementinage-heapingalmost
22 TheSydneyST84/1seriesonlycontainstheCEDT(alsoknownasaForm21)anddoesnotincludetheStatutoryDeclaration(Form22),whichshowsdata
relatedtooccupations,residences,andotherinformationusefulforanalysingheighttrend.
23 Forcalculatingage-heaping,weaggregateallagestatementsintotheagegroupssuchas23–32,33–42,and53–62,anddenotethosebornmostlyinthe
1850sas‘‘1850”inthegraph(evenifthissometimesreferstothosebornactually1847–56).Thismethodologyiscommonintheage-heapingliteratureto
ensurethatage-heapingisestimatedmoreconservativelythantheobviousalternativetoestimateagebrackets20–29,30–39,50–59andsoon.Theproblem
withthealternativemethodisastrongage-heapingon,forexample,age50,insocietieswithlowlifeexpectanciesleavingfewersurvivorspastage53.
Similarly,therewillbemoresurvivorsatage55ratherthanage59.Thus,takingagebrackets23–32etc.placesthemoststronglypreferredage30and25tothe
middleofthedistribution,henceminimizingthisbias.
24 Wealsolocatedaverysmalldatasetofabout50seamenwhofoundshelterinJapanduringastorm.TheirWhippleIndexturnedouttobeashighas213.
Thesamplesizeistoosmalltobemeaningfullyincludedhere.Butitisplausiblethatlevelsofliteracyandnumeracywereverylowamongtheclassofseamen
orpirateswhowereusuallysocialoutcastsbarred,forexample,fromtakingpartintheCivil-ServiceExaminationsystem,seeWakeman(1997),chapter1.Data
onChineseseamenarefromRyu(cid:2)kyu(cid:2)o¯kokuhyo¯jo¯shomonjohenshu(cid:2)iinkai(1988).
25 FortheUSmigrantsample,averageagebybirthdecadeisrelativelyconstantat30–36(exceptforthemiddlecohortofthoseborninthe1860s,withan
averageageof41),sowebelievethatourresultisnotbiasedbypossibledifferencesintheagecompositionofthevarioussamples.
J.Batenetal./ExplorationsinEconomicHistory47(2010)347–359 355
450
400
x) 350
e
d
n
e I 300
pl
p
hi
W
g ( 250
n
pi
a
he 200
e-
g
A
150
100
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Turkey Russia Ireland UK
India Poland China France
Fig.6. Age-heapinginChinaininternationalcomparison.Sources:Chinaisanaveragefromthedatareportedinthetext.Thesourcesfortheother
countriesareprovidedinCrayenandBaten(2009).ForIndia,thisincludesonlythepartofthecountryincludedinthelate-nineteenthCcensuses(age-
heapingmighthavebeenhigherforotherregions).PolandreferstoaweightedaverageofRussian,Habsburg,andPrussianPoland.Russiareflectsthe
provinceswhichformtoday’sRussia.IrelandexcludesNorthIreland.TheTurkishvaluesreflectthewholecountryafterthe1880s,andtheprovinceofKars
beforethat(whichCrayenandBaten,2009judgeasbroadlyrepresentativefortheTurkishaverage).WethankDorotheeCrayenforassistinguswith
relevantdataandinformation.
acrossallthedataseries.26Bytheearlytwentiethcentury,age-heapingseemstohavelargelydisappearedbasedontheNational
censusdataofthe1950s.27
Fig.6organizesthevariousage-heapingmeasuresforChinaintoonesinglenotionalseriestocastitininternationalcon-
text.TakinganaverageoftheChineseage-heapingvaluesreportedaboveyieldsvaluesaround160duringthe1820s,rising
to170duringthemid-centurycrisisperiod,anddecliningafterwardsuntilfullagenumeracyisreachedamongthebirth
cohortofthe1890s(withaWhippleIndexof100).Despitethemid-nineteenthcenturysurge,theChinesedegreeofage
numeracythusmeasuredwereimpressivebyinternationalcomparison,beingamongthehighestintheworldalongwith
WesternandEasternEuropeinthenineteenthcentury(seeCrayenandBaten,forthcoming-b).Infact,wecouldmakeagen-
eralcaseforEastAsia.TheearliestsourceonJapaneseage-heapingin1879(published1882fortheregionwhichisnow
Yamanashi)thatcouldbelocatedsofardidnotshowanyage-heapingforthebirthcohortsoftheearlynineteenthcentury,
nordidtheTaiwanlistfrom1905,takenbytheJapanesecolonialgovernment.28Fig.6showsthatwhileUKandFrancewere
achievingbettervaluesalreadyintheearlynineteenthcentury,Poland,Russia(Europeanpart)andIrelandwereactuallydoing
worsethanChina,withIndiaorTurkey(withpercapitaincomepossiblycomparabletothatofChina)faringfarworse.
The anthropometric, age-heaping, and real wage evidences presented in this article now allow us to piece together a
quantitative profile of Chinese welfare and human capital for the eighteenth to twentieth centuries when historical evi-
dencespresentedsofarhavebeendescriptive,indirectandscattered.Ourfindingsconfirmandrevisetraditionalhistoriog-
raphyaswellasrevealnewinsights.
Firstly,ourstudyquantitativelyconfirmsthelargeandsustaineddeclineinlivingstandardsandhumancapitalduringthe
mid-nineteenth century, an era of political and economic crises brought by the Opium War and the devastating Taiping
Rebellion. The Taiping rebels originated in the southern province of Guangxi in 1850 and spread north into east China
andbeyond.Bythetimeoftheirmilitarydefeatin1864,theentirerebellionanditssuppressionledtoahalvingofthepop-
ulationofthelowerYangziprovincesofJiangsuandZhejiangandpossibly30milliondeathsnationwide.ForGuangdong
provinceandthecityofCanton,therebellionofRedTurbansassociatedwithTaipingmovementcausedlarge-scaledestruc-
26 Althoughnotsufficientinnumbers,wealsocalculatedthelevelofUnitedStatesbornChineseforthe1870sand1880s.Interestingly,theirage-heapingis
notlowerthanthoseChineseborn,butratherhigher,withvaluesof167ofthoseborninthe1870s,and136inthe1880s.
27 WealsocalculatedWhippleIndexforthedataseriesoftherailwayandothermodernorganisationsfortheearlytwentiethcenturyandalsoconfirmedthat
therewasnoage-heaping.ThisisnotsurprisinggiventhattheaverageliteracylevelfortheChinesenationalrailwayswasabout70%,and100%forthe
professionalstaff.Moreimportantly,thesedataalsorecordedbirthdatesandyears,makingthecalculationofage-heapingindexhighlyproblematic.
28 WethankOsamuSaitoforprovidingthoselistsonJapanandTaiwan.
356 J.Batenetal./ExplorationsinEconomicHistory47(2010)347–359
tionoflivesandpropertiesduringthemid-1850s(Spence,1999;Wakeman,1966).Ourdatarevealstheseverenegativeim-
pactofmid-nineteenthcenturycrisisonthe1840sChinesebirthcohort’scapacitytoacquirenumericalandliteracyskills
possiblyduetomalnutritionandbreakdownofsocialorderandtraditionalschoolsystemduringtheirformativedecades
ofthe1850sand1860s.SuchanexperienceisnotpeculiartoChinaaswitnessedbythesurgeinage-heapingamongthe
Irishinflictedbythefaminecrisisofthe1840sandalsoforSpainonamilderscale(Manzel,2008).
Secondly,thedifferentpatternsofthethreedataseriesasrevealedinourstudycontributenewhistoricalinsights.Among
thethreeseries,realwageandage-heapingindicesbouncedbackfromthe1860s,butthefallinheighttrendseemstohave
sustainedthroughoutthelatterhalfofthenineteenthcentury.Therapidrecoveryofthefirsttwoseriesseemstoconfirmthe
traditionalhistoriographythatemphasizedtherelativesuccessoftheso-called1862–1874Tong-Zhirestorationinreturning
thepost-TaipingChinatopeaceandnormalcy(Wright,1962).AhallmarkoftheRestorationwastherejuvenationoftradi-
tionalgovernmentalbureaucracyasseverelycompromisedbythemassivesaleofofficialtitlesinthewareraforrevenue
purpose and reinstatement of the millennium-old national Civil-Service Examination system as suspended during the
Warera(Wright,1962,chapter5).Itislikelythatthesepolicieshaverestructuredincentivesforhumancapitalaccumulation
andcontributedtothedrasticimprovementinage-heapingindices.
Thesomewhatsurprisingfindingofasustaineddeclineinheightsintothe1880sand1890sseemstostandincontrastto
therapidrecoveryofage-heaping(andtherealwageseries)inthepost-TaipingRebellionera.Whileitisplausiblethisde-
clinemaybemoreregion-specifictoSouthChina(includingTaiwan)withCantonlosinghereminenttradingportstatusto
Shanghaiorothertreatyportsinthepost-OpiumWarera,webelievethatourempiricalfindingmeritsseriousfutureaca-
demicresearch,whichmaywellleadtoamorepessimisticprofileoflivingstandardsduringthelatterhalfofthenineteenth
century.29Infact,despitethehigh-profileattemptstomodernizehermilitaryandotherlimitedindustrialsectors,thegeneral
outlookandpolicyofQingundertheso-calledlate-nineteenthcenturyself-strengtheningmovementremainedconservative,
especiallyincontrasttocontemporaneousMeijiJapan.Notonlydidtheyresistanyfundamentalinstitutionalreform,butalso
obstructedtheconstructionofmoderninfrastructuressuchasrailroads.Modernpublicinfrastructuresconstructedmostlyafter
thebeginningofthetwentiethcentury,asemphasizedrecentlybyGeetal.(1999),wouldhaveallowedeffectivereliefeffortsto
avertthekindofmassivehumanandmateriallossesincurredbydisasterandfamineinthelatterhalfofthenineteenthcen-
tury.30Inthiscontext,therecoveryinheightsfromthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury–aneramarkedbytheimminent
dynasticcollapseandnationaldisintegration–doesnotcomeastotalsurprise.Recentscholarshiphasemphaticallyshownthat
thefirstthreedecadesofthetwentiethcentury–despitethepoliticalandcivilstrife–weremarkedbytheonsetofaregion-
basedspurtofindustrializationandmodernization(Rawski,1989;Ma,2008).
5. Conclusion:towardsanintegratednarrativeoflivingstandardsandhumancapital
Byplacingournewtimeseriesdatainaninternationalcontext,ourarticlerevealsaratherintriguingcombinationofrel-
ativelylowlivingstandardswithhighhumancapitalintraditionalChina.Whileourfindingofarelativelylowstandardof
livingcounterstheargumentofrecentrevisionism,thecaseforarelativelyhighlevelofhumancapitalseemstoechoother
historicalstudies.Forexample,RonaldP.Dore’slandmarkstudyin1965offeredaremarkablyoptimisticreassessmentof
JapaneseeducationintheTokugawaperiod(1603–1868).Theschoolenrolmentdatain1868ledhimtoconcludesomething
like43%literacyrateformaleand19%forgirls,aremarkablyhighlevelbyearlymodernstandards(HayamiandKito,2004).
Otherstudieshavealsopointedtotheexistenceofadynamicbookpublishingindustryandbookrentalmarketaswellas
nearubiquitouspresenceofbook-keepingandaccountingpractiseamongbusinessanddomestichouseholds,andthewide-
spreaduseoffarmmanuals(HayamiandKito,2004;Smith,1988).
EvelynRawski’s1979studyinmanywaysechoedtheJapaneseassessmentforthecaseofChina.Basedonadmittedly
fragmentaryandcircumstantialevidence,RawskiputthebasicliteracylevelofChinesemalesat30–45percentandfemales
at2–10percentforChinaasawhole(Rawski,1979,p.22–23).Accordingtoher,bothopportunitiesforeducationandschool-
inghadexpandedduringtheMing(1368–1644)andQing(1644–1911)period.Moreimportantly,educationwentwaybe-
yond the elites in preparation for the prestigious civil-service examinations and spilled over to a wide spectrum of the
societytofulfilldemandfor commerce, localadministration or evenagriculturalproduction(Rawski,1979, chapter 1,Li,
2004).IncomparisonwithJapan,Rawskiarguedthat‘‘ifastratified,status-fixedsocietysuchasJapan’sexperiencedthis
greatdemandforbasicskillsinreading,writing,andarithmeticamongtownsmenandfarmers(intheTokugawaperiod),
arelativelyopensocietysuchasChina’s,whereeducationwasthekeytoupwardsocialmobility,shouldhavestimulated
a similar if not greater effective demand for literacy” (p. 5). In other studies, both Rawski (1985) and Li (2004) detailed
29 Forregionaldifferencesinheighttrendinthefirstthreedecadesofthetwentiethcentury,seeMorgan(2004)).
30 Geetal.(1999),notedtheimportanceofmodernhealthfacilitiesandpublicinfrastructureintheearlytwentiethcenturyfordisasterandfaminerelief.For
warsanddisastersoccurringduringtheperiodof1870–1890,seeCao(2001),chapters13–15,ontheprolongedMuslimrebellionsinSouth-andNorth-western
partsofChinaandseveredroughtleadingtofamineinfiveprovincesofNorthernChinainthelate1870swhichclaimedtensofmillionsoflives.Finally,cross-
nationalfactorscouldbeatworkaswell:wavesofrinderpest(cattleplague)seemedtohavesweptacrosspartsofAsiaandAfricawhereweobservedsimilar
declineinheightsinthe1880sand1890speriod(Spinage,2003).RinderpestwasenzootictohoovedanimalsinChina’scentralplainsandtheMongolian
steppes.ItspresencewasfirstobservedinoutbreaksinHongKongandShanghaiinthe1860–70s,andtransmittedtoJapanthroughimportedcattlewith
epizooticeffect,thoughtherewereearliersuspectedoutbreaks(Spinage,2003;MacPherson,1987;Kishi,1976).Aforeignmedicalmissionary(Bliss,1922)
describedrinderpestashavingamoredebilitatingaffectonChineseagriculturethanfloodsanddrought,primarilybydeprivingfarmersofoxandbuffalofor
ploughingfieldsandpumpingwater,whichcouldreducegrainyield.